COA 376337 IN RE M WHITE MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/9/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
February 09, 2026
9:48 AM
In re WHITE/PARSONS, Minors.
Nos. 376337; 376338; 376545
Calhoun Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2023-001085-NA
Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and MURRAY and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals,1 respondent-father and respondent-mother appeal as of right
the trial court’s order terminating their respective parental rights to the minor children. In Docket
No. 376337, respondent-mother’s parental rights to MW were terminated under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist), (3)(c)(ii) (failure to rectify
other conditions), and (3)(j) (children will be harmed if returned to parent). In Docket No. 376338,
respondent-mother’s parental rights to MP were likewise terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i),
(3)(c)(ii), and (3)(j). In Docket No. 376545, respondent-father’s parental rights to MP were
terminated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) (desertion of the child for 91 or more days), (3)(c)(i),
(3)(c)(ii), and (3)(j).
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by finding that a statutory ground for
termination existed, that termination was in the children’s best interests, and that the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Respondent-
father argues that the trial court erred by finding that a statutory ground for termination existed.2
We affirm.
1 In re M White Minor, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 29, 2025 (Docket
Nos. 376337, 376338, and 376545).
2 Respondent-father does not raise any challenges to the trial court’s conclusion that terminating
respondent-father’s parental rights was in MP’s best interests. Nonetheless, we have reviewed the

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I. FACTS
In April 2023, the DHHS filed a petition regarding MW, the child of respondent-mother and
Alvin White.3 The DHHS requested that the trial court terminate White’s parental rights on the
basis of suspected, nonaccidental child abuse. MW was hospitalized and diagnosed with a suspected
seizure, subdural hematomas, and bilateral retinal hemorrhages. White was the sole caregiver at the
time of MW’s injuries. The trial court placed MW with respondent-mother. Respondent-mother
was ordered to not allow unsupervised parenting time with White unless authorized by the trial court
and arranged by the DHHS.
On July 20, 2023, the DHHS filed a supplemental petition requesting removal of MW from
respondent-mother, and filed a separate petition requesting the removal of MP from respondent-
mother and respondent-father. On the same day the petitions were filed, the trial court held a
preliminary hearing regarding MW and MP with respect to respondent-mother.4 The DHHS alleged
that respondent-mother faced eviction for nonpayment of rent, lost her job, and had no income. The
DHHS further alleged that respondent-mother had multiple warrants out for her arrest for reckless
driving and driving on a suspended license. In addition, the DHHS alleged that respondent-mother
canceled or missed multiple medical appointments for MW and MP. Further, the DHHS alleged
that despite respondent-mother’s knowledge of the court order barring White from unsupervised
contact with MW, on July 18, 2023, respondent-mother was pulled over in a traffic stop, and White
was a passenger in the car holding MW in his hands with no car seat. As a result, the DHHS planned
to place MW and MP with their maternal grandmother.
At the continued preliminary hearing on August 28, 2023, respondent-mother pleaded no-
contest to the allegations in the petition, including admitting that White severely injured MW, the
allegations regarding the traffic stop, and the allegations that MW and MP missed multiple medical
appointments. The trial court found that the allegations in the petition were true by a preponderance
of the evidence and took jurisdiction over MW and MP with respect to respondent-mother.
On September 12, 2023, a combined adjudication trial and disposition hearing was held
regarding respondent-father with respect to MP. The DHHS’s petition alleged that respondent-
father was on felony probation for weapons charges, was required to submit to drug screens, and
did not have employment or stable housing. The trial court found that the allegations in the petition
were true by a preponderance of the evidence and took jurisdiction over MP with respect to
respondent-father on the basis of respondent-father’s failure to provide support and an unfit home
environment by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity.
Both respondent-mother and respondent-father were ordered to comply with, and benefit
from, their individual Parent Agency Treatment Plans (PATP). Respondent-mother’s PATP
record and find no errors warranting reversal. See In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40-
42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).
3 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of White, but he has not appealed that ruling and
is not a party to this appeal.
4 The DHHS could not locate respondent-father at the time of this preliminary hearing.

