COA 372052 JOHNNIE MAE CULLINS V MGM GRAND DETROIT LLC Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/21/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
-1-
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
JOHNNIE MAE CULLINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
July 21, 2026
11:37 AM
v No. 372052
Wayne Circuit Court
MGM GRAND DETROIT, LLC, LC No. 22-011043-CD
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: MARIANI, P.J., and O’BRIEN and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Johnnie Mae Cullins, appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting the motion
for summary disposition filed by defendant, MGM Grand Detroit, LLC. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was hired by defendant as a pit clerk in July of 2001. She worked in this role until
September of 2007, at which time she became a security officer because defendant, according to
plaintiff, “had eliminated the pit clerk department.”
Plaintiff testified that she had a knee replacement in 2016, after which she had trouble
standing for long periods, so she asked for assignments with less standing. Plaintiff further
testified that, in 2018, she went to her supervisor at the time—Brian Humphries, who later became
a manager—and asked for less standing assignments because standing for long periods “was too
much on [her] knee,” and Humphries was dismissive and made a comment about plaintiff “always
asking for help.”
Effective July 1, 2018, the union covering defendant’s security guards agreed as part of
their collective bargaining agreement that its members would be required to “complete training
and testing . . . including a physical agility test, without accommodation.” The agreement
provided that members would have two opportunities to pass the agility test, and any member who
was unsuccessful would be offered a position as an ID checker. Consistent with the bargaining
agreement, the job description for defendant’s security guard position states that the individual
“[m]ust pass Physical Agility test.” Defendant’s ID-checker position also had physical

-- 1 of 8 --

-2-
requirements, but they were less stringent. The job description for defendant’s ID-checker position
lists under “Physical Requirements” the need to be able to stand for “5 hours minimum.”
Plaintiff testified that beginning in 2018, she was required to take two tests—a written test
and a physical agility test. The agility test, according to Humphries, consisted of running 80 feet,
picking up a 30-pound bag, carrying that bag up “42 steps,” then running another 100 yards,
performing “CPR, just chest compressions for two-minutes,” then running another 50 feet to the
finish line. All of this had to be completed within four minutes. Plaintiff testified that she passed
the required written test but failed the agility test when she first took it in 2018, but defendant
passed her anyway. The agility test was to be given annually, so plaintiff had to take it again in
2019. Plaintiff testified that when she took the test in September 2019, she cut her finger and was
injured when she fell while running, which caused her to fail. A report prepared following the test
reflected that plaintiff received medical care for a cut on her right index finger and a “[s]train of
adductor muscle, fascia and tendon of right thigh.”
Plaintiff took the test a second time and failed again. Plaintiff said that she took the test a
second time against the advice of her doctor because she “wanted to keep [her] job and [her] pay.”
Plaintiff was given a third opportunity to take the test, but she declined per her doctor’s advice.
After plaintiff failed the test twice, she was reassigned as an ID checker.
Plaintiff testified that she complained to HR about the agility test because she did not
believe it was fair, as defendant passed “some people” that plaintiff knew “couldn’t have passed.”
Plaintiff identified Randy Kol as one such person and Mark Costello as another. Plaintiff admitted,
however, that she did not see either Kol’s or Costello’s actual test results. Plaintiff also
acknowledged that Costello became an ID checker in 2019, and she could not say why. Plaintiff
further conceded that Mark Wolf, another employee, took the agility test, failed it, and became an
ID checker.
On October 22, 2019, plaintiff’s medical provider—Dr. Michael Williams—signed a form
requesting “a job-related accommodation” for plaintiff. In this form, Dr. Williams averred that
plaintiff could “stoop[]” but “can’t get on her knees.” He also wrote that plaintiff should not lift
more than 10 pounds or stand for more than “an hour at a time in an 8 hr day.” The form asked
Dr. Williams to circle activities that plaintiff’s medical condition limited, and Dr. Williams circled,
among other things, walking, lifting, and standing. In response to a question asking the doctor to
estimate the expected duration of plaintiff’s limitations, Dr. Williams wrote that the limitations
were “long term and its [sic] unknown if they’ll ever go away.”
Consistent with this form from Dr. Williams, plaintiff submitted a request for
accommodation to defendant on October 28, 2019, which was after plaintiff failed the agility test
a second time. In this request, plaintiff wrote that she had a knee replacement on her left knee and
that her right knee “also need[s] replacement,” so she “cannot [kneel] on hard surfaces.” She also
wrote that she has difficulty standing for long periods of time due to arthritis in her spine and hip.
To accommodate these disabilities, plaintiff requested that she be given an equal amount of time
standing/walking and sitting. Plaintiff also wrote that she wanted to ask to be excused from taking
the agility test but did not because she did not have the necessary paperwork in order at the time.

