COA 373195 IN RE KATHRYN PLANK REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/9/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
In re KATHRYN PLANK REVOCABLE LIVING
TRUST.
FRANKIE L. HAMILTON and PAULA DUNCAN,
Appellants,
UNPUBLISHED
January 09, 2026
9:45 AM
v No. 373195
Kalkaska Probate Court
MARY WALTERS, Trustee of the REVOCABLE
LIVING TRUST OF KATHRYN PLANK, and RAY
MARENTETTE,
LC No. 22-010745-TT
Appellees.
Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and O’BRIEN and YOUNG, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A probate court may remove a trustee only in accordance with MCL 700.7706(2). Because
the probate court did not provide a factual basis to support any of the statutory reasons for trustee
removal, we vacate the appointment of a new trustee and remand to the probate court for further
proceedings.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kathryn Plank executed the Kathryn Plank Revocable Living Trust (“the Plank Trust”) on
July 31, 2002, and originally named herself as the trustee. Plank has two daughters, Helen
Marentette and Virginia Hamilton, as well as several grandchildren.1 It is unclear from the record
when Helen became Trustee of the Plank Trust, but she voluntarily resigned as Trustee on April
15, 2019. Helen was later found guilty of embezzlement from a vulnerable adult,
1 We refer to the family members or parties involved in this case by their last name except when
they share the same last name as another involved family member or party.

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MCL 750.174a(7)(a) ($100,000 or more), for stealing upwards of $400,000 from the Plank Trust
during her time as Trustee. She was sentenced to two months in jail, and ordered to pay $375,000
in restitution to the Plank Trust.
After Helen’s voluntary resignation, Virginia became Trustee. Plank passed away on
September 12, 2020. As of May 2022, Helen had not paid any restitution money to the Plank
Trust. Virginia petitioned to modify the Plank Trust to remove Helen as a beneficiary because of
the embezzlement conviction and restitution owed, and the probate court treated Helen as if she
had predeceased Plank and removed Helen as a beneficiary. However, the probate court allowed
Helen’s children, Appellees Mary Walters and Ray Marentette, to receive her share of Trust assets.
In March 2023, Walters and Ray moved for the probate court to order Virginia to conduct
a full accounting and inventory of the Plank Trust from April 2019, when she became Trustee,
through September 2020, the month Plank died. The motion stated Walters and Ray requested a
full accounting “on different occasions” since Helen was removed as a beneficiary, and “only
received a hand written inventory and accounting for the year 2019.”
In a responsive pleading, Virginia detailed her responsibilities when she took over as
Trustee in 2019. Virginia became responsible for working with law enforcement to track
remaining assets still owned by the Plank Trust during Helen’s embezzlement trial. She also
became Plank’s caregiver. Virginia relocated Plank from Michigan to Arkansas to care for her,
transitioned Plank into an assisted living facility during the COVID-19 pandemic, took Plank to
all her doctor’s appointments, and prepared the real property held in the Plank Trust in Michigan
for sale, while overseeing the removal and storage of items inside the real property. Virginia’s
response also detailed that ever since Helen was removed as a beneficiary, Virginia had been
working to compile an accounting to turn over to Walters and Ray. Virginia argued she
substantially complied with their requests and provided them with various documents and ledgers
to show the financial activities of the Plank Trust from April 2019 to September 2020, the last year
or so of Plank’s life. Virginia argued she did her best to keep adequate records of the
administration of the Trust, and tried to figure out what accounts were still open and what funds
remained.
The probate court heard oral argument on the motion for an accounting, and remarked that
some of the documents and ledgers Virginia provided were illegible, and she needed to provide
banking records rather than handwritten notes. Virginia was present at the hearing, and stated on
the record there was no money left in the Plank Trust. Nevertheless, the probate court ordered
Virginia to produce an accounting from April 15, 2019 to September 12, 2020, within 60 days.
On August 15, 2023, Virginia, through her counsel, produced an accounting for the Plank Trust.
Virginia passed away on August 30, 2023.
Following Virginia’s death, her daughter, Appellant Paula Duncan, petitioned the probate
court in February 2024 to be appointed as Trustee of the Plank Trust. The petition stated the
administration of the Plank Trust was plagued by complications because of Helen’s embezzlement
and her lack of proper documentation of trust assets, but that Duncan had general knowledge of
the remaining assets and desired to assist in overseeing the proper accounting and distribution of
assets in the Plank Trust. On June 21, 2024, the trial court granted the petition and appointed
Duncan as Trustee, giving her full powers and authority over the Plank Trust. The order stated

