COA 372718 PEOPLE OF MI V USAMAH ABDUL RAHEEM CARSWELL Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2026
1:51 PM
v No. 372718
Wayne Circuit Court
USAMAH ABDUL RAHEEM CARSWELL, LC No. 23-005956-01-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and YOUNG, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Usamah Carswell, appeals as of right his jury-trial conviction of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III), MCL 750.520d(1)(a). For the reasons stated in this opinion,
we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
This case arises from Carswell’s sexual assault of BO. At the time BO was fifteen years
of age and had run away from home. She testified that she stayed with her boyfriend’s
grandmother for a few days and then stayed overnight at a friend’s house. Her friend’s father, a
man known as “Tattoo,” told her to leave the next day. BO explained that she then got into a gold-
colored vehicle with Tattoo and Carswell.
According to BO, Carswell drove to a self-serve carwash. BO testified that they smoked
“weed” and “small crystal-like type things.” Afterward, Carswell told her to get into the backseat
and followed her back. He told her to take off all of her clothing and had penile-vaginal intercourse
with her, which resulted in him ejaculating. He also touched and kissed her from the top of her
breasts to her thighs. BO was unable to say “a single word” during the assault.
Carswell drove BO to a park, and she walked home. BO took a shower, disclosed the abuse
to her sister, and was taken to the hospital for an examination by a sexual assault nurse examiner.
Forensic evidence showed “very strong support” that Carswell contributed to the DNA that was
located on a swab of BO’s breasts. There was also “very strong support” that Carswell had
contributed DNA to the swabs taken from her anal and perineal areas. At trial, Carswell denied

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meeting BO or sexually assaulting her. The jury convicted him of CSC-III, but acquitted him of
the remaining charges.1
II. LIMITATION ON JURY SELECTION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court advised the prosecution and the defense that they would each have 30
minutes to conduct voir dire. Carswell argues that the time limitation violated his constitutional
right to an impartial jury. We review de novo a challenge to the jury selection process. People v
Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 554; 679 NW2d 127 (2004). However, in order to preserve an issue
of jury selection, the defendant must either exhaust all of his or her preemptory challenges or refuse
to express satisfaction with the jury. People v Taylor, 195 Mich App 57, 59-60; 489 NW2d 99
(1992). Here, Carswell did not exhaust his preemptory challenges and did not refuse to express
satisfaction with the jury. Accordingly, the issue is unpreserved. Unpreserved issues are reviewed
for plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial rights. People v Cain, 498 Mich 108, 116; 869
NW2d 829 (2015).
B. ANALYSIS
“[A] trial court has discretion in both the scope and the conduct of voir dire.” People v
Washington, 468 Mich 667, 674; 664 NW2d 203 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“A defendant does not have a right to have counsel conduct the voir dire.” Id. at 674 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “However, a trial court may not restrict voir dire in a manner that
prevents the development of a factual basis for the exercise of peremptory challenges.” People v
Taylor, 195 Mich App 57, 59; 489 NW2d 99 (1992) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Carswell argues that, by limiting his lawyer’s time to conduct voir dire, the trial court
prevented him from developing a factual basis regarding the jurors’ attitudes toward allegations of
sex offenses with a minor. We disagree. Before voir dire commenced, the trial court advised the
parties that it would ask the jurors preliminary questions and that they would each be afforded 30
minutes to question the jurors. Thereafter, the court questioned the jurors extensively regarding
their marital status, their professions and the professions of their spouses, and whether they had
any children. The court also questioned them regarding their education and any religious or
philosophical beliefs they might hold that would affect their partiality. Questions were also asked
regarding whether the jurors or their close friends and family were or had any relationship to
lawyers, judges, or law enforcement; their prior juror experiences, including whether they had
served on criminal or civil cases, whether they reached a verdict, and, if so, whether they were the
foreperson; whether they were the victims or perpetrators of crimes and details related to such
disclosures. The prosecutor then asked a number of questions related to the burden of proof, the
nature of evidence, the evidentiary proof needed for a criminal sexual abuse conviction, and how
1 Carswell was acquitted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(c), distribution
of a controlled substance to a minor, MCL 333.7410(1), two counts of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(c), and distribution of marihuana to a minor, MCL
333.7401(2)(d)(iii) and MCL 333.7410(1).

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to judge the credibility of witnesses, including child witnesses. Finally, the defense lawyer asked
multiple questions relating to the presumption of innocence, the locations involved in the
allegations against Carswell, and the juror’s attitudes toward criminal sexual abuse involving a
teenage victim. As jurors were excused peremptorily or for cause, the court, the prosecutor, and
the defense lawyer would repeat their questions, following up with the jurors as necessary.
Eventually, both parties expressed that they were not seeking to excuse any further jurors. Notably,
there is no indication that the 30-minute time limit expired prior to the defense expressing
satisfaction. Moreover, during at least one round of questioning, the defense lawyer sought
permission from the court to ask additional questions, and the court granted him permission to do
so. Given the record in this case, the court’s decision to limit voir dire to 30 minutes of questions
per party did not prevent the development of a factual basis for the parties to exercise preemptory
challenges. See Taylor, 195 Mich App at 59. Reversal is, therefore, not warranted.
III. BATSON2 CHALLENGE
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Carswell next argues that the prosecution’s preemptory exclusion of three prospective
African-American jurors was racially motivated. This Court generally reviews de novo questions
of constitutional law. People v Johnson, 340 Mich App 531, 542; 986 NW2d 672 (2022). And
we review a trial court’s ruling on a Batson challenge for an abuse of discretion. People v Ho, 231
Mich App 178, 184; 585 NW2d 357 (1998). However, “a trial court’s determination concerning
whether the opponent of the peremptory challenge has satisfied the ultimate burden of proving
purposeful discrimination is a question of fact that is reviewed for clear error.” People v Knight,
473 Mich 324, 344; 701 NW2d 715 (2005).
B. ANALYSIS
A defendant’s right to equal protection is violated when a party exercises a peremptory
challenge to exclude a prospective juror based solely on their race. US Const, Am XIV, § 1;
Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 86; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986). We use a three-step
process to determine whether a peremptory challenge was based on purposeful racial
discrimination. Knight, 473 Mich at 336. “First, the opponent of the peremptory challenge must
make a prima facie showing of discrimination.” Id. “Second, if the trial court determines that a
prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the proponent of the peremptory challenge
to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the strike.” Id. at 337. “Finally, if the proponent
provides a race-neutral explanation as a matter of law, the trial court must then determine whether
the race-neutral explanation is a pretext and whether the opponent of the challenge has proved
purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 337-338.
2 Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986).

