COA 376681 IN RE A J GILMORE MINOR Opinion & Order - PC - Remand & Ret Juris 5/7/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
May 07, 2026
11:18 AM
In re A. J. GILMORE, Minor.
No. 376681
Shiawassee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 24-014802-NA
Before: KOROBKIN, P.J., and RIORDAN and MARIANI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to the
minor child. He contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for an adjournment and
in finding that termination was in the child’s best interests. We disagree with respondent regarding
the adjournment, but we agree, in part, regarding the trial court’s best-interest determination. We
therefore affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
The Department of Health and Human Services filed the petition in this matter requesting
termination at initial disposition after it received allegations that respondent sexually abused the
minor child, who was placed with her mother. While this case was pending and about a month
before the termination trial, a jury convicted respondent of two counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct. The child protective proceedings were adjourned seven times before respondent’s
termination hearing on July 18, 2025. Although no appeal had been filed or briefed at the time,
respondent orally requested another adjournment until this Court could decide his criminal appeal
because respondent’s criminal attorney believed that his convictions may be overturned.
Recognizing the speculative nature of respondent’s request, as well as the child’s need for finality,
the trial court denied respondent’s oral motion.
At the termination hearing, the trial court admitted the child’s testimony from respondent’s
criminal trial under MRE 803(6). The child’s caseworker read an excerpt of the testimony about
the sexual abuse and testified that terminating respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best
interests. Respondent did not testify or present any witnesses. Ultimately, the trial court found

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statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (sexual
abuse and reasonable likelihood of further abuse if returned to parent), (j) (reasonable likelihood
of harm if returned to parent), and (m) (parent convicted of specified crime and termination is in
child’s best interests), and it concluded that terminating respondent’s parental rights was in the
child’s best interests. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. ADJOURNMENT
On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion
to adjourn. We disagree.
We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision regarding a respondent’s motion
for an adjournment. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 28; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). “An abuse of
discretion occurs if the decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes.” In re Piland, 336
Mich App 713, 733; 972 NW2d 269 (2021).
MCR 3.923(G) provides that “[a]djournments of trials or hearings in child protective
proceedings should be granted only (1) for good cause, (2) after taking into consideration the best
interests of the child, and (3) for as short a period of time as necessary.” In re Utrera, 281 Mich
App 1, 10; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). A party establishes good cause for adjournment by
demonstrating “a legally sufficient or substantial reason” to adjourn. Id. at 11 (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to adjourn.
Respondent argues that there was good cause to adjourn based on his criminal attorney’s belief
that his criminal convictions may be overturned on appeal. But as the trial court recognized,
respondent’s argument was speculative at best. Mere speculation regarding the potential outcome
of respondent’s appeal did not constitute good cause to adjourn under MCR 3.923(G)(1). See In
re Utrera, 281 Mich App at 11; see also In re Patillo/Rious/Gee-Darden, unpublished per curiam
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 14, 2012 (Docket No. 307558), p 2 (finding that the
respondent failed to meet the good cause standard of MCR 3.923(G)(1) because “incarceration . .
. was not a legally sufficient reason to adjourn” and because respondent’s “speculation that she
might have a job or housing when she was released from jail was not based on any supportable
facts”).1 Further, the trial court properly took into consideration the best interests of the child, see
MCR 3.923(G)(2), and reasonably concluded that those interests would not be served by an
indefinite adjournment given the child’s interest in finality. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision
did not fall “outside the range of principled outcomes” and the trial court therefore did not abuse
its discretion when it denied respondent’s motion to adjourn. In re Piland, 336 Mich App at 733.
1 Unpublished decisions are not precedentially binding. MCR 7.215(C)(1). However, they may
provide persuasive value. See Aroma Wines & Equip, Inc v Columbian Distribution Servs, Inc,
497 Mich 337, 356 n 50; 871 NW2d 136 (2015).