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Duncan agreed to “notify the parties as soon as practicable of the remaining assets owned by the
Trust,” and that she agreed to refrain from expending any Trust funds until she notified all parties
of the remaining assets.
On July 10, 2024, counsel for Walters and Ray contacted counsel for Duncan asking
Duncan to “provide an accounting” of Plank Trust assets within 30 days. On August 20, 2024,
counsel for Walters and Ray contacted counsel for Duncan again, stating “we have heard nothing
from your client regarding an analysis. Please be advised that you are given 5 days from the date
of this letter to provide same or we will once again file a Motion.” On September 27, 2024, Walters
and Ray filed a motion to remove Duncan as Trustee of the Plank Trust. The motion stated Walters
should be appointed to provide a full accounting of Plank Trust assets to the probate court. The
motion did not make any legal arguments, and did not include a brief in support, but attached the
letters to Duncan’s counsel as exhibits.
Through counsel, Duncan responded to the motion, stating that on October 11, 2024, she
emailed counsel for Walters and Ray “an accounting of the remaining trust assets” from September
2020 to September 29, 2024, which documented that $2,059.94 remained in the Plank Trust.
Duncan stated no funds were spent since she assumed her role as Trustee, and explained that the
Plank Trust remained open to receive restitution payments from Helen, who still owed $375,000.
Duncan argued she demonstrated responsible stewardship of Plank Trust assets and complied in
full with the probate court’s order appointing her as Trustee.
The probate court heard argument on the motion to remove Duncan as Trustee on October
15, 2024. Counsel for Walters and Ray argued the accounting Duncan provided was “very
simplistic” and not a proper accounting, and “it really is time to appoint someone who can get this
done and finalize this matter.” Duncan’s counsel responded that she complied with the order
appointing her as Trustee, and the accounting she provided was “simplistic” because there was
very little revenue left in the Plank Trust. Walters’ and Ray’s counsel responded that when Plank
was relocated from Michigan to Arkansas to live with Virginia, Plank “was sent out with about
$1.2 million worth of assets,” and Virginia “began to move the assets for her own.” Duncan’s
counsel stated he was unsure where the $1.2 million figure came from and needed evidence that
$1.2 million existed in the first place.
The probate court found that Duncan did very little between being appointed and the
hearing date, and “a full accounting and investigation” was still necessary. The court ultimately
granted the motion to replace Duncan as Trustee, asking:
What would be the harm, if you’re claiming there’s only $2,000 left in the trust,
you know, somebody else to get in there and see what happened with these items
that were taken out or removed from the trust and where it ended up.
The order removing Duncan and appointing Walters as Trustee of the Plank Trust was entered
October 15, 2024.