-- 2 of 8 --

-3-
On November 5, 2019, apparently after not hearing back from defendant, plaintiff filed a
“charge of discrimination” against defendant with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). In this document, plaintiff wrote that she “requested reasonable
accommodation for [her] disability” but defendant denied her request and asked her to perform a
physical test that defendant was “aware [plaintiff could not] achieve due to [her] disability.”
Plaintiff further alleged that defendant “demoted” her for failing this test, and she believed that
this demotion and defendant’s refusal to provide reasonable accommodations violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
In a letter dated November 13, 2019, and signed by Susanne Bennett, defendant informed
plaintiff that it was granting her an accommodation that restricted her from lifting and kneeling.
This notice informed plaintiff that the accommodation was effective starting November 8, 2019,
and would last through November 25, 2019, at which time plaintiff “would be expected to take the
agility test again.”
Plaintiff testified that after she received Bennett’s letter, she told Bennett over the phone
that the accommodation “was not going to help [plaintiff] with standing” and that she “need[ed] a
chair.” Plaintiff believed that the accommodations that Bennett identified in her letter were not
accommodations for her difficulty standing.
On November 18, 2019, Dr. Williams signed a document stating that plaintiff should “limit
standing to 2 hours with 15 minute [b]reak[s],” and she should not run or use stairs. Plaintiff
testified that, despite her requests, she was not given any breaks or chances to limit her standing
while working as an ID checker. Plaintiff elaborated that, when she was working as an ID checker
in 2019, she asked Humphries if she could have a chair because standing was causing her pain,
and Humphries “got upset with [her] about that.” Humphries, according to plaintiff, told her that
plaintiff “couldn’t get a chair,” that “[t]here would be no chairs to sit down,” and “that was final.”
Humphries testified that ID checkers could not have chairs for “safety reasons.” He
explained that ID checkers “have to be vigilant as a safety precaution,” which requires them “to
stand and greet and be vigilant at all times, forward and backwards.” Chairs, Humphries
elaborated, interfered with this because “if someone is sitting down,” they may not notice
“someone com[ing] up behind [them],” and they “could be injured in that way.”
Plaintiff testified that in January 2020, she had foot surgery and went on medical leave
until August of that year. Plaintiff returned to work in August 2020 and resumed her position as
an ID checker. Plaintiff explained that she was cleared to return to work, but her doctor that cleared
her to return was her “foot doctor,” who “didn’t know what job [plaintiff] was doing.” Plaintiff’s
“foot doctor” was apparently Dr. Harvey Lefkowitz, who submitted a form to defendant on July
7, 2020, that authorized plaintiff to return to work on July 15, 2020, with “no restrictions.” The
form noted that plaintiff was previously unable to work due to “Foot/Ankle Problems,” and that
those problems had resolved.
Plaintiff testified that after she returned to work, she renewed her request for a chair, and
Humphries denied her request again. Plaintiff claimed that, based on her experience doing the job,
a chair would not have affected plaintiff’s ability to perform the tasks that an ID checker must
perform.

-- 3 of 8 --

-4-
Plaintiff further testified that in September 2020, she had to take medical leave from work
because her doctor believed that she needed to attend “a day treatment program” to help address
severe mental-health issues. Plaintiff testified that defendant demoting her, the attendant loss of
pay, and defendant ignoring plaintiff’s repeated requests for an accommodation so she did not have
to stand for long hours had taken a significant toll on her mental well-being, which caused her
need to seek care.
While plaintiff was still on medical leave for her mental-health issues, she was evaluated
by Dr. Harvey G. Ager. In a letter dated July 13, 2021, Dr. Ager wrote that he was hired by
defendant to evaluate plaintiff, and he “attempted” to do so but plaintiff “was extremely
uncooperative,” so Dr. Ager’s report was “extremely limited.” In his report, Dr. Ager wrote that
plaintiff told him, among many other things, that “[w]hen she last worked, she was working four
hours sitting, four hours standing.” This comment was largely irrelevant to the purpose of Dr.
Ager’s examination, which was a psychiatric evaluation to assess plaintiff’s claim that she
continued to suffer from mental-health issues that prevented her from returning to work.
On March 24, 2022, Bennett, writing on defendant’s behalf, informed plaintiff that it
received a request from plaintiff in “January 2022” asking to extend plaintiff’s medical leave to
May 2, 2022. Bennett wrote that defendant had already granted plaintiff three medical-leave
extensions, the last of which extended plaintiff’s medical leave—which started on September 24,
2020—until January 31, 2022. Bennett wrote that defendant was denying plaintiff’s latest request
to extend her leave and informed plaintiff that if she was not “released to work” soon, then she
would be terminated. The letter also stated that defendant was willing to provide defendant with
reasonable accommodations for plaintiff, if necessary.
On April 30, 2022, Dr. Vera Sekulov sent a letter to defendant stating that plaintiff “remains
totally disabled vocationally.” The letter asked that plaintiff’s medical leave be extended to July
31, 2022, at which time plaintiff’s “ability to return to work will be revaluated.”
On May 3, 2022, Bennett sent plaintiff a letter informing her that defendant was
terminating plaintiff’s employment, effective that day. The reason given was “[f]ailure to return
to work without just cause.”
Plaintiff confirmed that she was on medical leave until May 2022, at which time defendant
fired her. At the time of her deposition, plaintiff testified that it was her understanding that her
physicians had still not “cleared” her to return to work due to mental-health concerns.
Plaintiff filed the complaint giving rise to this action on September 16, 2022, alleging in
relevant part that (1) defendant retaliated against plaintiff for exercising her rights under Worker’s
Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq., in violation of that act and (2)

