COA 375727 MICHELLE MIKE V PARSCH INC Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/9/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
MICHELLE MIKE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
September 09, 2026
11:00 AM
v No. 375727
Lapeer Circuit Court
PARSCH, INC., LC No. 23-056801-NO
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: LETICA, P.J., and RICK and GARRETT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to
defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff worked as a rural mail carrier for the United States Postal Service. On
November 30, 2020, her right-hand-drive Jeep Wrangler malfunctioned while she was completing
her mail route. She drove it to defendant’s automotive business. Plaintiff was familiar with the
business because she stopped there regularly. Defendant’s employee, Lucas Parsch, replaced a
broken belt, and plaintiff left the premises. The problem recurred soon after, and plaintiff returned
to defendant’s business. Parsch or another mechanic then determined that the Jeep’s crankshaft
was cracked and that the vehicle would need to be towed to a dealership.
Because plaintiff still had mail to deliver, she contacted her supervisor, Bronze Wadsworth.
Wadsworth arranged for another postal employee to bring a replacement mail vehicle so plaintiff
could transfer the mail from her Jeep and complete her route. According to plaintiff, the
replacement vehicle was backed into the west driveway, approximately 20 to 30 steps from the
garage where her Jeep was located. Parsch recalled the replacement vehicle being much closer to
the garage, approximately 10 to 15 feet from plaintiff’s Jeep.
Plaintiff, Wadsworth, and another postal employee first transferred the parcels from
plaintiff’s Jeep to the replacement vehicle. Plaintiff then transferred the sorted mail herself so that
it would remain in delivery order. During her second trip, plaintiff stepped onto the side step of

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the replacement vehicle, placed a bundle of mail on a tray, and stepped backward with her right
foot. She testified that her foot landed in gravel inside a pothole, slid backward, struck the back
of the hole, and caused her ankle to roll. Plaintiff fell backward, landing on her left wrist and
backside.
Plaintiff described the condition as a hole approximately the size of her foot and three to
four inches deep, with gravel inside and pavement around it. She did not see the pothole before
stepping into it, and there was no snow or ice on the ground. After the fall, Wadsworth helped
plaintiff up, kicked the gravel in the hole with his foot, and asked whether that was where she fell.
Plaintiff nodded yes. Plaintiff did not photograph the pothole, did not know whether anyone else
photographed it, and was unsure whether there were other potholes nearby.
Parsch did not witness the fall. He testified that he did not inspect the area afterward and
had not seen any potholes, despite walking over the general area approximately 100 times each
day. Both parties relied on a May 2019 Google Street View image of the west driveway. Plaintiff
argued that the image showed discoloration at the location where she fell. Defendant argued that
the image did not depict the pothole plaintiff described.
Plaintiff later filed this premises-liability action. Defendant moved for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that plaintiff could not establish actual or
constructive notice of the alleged pothole. Defendant emphasized that no photograph depicted the
pothole, that no witness testified that defendant had previously observed or received a report about
the pothole, and that plaintiff had no evidence showing when the condition arose.
Plaintiff responded that constructive notice could be inferred from the character of the
defect. She maintained that potholes develop through deterioration rather than appearing
instantaneously. She pointed out that the May 2019 image showed discoloration at the fall location
and contended that Parsch’s testimony about regularly walking through the area supported an
inference that defendant should have discovered the condition.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion. The court concluded that plaintiff had not
presented evidence showing when the pothole arose or how long it had existed before her fall. The
court also relied on Parsch’s testimony that he regularly crossed the general area without seeing a
pothole. The court therefore determined that plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material
fact regarding notice.
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court had improperly weighed
Parsch’s testimony against hers and made credibility determinations when deciding a motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). The trial court denied reconsideration, explaining that its ruling did not rest
on a credibility determination, but on plaintiff’s inability to offer evidence that defendant had
notice of the pothole’s existence.
Plaintiff timely filed a claim of appeal. This Court initially dismissed the claim of appeal
without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the April 8, 2025 opinion and order was not
“a final order as defined under MCR 7.202(6).” Mike v Parsch, Inc, unpublished order of the
Court of Appeals, entered June 3, 2025 (Docket No. 375727). Plaintiff moved for reconsideration,
and this Court granted reconsideration on July 3, 2025, allowing the appeal to proceed. Mike v

