COA 370378 PEOPLE OF MI V STEVEN MICHAEL HIGHLAND Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 4/15/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
April 15, 2026
10:50 AM
v No. 370378
Jackson Circuit Court
STEVEN MICHAEL HIGHLAND, LC No. 2023-004346-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: TREBILCOCK, P.J., and BOONSTRA and LETICA, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury trial conviction of operating while visibly impaired
(OWVI) as a third offense, MCL 257.625(3); MCL 257.625(11)(c). The trial court sentenced
defendant, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 365 days’ imprisonment,
followed by 24 months of probation. We affirm.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from a Jackson County resident’s call for emergency services after
discovering defendant passed out behind the wheel of his vehicle. The caller was driving after
dark on November 13, 2022, when he noticed a pickup truck that was “parked in the middle of the
road” with its interior lights on. He saw defendant “slumped over the steering wheel” inside the
truck. The caller turned his vehicle around, parked behind the truck, and activated his vehicle’s
hazard lights.
The caller approached the driver’s side window, knocked several times, and yelled through
the cracked window, but he received no response. He called the police, thinking that defendant
was dead. Because the window was partially down, the caller reached inside, unlocked the door,
and took the keys out of the ignition. He began rubbing defendant’s sternum with his knuckles to
wake him. Defendant woke up momentarily, said that he had been “partying down at the lake and
that he had been drinking,” and then he “nodded back out.” The caller thought that defendant
“stunk” of alcohol.

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Police, fire, and medical services arrived within minutes. Two Jackson County Sheriff’s
Office deputies questioned defendant after he received attention from medical personnel. As
Deputy Zachary Vetor approached the driver’s side window, he detected the smell of alcohol.
Defendant denied that he was intoxicated. He stated that he had taken “Ibuprofen and some blood
pressure medication” but denied taking any controlled substances. Defendant later informed
Deputy Emma Freeman “that he had twenty-four ounces [of alcohol] before the incident.” Deputy
Freeman observed that defendant “was kind of in and out” and “groggy” with “droopy eyelids”
and “thick slurred speech.” She was unable to smell anything at the time because she had not yet
regained her sense of smell after recovering from COVID-19 about a month earlier.
The deputies conducted a standardized field sobriety test. Defendant was unable to
perform the one-legged-stand test or the walk-and-turn test. Deputy Vetor noted that defendant
was “shaky and rocking back and forth,” but he also acknowledged that the weather was cold that
evening. Defendant was unable to complete the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test because he “kept
closing his eyes” and “putting his head down.” Throughout the interaction, defendant appeared
“very restless” and was “unable to hold still” or “follow basic directions.”
Defendant consented to a preliminary breath test (PBT), which produced a result of 0.019%
blood alcohol level. At that point, the deputies suspected that “it was possibly narcotics.” Deputy
Freeman testified that defendant “was very irritable and agitated,” which she described as “a
common sign in someone that’s under the influence of something,” like being drunk or
“intoxicated by a controlled substance.” Defendant also explained to Deputy Freeman that he
drank about 24 ounces of beer when he had dinner at his daughter’s home earlier that night.
Despite the low PBT result, Deputy Freeman placed defendant under arrest for operating while
intoxicated because she believed that defendant exhibited visible signs of impairment. Deputy
Vetor conducted an inventory search of defendant’s vehicle and found multiple prescription
medications in a lunchbox container.
Deputy Freeman transported defendant to the hospital. Defendant refused consent to have
his blood drawn, so Deputy Freeman requested a search warrant. In her warrant affidavit, she
stated, “I made contact with Steven Highland [who] was in the driver’s seat, he admitted to
drinking alcohol, Steven did not know his address or what year it was. Steven kept falling asleep
while rescue personnel was [sic] trying to speak to him. Steven had the smell of intoxicants coming
from his person.” A judge authorized the warrant, so the hospital staff performed the blood draw,
which was about two hours after the PBT test.
Defendant’s blood samples were tested for alcohol and controlled substances but not
prescription medication. Ryan Gifford, a qualified expert in forensic science, testified that no
alcohol was detected in defendant’s blood samples. The test for controlled substances detected
amphetamines at “less than ten nanograms per milliliter” and also indicated the presence of an
unquantified level of methamphetamine.
Dr. Randall Commissaris, a qualified expert in toxicology and pharmacology, stressed that
drug concentration was the primary factor in determining whether a substance affects driving
ability. Commissaris explained that both prescription drugs and nonprescription drugs “can turn
badly and affect driving performance.” Defendant’s prescription drugs could each individually
affect driving ability in high doses, but defendant was prescribed “at the low end for each of those
drugs,” and there was no evidence that he took more than he was prescribed. Because defendant

