COA 370563 RONALD PACKER V MARGENE K TAGG Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/18/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
RONALD PACKER and ROBIN PACKER,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants-
Appellants,
UNPUBLISHED
August 18, 2026
10:29 AM
v No. 370563
Barry Circuit Court
MARGENE K. TAGG, also known as MARGENE
K. BLASHKIW, FREDRIC D. AINSWORTH, also
known as FREDERIC D. AINSWORTH, LINDA K.
AINSWORTH, and DIXIE JEAN SCHULTZ,
Defendants/Counterplaintiffs-
Appellees,
LC No. 2022-000182-CH
and
MICHAEL D. MOORE and BETSY M. MOORE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and YOUNG and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Ronald Packer and Robin Packer (collectively, the Packers or
plaintiffs) initiated this property action against certain neighbors owning back-lot properties within
the Arhana Crest Subdivision (the Plat) in Yankee Springs Township, alleging that defendants’
use of a lakefront neighborhood park (Park A, or the park) interfered with plaintiffs’ riparian1
rights. Defendants Margene K. Tagg, Frederic D. and Linda K. Ainsworth, and Dixie Jean Schultz
1 We recognize that “[s]trictly speaking, land which includes or abuts a river is defined as riparian,
while land which includes or abuts a lake is defined as littoral.” Thies v Howland, 424 Mich 282,
288 n 2; 380 NW2d 463 (1985). However, “the term ‘riparian’ is often used to describe both types
of land, and will be used in such a manner in this opinion.” 2000 Baum Family Trust v Babel, 488
Mich 136, 138 n 1; 793 NW2d 633 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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filed a counterclaim, alleging in relevant part that they held riparian rights to the park or, in the
alternative, that they were entitled to use the park by virtue of an easement. These defendants also
alleged that plaintiffs may be encroaching on those rights or trespassing by building beyond their
own property line and onto the park. On February 12, 2024, the trial court entered an order
regarding the parties’ cross-motions for summary disposition, holding in part that “those properties
that are separated from the lake only by the Park have riparian rights.” Following a bench trial on
the remaining issues, the trial court held that Tagg, Schultz, the Ainsworths, and the owner of Lot
60 “own the land under Park A” and, alternatively, have a prescriptive easement affording them
various allowable uses of Park A, including continued use of the four-fingered dock currently
present at Park A.
Plaintiffs appealed, raising numerous claims, which we distill into two questions to answer:
(1) what are the parties’ legal rights with respect to Park A, and (2) what is the scope of those
rights? In answering these questions, we vacate in part and reverse in part the trial court’s ruling
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Plat was created in 1941 and runs adjacent to Barlow Lake (the lake). It contains 60
lots and four parks; each of the parties own properties located within the Plat. This litigation
specifically involves the ownership rights and permissible uses of Park A. Park A and the
properties of all involved parties to this litigation are highlighted below on the relevant portion of
the map of the Plat:
The Plat Dedication states that “the drives, courts and parks as shown on said plat are
dedicated to the use of lot owners of Arhana Crest only.” It is uncontested that all Plat lot owners
are entitled to “use” the four platted parks, including Park A, but the parties disagree as to who
owns Park A and the scope of ownership/usage rights. The Packers own Lot 3 in the Plat. It is
immediately adjacent to Park A and also has its own separate lakefront. Gerriet Bekkering owns
Lot 60, a sliver of Lot 59, and Lot 2. Schultz owns Lot 55, Tagg owns Lots 56 and 57, the
Figure 1 - Image of Plat Dedication

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Ainsworths own Lot 58 and part of Lot 59, and the Moores own Lots 52, 53, and 54. Each of these
parties purchased their properties in the Plat at different times, as further described in the trial
testimony below.
The Packers bought their property in 2011 from the Wustmans and built and moved into
their home in 2013. By the spring of 2018, Robin Packer had noticed increased activity on Park
A that she found concerning. Robin went to Yankee Springs Township to complain and reviewed
the Plat Dedication and Yankee Springs Zoning Ordinance for the first time. Robin believed that
defendants’ placement and use of docks and boats at Park A violated Section 3.8 and Article XVIII
of the Zoning Ordinance. Specifically, Robin claimed that Section 3.8C “does not permit multi-
family (i.e., more than one family) uses or activities within the . . . Zoning District” and that Article
XVIII “prohibit[ed] the type of dockage and boat mooring, docking, and storage by Defendants on
or at Park A.”
Per Robin’s request, Yankee Springs Township notified defendants that they were violating
the Zoning Ordinance and asked them to remove their docks and boats from Park A. None of
defendants responded, nor did they remove their docks or boats from Park A. The Township took
no further action, and the Packers filed this suit in 2022.
The Parties’ Claims And Cross-Motions For Summary Disposition
Plaintiffs filed their complaint, alleging the following claims against defendants:
Count I: Declaratory Relief/The Improper Use of Park A by Defendants Exceeding the
Scope of the Dedication
Count II: Declaratory Judgment/Misuse of Park A by Defendants
Count III: Interference with the Packers’ Riparian Rights
Count IV: Declaratory Judgment/Ownership of the Land of Park A
Count V: Violation of the Yankee Springs Township Zoning Ordinance
Count VI: Trespass
Count VII: Nuisance
Count VIII: Violation of State Law – Failure to Obtain a State Permit for the Permanent
Piers
Count IX: Violation of State law – Failure to Obtain a Marina Permit
Count X: The Little v Kin Balancing Test
Count XI: Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief

