COA 370469 MICHAEL DUPREE V DAVID OPPLIGER Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/3/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
MICHAEL DUPREE and DARLENE DUPREE,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants-
Appellants,
UNPUBLISHED
December 03, 2025
2:40 PM
v No. 370469
St. Clair Circuit Court
DAVID OPPLIGER and KRISTINE OPPLIGER, LC No. 21-000754-CH
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs/Third-
Party Plaintiffs-Appellees,
and
JAMES SMELTZER, PATRICIA SMELTZER,
TIMOTHY HOGAN, CHRISTOPHER HOGAN,
JEFFREY LONDON, FRANCINE L. ROBINSON-
LONDON, SUSAN M. DAVIS, JOSEPH PIERCE,
RICHARD HOWARD DAVIS, JUDITH ANN
DAVIS, JAMES WENZLOFF, JEAN WENZLOFF,
WILLIAM A. HORNBY, SANDRA K. HORNBY,
ERNEST R. HAMM, KATHERINE ANN HAMM,
REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT OF
ROBERT L. ANGE AND MARJORIE L. ANGE,
NS BEACH PROPERTIES LLC, JAMES
SCHOFFNER, BETHANY SCHOFFNER,
DARLENE PETERSON, JANET LEE WILSON,
SANDRA L. MEYERS, ROBERT MCKENZIE,
PATRICIA MCKENZIE, MICHELLE KINNA,
SUSAN M. SMITH TRUST, JULIAN GO JR. M.D.
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST, JOHN GOUDY,
LINDA GOUDY, CHARLES E. LANGOLF AND
THERESA M. LANGOLF REVOCABLE TRUST,
DEBRA MINOR, DONALD C. HUGHES, RENEE
C. HUGHES, and CHRISTOPHER SMELTZER,
Third-Party Defendants.

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Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and BORRELLO and CAMERON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s judgment awarding certain disputed property
to defendants. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs and defendants are next door neighbors who own adjacent beachfront properties.
Defendants bought their home in 1990, and plaintiffs bought their home in 1995—having lived in
the same neighborhood but farther away from defendants since 1989. Defendants’ home occupies
a single plat with a width of 25 feet. Plaintiffs’ home occupies a double plat with a width of 50
feet. The homes are very close to one another, with the parties estimating a space of between three
to four feet between them.
Defendants’ home had a concrete patio attached to it when they bought it in 1990.
Defendants introduced evidence that the patio existed since at least 1968. It is undisputed that the
patio’s footprint encroached on the common beach area dedicated to all homeowners in the
neighborhood. Defendants remodeled their home twice between 1990 and 1993. During this time,
defendants added a door at the back of their home leading to the patio, and added stairs leading
from the door to the patio surface. Sometime between 2000 and 2004, defendants constructed a
wooden deck on top of the patio. The deck did not expand the patio’s footprint.
In 2008, either because she first observed the new deck at this time, or because the deck
was brought to her attention because of a new survey conducted by her neighbors on the other side
of her home, plaintiff Darlene Dupree confronted defendant David Oppliger about the deck, which
Darlene contended was encroaching on plaintiffs’ land. After plaintiff Michael Dupree also
confronted David about the deck, David wrote plaintiffs a letter which stated:
A survey of your property showed that part of the deck Kristine and I built
between our two homes extends over your property.
Please be advised that we acknowledge the surveyed property line and we
will not use any part of your property in any way that is adverse to your property
interests.
Plaintiffs contended they relied on this letter to protect their interests, and, as a result, they did not
take any action to force defendants to remove the deck until 2021, when defendants were planning
to make repairs to the deck. Plaintiffs’ resulting lawsuit alleged that defendants’ deck trespassed
on plaintiffs’ property and the general beach property, and sought declaratory judgment.
Defendants filed a countercomplaint alleging they had adversely possessed the disputed areas or
that they had acquired title to the areas under the doctrine of acquiescence.
Darlene, Michael, and David were the only three witnesses to testify at the resulting bench
trial. After trial, the trial court described the issue as “quite simple[,]” in that defendants’ “title to
that area vested long before there was ever an issue with the new decking.” It found that

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defendants’ use of the patio predating the deck satisfied all the requirements of adverse possession,
and found plaintiffs’ testimonies incredible. Even without tacking from defendants’ predecessors,
defendants satisfied the 15-year statutory period for adverse possession by 2005, 15 years after
they bought their home in 1990. The trial court found it was not necessary to address the 2008
letter because title had already vested by that time. The trial court nevertheless described the letter
as vague. Plaintiffs now appeal.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“Actions to quiet title are equitable in nature, and equitable rulings are reviewed de novo.”
Houston v Mint Group, LLC, 335 Mich App 545, 557; 968 NW2d 9 (2021). A trial court’s factual
findings after a bench trial are reviewed for clear error. Walters v Snyder, 239 Mich App 453, 456;
608 NW2d 97 (2000). “A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” Id. The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in finding that defendants had adversely possessed
both the general beach area and plaintiffs’ property. We disagree.
“Ordinarily, an action for the recovery or possession of land must be brought within 15
years after it accrues.” Houston, 335 Mich App at 558, citing MCL 600.5801(4).
A claim of adverse possession requires clear and cogent proof that
possession has been actual, visible, open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and
uninterrupted for the statutory period of fifteen years. These are not arbitrary
requirements, but the logical consequence of someone claiming by adverse
possession having the burden of proving that the statute of limitations has expired.
To claim by adverse possession, one must show that the property owner of record
has had a cause of action for recovery of the land for more than the statutory period.
A cause of action does not accrue until the property owner of record has been
disseised of the land. MCL 600.5829. Disseisin occurs when the true owner is
deprived of possession or displaced by someone exercising the powers and
privileges of ownership. [Houston, 335 Mich App at 558-559 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).]
“The term hostile . . . does not imply ill will; rather, hostile use is that which is inconsistent with
the right of the owner, without permission asked or given, and which would entitle the owner to a
cause of action against the intruder.” Id. at 559 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Where a landowner possesses the land of an adjacent owner with the intent
to hold to the true line, the possession is not hostile and cannot establish adverse
possession. By contrast, where a person possesses the land of another intending to
hold to a particular recognizable boundary regardless of the true boundary line, the
possession is hostile and adverse possession may be established. Simply being
mistaken with regard to the true boundary line, however, does not defeat a claim of
adverse possession. As noted by this Court . . . , it would be unjust to limit the