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Duncan now appeals by right.2
II. ANALYSIS
A. ISSUE PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
For an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must be raised in or addressed by the
trial court. Glasker-Davis v Auvenshine, 333 Mich App 222, 227; 964 NW2d 809 (2020).
Although neither party raised the circumstances listed in MCL 700.7706(2) below and the trial
court did not expressly consider it when granting the motion to remove Duncan and appoint
Walters as Trustee, “appellate consideration is not precluded merely because a party makes a more
developed or sophisticated argument on appeal.” Mueller v Brannigan Bros Restaurants &
Taverns LLC, 323 Mich App 566, 585; 918 NW2d 545 (2018). Duncan’s response to the motion
to remove her as Trustee argued she demonstrated “responsible stewardship of trust assets” and
“complied with the [c]ourt]’s [o]rder appointing her as Trustee.” Affording Duncan “the very
maximal benefit of the doubt,” Mueller, 323 Mich App at 585, her arguments speak to the
responsibility she held as Trustee, allowing us to consider MCL 700.7706(2).
Duncan challenges the probate court’s decision to remove her as Trustee, arguing there are
no facts to support any of the conditions for removal in MCL 700.7706(2). Specifically, she argues
by the time of the hearing on the request for her removal, Duncan provided a list of the remaining
Plank Trust assets as of the date she became Trustee and through the date of the hearing. She
points out that she also did not spend any Plank Trust assets since assuming her role. Although
her response to Walters’ and Ray’s letters was delayed, Duncan argues this was because she was
trying to make sense of the complicated financial issues that stemmed from the embezzlement
issue preceding her appointment.
“This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a probate court’s dispositional rulings and
reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying a probate court’s decision.” In re Portus,
325 Mich App 374, 381; 926 NW2d 33 (2018) (cleaned up). “An abuse of discretion occurs when
the probate court chooses an outcome outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.”
Id. (cleaned up). “A probate court’s finding is clearly erroneous when a reviewing court is left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, even if there is evidence to
support the finding.” Id. (cleaned up).
“Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law reviewed de novo.” In re Duane v
Baldwin Trust, 274 Mich App 387, 396; 733 NW2d 419 (2007). “If the language in a statute is
clear and unambiguous, this Court assumes that the Legislature intended its plain meaning, and
the statute must be enforced as written. This Court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute
2 After the claim of appeal was filed in this matter, appellees filed subpoena requests and a motion
to compel copies of tax returns for Virginia, Duncan, and other involved family members, from
2018 to 2024, as well as copies of all statements, deposits, checks, and withdrawals from 13 listed
accounts from 2018 to present, stating these documents were necessary to conduct a full
accounting of the Plank Trust. Duncan responded, arguing the requested tax returns were
irrelevant and an invasion of privacy, and the request was unduly burdensome.

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that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute
itself.” Bay City v Bay Co Treasurer, 292 Mich App 156, 166-167; 807 NW2d 892 (2011)
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
B. THE RECORD BEFORE US DOES NOT SUPPORT ANY CIRCUMSTANCES FOR
REMOVAL UNDER MCL 700.7706(2)
A trustee is required to administer a trust “in good faith, expeditiously, in accordance with
its terms and purposes, for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries,” and in accordance with the
Michigan Trust Code (MTC), MCL 700.7101 et seq. MCL 700.7801. The probate court’s power
to remove a trustee and appoint a successor is recognized by MCL 700.7706; however, a probate
court may not remove a Trustee for “any good cause.” In re Pollack Trust, 309 Mich App 125,
163; 867 NW2d 884 (2015) (citation omitted). Removal is limited to the circumstances listed in
MCL 700.7706(2) (emphasis added):
(a) The trustee commits a serious breach of trust.
(b) Lack of cooperation among cotrustees substantially impairs the administration
of the trust.
(c) Because of unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure of the trustee to
administer the trust effectively, the court determines that removal of the trustee best
serves the purposes of the trust.
(d) There has been a substantial change of circumstances, the court finds that
removal of the trustee best serves the interests of the trust beneficiaries and is not
inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and a suitable cotrustee or
successor trustee is available.
Although the probate court did not expressly rely on the statutory grounds for removal
listed in MCL 700.7706(2), the court reasoned Duncan did very little between being appointed and
the date of the removal hearing, “a full accounting and investigation” was still necessary, “and
clearly she’s not.” From what we can gather from the scant record, it seems the statutory reason
for the removal was MCL 700.7706(2)(c).3
Walters and Ray began demanding an accounting of Plank Trust assets as soon as Duncan
became Trustee, and the hostility between the parties is apparent from the record. But hostility
between a Trustee and beneficiaries, by itself, without evidence that the administration of the Trust
has been affected, does not provide a basis for removing a Trustee. Pollack Trust, 309 Mich App
at 167. While there is some record evidence of Duncan’s delay in reporting the remaining balance
of assets, the record does not yet support Duncan’s “unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent
3 Considering Duncan did not spend any Trust assets since her appointment, there were no
cotrustees, and nothing significant happened between her appointment and removal to constitute a
“substantial change of circumstances,” the facts do not support the probate court’s potential
reliance on subsections (a), (b), or (d).

