COA 377114 IN RE ASHER MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/26/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
August 26, 2026
11:08 AM
In re ASHER, Minors.
No. 377114
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC Nos. 2024-000172-NA;
2024-000173-NA
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and BOONSTRA and CAMERON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his
minor children, GA and LA, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), and (k)(ii). We affirm.
I. FACTS
In 2019, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed a petition to
terminate the parental rights of GA’s and LA’s biological mother because her untreated mental
illness was preventing her from properly caring for the children. During the 2019 termination
proceedings, the children’s mother accused respondent of sexually abusing LA. Children’s
Protective Services (CPS) investigated the allegations of sexual abuse but was unable to
substantiate them. The mother’s parental rights to GA and LA were terminated in June 2020.
Respondent also was named as a respondent in the 2019 petition and was provided with a parent-
agency treatment plan and service agreement. While respondent worked on the treatment plan,
GA and LA, then approximately ages three and four, were placed in a licensed foster home. In
July 2021, GA and LA were returned to respondent’s care.
In July 2024, LA disclosed to the children’s maternal grandmother that respondent had
touched her inappropriately. The grandmother reported the abuse to the police. LA was
forensically interviewed by Care House forensic interview specialist Jessalyn Gaskin. LA, then
age seven, gave a detailed history of the sexual abuse. LA disclosed during the interview that
respondent had touched her genitals under her clothes on numerous occasions and that respondent
showed her videos of the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles having sex. During the interview LA also

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reported that respondent directed her to take a picture of her private area on his phone. She also
disclosed that respondent had instructed her to touch her private areas in a sexual manner.
DHHS filed the petition initiating this action seeking to terminate respondent’s parental
rights at the initial dispositional hearing under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), and (k)(ii). At the
preliminary hearing, the trial court authorized the filing of the petition. Thereafter, the trial court
granted the prosecution’s motion to introduce Gaskin’s testimony regarding LA’s disclosures of
abuse during her Care House interview under MCR 3.972(C)(2), known as a “tender years”
motion.
The trial court referee then conducted an adjudication hearing and an initial dispositional
hearing. CPS specialist DeMia Shelley testified that CPS had investigated earlier allegations that
respondent had sexually abused LA in February 2019, June 2019, and July 2023, but had been
unable to substantiate the earlier allegations. Shelley testified that when she investigated the July
2024 allegations, LA disclosed the abuse to her. Similarly, Gaskin testified that in her July 2024
forensic interview with LA, the child disclosed in detail the sexual abuse by respondent.
Respondent then testified, denying that he had touched LA inappropriately and asserting that the
children’s grandmother had coached LA regarding the allegations.
Respondent also called LA as a witness. LA testified that respondent touched her private
parts, but denied parts of her earlier account to Gaskin, including that respondent had shown her
pornographic videos of the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles. After LA’s testimony, respondent
testified again, denying sexually touching LA or showing her pornographic cartoons. The parties
rested, and the trial court continued the trial for closing arguments on a different day.
When trial resumed 3 weeks later, the case had been reassigned to Referee Eric O.
Lundquist, Jr., who informed the parties that they would proceed with a new trial because he could
make a fair determination of the case only by personally observing the witnesses and assessing
their credibility. Both parties objected to the court’s directive to retry the case, but the trial court
maintained the need for a new trial.
Referee Lundquist also required the tender-years motion to be relitigated so that he could
make his own determination regarding the admissibility of the forensic interview. Following a
hearing, the trial court again held that LA’s statements during the interview were admissible as
substantive evidence of abuse under MCR 3.972. The parties then retried the case before Referee
Lundquist. The prosecution called Amy Dumas, a CPS supervisor, who testified about the CPS
investigation that led to the termination proceedings, as well as the prior complaints to CPS
alleging that respondent was sexually abusing LA. LA testified that respondent touched her private
parts at least ten times, that respondent told her not to tell anyone, and that he bought her presents
after each incident. LA also testified that respondent took pictures of her while unclothed. Gaskin
testified regarding LA’s disclosures of sexual abuse during her forensic interview, which was
consistent with Gaskin’s prior testimony on the subject. The children’s foster mother testified
regarding LA’s overtly sexual behavior, which they were attempting to address with therapy.
Respondent called as witnesses his two adult sons, one of whom lived with respondent and
the children before their removal, who testified that they did not witness any sexual abuse in the
home. The sons’ mother also testified that respondent had never been accused of sexual abuse of