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application of the doctrine of adverse possession to those adverse possessors who
knew the possession was wrong, while excluding those whose possession was by
mistake, thereby rewarding the thief while punishing the person who was merely
mistaken[.] [Id. at 559-560 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
Furthermore:
“In order to support a claim of title by adverse possession, acts of possession
must be open and of a hostile character, but it is sufficient if the acts of ownership
are of such a character as to indicate openly and publicly an assumed control or use
such as is consistent with the character of the premises in question.” [Id. (quotation
marks, emphasis, and citation omitted).]
The trial court correctly found that all elements of adverse possession were satisfied.
The trial court found that the statutory time frame for possession began, even without
tacking,1 when defendants bought the house in 1990. The bulk of plaintiffs’ argument is that the
time frame did not begin to run until the deck was installed, because the patio was not hostile or
exclusive. This argument fails, because, even ignoring tacking, defendants’ exclusive use of the
patio as their own, personal outdoor living space began in 1990 when they bought the house.
Defendants openly kept their barbeque and deck chairs on the patio and had exclusive control over,
and financial responsibility for, the lamps on the patio. The patio was attached to defendants’
home, and, contrary to Darlene’s incredible and disproven testimony, was directly accessible from
defendant’s home via a door and stairway installed sometime between 1990 and 1993.
Defendants’ acts of possession were, therefore, open and notorious, and “of such a character as to
indicate openly and publicly an assumed control or use as is consistent with the character of the
premises in question.” Houston, 335 Mich at 560 (quotation marks, emphasis, and citation
omitted).
As for the disputed area encroaching on plaintiffs’ property, the trial court reasonably
found that the pathway between the parties’ homes that terminated at the stairs leading to the patio
was far more consistent with defendants’ exclusive use than plaintiffs’. Plaintiffs’ only claimed
uses of the area were for occasional cleaning, beach access, and boat storage. While it is at least
believable that Darlene may have helped clean the area between the parties’ homes or used it to
access areas of her own home to clean, as the trial court noted, this occasional use was insufficient
to defeat defendants’ exclusive use. See Waisanen v Superior Twp, 305 Mich App 719, 732; 854
NW2d 213 (2014). Similarly, the trial court reasonably found that the other two uses claimed by
plaintiffs were illogical and impractical. Plaintiffs had a much larger area on the other side of their
home by which they could access the beach themselves or store their boat and access the beach
without having to drag it up and down the steps of a concrete patio. Any use of the narrow, three-
1 “[S]uccessive periods of adverse possession by different parties can be joined or ‘tacked’ to
satisfy the 15-year statutory period, but only if there was privity of estate.” Houston, 335 Mich
App at 560. The trial court declined to, and did not need to, consider whether defendants’ time
tacked on to the time of their predecessors, because their own ownership was long enough to satisfy
the period without assistance.

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to four-foot space between the parties’ homes was incidental at best, concerning plaintiffs’
individual use, and wholly illogical at worst, concerning the boat. As the trial court recognized,
defendants did not need to erect fences or barriers. The pathway’s nature and use, as well as the
inconvenience it posed to plaintiffs’ alleged uses, was enough to demonstrate exclusive use of the
area.
As for hostility, defendants testified that they had understood the boundary line to be where
four pillars lined up with the ledge on the outside of the patio. Plaintiffs attempt to circumvent
this testimony by emphasizing that they never held the same opinion. However, the rule set forth
in Houston does not require mutual mistake:
[W]here a person possesses the land of another intending to hold to a particular
recognizable boundary regardless of the true boundary line, the possession is hostile
and adverse possession may be established. Simply being mistaken with regard to
the true boundary line, however, does not defeat a claim of adverse possession.
[Houston, 335 Mich App at 559-560 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
Defendants’ testimony of their intent to hold the boundary line they perceived as being marked by
the pillars and patio ledge, even if only based on innocent mistake, was, therefore, sufficient to
establish hostility.
In sum, defendants’ use of the patio, beginning in 1990, was “actual, visible, open,
notorious, exclusive, continuous,” and hostile for the requisite 15-year period.2 Moreover, because
title had long since vested by the time David wrote the 2008 letter, its contents need not be
addressed.3
2 Because the trial court properly determined that defendants had adversely possessed both
contested areas, we need not address the issue of acquiescence.
3 Plaintiffs also argue the trial court failed to consider the proper burden of proof when considering
the beach disputed area. Because defendants had the right to be on the beach disputed area, their
easement rights “somewhat alter the evidentiary burden in relation to the adverse possession
analysis.” Beach v Lima Twp, 283 Mich App 504, 514; 770 NW2d 386 (2009). “In Michigan, use
of an easement by the owner of the servient estate will not ripen into adverse possession unless
such use is inconstant with the easement.” Id. (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
While the trial court did not expressly note this somewhat altered standard, it can be easily inferred
from the trial court’s findings that defendants’ use of the patio as their own personal living space
was inconsistent with the easement of the communal beach. Thus, while the trial court may not
have expressly held defendants to this standard, its findings necessarily demonstrate that the
standard was satisfied.

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Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron

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