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failure . . . to administer the Trust effectively . . . .” MCL 700.7706(2)(c). Duncan was Trustee of
the Plank Trust for only three months before appellees sought her removal, and the probate court
and both parties acknowledged the complexity of the Plank Trust assets because of Helen’s
embezzlement. While the MTC imports on the Trustee a duty to keep beneficiaries “informed
about the administration of the trust,” MCL 700.7814(1), it does not specifically define what is
required for an accounting. But the minimum requirement of the MTC is that a Trustee provide
beneficiaries an “annual report of the trust property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements.” MCL
700. 7814(2).
Even though MCL 700.7814(4)4 affords the probate court discretion to order the Trustee
to provide more than an annual accounting, and Walters and Ray moved for the probate court to
order an accounting, the probate court did not order one. The probate court’s order directed
Duncan to “notify the parties as soon as practicable of the remaining assets owned by the Trust,”
which is distinct from an accounting because it does not include an order for a report of Trust
liabilities, receipts, and disbursements. And Duncan substantially complied with the probate
court’s order when, on October 11, 2024, she emailed counsel for Walters and Ray a summary of
the balance of Plank Trust Account funds from September 2020 to September 29, 2024, which
documented that $2,059.94 in assets remained.
This amount is not entirely unreasonable given that Virginia informed the probate court
that during her Trusteeship, she sold the real property within the Plank Trust, as well as the items
inside it, and relocated Plank to assisted living in Arkansas before her death. The Plank Trust
assets were further affected by Helen’s embezzlement. Although the MTC directs a Trustee to
take “reasonable steps to locate trust property and compel a former trustee or other person to
deliver trust property to the trustee,” MCL 700.7813(1), by the time Duncan became Trustee, the
record evidence supports that there was very little left in the Plank Trust. Walters and Ray further
contend that there was $1.2 million in Plank Trust assets that Duncan failed to account for, and
seemed to imply Virginia embezzled Plank Trust assets during her time as Trustee. But the record
does not support this, and the probate court clearly erred to the extent that it relied on the allegedly
missing $1.2 million dollars as grounds for Duncan’s removal as Trustee.
With very little assets left in the Plank Trust, and no evidence that Duncan failed to sell,
invest, or receive any Plank Trust assets or property, it is not clear what more Duncan could do to
comply with her duties as Trustee. Duncan’s failure to do more than what she was ordered to do
does not constitute “unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure . . . to administer the Trust
effectively . . . .” MCL 700.7706(2)(c). To the extent there is more to this that is not reflected on
the record, the probate court is permitted to further develop the record on remand. However, at
4 “If the terms of a trust direct that accounts and information be provided to less than all qualified
trust beneficiaries, at the court’s discretion, the trustee shall provide statements of account and
other information to persons excluded under the terms of the trust to the extent and in the manner
the court directs.” MCR 700.7814(4).

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this juncture, and with this record, we hold the trial court has abused its discretion by removing
Duncan as Trustee under MCL 700.7706(2).5
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
5 Both parties separately argue on appeal that appointing the other as Trustee creates a conflict of
interest. “MCL 700.7706(2) does not list ‘conflict of interest’ by itself as a ground for removal.”
Pollack Trust, 309 Mich App at 166. Thus, absent “evidence of any mismanagement or negative
effect on the administration of the Trust,” a conflict of interest is not, by itself, grounds for removal
of a Trustee. Id. at 167. The record is not sufficiently developed to determine whether Duncan
mismanaged the Plank Trust or whether her relationship with Plank, Walters, or Ray had a negative
effect on administering the Plank Trust, and the trial court did not indicate it removed Duncan as
Trustee over a conflict of interest. These arguments necessarily fail.

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