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any kind when she was raising her sons with him. Respondent testified about the history of sexual
abuse allegations made by the mother of LA and GA. Respondent denied that he had ever sexually
abused LA, and he denied the specific allegations made by LA in the Care House interview.
The prosecution called Jennifer Smith, the children’s therapist, as a rebuttal witness. She
testified that LA disclosed the sexual abuse during her therapy sessions. Smith also testified that
GA exhibited symptoms of trauma, and that GA had disclosed to her that he witnessed respondent
sexually abusing LA.
The trial court issued its opinion on the record, finding that LA’s testimony was consistent
across multiple settings and was emotionally appropriate, that there was no evidence of coaching
or external influence, and that “the child described sensory details and contextual facts that could
not have been fabricated.” The trial court discounted the testimony of respondent’s adult sons and
former partner because they had no firsthand knowledge of the incidents LA described, and their
knowledge of the home was limited to shared or public spaces of the home. The trial court found
respondent’s categorical denial of any sexual misconduct not credible. The trial court found that
jurisdiction was proper under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2) and that clear and convincing evidence
established that there were statutory grounds for termination under the provisions charged. The
trial court then conducted a best-interest hearing, at the conclusion of which the trial court found
that the preponderance of the evidence weighed in favor of terminating respondent’s parental rights
to GA and LA. The trial court entered an order assuming jurisdiction of the children and an order
terminating respondent’s parental rights. Respondent now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
A. DUE PROCESS
Respondent contends that he was denied his fundamental right to a fair trial because he was
required to repeat the proceedings before a second trial court referee after having partially
completed the proceedings before the first referee. We disagree that respondent was denied due
process.
A parent has a “fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and control of his or her child
free from governmental interference.” In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 415; 852 NW2d 524 (2014).
This interest is a “core liberty interest recognized by the Fourteenth Amendment,” and therefore
is protected by due process. Id. at 409, 415. We review de novo whether child protective
proceedings complied with a respondent’s substantive and procedural due process rights. In re
Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 268; 976 NW2d 44 (2021).
“Procedural due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before
an impartial decision-maker,” whereas “the essence of a substantive due process claim is the
arbitrary deprivation of liberty or property interests.” In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 706; 859
NW2d 208 (2014). “Procedural due process limits actions by the government and requires it to
institute safeguards in proceedings that affect those rights protected by due process, such as life,
liberty, or property.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 132; 809 NW2d 412 (2011) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).

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Respondent in this case does not specify whether he is alleging a violation of procedural
or substantive due process but appears to argue a procedural due process violation because he
emphasizes the “need for procedural integrity.” A procedural due process claim requires this Court
to consider: “(1) whether a liberty or property interest exists which the state has interfered with,
and (2) whether the procedures attendant upon the deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.”
VanDalen, 293 Mich App at 132 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“In Michigan, procedures to ensure due process to a parent facing removal of his child from
the home or termination of his parental rights are set forth by statute, court rule, DH[H]S policies
and procedures, and various federal laws.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 268 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Although a parent has an interest in the companionship, care, and custody
of his children, which is protected by due process, see Sanders, 495 Mich at 409, the government
has a competing interest “in protecting the welfare of children, which coincides with the child’s
interest of being free from an abusive environment.” VanDalen, 293 Mich App at 132-133
(quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, this interest is significant given the serious
nature of the abuse reported by LA. Because there are competing interests at stake, “the pertinent
question [is] whether the procedures used were constitutionally adequate.” Id. at 133 (quotation
marks and citations omitted). We conclude that they were constitutionally adequate in this case
given that the process provided was that established by statute and not unlike that provided in any
child protective proceeding.
Generally, child protective proceedings are divided into the adjudicative phase and the
dispositional phase. In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 108; 499 NW2d 752 (1993). During the
adjudicative phase, the trial court determines whether it has jurisdiction over the child under MCL
712A.2(b). If the trial court assumes jurisdiction of the child, the case proceeds to the dispositional
phase of the proceedings where the trial court determines what action, if any, will be taken on
behalf of the child. In re Brock, 442 Mich at 108. Typically, during the dispositional phase,
reasonable efforts must be made by the DHHS to reunify the child with the parent. In re KV, ___
Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 374236); slip op at 4. In certain
circumstances, however, such as when the parent has subjected the child to aggravated
circumstances under MCL 722.638(1) and (2), the trial court may hold a combined adjudicative
and dispositional hearing, and the parent’s parental rights may be terminated at the initial
dispositional hearing, if a statutory basis for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3) is established
and if the trial court determines that termination is in the child’s best interests. Id.
In this case, respondent argues that he was prejudiced by starting the trial anew because
the result was that certain witnesses, such as LA and Gaskin, testified a second time and thereby
were able to hone their testimony.1 Respondent has not identified authority to support the
1 We observe that the second trial arguably was favorable to respondent. In the first trial,
respondent primarily offered his own testimony to refute LA’s allegations of abuse. In the second
trial, respondent also offered the testimony of his two adult sons and respondent’s former partner,
who testified that they had never seen respondent act inappropriately toward LA. This change in
the presentation of respondent’s case suggests that respondent benefitted from having seen
DHHS’s evidence during the first trial and bolstered his case to refute the allegations of abuse.