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In response, defendants filed a counterclaim2 against plaintiffs, alleging:
Count I (sic): Ownership of Park A with alleged riparian rights by Defendants Tagg,
Schultz, and Ainsworth3
Count II: Prescriptive Easement
Count III: Adverse Possession
Count III (sic): Acquiescence
Count IV: Trespass
Count V: Violation of Plat Restrictions
Count VII (sic): Swim Raft
The parties conducted discovery and then filed cross-motions for summary disposition.
Plaintiffs argued that defendants are back-lot owners with no riparian rights and that plaintiffs, as
waterfront owners, do hold riparian rights. Under Michigan law, they claimed, defendants have
no right to “maintain a marina or install or use docks, boat hoists, etc. within [Park A]” and
defendants “do not have the right to moor, dock, store, etc. boats or watercraft overnight.”
Plaintiffs argued that the case upon which defendants relied to support their position, Dobie v
Morrison, 227 Mich App 536; 575 NW2d 817 (1998), was factually distinguishable because the
configuration of Park A in the Plat here is different than the configuration of the park and plat in
that case. Plaintiffs also argued that defendants’ use of the park violated the Zoning Ordinance
and constituted a nuisance per se, and that defendants “cannot expand their normal common law
usage rights as to the platted park via a prescriptive easement.” Further, plaintiffs argued that
defendants’ use of Park A violated the corelative rights of other lot owners and that their uses
overburdened plaintiffs’ servient rights. Finally, plaintiffs argued that defendants’ “uses and
activities constitute a ‘marina’ under Michigan law for which they do not have the required state
permit.”
Defendants’ motion for summary disposition conversely argued that the defendants have
riparian rights to “most all of Park A.” Specifically, either the properties immediately abutting the
park had riparian rights by virtue of Park A being lakefront or they had a prescriptive easement by
virtue of their continuous control and operation of Park A.
2 References to the counterclaim throughout this opinion refer to the First Amended
Countecomplaint filed by defendants on August 1, 2023. We use the proper term “counterclaim.”
See MCR 2.110(A) (defining a “pleading” as including a “counterclaim”).
3 Count I in the counterclaim did not have a title, but the phrasing provided here for this count was
used by the trial court and is an accurate reflection of the claim asserted based on the corresponding
allegations.

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The trial court heard the parties’ cross-motions for summary disposition on January 2,
2024. After hearing arguments, the trial court stated its findings from the bench. The court began
by criticizing plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish Dobie on the basis that the park in that case ran
parallel to the properties and lake at issue, as opposed to here, where Park A is perpendicular to
the lake. The court found that plaintiffs’ factual distinction was without legal import. It continued:
Dobie says [if] your property is separated from the lake by a park then you have
those riparian rights. So, in applying Dobie to this case, I think the . . . proper
finding is that those properties that are separated from the lake only by the park
have riparian rights.
Thus, according to the court, it remained to be decided “[w]hether the [defendants] in this case
have by virtue of exercising riparian rights, have made it so that no one else who has the right to
use the easement can use the easement.”
Following the hearing, the trial court issued a written order granting summary disposition
to plaintiffs on Count III (sic) (Acquiescence) and Count V (Violation of Plat Restrictions) of the
counterclaim, and granting summary disposition, in part, to defendants on Count I (sic)
(Ownership of Park) of the counterclaim. Specifically, the court ruled that “those properties that
are separated from the lake only by the Park have riparian rights.” All other claims were preserved
for trial. The case proceeded to a six-day bench trial on the remaining claims beginning on
February 12, 2024.
Bench Trial
At trial, Robin Packer testified that over the past several years, she became concerned by
changes she observed at Park A. Specifically, Robin did not like that “there were more boats . . .
There was more traffic. There [were] more trucks coming down. There was more on the beach.”
In the spring of 2018, before going to the Township, Robin noticed that a then-resident, Paul
Dykgraaf, added an extension to his dock and “install[ed] a shore station[4] and had a wake boat.”
When asked whether and how the increased activity at Park A personally affected Robin, she
replied,
Yes. I could see that it was starting to become over-burdened. There was more –
there just never seemed to be an end to more stuff going in. And we thought we
didn’t have any rules so what was to stop them. That’s why I started to inquire
about what the rules were and how to protect from all the stuff being stored on the
beach because we couldn’t walk the beach. My grandkids couldn’t fish. Or there
was a swim – we could use the swim raft; we couldn’t see them because all the
boats were in the way. It was – and with all their traffic and the boats or the trucks
4 ShoreStation is a brand of boat lift: “A boat lift, like a ShoreStation boat lift, can be used to lift
a boat out of the water and hold the boat in a cradle above the dock.” What Is The Advantage Of
A ShoreStation Boat Lift? Recreational Services, LLC
<https://www.recreationalservicesllc.com/what-is-the-advantage-of-a-shorestation-boat-lift/>
(accessed July 29, 2026).