-- 4 of 8 --

-5-
defendant violated plaintiff’s rights under the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act
(PWDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq., by failing to accommodate plaintiff’s disability.1
Defendant eventually moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing
in relevant part that all of plaintiff’s claims failed on the merits. Turning first to plaintiff’s WDCA-
retaliation claim, defendant argued that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case for
retaliation because plaintiff had no evidence that defendant knew that plaintiff had engaged in an
activity protected by the WDCA, let alone that she was terminated for that activity. Defendant
further asserted that it had a legitimate reason for terminating plaintiff—she was unable to return
to work—and plaintiff could not demonstrate that this proffered reason was pretextual because it
was undisputed that plaintiff could not, in fact, return to work. As for plaintiff’s failure-to-
accommodate claim, defendant argued that it had accommodated plaintiff’s inability to perform
the agility test by offering her a position as an ID checker per the security officers’ collective
bargaining agreement. Defendant then stressed that it had accommodated plaintiff’s medical
conditions by granting her kneeling and lifting restrictions for her role as an ID checker, and it
contended that it could not be held liable for refusing to give plaintiff a chair as an accommodation
because plaintiff had never properly requested that accommodation. Defendant additionally
argued that plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim had to fail because her disability related to
her ability to perform the essential functions of a security officer or ID checker for defendant.
In response, plaintiff argued that a jury could infer from the evidence that defendant
retaliated against her for seeking worker’s compensation because defendant was aware of
plaintiff’s work-related injury and her seeking accommodation for the resulting impairment. For
her failure-to-accommodate claim, plaintiff argued that she presented direct evidence for this claim
because she testified that defendant never provided her with the chair that she repeatedly requested.
At a hearing on defendant’s motion, the trial court delivered an oral ruling from the bench.
For plaintiff’s retaliation claim under the WDCA, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to
present any evidence establishing a causal connection between a protected activity “and some
alleged retaliation.” The court further concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could conclude
that defendant had a retaliatory motive when firing plaintiff considering that defendant extended
plaintiff’s medical leave for almost two years.
For plaintiff’s claim under the PWDCRA, the court noted that plaintiff had been on medical
leave since September 2020 and had never been cleared to return to work, so there was no evidence
that plaintiff was able to perform the functions required for either a security guard or ID checker.
As for plaintiff’s argument that defendant failed to accommodate her disability by providing her
with a chair to use, the court found that plaintiff had not provided any evidence demonstrating that
she had requested a chair as an accommodation in writing.
1 Plaintiff also brought three distinct claims under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA),
MCL 37.2101 et seq., all of which the trial court dismissed. Plaintiff does not take issue with the
dismissal of those claims on appeal, so this opinion does not discuss them further.

-- 5 of 8 --

-6-
The trial court entered an order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint on July 2, 2024. This
appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. West v
Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). Defendant moved for summary
disposition in relevant part under MCR 2.116(C)(10). A (C)(10) motion tests the factual
sufficiency of a claim. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). In
reviewing a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), all the facts are viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. A (C)(10) motion is properly granted if “there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a
matter of law.” “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of
reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might
differ.” West, 469 Mich at 183.
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her claims brought under
the WDCA and the PWDCRA.
First addressing plaintiff’s claim under the PWDCRA, “[t]o prove a discrimination claim
under the PWDCRA, the plaintiff must show (1) that he is disabled as defined in the act, (2) that
the disability is unrelated to his ability to perform his job duties, and (3) that he has been
discriminated against in one of the ways delineated in the statute.” Peden v City of Detroit, 470
Mich 195, 204; 680 NW2d 857 (2004) (quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted).
At one point in its oral opinion, the trial court stated that defendant “granted” plaintiff an
accommodation in which “[s]he was permitted to sit for four hours and then stand for four hours.”
The basis for this statement was presumably Dr. Ager’s report, wherein the doctor wrote in July
2021 that “[w]hen [plaintiff] last worked, she was working four hours sitting, four hours standing.”
Plaintiff takes issue with the trial court’s reliance on the statement from Dr. Ager’s report,
contending that it was inadmissible hearsay.
Regardless of whether the statement in Dr. Ager’s report was inadmissible hearsay, it was
error for the trial court to recite that statement as fact because there was at least a question of fact
whether defendant offered plaintiff an accommodation in which “she was permitted to sit for four
hours and then stand for four hours.” Plaintiff testified that, despite her requests, she was not given
any breaks or chances to limit her standing while working for defendant, so there was a question
of fact on this issue.
That the trial court erred by relying on the statement from Dr. Ager’s report does not
warrant granting plaintiff appellate relief, however, because the statement from Dr. Ager’s report
was immaterial to the court’s ruling. In dismissing plaintiff’s claim under the PWDCRA, the trial
court did not rely on the fact that plaintiff was allegedly accommodated by being “permitted to sit
for four hours and then stand for four hours.” The trial court instead reasoned that plaintiff’s
failure-to-accommodate claim had to be dismissed because plaintiff could not prove the second
element of her claim. The court explained that defendant established that plaintiff’s disability was