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required her to maintain employment and stable housing, complete a psychological evaluation,
follow a safety plan regarding abuse and neglect, complete parenting training, utilize new parenting
skills during visitation, complete budgeting classes, complete domestic-violence classes, and
comply with therapy. Over the course of the case, respondent-mother began various services but
struggled to complete them. Respondent-mother maintained her relationship with White, and the
DHHS caseworker Deniel Enos discovered instances of domestic violence between the pair and
violations of the safety plan.
As part of his PATP, respondent-father was required to complete a psychological evaluation,
individual counseling, parenting classes, and negative drug screenings; attend supported visitations;
and obtain employment. Over the course of the case, respondent-father participated in some services
but effectively disappeared from the case from February 2024 until early 2025 when he was arrested
in Calhoun County and charged with homicide.
The trial court held a termination hearing in May 2025 that was continued in June 2025. At
the termination hearing, Enos testified that respondent-mother failed or struggled to comply with
her PATP because she allowed White to attend unsupervised parenting time and enter her home,
struggled to maintain housing and employment, did not consistently attend counseling, was not
honest with her therapist about her relationship with White, did not complete a one-on-one
budgeting class to which she was referred, did not complete any of the domestic-violence programs
to which she was referred, and displayed a decline in parenting skills at visitations over the course
of the case.
Enos further testified that respondent-father failed to comply with his PATP because he did
not see MP for approximately a year between February 2024 and February 2025, did not participate
in supported visitations or a fatherhood program, did not complete the written parenting chapters
provided by the DHHS, failed or missed every weekly drug test that he was required to complete,
failed to secure housing and employment, and declined to participate in services offered by the jail
while incarcerated because he believed that he did not need them.
The trial court found that statutory grounds for termination existed under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (3)(c)(ii), and (3)(j) with respect to respondent-mother. The trial court
found that respondent-mother was not credible, highlighting respondent-mother’s denial of her
relationship with White despite her pregnancy, contact history, and financially supporting White
while he was incarcerated. The trial court found that respondent-mother did not benefit from the
parenting-skills classes, despite completing them, because she regularly ignored the children during
visitations and exposed the children to White, someone with a history of criminality, due to her
continued relationship with him. The trial court also found that respondent-mother did not have
stable housing and did not address her mental-health issues because she did not regularly attend
counseling and she lied to her counselor about her relationship with White.5
5 Respondent-mother consistently denied the nature of her relationship with White despite giving
birth to a third child (her second with White) on March 2, 2024. In addition, respondent-mother
was pregnant with her fourth child (her third with White) at the time of the termination hearing.

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The trial court also found that statutory grounds for termination existed under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (3)(c)(i), (3)(c)(ii), and (3)(j) with respect to respondent-father and MP.
The trial court did not find respondent-father to be credible. The trial court noted the conflicting
testimony regarding respondent-father’s living situation at his grandmother’s house and the lack of
verification of his testimony regarding his employment. The court found that respondent-father
attended some visits with MP, but regularly appeared late. The court stated the respondent-father
stopped services and visitations for a year. The court also found that while respondent-father was
required to attend weekly drug screens, he only completed three screens and tested positive for
marijuana, cocaine, and benzodiazepines. Respondent-father continued his criminality and would
have to address federal charges and state murder charges.
Finally, the trial court found that termination of respondent-mother and respondent-father’s
parental rights was in the best interests of MW and MP despite the relative placement with their
maternal grandmother. Respondent-mother and respondent-father now appeal.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
Both respondents argue that the trial court erred by finding that there were statutory grounds
to terminate their parental rights.
“In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been
met.” In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App 326, 333; 985 NW2d 912 (2022) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding that statutory
grounds exist for termination. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 343; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). “A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the
witnesses.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 272-273; 976 NW2d 44 (2021) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). This Court need not consider additional grounds for the trial court’s decision
if termination was supported by at least one statutory ground. In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340
Mich App at 333-334.
A. RESPONDENT-MOTHER
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by finding that statutory grounds for
termination of her parental rights existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (3)(c)(ii), and (3)(j). We
disagree.
MCL 712A.19b(3) provides:
The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
* * *
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter,
182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,
and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