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coming, the fishing boats parking there. There was just more, every – every year it
was getting more and more.
Robin was also concerned by what she perceived as an inability to “spray” for weeds in the areas
that are covered by boats. She did not like that anyone was launching boats from the park. Robin
stated that if the trial court did not find Zoning Ordinance violations by defendants, she at least
hoped it would “determine rules for the park.” Furthermore, if the trial court allowed docks to
remain at the park, Robin wanted the court to impose the restriction of “[a] single boat – a single
dock.” On cross-examination, Robin clarified that the swim raft referenced in Count VII (sic) of
the complaint “doesn’t matter to [her]. So, it can stay.” She did not recall if she saw boats or a
dock in the water at the time plaintiffs bought their property. Robin testified that plaintiffs “have
riparian rights” and should not “have to share [their] property.”
Ronald Packer testified that he and Robin bought their home from the Wustman family in
2011. Up until 2018, there were only four pontoons, a rowboat, and a paddle boat at Park A;
Ronald did not have any concerns during that time. Then in spring 2018, Dykgraaf put in a boat
lift and extended the dock. Ronald did not believe that defendants should have boats at Park A
and objected to launching boats at the park. Ronald testified that the shore station installed by
Dykgraaf blocked his view and was “very disturbing” which is why plaintiffs initiated this suit.
He believed defendants’ use of the park had a negative effect on his property. Similar to Robin,
Ronald wanted “rules for the park.” He also did not mind the swim raft remaining at Park A.
When plaintiffs purchased the property, Ronald “didn’t notice [the docks] but [he] assume[d] they
were there.”
Each of defendants testified at trial, as well as some nonparty current and former Arhana
Crest residents; Schultz was first. Schultz purchased her properties in the Plat in 1968. Schultz
received a deed for Lots 55, 56, and 57. She built a house on Lots 56 and 57 that she later sold to
Tagg. Schultz was told by the seller when she bought the property that she was allowed to install
a dock at Park A. When Schultz first moved in, no one was using Park A, and there was a sunken
rowboat, trash, glass, and cans along the shoreline. In 1973, Schultz and her husband cleaned up
Park A and installed a straight dock that then turned into a “T” shape and later turned into a two-
finger dock. There was another dock installed by then-neighbor Ben Card in or around 1993—
meaning there was a two-finger dock and Card’s straight dock for some time until Card moved out
and took the dock with him. Schultz had various boats in the water beginning in 1979, including
a speed boat and a pontoon. In 1992, when her husband died, she removed the speed boat briefly
from the water, but her pontoon remained in the water. The speed boat was put back shortly after.
Schultz said the boats and docks have never interfered with anyone else and that the dock stays in
year-round. She described the area surrounding Park A as a “friendly environment” where
everyone got along and “never had problems” until plaintiffs moved in. All the neighbors would
contribute to making repairs and changes to the dock over time. Schultz always had a boat at Park
A until 2021, when she was diagnosed with a debilitating disease that paralyzed her.
Current Arhana Crest resident and nonparty to this case, Dwain Reynolds, testified that he
has been acquainted with the Plat for 63 years, as his parents bought the first lakefront property in
1954 near a different park in the Plat, Park C. Reynolds has had a boat and dock at Park C since
his parents first bought it and testified that the man who sold them the house previously had a dock
as well. Reynolds testified there have been docks at Park B as well since the 1960s and that Park

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D has a dock and a boat launch resulting from previous litigation. According to Reynolds, “when
you bought a back lot, whoever sold you the lot informed you that the parkways are for your use
and to put a dock and a boat in. And that’s been that way since the 50s.”
Dykgraaf bought his property (Lots 52, 53, and 54) from Paul Novara in November 2017
and sold it to the Moores in fall 2021. Dykgraaf testified that he bought the property specifically
because he was told that he could have a dock and a boat. When he sold to the Moores, Dykgraaf
told them that they could dock a boat at Park A too. Dykgraaf kept a boat lift and a boat at the
dock during the four summers he lived in the Plat until selling his property and moving out of
Arhana Crest. Plaintiffs complained, and Dykgraaf tried to accommodate them by moving the
boat as far down as possible. Dykgraaf and Fred Ainsworth would maintain the park by mowing
it, raking leaves, and putting in new sand. The atmosphere was friendly among all the neighbors
with the exception of plaintiffs. Other people would launch their boats at the park and the
Ainsworths, Schultz, and Tagg all kept their boats there too.
Tagg bought her property (Lots 56 and 57) from Schultz and her husband in July 1978.
Tagg testified that Schultz told her when she bought the property that she could use the dock and
have a boat at Park A. In 1979, Tagg bought a speedboat that she kept at the dock for over 20
years. Tagg also had a rowboat that she kept in the water since 1978 but recently took it out
because she “wanted to make the Packers happy.” Tagg’s son has kept a boat at the dock during
the times that Tagg has not had a boat there. Tagg never heard any of the neighbors complain
about others’ uses of Park A other than plaintiffs.
Former Plat resident Brad Harmon testified that he purchased his property from the
Wustmans in 2003 and that he sold to the Novaras in 2014. Harmon specifically bought his
property because the Wustmans told him that he would “have lake access and . . . a boat and [there
was] a dock down [at Park A] so [he] could use the dock.” Harmon also read the Plat Dedication
and understood the language as giving him the right to have boats and docks. He put his boat in
the water the first spring that he lived in the Plat (2004) and kept his boat in the water “the whole
time he lived there.” Harmon helped modify the dock to resemble its current form (four-fingered),
in 2005. He testified that the four-fingered model was constructed so that all the neighbors could
fit their boats at the dock “for safety reasons.” Harmon testified that there was plenty of room for
everyone to swim and fish and that no one ever had safety concerns. People would launch their
boats from the park in the spring and fall. Harmon explained that he ultimately moved because
“the Packers built a house in front of [him].” When Harmon sold to the Novaras in 2014, he
“explained [the park] the same way it was explained to [him],” meaning, “[t]here’s the dock, this
is where you put your boat, this is a shared access for these people on the Arhana Crest plot, these
people use it, they will have parties, everybody gets along, use it.”
Michael Moore testified that he bought his property (Lots 52, 53, and 54) from Dykgraaf
in 2021 and put his boat in the water during spring 2022. Having a boat and using the dock at Park
A was one of the main reasons that Moore bought the property. No one ever told Moore that he
could not keep his boat at the park until he received a letter from “an attorney asking [him] to
remove [his] boat once [he] had placed it.” The park is well-maintained, primarily by Fred
Ainsworth, and the codefendant neighbors are very friendly.