-- 6 of 8 --

-7-
directly related to her ability to perform an essential function required of an individual working as
either a security guard or an ID checker for defendant, and that plaintiff failed to proffer evidence
creating a genuine issue of material fact as to this issue. The trial court also reasoned that, to the
extent plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim was premised on defendant’s failure to provide
plaintiff with a chair, the claim had to be dismissed because plaintiff failed to provide any evidence
tending to establish that she asked defendant for a chair in a written request, which the court opined
was required to sustain a failure-to-accommodate claim under PWDCRA. Neither basis for
dismissal relied on the statement in Dr. Ager’s report about how defendant accommodated
plaintiff’s disability. Accordingly, the trial court’s error of restating as fact a contested statement
from Dr. Ager’s report was immaterial to the trial court’s reasons for dismissing plaintiff’s claim
under the PWDCRA.
As for plaintiff’s retaliation claim under the WDCA, MCL 418.301(13) provides, “A
person shall not discharge an employee or in any manner discriminate against an employee because
the employee filed a complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted a proceeding under this act
or because of the exercise by the employee on behalf of himself or herself or others of a right
afforded by this act.”
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by dismissing her WDCA claim because the
court improperly relied on results from the agility test that defendant produced without first laying
a proper foundation for the results, rendering the results inadmissible hearsay. This argument fails
because defendant “did not have to lay the foundation for the admission of the [test results] in
order for the court to consider them on a motion for summary disposition as long as there was a
plausible basis for the admission of the [results].” Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance
Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 373; 775 NW2d 618 (2009). With a proper foundation, the
test results would be admissible, so the trial court was permitted to consider the results. See id. at
373-374. Regardless, the evidence only needed to be substantively admissible—“it does not have
to be in admissible form.” Id. at 373. It follows that even if the test results themselves were
inadmissible, the person who recorded the tests results would have been able to testify about the
content of the results. Plaintiff is not contesting the substantive admissibility of the results but
their form, and that is not a basis for granting plaintiff the relief she seeks.
That aside, plaintiff presumably believes that the trial court relied on the agility test results
on the basis of the court’s statement that “[d]efendant has supplied in their supplemental brief the
details of these other employees[’] [test results] and indicated some in fact were reduced to an ID
checker job and some were not because they passed the test on subsequent tries.” This statement,
however, was immaterial to the trial court’s reasons for dismissing plaintiff’s retaliation claim
under the WDCA. The court concluded that dismissal of plaintiff’s WDCA-retaliation claim was
proper because plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection between a protected activity and
any alleged retaliation. The court further reasoned that the only adverse employment action that
defendant took against plaintiff was firing her, and the court concluded that no reasonable trier of
fact could conclude that the firing had a retaliatory motive given that defendant had repeatedly
extended plaintiff’s medical leave, and the evidence established that plaintiff had still not been
medically cleared to return to work. Neither reason for dismissing plaintiff’s claim had anything
to do with the results of the agility test. Accordingly, whether the trial court properly considered
those results had no bearing on whether the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s WDCA claim.

-- 7 of 8 --

-8-
This is all to say that, in her brief on appeal, plaintiff fails to actually address the trial
court’s reasons for dismissing plaintiff’s complaint. As a result, even if both of plaintiff’s
arguments have merit, she would not be entitled to the relief she seeks. “When an appellant fails
to dispute the basis of the trial court’s ruling, this Court need not even consider granting plaintiffs
the relief they seek.” Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys, 263 Mich App 364, 381; 689 NW2d
145 (2004) (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). Accordingly, because the
arguments that plaintiff raises on appeal cannot provide her with the relief she requests, there is no
reason to fully resolve plaintiff’s arguments, and the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims
must be affirmed.
Affirmed.
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

-- 8 of 8 --