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During voir dire, Carswell’s lawyer raised a challenge to the prosecution’s use of
preemptory challenges. Carswell’s lawyer argued:
Of course, my client is African American and we had five African American
jurors and the prosecutor just excused three of them, three in a row and I would
make a challenge pursuant to People versus Batson on that. Why she excused three
out of five African American on a panel and she excused three in a row, three
together.
In response, the prosecutor explained:
Judge, the reason I kicked juror number one was his indication of a friend
of his that had been wrongfully convicted.
My reason for kicking juror number ten was the indication that she has a
nephew in prison for the exact same crime.
My reasoning for kicking juror number twelve was when he was talking
about his conviction it gave me the impression that he thinks some crimes are not
important or frivolous, so that’s why I excused him.
Based upon the foregoing, the parties agree that Carswell made a prima facie showing of
discrimination and that the prosecution articulated a race-neutral explanation for the exercise of
the preemptory challenges. Thus, the sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court clearly erred
by determining that the race-neutral explanations were not pretextual.
Carswell argues that the prosecutor’s explanation for the strikes was based upon the
prospective jurors’ demeanors. “Explanations for peremptory challenges based solely on a juror's
demeanor are particularly susceptible to serving as pretexts for discrimination.” People v Tennille,
315 Mich App 51, 65; 888 NW2d 278 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Nonverbal
conduct or demeanor, often elusive and always subject to interpretation, may well mask a race-
based strike. For that reason, trial courts must carefully examine such rationales.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “[B]ecause such after-the-fact rationalizations are susceptible to
abuse, a prosecutor's reason for discharge bottomed on demeanor evidence deserves particularly
careful scrutiny.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). With these legal principles in mind,
we examine in turn each of the prospective jurors struck by the prosecution.
Juror One disclosed that he had family and friends in jail. When asked if they were treated
fairly, he stated that one of those individuals had not been treated fairly. Juror One explained that
the person “didn’t do it,” had served 16-and-a-half years, and was only prosecuted “because he
was around the area.” The prosecutor elected to strike Juror One based upon his belief that his
friend was wrongfully convicted. That decision was based upon Juror One’s answer to the
questions, not upon his demeanor and nonverbal conduct. The trial court found that the
prosecutor’s reason for the strike was not a pretext for discrimination and that it was instead a
legitimate reason for striking the prospective juror. That finding was not clearly erroneous given
the record before this Court.

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Next, Juror Ten stated that her nephew was in prison for criminal sexual conduct. The
prosecutor stated that she had struck her from the jury for that reason. The decision to strike was
not based upon any nonverbal conduct or demeanor. Rather, it was based upon her familial
relationship with someone who had been convicted of the same class of offense as Carswell was
charged with committing. The trial court found that the reason for striking the juror was legitimate
and was not pretextual. In light of the record, we conclude that the court’s finding was not clearly
erroneous.
Finally, Juror Twelve informed the court that he had been convicted of “bouncing” a check
when he was a teenager. He stated that he had not been treated fairly. When asked to elaborate,
he explained:
First of all, it was my own check. I did not know my amounts [sic] was not
sufficient to cover the cost of the grocery shopping and I was sentenced for that,
three days to serve jail time. If the circumstance was different, I would have, you
know, just slap on the wrist and probably, you know, pay the amount of the money
that caused (inaudible). Learned from my mistake instead of being sent to jail for
that.
The prosecutor stated that, based upon the response, she got the impression that Juror Twelve
believed that some offenses were not important or were somehow frivolous. Once again, the
prosecutor’s decision to strike the juror was based upon the juror’s answers to the questions posed
and the inferences she drew from those responses. It was not based upon any nonverbal conduct
or demeanor. Given that it is reasonable to infer from the juror’s response that he felt some crimes
were less important, the prosecutor’s stated reason is supported by the record. We do not find
clearly erroneous the trial court’s finding that the reasons stated was legitimate and not a pretext
for discrimination.
Nevertheless, Carswell argues that each explanation for striking the jurors was pretextual
because each prospective juror indicated that their ability to be fair and impartial was not impacted.
Yet, it is clear that if the jurors indicated an inability to be impartial or fair there would have been
grounds to dismiss them for cause. See MCR 6.412(D)(1); MCR 2.511(E). It is axiomatic that
there is no requirement that a preemptory challenge can only be exercised if the juror indicates an
inability to be fair or impartial. Moreover, we do not find persuasive Carswell’s speculation that
the dismissal must have been racially-motivated given the lack of for-cause reasons to strike the
juror.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err by finding that the reasons for dismissing
the three prospective jurors were legitimate and did not demonstrate purposeful racial
discrimination. Carswell is, therefore, not entitled to relief on this basis.
Affirmed.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Adrienne N. Young

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