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Fred Ainsworth testified that he purchased his property from Ben Card in 1994. He has
always had a dock at the park since moving in and there was an existing dock there prior to him
moving in. He remembered Card had a boat in the water when the Ainsworths bought the house
and that Card left the rowboat and swim raft for them to keep as part of the purchase. Ainsworth
always understood that the neighbors in the Plat had shared access to the park and he had always
observed boats there. Decisions about the park or dock or boats are always made “as a committee”
by the defendants and its always “worked great.” Ainsworth has always launched his boat from
the park and has observed others doing the same. He has never heard anyone complain about
dangerous conditions at Park A. Ainsworth installed a shore station at some point, but that was
only after plaintiffs installed theirs. He made sure to put the shore station on the other side of the
dock to accommodate plaintiffs by not blocking their view. The Ainsworths got a survey of the
park done which indicated that plaintiffs’ dock crossed over the property line onto Park A. In
2005, Ainsworth worked with Harmon to remodel the prior three-fingered dock into a the current
four-fingered version there today. Ainsworth reviewed exhibits presented at trial consisting of
photos of the park from 2004 through 2006 and confirmed the conditions of the park, observing
the Wustmans’ boat and Ainsworths’ jet ski, and a 30 to 40 foot area to swim. Ainsworth
confirmed that he received the township’s September 2020 letter which claimed that defendants
were violating the Zoning Ordinance, but that Ainsworth believed the boats and docks could
remain based on his communications with his attorney.
Two expert witnesses testified at trial. Greg Vaughn testified as an expert in surveying for
defendants. Based on his review of the Plat and a survey of the land, Vaughn opined that Lots 55,
56, 57, 58, 59, and 60 (those belonging Schultz, Tagg, the Ainsworths, and Bekkering) are riparian
“due to the fact that they have frontage on Park A.” Vaughn opined that Lots 52, 53, and 54 (those
belonging to the Moores) do not have riparian rights, but that they have rights to use Park A as
property owners in the Plat. Vaughn confirmed that he reviewed the Dobie decision and that much
of his expert opinion was based on his interpretation of Dobie. The second expert witness, Corey
Hughes, testified as an expert in surveying for plaintiffs. Hughes stated he was unaware of any
authority that would give riparian rights to defendants. Hughes’ opinion was based on
MCLA 560.227(a), a statute that did not reference parks specifically, but rather vacated streets and
alleyways.
The parties delivered closing arguments, and the trial court stated its findings and
conclusions from the bench. The trial court ruled in favor of defendants on nearly all issues. On
Counts I and II, the court reiterated its previous ruling on summary disposition that Tagg, Schultz,
the Ainsworths, and non-party Bekkering have riparian rights based on Dobie. It stated that,
alternatively, should the Court of Appeals disagree with the trial court’s interpretation of Dobie,
“the Defendants have a prescriptive easement for shared use of Park A for the maintaining of docks
and docking of boats.” Specifically, the court found “by clear and cogent evidence” that the docks
and boats have been “open, notorious, adverse, and continuous for the required 15 years. Much
more than the required 15 years.” On Count III of plaintiff’s complaint, the court found there was
no evidence showing that defendants had interfered with plaintiffs’ riparian rights. The court
found no cause of action as to Count IV, the claim for plaintiffs having ownership of Park A,
because the case law plaintiffs used to support their position “related to the vacation of streets and
walkways, not to parks.” It held there was no cause of action for Count V, alleging violations of
the Zoning Ordinance, because plaintiffs failed to show special injury. Plaintiffs failed to show
evidence to support their assertions of safety hazards and decreased property value and made no