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Parsch, Inc, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 3, 2025 (Docket No. 375727).
We now address plaintiff’s issues on appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. El-Khalil
v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). A motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual sufficiency of a claim.” Id. at 160. When deciding a motion
under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a court considers the evidence submitted by the parties in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
Dextrom v Wexford Co, 287 Mich App 406, 415; 789 NW2d 211 (2010). Summary disposition is
appropriate when the record presents no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10).
A genuine issue of material fact exists when, “giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the
opposing party,” the record “leave[s] open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.”
West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). The court may not weigh
the evidence, make findings of fact, or determine witness credibility when deciding a motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). Innovative Adult Foster Care, Inc v Ragin, 285 Mich App 466, 480; 776
NW2d 398 (2009). However, the nonmoving party must come forward with substantively
admissible evidence creating a genuine factual dispute, rather than relying on conjecture or
speculation. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120-121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
B. IMPROPER EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court considered the evidence in the light most favorable
to defendant and made improper factual findings when granting summary disposition. We
disagree.
Plaintiff relies on the conflict between her testimony and Parsch’s testimony concerning
the location of the replacement vehicle and the area where plaintiff fell. According to plaintiff,
the replacement vehicle was parked approximately 20 to 30 steps from the garage, near the west
driveway, and she fell after stepping backward from that vehicle. Parsch, who did not witness the
fall, believed that the vehicle and the place where plaintiff fell were much closer to the garage.
Plaintiff maintains that the trial court resolved this conflict in Parsch’s favor when it referred to
his testimony that he crossed the general area approximately 100 times each day without seeing a
pothole.
A court deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may not determine which witness
offered the more credible account. Innovative Adult Foster Care, 285 Mich App at 480. The trial
court therefore should not have relied on Parsch’s testimony that he regularly traversed the area
without seeing a pothole to the extent that his testimony depended on his disputed identification
of the fall location.
Nevertheless, any error does not require reversal. We review the trial court’s decision de
novo. El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 159. In doing so, we disregard Parsch’s competing recollection of

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the fall location and accept plaintiff’s testimony concerning the pothole’s existence, dimensions,
composition, and location. We also accept that plaintiff stepped into a foot-sized, three-to-four-
inch-deep, gravel-filled pothole at the location she identified. Even under that version of the
events, however, plaintiff’s evidence does not establish when the condition arose or otherwise
permit a reasonable inference that defendant had actual or constructive notice of it. Thus, the
disputed testimony concerning where plaintiff fell is not material to the basis for summary
disposition. West, 469 Mich at 183. Plaintiff’s claim fails not because Parsch’s account is more
credible, but because plaintiff’s own evidence, accepted as true, is insufficient to establish the
notice element. As discussed below, plaintiff has not demonstrated reversible error.
C. NOTICE OF DEFECT
Plaintiff next argues that the evidence, viewed in her favor, created a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether defendant had actual or constructive notice of the alleged pothole.
We disagree.
A premises-liability plaintiff must establish that the premises possessor had actual or
constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc, 500 Mich 1, 8; 890
NW2d 344 (2016). Constructive notice requires evidence “that the hazard was of such a character,
or had existed for a sufficient time, that a reasonable premises possessor would have discovered
it.” Id. at 11-12. Constructive notice may arise “not only from the passage of time itself, but also
from the type of condition involved, or from a combination of the two elements.” Kroll v Katz,
374 Mich 364, 372; 132 NW2d 27 (1965). But a plaintiff must present evidence permitting a
reasonable inference, not “mere speculation or conjecture.” Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich
153, 164; 516 NW2d 475 (1994).
Plaintiff presented no evidence that defendant actually knew of the alleged pothole before
she fell. No witness testified that the condition had previously been reported or observed, and the
record contains no pre-accident complaint, photograph, or repair connected to the alleged pothole.
Plaintiff therefore failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding actual notice.
Plaintiff likewise failed to create a genuine issue regarding constructive notice. Accepting
her testimony in full, the evidence establishes that a foot-sized, three-to-four-inch-deep, gravel-
filled hole existed when she stepped backward from the replacement mail vehicle. Her testimony
does not establish when the hole formed, whether it had changed over time, or whether its
appearance reflected prolonged deterioration. Plaintiff did not identify a physical characteristic,
such as weathering or deterioration, from which a fact-finder could reasonably determine the
condition’s age.
The presence of gravel does not permit a different conclusion. Gravel inside the hole could
be consistent with an earlier attempt to repair or fill the condition. But plaintiff presented no
evidence identifying who placed the gravel, when it was placed, or whether it was deposited as
part of a repair. The gravel could also have accumulated through ordinary use of the driveway or
from another source. Concluding that defendant previously attempted to repair the pothole would
require selecting one possible explanation without evidence supporting that choice. Such an
inference would be speculative. Skinner, 445 Mich at 164.