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B. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent also contends that the trial court erred in finding that it was in the child’s best
interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. We agree, in part, because the trial court failed
to consider the child’s placement with a relative as weighing against termination, and we
accordingly remand for further proceedings.
“Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven,[2] the trial court must find that
termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re Olive/Metts,
297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). “[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the
best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301
Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). We review a trial court’s best-interest determination for
clear error. In re Baham, 331 Mich App 737, 751; 954 NW2d 529 (2020). A clear error “exists
when some evidence supports a finding, but a review of the entire record leaves the reviewing
court with the definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a mistake.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted).
“When determining whether termination is in the best interests of the child, the court should
place its focus on the child rather than the parent.” In re CJM, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d
___ (2024) (Docket No. 367565); slip op at 4 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Trial courts
should weigh all available evidence to determine what is in the child’s best interests. In re White,
303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). In doing so, courts consider
the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for
permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the
parent’s home. The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic
violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s
visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the
possibility of adoption. [Id. at 713-714 (quotation marks and citation omitted).]
“[A] child’s placement with relatives is a factor that the trial court is required to consider when
making its best-interests determination, and a child’s placement with relatives weighs against
termination.” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 321; 964 NW2d 881 (2020) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
In this appeal, we disagree with respondent’s argument that the trial court erred in its best-
interest determination because it did not have sufficient evidence to adequately consider the child’s
bond with respondent. The child’s caseworker testified to the child’s description of being sexually
abused by respondent and the child not feeling safe with respondent. This record was sufficient
for the trial court to adequately consider the parent-child bond.
We likewise disagree with respondent’s argument that the trial court improperly relied on
the caseworker’s testimony because she was not qualified as an expert witness. The caseworker
2 Respondent does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s finding that there were statutory
grounds for termination.

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testified as a lay witness, not as an expert, because she discussed observations she made and
opinions she developed while working directly with the child. See MRE 701.
We agree with respondent, however, that the trial court failed to give proper consideration
to the child’s placement with her mother. Although the fact that a child is placed with a relative
is not dispositive and a trial court “ ‘may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with
relatives if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests,’ ” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App
332, 347; 990 NW2d 685 (2022), quoting In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43, courts are
nonetheless “required to expressly consider [a child’s] placement with [a relative] as weighing
against termination” when making best-interest determinations, In re CJM, ___ Mich App at ___;
slip op at 5. The trial court here failed to do so. The court communicated, at best, a generalized
statement regarding the child’s placement, stating that “[t]he child is with her biological mother
and is being cared for there.” But there was no specific finding as to how this placement factored
into the trial court’s best-interest determination nor did the trial court expressly consider it as
weighing against the termination of respondent’s parental rights. “A trial court’s failure to
explicitly address whether termination is appropriate in light of the children’s placement with
relatives renders the factual record inadequate to make a best-interest determination and requires
reversal.” In re Boshell/Shelton, ___Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No.
371973); slip op at 10 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently, the factual record
here was inadequate to support a best-interest determination because it failed to account for the
child’s placement with her mother. See id. Therefore, the trial court clearly erred and further
proceedings are required. On remand, the trial court may make additional findings of fact as
needed and must then reconsider whether termination is in the best interests of the child, expressly
considering the child’s placement with her mother as weighing against termination.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm in part and vacate in part. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to adjourn. But the trial court clearly erred in not
expressly considering the child’s placement with her mother as weighing against termination.
Accordingly, the trial court’s best-interest determination is vacated and the case remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Philip P. Mariani

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A true copy entered and certified by Jerome W. Zimmer Jr., Chief Clerk, on
May 07, 2026
Date Chief Clerk
Court of Appeals, State of Michigan
ORDER
IN RE A J GILMORE MINOR
Docket No. 376681
LC No. 24-014802-NA
Daniel S. Korobkin
Presiding Judge
Michael J. Riordan
Philip P. Mariani
Judges
For the reasons stated in the opinion issued with this order, we REMAND this case for
further proceedings. We retain jurisdiction. After the remand proceedings conclude, we will review the
decisions that the trial court made during those proceedings and consider any remaining issues in this
appeal. Any challenges to the trial court’s decisions on remand must be raised in this appeal. Therefore,
the parties and the trial court must not initiate a new appeal from an order entered on remand within the
scope of this appeal. The Clerk of the Court is directed to reject the initiation of a new appeal from such
an order.
Appellant must initiate the proceedings on remand within 14 days of the Clerk’s
certification of this order, and the trial court must prioritize this matter until the proceedings are concluded.
As stated in the accompanying opinion, the trial court must reconsider whether the termination of
respondent’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests in light of the child’s placement with her mother.
The proceedings on remand are limited to this issue.
The parties must serve copies of their filings in the trial court on this Court. Appellant
must file with this Court copies of all orders entered on remand within seven days of entry. Either party
may submit a supplemental brief on the issue of best interests within 21 days after the conclusion of the
remand proceedings.
Appellant must ensure the transcript of all proceedings on remand is filed in the trial court
and this Court within 21 days after completion of the proceedings.
_______________________________
Presiding Judge

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