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showing of trespass on Count VI. There was no evidence to support Count VII, claim of nuisance
per se. Plaintiffs also failed to show that defendants’ failure to maintain a permit for a marina
constituted any violation of law because plaintiffs failed to show the existence of a marina and
plaintiffs also admitted they do not take their docks in or have a permit either. Thus, Counts VIII
and IX failed.
Turning to the counterclaim, the court held that defendants’ use of Park A is not limited to
ingress and egress for Count I. It reiterated that a prescriptive easement existed under Count II. It
found no cause of action on Count III because adverse possession was not argued at trial. On
Count IV for trespass, the court stated the evidence was conflicting and therefore ordered that a
survey be conducted to determine whether or not plaintiffs’ dock is encroaching on Park A. Should
the survey reveal that plaintiffs’ dock is encroaching on Park A, the court would require plaintiffs
to remove their dock and pay the costs of the survey. For Count VII (sic) regarding the swim raft,
the court stated that the issue was abandoned at trial and that the raft “will be allowed to continue.”
The court turned next to apply the Little v Kin, 468 Mich 699; 664 NW2d 749 (2003) (Little II),
balancing test which is alleged in Count X of plaintiffs’ complaint, finding that the shared dock
had worked for many years. The court also denied injunctive relief sought in Count XI.
Following these rulings, the court outlined its findings regarding defendants’ rights with
regard to the use of the park and certain restrictions that it was imposing on the use of the park.
The trial court entered its final judgment on April 2, 2024. The judgment provided for the
following:
● A judgment of “no cause of action” on Counts I through IX of plaintiffs’
complaint;
● With respect to Count X of plaintiffs’ complaint (and the Little II balancing
test), the following “allowable and prohibited uses of Park A”:
(i) The defendants may continue to share the four-fingered dock
currently present at Park A.
(ii) Boats can be launched from Park A with vehicles, however, those
vehicles cannot be parked at Park A. There can be no day or
overnight parking of vehicles at Park A.
(iii) On a seasonal basis and not on a year-round basis, defendants may
only moor the number of boats that can be accommodated by the
four-finger dock in its current configuration.
(iv) The defendants cannot enlarge the four-fingered dock at Park A,
however, the defendants may reduce the size of the dock at Park A.
(v) The swim raft may continue to be present at Park A.
(vi) Park A may be maintained by the defendants and other lot owners
in the Plat of Arhana Crest, which includes that Park A may be
mowed, and flowers, bushes and trees may be planted. However,

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the planting of flowers, bushes and trees cannot interfere with the
reasonable use of Park A by an Arhana Crest lot owner.
(vii) The firepit may remain at Park A.
(viii) A reasonable number of picnic tables and chairs may be left
overnight at Park A for picnicking and lounging by Arhana Crest lot
owners.
(ix) In the event of special events, while additional chairs and tables may
be brought in for those special events, those additional chairs and
tables may not be maintained at Park A overnight and are limited to
“day use” only.
(x) No one may store boats, including paddle boats and rowboats,
kayaks, jet skis, or other watercraft items etc. in or on Park A, its
beach, or its shoreline.
(xi) No boat hoists or shore stations are allowed at the dock at Park A or
in or on Park A.
● With respect to Count XI of plaintiffs’ complaint, granting relief in favor of
plaintiffs “only as set forth above as respects Count X or otherwise as set
forth by the Court in its rulings for the reasons set forth from the Bench on
March 1, 2024,” and otherwise entering a judgment of “no cause of action.”
● Denying plaintiffs’ motion to strike the affidavit and testimony of
defendant’s expert witness, Greg Vaughn.
As for defendants’ counterclaim, the judgment provided for the following:
● With respect to Count I of defendants’ counterclaim, the court previously
granted summary disposition to defendants on the issue of ownership of
riparian rights to Park A as set forth in its February 12, 2024 order.
● With respect to Count II of defendants’ counterclaim, the court ruled
alternately in favor of defendants “for the reasons set forth from the Bench
on March 1, 2024.”
● A judgment of “no cause of action” on Count III.
● With respect to Counts III (sic) and Count V of defendants’ counterclaim
the court previously granted summary disposition to plaintiffs in its
February 12, 2024 order.
● With respect to Count IV of the counterclaim, the court ruled that a survey
should be performed to determine whether plaintiffs’ dock encroaches on
the bottomlands of Park A and that if the survey shows that plaintiffs’ dock

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is on the bottomlands of Park A, plaintiffs would be required to pay for the
survey and move their dock onto their own lot’s bottomlands. However, if
the survey shows that plaintiffs’ dock is not on the bottomlands of Park A,
plaintiffs would not need to move their dock and defendants would be
required to pay for the survey.
● With respect to Count VII (sic) of the counterclaim, the court ruled that the
swim raft at issue may remain.
● The court ruled that all lot owners in the Plat of Arhana Crest have easement
usage rights in and through Park A to the lake (except that defendants Tagg,
Schultz, the Ainsworths and the owner of Lot 60 own the land under Park
A that is subject to the easement).
Plaintiffs appealed.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT THE BACK-LOT OWNERS HAVE
RIPARIAN RIGHTS BY VIRTUE OF FEE OWNERSHIP OF PARK A
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). Under
MCR 2.116(C)(10), summary disposition is appropriate “if there is no genuine issue regarding any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Patrick v Turkelson,
322 Mich App 595, 605; 913 NW2d 369 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Because
a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint, the circuit court
must consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by
the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.”
Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 491 Mich 200, 206; 815 NW2d 412 (2012).
At the summary disposition phase, the trial court found that “that those properties that are
separated from the lake only by the Park have riparian rights,” meaning all defendants’ properties
had riparian rights except for the Moores’ back-lot property that did not border Park A. Because
the trial court misread Dobie in reaching this conclusion, we vacate this portion of the trial court’s
ruling.
In Dobie, the park in question, like Park A, had lake frontage and also bordered lots in the
subdivision. Id at 537. The plaintiffs in Dobie owned Lot 17, which unlike this case was not
waterfront property per se, as Lot 17 was separated from the water by a park. Id. The defendants,
referred to as back-lot owners, were separated from the waterfront park by Lot 17 itself or other
additional land and roads. Id. This Court reviewed the applicable plat dedication language, which
provided that the park was for the “use of the owners of the lots in this plat which have no lake
frontage” to determine the plattors’ intent as to the ownership and related rights of the park. Id. at
540. The plat was silent as to ownership of the park, but at the time of the dedication, the park
was owned by the plattors, who resided on Lot 17. Id. This Court concluded that the plattors
intended merely to grant an easement to properties without lake frontage and that they intended to
retain fee ownership of the park. Id. Because the plaintiffs in Dobie were direct successors to the
plattors, they owned the park. Id. And because they owned the park, they had riparian rights. Id.