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argument that duplicative testimony results in a violation of due process, however, which
constitutes abandonment of the issue on appeal. See Henderson v Dep’t of Health & Human Servs,
347 Mich App 36, 46; 14 NW2d 184 (2023) (The failure to cite relevant authority results in
abandonment of an issue on appeal).
Moreover, respondent has not demonstrated that the procedures involved in this case were
constitutionally insufficient. See VanDalen, 293 Mich App at 132. “Due process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich
App at 268 (quotation marks and citation omitted). That certain witnesses testified more than once
during the dispositional phase of the proceedings in this case does not distinguish this case from a
typical child protective proceeding.
As discussed, in child protective proceedings more than one hearing typically is held; a
preliminary hearing is held to determine whether probable cause exists to issue a petition, followed
by an adjudication hearing to determine whether the trial court may exercise jurisdiction over the
child. If the trial court assumes jurisdiction of the child, the dispositional phase of the proceedings
ensues during which, typically, a series of hearings is held over several months or even years.
Certain witnesses who may have testified at the preliminary hearing or at the adjudication hearing
often are called upon again to testify at hearings during the dispositional phase. Often, a CPS
worker or a foster care case worker testifies at several dispositional-phase hearings before
termination is sought or the case is otherwise resolved. And often, when numerous dispositional
hearings are held over the course of several months or even years, different trial court referees
preside over the various hearings, undoubtedly resulting in the need to repeat and clarify
information regarding various issues from one hearing to the next.
In this case, because the petition sought adjudication and also termination of parental rights
at the initial dispositional hearing, only an initial dispositional hearing was held rather than a series
of dispositional phase hearings. The case was then reassigned to a different trial court referee who
was tasked with determining at the initial dispositional hearing whether respondent’s parental
rights were to be terminated, necessitating the trial starting over at the beginning to enable the
second referee properly to determine the resolution of the case. The fact that certain witnesses
were called upon to testify more than once does not suggest a violation of due process nor even a
departure from the procedure employed in a typical child protective proceeding.
We also observe that, unlike criminal proceedings2 in which under certain circumstances a
mistrial might lead to the dismissal of charges, child protective proceedings do not involve criminal
2 We also observe that substitution of a judge occurs in other types of cases and that judicial
substitution sometimes requires a new trial. Although not controlling here, we note that in civil
cases, MCR 2.630 provides that a substitute judge may be assigned to a case in certain
circumstances and that “if the substitute judge is not satisfied that he or she can do so, the substitute
judge may grant a new trial.” Similarly, reassignment of a criminal case to a different judge at
certain stages of the proceedings may result in the new judge granting the defendant a new trial “if
that judge is not satisfied of an ability to perform [posttrial] duties because of not having presided
at the trial or determines that it is appropriate for any other reason . . . .” MCR 6.440(C). In neither

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charges against a parent for alleged wrongful behavior, but rather concern the safety, wellbeing,
and custody of children. The trial court having jurisdiction of a child whose safety is at stake is
charged with ascertaining whether a statutory basis exists to terminate parental rights and whether
doing so is in that child’s best interests based on the evidence presented. Regardless of
circumstances, the trial court is obligated to resolve the matter before it while considering foremost
the wellbeing of the child. Moreover, when a respondent parent is not provided procedural due
process, the remedy typically is a new trial, which the trial court in this case provided to ensure a
proper determination of the children’s custody. Because respondent in this case has not
demonstrated that a new trial deprived him of due process, he is not entitled to relief on that basis.
B. STATUTORY BASIS
Respondent also contends that the trial court erred by finding that sufficient evidence was
presented to establish a statutory basis for termination. We disagree.
To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find that at least one of the statutory bases
for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established by clear and convincing
evidence. In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App 326, 333; 985 NW2d 912 (2022); see
also In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 346 n 6; 990 NW2d 685 (2022) (“[O]nly one statutory
ground for termination of a respondent’s parental rights need be established”). We review for clear
error both the trial court’s factual findings and the trial court’s determination that a statutory basis
for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re Keillor, 325 Mich App
80, 85; 923 NW2d 617 (2018). The decision whether to terminate parental rights is clearly
erroneous if “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re JK, 468 Mich 202,
209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
Here, the trial court found that statutory grounds for terminating respondent’s parental
rights were established under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), and (k)(ii), which authorize
termination under the following circumstances:
(b) The child or a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury or physical
or sexual abuse under 1 or more of the following circumstances:
(i) The parent’s act caused the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse
and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will
suffer from injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s
home.
* * *
(g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so,
fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable
instance is a new trial considered to be a violation of due process by virtue of witnesses testifying
a second time.