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(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time
considering the child's age.
Termination of parental rights is proper under MCL 712.A19b(3)(c)(i) when “the totality of
the evidence amply supports that [the respondent] had not accomplished any meaningful change in
the conditions” that led to the adjudication, In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286
(2009), and that the respondent would not be able to rectify those conditions “within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age,” MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). To the extent that a service plan is
“specifically targeted to address the primary basis for the adjudication in [the] matter,” the
respondent’s “insufficient compliance with and benefit from the services provided by the [DHHS]”
justify termination of the respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). In re Frey,
297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Further, “minimal progress” in addressing the
requirements of a service plan supports a finding that the respondent will not accomplish the purpose
of the service plan within a “reasonable time.” In re Smith, 324 Mich App 28, 49; 919 NW2d 427
(2018).
It is undisputed that more than 182 days had elapsed since the initial dispositional order in
this case. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c). The initial dispositional orders were entered on September 12,
2023. The hearing to terminate respondents’ parental rights was held on May 21, 2025, and June
11, 2025. The order terminating respondent-mother’s and respondent-father’s parental rights was
entered on June 11, 2025, 638 days after the initial dispositional orders were entered.
The conditions that led to respondent-mother’s adjudication were respondent-mother’s
failure to protect her children by violating the established safety plan, her lack of parenting skills,
and medical neglect. To rectify these conditions, respondent-mother was required to complete a
psychological evaluation; follow a safety plan regarding abuse and neglect; identify potential
harmful intimate partners; complete a parenting skills program, budgeting classes, domestic-
violence classes, and therapy; utilize increased parenting skills; and maintain stable employment
and housing.
At the termination hearing, Enos testified that respondent-mother had completed her
psychological evaluation, but she violated the safety plan by allowing White to attend unsupervised
parenting time and enter respondent-mother’s home. Though respondent-mother had housing, she
moved multiple times during the case, and at least one instance was because of lease violations.
Similarly, though she was employed, respondent-mother struggled to maintain employment and to
provide for her children’s needs despite providing financial assistance to White so that she could
communicate with him while he was incarcerated.6 Respondent-mother remained in contact with
White despite Enos informing her that “contact with [White] would be detrimental to getting her
6 Respondent-mother denied providing money to White, but text exchanges from the jail logs
demonstrated that respondent-mother provided money so that White could call and text her while
incarcerated and also showed that respondent-mother planned to pay for White’s bond. Respondent-
mother and White spent approximately 52 hours on the phone while White was incarcerated.
Simultaneously, respondent-mother was unable to meet the financial needs of her children and
requested assistance from the DHHS to pay for rent, diapers, and other necessities.

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kids back.” Additionally, respondent-mother did not consistently attend counseling, and the
counseling that she did attend was not considered successful because she was not honest with the
therapist about her relationship with White. Respondent-mother completed a one-time budgeting
class but did not complete a one-on-one budgeting class to which she was also referred. Though
respondent-mother completed a parenting program, she did not complete any of the domestic-
violence programs to which she was referred. Further, her parenting skills declined at visitations,
and Enos believed that the children were emotionally harmed during their visits. The foregoing
noncompliance with the case service plan justified termination of respondent-mother’s parental
rights under Subsection (3)(c)(i). See In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248.
Further, Enos testified that there was no service that the DHHS could offer respondent-
mother in which she would be willing to participate that would rectify the situation in a reasonable
amount of time given that respondent-mother was unwilling to participate in a variety of services
throughout the case. In combination with the children’s young ages, the trial court was justified in
finding that respondent-mother would not rectify her issues within a reasonable time. See
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); In re Williams, 286 Mich App at 273.
Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the conditions that led to
adjudication—including respondent-mother’s violation of the safety plan and her lack of parenting
skills—had not meaningfully changed and were unlikely to do so within a reasonable amount of
time. Accordingly, based on our review of the record, we are not definitely and firmly convinced
that the trial court erred when it found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of
respondent-mother’s parental rights was appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).7
B. RESPONDENT-FATHER
Respondent-father argues that the trial court erred by finding that statutory grounds for
termination of his parental rights existed under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (3)(c)(ii), and (3)(j).
We disagree.
As stated, it is undisputed that more than 182 days had elapsed since the initial dispositional
order in this case. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
The conditions that led to respondent-father’s adjudication were respondent-father’s
parenting skills, lack of stable housing, violation of his probation, and inconsistent drug testing. To
rectify these conditions, respondent-father was required to complete a psychological evaluation,
individual counseling, parenting classes, and weekly drug screens; attend supportive visitations; and
obtain employment.
At the termination hearing, Enos testified that respondent-father completed a psychological
evaluation and parenting class. During the period that respondent-father attended in-person
7 Because only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to
terminate a respondent’s parental rights, we need not address respondent-mother’s arguments
related to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) and (3)(j). In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App at
333-334.