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While we agree with the trial court that the factual distinction plaintiffs emphasize between
the Dobie plat and this plat (namely, the shape of the park) is unavailing, the trial court overlooked
the critical legal conclusion that the Dobie plaintiffs were the owners in fee of the park by virtue
of their being “successors in interest to the plattors” and the fact that the plat dedication did not
indicate otherwise. Dobie was not a generalized grant of riparian rights to all properties separated
from waterfront by a park.5 To the contrary, the Court in Dobie expressly distinguished a
waterfront park from a right of way along the water like a highway or walkway; only the latter was
recognized as not cutting off the adjoining landowner’s riparian rights. Id. at 539-540.
We vacate this legally erroneous conclusion as to the ownership of Park A and thus the
parties’ riparian rights that would flow from such ownership. Moreover, even if those defendants
whose parcels abut the park were determined to be fee owners of portions of the park, we see no
scenario in which those portions would extend to the lakefront so as to convey riparian rights. See,
e.g., Morse v Colitti, 317 Mich App 526; 896 NW2d 15 (2016); Otto v Batdorfer, unpublished per
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 17, 2022 (Docket No. 355936). With
that said, we decline to engage further in the ownership question because, as the parties conceded
at oral argument, we need not decide the ownership of Park A to resolve this case. See Kosmyna
v Botsford Cmty Hosp, 238 Mich App 694, 702; 607 NW2d 134 (1999) (“This Court may decline
to address issues not necessary to the resolution of the case at hand.”).
III. THE PLAT DEDICATION EASEMENT DOES NOT GIVE DEFENDANTS THE RIGHT
TO MOOR OR DOCK BOATS AT THE PARK
“The scope and extent of an easement is generally a question of fact that is reviewed for
clear error on appeal.” Wiggins v Burton, 291 Mich App 532, 550; 805 NW2d 517 (2011).
Likewise, a “trial court’s factual findings in a bench trial are reviewed for clear error.” Prentis
Family Foundation v Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Institute, 266 Mich App 39, 59; 698 NW2d
900 (2005). Further, we review a trial court’s conclusions of law in a bench trial de novo. Chelsea
Inv Group, LLC v Chelsea, 288 Mich App 239, 250; 792 NW2d 781 (2010).
“When interpreting a plat, this Court seeks to effectuate the intent of the plattor.” Morse,
317 Mich App at 534. The intent of plattors is determined by the language they used. Thies v
Howland, 424 Mich 282, 293; 380 NW2d 463 (1985). The Plat Dedication in Arhana Crest states
that “the drives, courts and parks as shown on said plat are dedicated to the use of lot owners of
Arhana Crest only.” “Because language dedicating land for ‘the use’ of others is consistent with
a grant of an easement, not a grant of fee ownership, the plat granted an easement in the Park.”
Morse, 317 Mich App at 534 (citations omitted). And, given the Plat Dedication date of 1941, an
irrevocable easement was created in favor of the Arhana Crest lot owners. Little v Hirschman, 469
5 The Plat Dedication language here resembles that in Dobie in that the dedication is silent as to
ownership of the park. Given this Court’s holding in Dobie that the fee title remained with the
plattor or the successor to the plattor, id. at 540, we cannot conclude that by merely sharing a
border with the park, all defendant property owners except the Moores would have fee ownership
rights to Park A, all the way to the lakefront.