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expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a
reasonable time considering the child’s age.
* * *
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the
child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if the child is returned to the home of
the parent.
* * *
(k) The parent abused the child or a sibling of the child, the abuse included
1 or more of the following, and there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will
be harmed if returned to the care of the parent:
* * *
(ii) Criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted penetration,
or assault with intent to penetrate.
We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by determining that at least one of the
statutory bases for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3) had been established by clear and
convincing evidence. LA testified that respondent sexually abused her on numerous occasions
and the abuse included digital vaginal penetration. Her testimony was consistent with the
disclosures she made during the Care House interview. LA’s therapist testified that LA made
spontaneous disclosures in therapy that respondent touched her vagina. The trial court found
credible LA’s consistent, detailed accounts of sexual abuse in contrast to respondent’s denials and
unsupported allegations of coaching. We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s
findings and we give due regard to the trial court’s credibility determinations. See In re Miller,
347 Mich App 420, 425; 15 NW3d 287 (2023).
The trial court also did not err when it concluded that GA and LA would be at risk of future
harm if returned to respondent’s care. Based on LA’s credible disclosures of sexual abuse, the
court appropriately concluded that she would be at risk of further abuse if returned to the home.
In addition to physical harm, the court may also consider the risk of emotional harm if returned to
respondent’s care. In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). GA disclosed
to Smith that he witnessed respondent abusing LA, and GA had trouble managing his guilt,
sadness, and self-blame as a result. Smith testified that both children have symptoms consistent
with trauma and that the children were in the beginning stages of treatment plans to address these
issues. The trial court appropriately considered that the children may be at risk of future emotional
harm if returned to respondent’s care. Accordingly, respondent has not demonstrated that the trial
court clearly erred when it found that termination was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i),
(g), (j), and (k)(ii).
C. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent also contends that the trial court erred by finding that termination was in the
children’s best interests. We disagree.

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When a trial court finds that a statutory basis for termination of a respondent’s parental
rights has been established, the trial court must terminate the parent’s rights if a preponderance of
the evidence demonstrates that termination is in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In
re Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 236-237; 894 NW2d 653 (2016). We review for clear error the
trial court’s decision regarding a child’s best interests, In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 276,
focusing on the child, not the parent. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 346.
When determining the best interests of a child in a termination proceeding, the trial court
must weigh the available evidence and should consider a wide variety of factors, including the
child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability,
and finality, the advantages of the foster home over the parent’s home, the likelihood that the child
could be returned to the parent’s home in the foreseeable future, and the parent’s compliance with
the case service plan. See In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 276-277. The trial court also should
consider the child’s safety and well-being and any risk a child might face if returned to the parent’s
care. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App at 141-142.
Here, a preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that
termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The trial court
considered each child’s emotional bond to respondent and their preferences as to whether they
wanted to remain in his care. GA expressed hatred toward respondent for abusing LA. Although
LA expressed forgiveness toward respondent, her therapy sessions revealed the deep trauma she
suffered at respondent’s hands, and the trial court found that there was credible evidence of
“grooming, secrecy instructions, [and] bribery with toys that’s fundamentally incompatible with
healthy guidance.” In contrast, both children had a healthy and stable bond with their foster parent,
and the foster parent was providing the children with structure, therapy, and the tools they needed
to heal and move forward.
In addition, the children’s need for stability favored termination. A review of the record
indicates that both children had truancy issues while in their father’s care, which led to LA being
required to repeat the second grade. GA needed leg braces for chronic toe-walking, which
respondent refused to use for the child. After GA was returned to foster care, he also was
diagnosed with autism. In contrast, the children’s educational needs were being met with
specialized services in foster care. The trial court also observed that the children’s trauma
symptoms, which were not acknowledged or treated in respondent’s care, were being addressed
by their foster parent.

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We conclude that the trial court appropriately considered the relevant factors and its
findings are supported by the evidence. The credible evidence of sexual abuse led the trial court
appropriately to conclude that the children would not be safe in respondent’s care. Respondent
has not demonstrated that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that termination was in
the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron

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