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visitations, he arrived over 30 minutes late multiple times and had less than a half-hour to spend
with MP. Respondent-father did not see MP for approximately a year between February 2024 and
February 2025. Respondent-father reengaged with the case and began virtual visitations only after
his arrest in early 2025. Respondent-father completed three of the weekly drug tests that he was
required to attend. All three drug tests were positive for THC. One test was positive for cocaine
and benzos, and missed tests were considered positive. Respondent-father reported to Enos that MP
would live with him and his grandmother in the future; however, Enos testified that respondent-
father had been kicked out of the house by his grandmother. Enos was never able to verify
respondent-father’s employment. Respondent-father did not enroll in the Fatherhood Program.
Respondent-father completed and returned only half of one chapter of a parenting packet provided
by Enos. Finally, respondent-father declined to participate in services offered by the jail while
incarcerated because he believed that he did not need them. The foregoing noncompliance with the
PATP justified termination of respondent-father’s parental rights under Subsection (3)(c)(i). See
In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248.
Further, Enos believed that respondent-father had “plenty of time” during the case to
complete services. In combination with MP’s young age, the trial court was justified in finding that
respondent-father would not rectify the issues that led to adjudication within a reasonable time. See
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); In re Williams, 286 Mich App at 273. Accordingly, based on our review
of the record, we are not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court erred when it found by
clear and convincing evidence that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was
appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).8
III. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN
Next, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by finding that termination was in
the children’s best interests. We disagree.
This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s decision that termination is in a child’s best
interests. In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App at 333. “A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” Id.
“Once a statutory basis for termination has been shown by clear and convincing evidence,
the court must determine whether termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re LaFrance, 306
Mich App 713, 732-733; 858 NW2d 143 (2014), citing MCL 712A.19b(5). Whether termination is
in the children’s best interest must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 733.
The trial court should consider all of the evidence when determining whether it is in the child’s best
interests to terminate parental rights. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).
When determining if termination is in a child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the bond
between the child and the respondent, the respondent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for
stability and permanency, and the advantages of the child’s current placement. In re Olive/Metts
8 Because only one statutory ground for termination is necessary, we need not address respondent-
father’s arguments related to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (3)(c)(ii), and (3)(j). See In re
Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App at 333-334.

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Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). The trial court may also consider any history
of domestic violence, the respondent’s compliance with their parent-agency agreement, the
respondent’s visitation history with the child, the child’s well-being in their current placement, and
the potential for adoption. In re White, 303 Mich App at 714. A best-interests analysis should focus
on the child, not the respondent. In re MJC, 349 Mich App 42, 62; 27 NW3d 122 (2023). “A child’s
placement with relatives weighs against termination.” In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d
747 (2010). However, placement with relatives does not preclude termination. In re Olive/Metts
Minors, 297 Mich App at 43. Generally, it is in a child’s best interests to keep siblings together. Id.
at 42.
Though the trial court acknowledged that respondent-mother was bonded with the children,
the trial court properly considered respondent-mother’s compliance with her case service plan and
the children’s need for permanency and stability. See In re White, 303 Mich App at 714; In re
Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42. The trial court found no evidence that respondent-
mother would benefit from additional services in a reasonable amount of time. Respondent-mother
repeatedly violated the safety plan; struggled to maintain housing and employment; failed to
participate in the services that she was required to complete; and displayed declining parenting
skills. Enos testified that MW and MP were excited to see respondent-mother at visits, but
respondent-mother would give the children “half hugs,” spent a lot of time on her phone, fell asleep,
ignored MW and MP to focus on the youngest child, and would not respond to MW and MP. Enos
believed that the children were bonded to respondent-mother, but that she did not reciprocate the
bond. In addition, respondent-mother prioritized White’s financial needs over her children’s needs.
The children, who were two and three years old at the time of the termination hearing, had spent a
majority of their life in foster care. The children were placed with their maternal grandmother and
bonded with their foster family. In light of respondent-mother’s noncompliance with her case
service plan, the trial court properly concluded that the children’s need for permanency and stability
supported that termination was in their best interests. See In re White, 303 Mich App at 714; In re
Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42.
Respondent-mother argues that the DHHS’s and trial court’s failure to ask the children’s
maternal grandmother whether she would be willing to serve as a guardian constituted error
warranting reversal. The trial court expressed justified concern that the DHHS did not discuss
guardianship with the children’s grandmother. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 42, held
that the trial court must address a child’s relative placement in its best-interest analysis, but no case
suggests that duty extends to questioning the relative caregiver regarding a guardianship. See In re
Mason, 486 Mich at 164; In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 42. In the present case, the
trial court properly addressed whether termination was warranted despite the children’s placement
with a relative. The trial court noted that guardianship is meant to be short term. The trial court
found that termination was in the children’s best interests given their ages, their need for
permanency and stability, and the lack of evidence that respondent-mother would benefit from any
additional services in a reasonable amount of time given her noncompliance. See In re Olive/Metts
Minors, 297 Mich App at 42. Further, through their grandmother, the children had ongoing contact
with their youngest sibling, who was placed in relative care with their grandmother’s cousin.
In light of this evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that it
was in the children’s best interests to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights.