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Wadsworth’s conduct immediately after the accident likewise does not supply the missing
evidence. Plaintiff testified that Wadsworth kicked the gravel and confirmed that she had fallen
at that location. That testimony supports plaintiff’s account that a gravel-filled depression existed
at the time of the fall, but it provides no information concerning when the condition arose or how
long it had been present.
The photographs also do not create a factual question concerning notice. Plaintiff contends
that the May 2019 image shows discoloration in the pavement at the location she identified. Even
assuming that it does, no testimony or other evidence connects that discoloration to the foot-sized,
three-to-four-inch-deep, gravel-filled pothole plaintiff encountered approximately 18 months later.
Inferring that the discoloration and the alleged pothole were the same condition would therefore
require speculation.
Plaintiff relies on Basehore v Short, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued March 14, 2024 (Docket No. 366596), Thompson v Gibson (On Remand),
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 24, 2018 (Docket
No. 333755), and Mancill v Trio Inv Props, LLC, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued May 19, 2025 (Docket No. 370890).1 Those decisions do not alter the result.
Basehore recognized the general principle that constructive notice may be inferred when a
condition’s character or duration would have led a reasonable premises possessor to discover it.
See Basehore, unpub op at 8. It discussed examples in which evidence linked a condition to an
appreciable period, including produce that remained on a store floor for a known time, a hole in a
rug located in a frequently traversed doorway, and pavement defects shown to have existed for
months. Id. Here, by contrast, plaintiff presented no evidence tying the alleged pothole to any
identifiable period before her accident. Defendant’s opportunity to discover the pothole cannot
establish constructive notice without evidence that the pothole existed during that opportunity.
Thompson similarly recognized that a jury may determine constructive notice when the
evidence concerning a defect’s physical condition permits an inference that the defect developed
over time. See Thompson, unpub op at 6. The dangerous condition there involved a defective
deck railing whose condition and surrounding evidence permitted a factual determination
concerning whether the defect had existed long enough to be discovered. Id., unpub op at 5-6. In
this case, plaintiff described the dimensions and contents of the pothole but presented no evidence
that those characteristics revealed its age. The general proposition that potholes ordinarily develop
through deterioration does not establish how long this particular pothole existed.
Mancill is also distinguishable. There, the plaintiff testified that she had informed the
defendant landlord approximately two years before the accident that the porch needed repair or
treatment. See Mancill, unpub op at 4. The defendant responded by power-washing and painting
the problem area. Id. Thus, the record contained affirmative evidence that the defendant had been
alerted to the condition long before the plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff presented no comparable
1 Although unpublished opinions are not precedentially binding under the rule of stare decisis,
MCR 7.215(C)(1), they may be considered for their persuasive value.

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evidence here. No witness reported the alleged pothole to defendant before the accident, and no
evidence showed that defendant previously treated or repaired it.
Plaintiff’s reliance on the general rule that the character of a defect can support constructive
notice is otherwise unavailing. In Siegel v Detroit City Ice & Fuel Co, 324 Mich 205, 211-212;
36 NW2d 719 (1949), the record involved a worn hole approximately seven or eight feet wide and
18 inches deep, whose developed physical character supported an inference that it had existed for
an appreciable period. Goldsmith v Cody, 351 Mich 380, 389; 88 NW2d 268 (1958), distinguished
that type of developed physical defect from a condition whose duration could not be determined.
Here, plaintiff provided estimated dimensions and testified that gravel was present, but she offered
no evidence of deterioration or another characteristic revealing the hole’s age.
Finally, Parsch’s testimony that he walked through the general area approximately 100
times each day does not fill the evidentiary gap. Plaintiff relies on that testimony to argue that
defendant had repeated opportunities to discover the condition. But an opportunity to discover a
defect does not establish constructive notice, absent evidence that the defect existed while those
opportunities occurred. See Lowrey, 500 Mich at 11-12; Kroll, 374 Mich at 372. And because
plaintiff and Parsch identified different fall locations, we do not rely on Parsch’s testimony that he
did not observe a pothole. Plaintiff’s claim fails because the evidence she presented does not
permit a reasonable inference concerning the condition’s duration.
Defendant met its initial burden by identifying the absence of evidence supporting the
notice element, and plaintiff failed to produce evidence creating a genuine factual dispute. Lowrey,
500 Mich at 9-12. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

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