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Mich 553, 561-562; 677 NW2d 319 (2004).6 “The private dedication became irrevocable on the
sale of the lots.” Id. at 558-559. “A landowner is considered to have accepted any private
dedication in a plat when property is purchased pursuant to a deed that references the plat.” Beach
v Lima Twp, 283 Mich App 504, 510-511; 770 NW2d 386 (2009) (citation omitted).
Further, caselaw provides some parameters on activities included under the word “use,”
and “use” of a waterfront park does not include mooring and docking boats. Mooring and docking
boats are riparian rights. See Thies, 424 Mich at 288 (riparian owners enjoy “the right to erect and
maintain docks along the owner’s shore, and the right to anchor boats permanently off the owner’s
shore”). A deeded easement does not include riparian rights. See Little v Kin, 249 Mich App 502,
509; 644 NW2d 375 (Little I) (“a deed reservation or restriction does not constitute a grant of
riparian rights, but merely a right of way to access the beach and waters”); see also Schofield v
Dingman, 261 Mich 611, 613; 247 NW 67 (1933) (a grant of “riparian rights” in a deed “can be
given no greater meaning than right of access to the beach and enjoyment thereof for the purposes
of recreation”).
Additionally, there is no record evidence that the plattors intended, at the time the Plat
Dedication was enacted, that all lot owners would have use of Park A that resembled riparian
rights, including mooring boats and installing docks and boat lifts. While ample evidence was
presented as to how the property was used by defendants historically, that evidence only speaks to
the property usage from the 1960s through today, beginning with Schultz purchasing her first
property in 1968. Although Schultz testified about her consistent dock and boat usage since
moving into the Plat, there is no indication that the activities she described were occurring at the
time the easement was granted in 1941. The very earliest testimony came from Reynolds, who
stated that his parents first bought property in 1954, but again that comes 13 years after the Plat
Dedication was enacted. Reynolds did not testify at any point about the plattors themselves or
their intent. Generic testimony regarding the activities at Park A at some time after the Plat
Dedication was written is not sufficient to establish “that the disputed activities are properly within
the scope of the plat dedication.” Jacobs v Lyon Twp (After Remand), 199 Mich App 667, 671-
672; 502 NW2d 382 (1993).
Accordingly, although defendants (and all lot owners in the Plat) hold an easement to use
Park A, we conclude that the plain language of the Plat Dedication providing the easement does
not permit defendants to use the park in the way that riparian owners may (e.g., mooring and
6 “There is a distinction between pre-1968 private dedications and ones contained in plats filed
thereafter, which is that a private dedication made before 1967 PA 288 took effect conveyed an
irrevocable easement, whereas MCL 560.253(1) now indicates that a private dedication conveys a
fee interest. . . . ’ ” Beach v Lima Twp, 283 Mich App 504, 510; 770 NW2d 386 (2009), quoting
Martin v Beldean, 469 Mich 541, 548 n 18; 677 NW2d 312 (2004). “But even though a fee simple
interest is conveyed, lot owners in the subdivision cannot use the dedicated land for any purpose
they desire. Rather, use must be compatible and consistent with the dedicatory language.” Beach,
citing Martin, 469 Mich at 549 n 19.

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docking boats). The trial court, however, found that defendants had established a prescriptive
easement that allowed them to engage in these riparian activities. We turn to that conclusion next.
IV. DEFENDANTS FAILED TO ESTABLISH AN EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION
“An easement by prescription results from use of another’s property that is open, notorious,
adverse, and continuous for a period of fifteen years.” Plymouth Canton Community Crier, Inc v
Prose, 242 Mich App 676, 679; 619 NW2d 725 (2000). “Thus, a prescriptive easement is ‘no
more than an unopposed, continuous trespass [on another’s property] for 15 years.” Astemborski
v Manetta, 341 Mich App 190, 198; 988 NW3d 857 (2022) (citation omitted). “Mere permissive
use of another’s property . . . will not create a prescriptive easement.” Plymouth Canton, 242 Mich
App at 679. “An action for a prescriptive easement is equitable in nature. This Court reviews de
novo the trial court’s holdings in equitable actions.” Mulcahy v Verhines, 276 Mich App 693, 698;
742 NW2d 393 (2007).
Given that there is a private dedication giving an easement to all Arhana Crest property
owners, an initial question is whether one can expand the parameters of that easement by an
additional prescriptive easement. Both parties point this Court to Astemborski for the answer.
In Astemborski, a back-lot property owner had an easement to access a lake through a
servient estate (waterfront property). Astemborski, 341 Mich App at 193-194. The waterfront
property owners allowed the back-lot property owner greater rights, including the docking and
mooring of boats, thereby granting that specific back-lot property owner a license. Id. at 201-202.
When the back-lot owner’s property was sold, that license ended under the law. Id. However, the
next owners continued to use the servient estate in a similar way, thus expanding what was a mere
“use” easement to something that resembled a use that would flow from riparian rights. Id. at 202.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants could not expand their rights merely by overusing an
express shared-access easement. Id. at 203. The trial court held, and this Court affirmed, that
“defendants established by clear and cogent evidence that they had a prescriptive easement.” Id.
at 204.
Astemborski does differentiate in what is arguably dicta between an easement granted
privately and an easement through dedication of land:
Plaintiffs also cite several unpublished opinions to support their argument.
However, unpublished opinions are not binding authority. Cox v Hartman, 322
Mich App 292, 307; 911 NW2d 219 (2017). Moreover, the cases plaintiffs cite are
not persuasive because they involve dedications of land, as opposed to private
easements. See 2000 Baum Family Trust v Babel, 488 Mich 136, 144; 793 NW2d
633 (2010) (“A ‘dedication’ of land is an ‘appropriation of land to some public use,
accepted for such use by or in behalf of the public. The essence of a dedication is
that the covered land will be for the use of the public at large.”) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). [Astemborski, 341 Mich App at 203.]
Plaintiffs, citing the above passage, argue that defendants are foreclosed from expanding
upon an easement granted by private plat dedication. But that argument falls short. As plaintiffs
recognize, in the above passage this Court cited 2000 Baum Family Trust, a case regarding a