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IV. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Finally, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by finding that the DHHS made
reasonable efforts toward reunification. We disagree.
In order to preserve an argument regarding reasonable reunification efforts, a respondent
must object to the services at the time that they are offered. In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 247. “The
time for asserting the need for accommodation in services is when the court adopts a service plan . . .
.” Id., quoting In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 27; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). “However, even if a parent
does not object or otherwise indicate that the services provided were inadequate when the initial
case services plan is adopted, such an objection or challenge may also be timely if raised later during
the proceedings.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 337. Respondent-mother did not challenge the
adequacy of her services at any point during the proceeding. At a continued review and
permanency-planning hearing in February 2024, respondent-mother testified that she had done or
was working on everything that she was asked to do and did not believe that she needed additional
services. Therefore, the issue is not preserved. See id.
We review unpreserved issues arising in a termination hearing for “plain error affecting
substantial rights.” In re MJC, 349 Mich App at 47. To establish plain error, the party asserting
error must show that (1) the error occurred, (2) “the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious,” and
(3) the error affected the respondent’s substantial rights. Id. at 48. “Generally, an error affects
substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in all cases except those
involving aggravated circumstances under MCL 712A.19a(2),” In re Rippy, 330 Mich App 350,
355; 948 NW2d 131 (2019), none of which were raised by the DHHS in the present case. As part
of its duty to make reasonable efforts, “the Department must create a service plan outlining the steps
that both it and the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve
reunification.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85-86; 893 NW2d 637 (2017). Although “the
[DHHS] has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification,
there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to participate in the services
that are offered.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248. When “services were proffered, but [the]
respondents failed to either participate or demonstrate that they sufficiently benefited from the
services provided,” the DHHS discharges its duty to make reasonable efforts, though its efforts were
unsuccessful. Id.
In the present case, the DHHS provided respondent-mother with supervised and
unsupervised parenting time, safety planning, supportive-visitation referrals, a psychological
evaluation, individual counseling at Summit Pointe, parenting classes at Woman’s Co-op, a
Goodwill budgeting-assistance referral, a domestic-violence class at Wings of a Dove, parenting aid
at Wings of a Dove, housing resources, a referral to Safe Place, and gas cards. Notably, the DHHS
provided multiple referrals to two different agencies for domestic-violence services. Enos testified
that she had exhausted all potential services to assist respondent-mother. Enos noted that
respondent-mother’s unwillingness to fully participate in services had been a challenge throughout
the case.

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Respondent-mother argues that the DHHS failed to provide her with rent assistance despite
her struggles with housing. Enos testified that respondent-mother was provided with housing
resources, and respondent-mother utilized Section 8 housing at the start of the case. Such external
resources were sufficient to discharge the DHHS’s duty. See In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 358; 612
NW2d 407 (2000).
Respondent-mother next argues that the DHHS failed to provide and adjust domestic-
violence services. However, respondent-mother was referred to multiple domestic-violence
programs. She was first referred to the Wings of a Dove domestic-violence program in April 2024.
Respondent-mother completed an initial assessment but never returned and was discharged. After
the waiting period, respondent-mother was referred to the program again and started sessions in
September 2024 but was again discharged in March 2025 for lack of participation and benefit.
When respondent-mother was discharged from Wings of a Dove for the second time, Enos referred
her to Safe Place as an alternative. Respondent-mother informed Safe Place that she was not in a
domestic-violence situation and that she would not reach out to them in the future. After the waiting
period, Enos referred respondent-mother to the Wings of a Dove program for a third time in June
2025. Respondent-mother had a corresponding duty to participate in the services that were offered
by the DHHS, and the ultimate unsuccessfulness of these services did not equate with failure by the
DHHS to make reasonable efforts. See In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248.
Finally, respondent-mother cites In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 89-90, to support her
argument that her services should have been more tailored to her situation. Respondent-mother
argues that because she was pregnant with White’s child, it was unreasonable to exclude White from
her and the children’s lives. However, In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 86, 90, requires the DHHS
to adjust its services to accommodate a parent’s disability under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 USC 12101 et seq. Respondent-mother did not suggest in the record or on appeal that her
issues completing services resulted from a disability.
For the foregoing reasons, it was not plain error for the trial court to conclude that the DHHS
demonstrated reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification of respondent-mother and the children.
See id. at 85; In re MJC, 349 Mich App at 47.
Affirmed.
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Anica Letica

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