COA 374996 LENADANIELLE FIGUEROA V JOHN DOE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/10/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
LENADANIELLE FIGUEROA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
September 10, 2026
11:52 AM
V No. 374996
Wayne Circuit Court
JOHN DOE and KRYSTAL WILLIAMS, LC No. 24-001143-NI
Defendants,
and
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and O’BRIEN and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, Lenadanielle Figueroa, appeals as of right the trial court order granting summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) to defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange. Because the trial
court did not err by granting summary disposition, we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
On September 5, 2023, Figueroa rented a vehicle from Hertz in order to use the vehicle to
drive for Uber through a program Hertz had with Uber to provide vehicles for rideshare drivers.
The rental agreement included insurance coverage. Approximately one-and-a-half months later,
on October 20, 2023, Figueroa was driving that vehicle when another driver made a U-turn,
collided with her, and then fled the scene. At the time of the crash, Figueroa did not have any
passengers, was logged out of her Uber app, and was driving home. Rather than seek coverage
through the rental agreement, Figueroa applied for no-fault benefits through the Michigan
Assigned Claims Plan. Her claim was assigned to Farmers, which investigated the claim and
discovered that Figueroa had made a number of false statements on her application for benefits.
Farmers refused to pay Figueroa’s claim, so she filed a complaint seeking no-fault benefits.

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Following discovery, Farmers moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
In part, Farmers argued that Hertz’s insurer, as the insurer of Figueroa’s vehicle, had priority to
pay benefits to Figueroa under MCL 500.3114(2) because Figueroa’s vehicle was “operated in the
business of transporting passengers.” The trial court agreed and granted Farmers’ motion for
summary disposition. This appeal follows.
II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Figueroa argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition because, at the
time of the crash, she was not in the business of transporting passengers. A trial court’s decision
to grant or deny summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 491
Mich 200, 205; 815 NW2d 412 (2012). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is
warranted if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” besides the amount of damages
“and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.” When
reviewing the motion, the trial court must consider the evidence submitted by the parties “in the
light most favorable” to the nonmoving party, Joseph, 491 Mich at 206. “A genuine issue of
material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party,
leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Webb v Progressive Marathon
Ins Co, 335 Mich App 503, 507; 967 NW2d 841 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. ANALYSIS
Under Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., multiple insurers might be
responsible to pay no-fault benefits to an individual. Miclea v Cherokee Ins Co, 333 Mich App
661, 667-668; 963 NW2d 665 (2020). Under such circumstances, “the relative priority of those
insurers is determined by MCL 500.3114(1).” Id. at 668. “The general rule is that one looks to a
person’s own insurer for no-fault benefits unless one of the statutory exceptions, MCL
500.3114(2), (3), and (5), applies.” Id. (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
Here, Farmers contends that the exception to the general rule stated in MCL 500.3114(2)
applies. As relevant to this appeal, MCL 500.3114(2) provides:
(2) A person who suffers accidental bodily injury while an operator or a
passenger of a motor vehicle operated in the business of transporting passengers
shall receive the personal protection insurance benefits to which the person is
entitled from the insurer of the motor vehicle. This subsection does not apply to a
passenger in any of the following, unless the passenger is not entitled to personal
protection insurance benefits under any other policy:
* * *
(g) A transportation network company vehicle.
At the outset, although Figueroa maintains that her vehicle was not a “transportation
network company vehicle” because she was logged out of the Uber app when the crash occurred,
the section of MCL 500.3114(2) that pertains to transportation network company vehicles is only

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applicable to passengers, not operators of the vehicle. Because Figueroa was an operator of her
vehicle, her claim must be analyzed under the first sentence of MCL 500.3114(2), not the second.
The no-fault act does not define the phrase “motor vehicle operated in the business of
transporting passengers.” Farmers Ins Exch v AAA of Mich, 256 Mich App 691, 696-697; 671
NW2d 89 (2003). The phrase, however, was interpreted in Farmers Ins Exch, which held that the
phrase was ambiguous and established “a primary purpose/incidental nature test . . . to determine
whether at the time of an accident a motor vehicle was operated in the business of transporting
passengers pursuant to subsection 3114(2).” Id. at 701. As explained recently,
[t]he relevant inquiries under the primary purpose/incidental nature test are (1)
whether the transportation of passengers is the primary purpose for which the
vehicle is used and (2) whether the transportation of passengers is a primary, as
opposed to incidental, component of the overall business or activity of the operator.
If answered affirmatively, a motor vehicle is in the business of transporting
passengers. [Smith v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, ___ Mich App ___, ___;
___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 369139); slip op at 6-7 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).]
In this case, Figueroa’s vehicle satisfies the “primary purpose/incidental nature test” as a
“motor vehicle operated in the business of transporting passengers.” MCL 500.3114(2). That is,
even viewed in the light most favorable to Figueroa, her vehicle was primarily used to transport
passengers. Smith, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 7. First, although Figueroa could drive the
vehicle for personal reasons, she testified at her deposition that she rented the vehicle from Hertz
as part of its relationship with Uber and that “the vast majority of the time and miles” in the car
was used to transport passengers for Uber. She further explained that she drove for Uber around
five hours per weekday and that she did not use the vehicle extensively for personal use. Second,
Figueroa testified that the only “job and income [she] had at the time of the [2023 accident] was
[her] income from driving for Uber . . . .” As such, even viewed in the light most favorable to
Figueroa, transporting Uber passengers was the primary purpose of Figueroa’s business and was
not merely incidental. See id. at ___; slip op at 7. Therefore, under the primary purpose/incidental
nature test, Figuroa’s vehicle was a motor vehicle in the business of transporting passengers. Id.
at ___; slip op at 7. As the operator of a vehicle being operated in the business of transporting
passengers, the insurer of the vehicle was responsible for the payment of no-fault benefits. See
MCL 500.3114(2).1
Affirmed. Farmers Insurance Exchange may tax costs as the prevailing party. MCR
7.219(A).
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense
1 Given our resolution, we decline to address Farmers’ alternative argument in support of summary
disposition.

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