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public-dedicated easement. And again, as plaintiffs recognize, “the Legislature has decided that a
claim of adverse possession against state lands is against public policy and, therefore, will not be
recognized.”7 Higgins Lake Prop Owners Ass’n v Gerrish Twp, 255 Mich App 83, 118; 662 NW2d
387 (2003). Plaintiffs point to unpublished cases from this Court and argue, essentially, that that
same bright-line rule applies to private dedicated platted easements. But the cases that plaintiffs
cite ultimately held that the required elements of a prescriptive easement claim were not met. See,
e.g., Banacki v Howe, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 20,
2012 (Docket No. 302778), p 6 (holding “[b]ecause defendants and other lot owners used East
Court for an extended time period openly and without any dispute arising, this permissive and
accepted use of the subject property was not adverse or hostile,[8] and therefore, a prescriptive
easement could not arise”). We need not conclusively decide whether a private-dedicated
easement can be subject to a prescriptive easement because, contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the
required elements of a prescriptive easement claim are also not met here.
The trial court found “by clear and cogent evidence” that the docks and boats have been
“open, notorious, adverse, and continuous for the required 15 years. Much more than the required
15 years.” In reaching that determination, the trial court addressed the elements of prescriptive
easement, finding defendants had met them:
The docks are clearly visible to anyone who is in Park A, is on the lake, who has
any access, they’re easily seeable. The Packers could see them when they
purchased, they – w[ere]n’t important to them at the time so they’re claiming to not
be aware that they were there or not having a conscious understanding that they
were there but they were open and easily discoverable.
They were clearly without permission because no one testified that anyone ever
gave them authority to do so, they all believed that had it by right.
Adverse, contrary to the title owner, not sure anyone even knows who the title
owner is, but they have certainly using that property contrary to the – the dedication
and have been for as long as 50 years in some cases and as little as 28 years in
others. I think the – the least has been 17 years for the Ainsworths I believe – and
continuous.
Regular use, even if it’s not constant, as long as it is regular use, such as seasonal.
These parties have used this property in a manner that is no doubt that the owner’s
7 “The elements necessary to give rise to a prescriptive right are the same as those of title by
adverse possession, with the exception that it does not have to be exclusive.” Marlette Auto Wash,
LLC v Van Dyke SC Properties, LLC, 501 Mich 192, 202-203; 912 NW2d 161 (2018) (citations
omitted).
8 The terms “adverse” and “hostile” are used interchangeably in this context. The term “hostile”
“is a term of art and does not imply ill will.” Plymouth Canton, 242 Mich App at 681 (citation
omitted).

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rights have been invaded. Anyone who was at the park who is on the lake, on that
side of the lake, could see that these docks were there, that these boats were there.
Even accepting as true that all other elements of a prescriptive easement claim were met,
the trial court found “clear and cogent evidence” that defendants’ use of the park was adverse.
Specifically, the trial court found that the use was “contrary to the dedication” and without
permission. We agree with that conclusion in part—as we stated above, defendants’ use of Park
A was outside the scope of the Plat Dedication language. That alone does not make the possession
adverse, though.
This Court has reiterated the “inarguable proposition that a mutual, permissive use of
another’s land does not constitute adverse use that may ripen into a prescriptive easement.”
Plymouth Canton, 242 Mich App at 683. See also Wood v Denton, 53 Mich App 435, 441; 219
NW2d 798 (1974) (holding that consensual, “mutual use of an area will not mature into a
prescriptive easement until the mutuality has ended”).
By defendants’ own testimony, the use of Park A was not adverse until some time after the
arrival of plaintiffs. As Schultz described, the area surrounding Park A was a “friendly
environment” where everyone got along and “never had problems” until plaintiffs moved in.
Irrespective of who the owner(s) of Park A were during that time, the shared use of the park in the
manner that proceeded over the years was mutual, consensual, and pursuant to an informal
understanding that all of the landowners abutting the park were entitled to use the park in that
manner. Such “mutual, permissive use of another’s land does not constitute adverse use that may
ripen into a prescriptive easement.” Plymouth Canton, 242 Mich App at 683.
Plaintiffs became concerned about the use of Park A in 2018, complained about
defendants’ use of Park A to the Township in 2020, and filed this suit in 2022. That is an
insufficient duration of adversity to support a claim of prescriptive easement. Even if we were to
assume the myriad uses of Park A outside the scope of the Plat Dedication became adverse the day
the plaintiffs purchased Lot 3, which this record does not support, the period of adversity still
would not satisfy the 15-year period required to establish a prescriptive easement.
As a result, we reverse the trial court’s holding that defendants have a prescriptive easement
and vacate all subsequent findings with respect to the scope of the easement.9 We remand this
case for the trial court to determine what uses of Park A, if any, are within the scope of the Plat
Dedication.
9 We note that the trial court applied the Little II balancing test when reviewing whether defendants
acquired a prescriptive easement. This Court has previously observed that “the language of Little
II, 498 Mich at 700, indicates that it singularly applies to the determination of the scope of an
express easement.” Bloomquist v DePree, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued March 14, 2024 (Docket No. 362167), p 15. We do not address whether the
application of Little II to a prescriptive easement was legal error because, as stated above, we
determine the elements of a prescriptive easement were not met.

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V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we vacate in part and reverse in part the trial court’s ruling and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.10 We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
10 The relief granted obviates the need to address plaintiffs’ remaining arguments. We therefore
decline to address them.

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