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yielded a 0.019% result on the PBT and the toxicology report did not detect alcohol, Commissaris
believed that alcohol did not contribute to defendant’s behavior at the time of the incident. He
also explained that methamphetamine and amphetamine are central nervous system stimulants that
would not cause drowsiness or sleepiness. Based on his knowledge of half-lives, he believed that
there must have been less than fifteen nanograms per milliliter of amphetamine in defendant’s
system at the time that the police made contact with defendant. On the basis of his review,
Commissaris believed that alcohol, methamphetamine, and amphetamine did not impair
defendant’s driving performance on the night that he was arrested.
After the close of evidence, the trial court agreed not to instruct the jury regarding any
elements of an OWVI that involved alcohol because the prosecutor did not plan to argue that
defendant was “guilty because of alcohol in his system.” The trial court instructed the jury, in
relevant part, as follows:
The defendant is charged with the crime of operating a motor vehicle while
visibly impaired. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the defendant operated a
motor vehicle. To operate means to drive or have actual physical control of the
vehicle. Second, that the defendant operated the vehicle on a highway or other
place open to the public or generally accessible to motor vehicles including any
designated parking area. Third, that, due to the use or consumption of a controlled
substance/use or consumption—or use of—or use of an intoxicating substance the
defendant drove with less ability than would an ordinary careful driver. The
defendant’s ability to drive must have been lessened to the point that it would have
been noticed by another person. If the defendant’s ability to drive that must have
[sic] been visibly less—it must have been visibly lessened, not the defendant’s
manner of driving, though evidence of the defendant’s manner of driving may be
considered as evidence of the defendant’s ability to drive.
* * *
Intoxicating substance means a substance, preparation or a combination of
substances in preparation other than alcohol or a controlled substance and is either
of the following—that is either of the following recognized as a drug in any of the
following publications or their supplements. The United States, the Official United
States Pharmacopeia, the Official Homeopathic Pharmacopeia of the United States
or the official National Formulary.
The trial court did not provide an instruction on the definition of “controlled substance.” The jury
returned a guilty verdict, and the trial court sentenced defendant, as stated earlier. Defendant now
appeals, arguing that the prosecutor failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.” People v Murphy, 321
Mich App 355, 358; 910 NW2d 374 (2017). “[T]his Court reviews the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecutor to determine whether any trier of fact could find the essential elements
of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 5; 715

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NW2d 44 (2006). “It is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what inferences
may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those
inferences.” Murphy, 321 Mich App at 359 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “This standard
of review is deferential to the fact-finder that weighed the evidence to determine the criminal
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Prude, 513 Mich 377, 385; 15 NW3d
249 (2024). “The scope of review is the same whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial.”
People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
III. ANALYSIS
The Michigan Vehicle Code prohibits individuals from operating motor vehicles under
certain circumstances. The OWVI statute, MCL 257.625(3), prohibits a person from operating a
motor vehicle when, “due to the consumption of alcoholic liquor, a controlled substance, or other
intoxicating substance, or a combination of alcoholic liquor, a controlled substance, or other
intoxicating substance, the person’s ability to operate the vehicle is visibly impaired.” To obtain
a conviction of OWVI, the prosecutor “must present evidence to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that consumption of [alcoholic liquor, a controlled substance, or other intoxicating
substance] weakened or reduced the defendant’s ability to drive such that the defendant drove with
less ability than would an ordinary, careful, and prudent driver.” People v Mikulen, 324 Mich
App 14, 22; 919 NW2d 454 (2018). The evidence must be “visual or observational in nature” and
describe or depict “actions, conduct, characteristics, or movements of the person during the
pertinent time period, revealing an impaired ability to operate a vehicle.” Id. at 24. Unlike the
crime of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, an OWVI conviction does not require the
prosecutor to prove that the defendant “was actually operating his or her vehicle in an impaired or
erratic manner.” Id. Instead, the prosecutor must prove “that the defendant’s ability to operate the
vehicle was visibly impaired by evidence of, for example, the defendant failing a sobriety test, the
defendant stumbling out of a vehicle and unable to walk without falling over, or the defendant
speaking incoherently or in a confused manner.” Id.
In this case, sufficient evidence supported defendant’s OWVI conviction. Although
defendant had no alcohol, a low level of amphetamine, and an unquantified level of
methamphetamine in his system when his blood was drawn, the prosecutor presented evidence that
defendant was visibly intoxicated with testimony describing the witness’s impressions of his
behavior and body-camera footage depicting defendant as shaky, jittery, extremely drowsy, and
unable to comply with basic instructions. Defendant exhibited some behaviors that were consistent
with expert testimony regarding the behavioral effects of stimulants such as methamphetamine
and amphetamine. Even though defendant’s expert witness did not believe that alcohol,
methamphetamine, or amphetamine impaired his driving performance, the jury was “free to
believe or disbelieve, in whole or in part, any of the evidence presented.” People v Perry, 460
Mich 55, 63; 594 NW2d 477 (1999).
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor failed to establish that the drugs or substances
referred to at trial met the statutory definitions of an intoxicating substance or a controlled
substance. An “intoxicating substance” is defined as follows:
(a) “Intoxicating substance” means any substance, preparation, or a
combination of substances and preparations other than alcohol or a controlled
substance, that is either of the following:

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(i) Recognized as a drug in any of the following publications or their
supplements:
(A) The official United States Pharmacopoeia.
(B) The official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States.
(C) The official National Formulary.
(ii) A substance, other than food, taken into a person’s body, including, but
not limited to, vapors of fumes, that is used in a manner or for a purpose for which
it was not intended, and that may result in a condition of intoxication.
[MCL 257.625(25)(a)(i) and (a)(ii).1]
The Motor Vehicle Code adopts the Public Health Code’s definition of “controlled
substance.” MCL 257.8b. The Public Health Code defines “controlled substance” as “a drug,
substance, or immediate precursor included in schedules 1 to 5 of part 72” of the code.
MCL 333.7104(3). This includes any drugs classified as a controlled substance under an
administrative rule. Bloomfield Twp v Kane, 302 Mich App 170, 183-184; 839 NW2d 505 (2013).
Methamphetamine and amphetamine are listed as Schedule II controlled substances.
MCL 333.7214(c)(i) and (ii).
MCL 257.625(3) specifically notes that the intoxication may be “due to the consumption
of” one or any “combination of alcoholic liquor, a controlled substance, or other intoxicating
substance . . . .” Therefore, the prosecutor must prove that defendant consumed at least one of
those listed substances and that the consumption visibly impaired his ability to drive. But this case
is unique because the trial court removed “alcoholic liquor” from its jury instructions. For the jury
to find that the essential elements of the crime (as represented by the trial court) were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecutor had to present evidence that defendant consumed
something that satisfied the definition of “controlled substance” or “intoxicating substance.”
The prosecutor admitted the toxicology report that identified methamphetamine and
amphetamine in defendant’s blood. Deputy Freeman testified that this report related to testing for
controlled substances. Mr. Gifford, the forensic scientist, testified about the results of the report
and the identified presence of both amphetamine and methamphetamine in defendant’s blood. He
described the test as an “LCDOA,” which “stands for Liquid Chromatography Drugs and Abuse”
and which tests for “drugs of abuse.” Many of defendant’s behaviors were also consistent with
the use of methamphetamine or amphetamine.
Although defendant argues on appeal that the prosecutor failed to present any evidence
about whether methamphetamine and amphetamine are classified as controlled substances, he did
not dispute at trial, nor could he have,2 that amphetamine and methamphetamine are both classified
1 The trial court did not instruct the jury on the definition under MCL 257.625(a)(ii) because it
determined that there was insufficient evidence to support a jury instruction on that definition.
2 See MCL 333.7214(c)(i) and (ii).

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as “controlled substances.” He also did not challenge the evidence that the toxicology report
related to testing for controlled substances. Defendant instead presented a defense focused on
challenging whether those substances were of sufficient concentration in defendant’s blood to have
impaired his ability to operate a motor vehicle. Indeed, defendant’s expert, Dr. Commissaris,
acknowledged that methamphetamine and amphetamine are “stina stimulant drugs,” like cocaine,
that affect the central nervous system and that are subject to abuse and illegal use:
But basically methamphetamine and amphetamine like cocaine are CNS stimulant
compounds, central nervous system stimulant compounds. They are useful in
medical practice, but they also have powerfully rewarding affects [sic]. And some
individuals will use them illegally and you can recreationally, you can it call it drug
abuse, when you get to the point where it interferes with their life and things like
that. They are rewarded, they are, but they are stina stimulant drugs which basically
means when you're under the influence of those drugs, when an individual is under
the influence of those drugs they're probably going to see evidence of, at high doses
there's a risk of death from convulsions. There’s a death, a risk of death from
cardiac arrhythmias, heart attack, there's also a strong risk of becoming an addict
and ending up having been drugged sort of rule your life so to speak.
All of this supports the jury’s finding that defendant consumed a controlled substance.
Taken in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to find that defendant’s driving ability was impaired by his consumption of a controlled
substance or an intoxicating substance, and to find defendant guilty of OWVI beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Anica Letica

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