COA 371270 LINA SLEIMAN V GARY SLEIMAN Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 5/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
LINA SLEIMAN,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
May 12, 2026
9:56 AM
v No. 371270
Wayne Circuit Court
GARY SLEIMAN, LC No. 22-108323-DO
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant.
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and ACKERMAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant/counterplaintiff, Gary Sleiman, appeals as of right from a May 22, 2024
judgment of divorce. In relevant part, the judgment of divorce: (1) divided the marital estate; and
(2) awarded plaintiff/counterdefendant, Lina Sleiman, $1,500 in monthly spousal support. For the
reasons set forth in this opinion, we remand this matter for the trial court to make findings and
properly explain its ruling as provided in this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
After a lengthy marriage, plaintiff filed for divorce in July 2022. The parties had two living
adult children, Michael Sleiman and Zachary Sleiman. Shortly after plaintiff initiated the action,
the trial court entered mutual restraining orders concerning the parties’ finances, which were
intended to maintain the parties’ fiscal status quo. The proceedings were contentious, and each
party accused the other of secreting marital funds. Before trial commenced, the marital home was
sold, and the proceeds were divided between the parties.
A bench trial was held over the course of several days. The issues on appeal concern (1) a
condominium located on Garrison Street in Dearborn, Michigan; and (2) real property located in
Lebanon, which included land and a home the parties constructed and furnished during the
marriage. At the time of trial, plaintiff and Michael held the Garrison property as joint tenants
with full rights of survivorship. Michael had resided in the Garrison property since 2020. The
Garrison property was originally purchased in plaintiff’s name, but Michael’s name was added
through a quitclaim deed from plaintiff because the condominium association would not allow
Michael to live there unless he was “on title.”

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Following trial, the court made rulings from the bench and subsequently entered a
judgment of divorce. In relevant part, the trial court awarded plaintiff the Garrison and Lebanon
properties. The trial court ordered Michael to either vacate the Garrison property or pay plaintiff
the fair market value of the property if plaintiff elected to allow him to continue living in the
condominium. Defendant was awarded his businesses, including their assets and debts. This
appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant first argues that the trial court’s judgment provision eliminating Michael’s
ownership interest in the Garrison condominium is void and must be vacated because the trial court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over non-party Michael’s property interest. Defendant
maintains that the jurisdiction of the divorce court is defined by statute and does not include
jurisdiction over third parties, who may be joined only if there is evidence that the third party
conspired with one spouse to defraud the other spouse. There are no allegations of fraud in this
case. Defendant also appears to argue that the trial court’s judgment could not be enforced against
Michael because doing so would violate the statute of frauds as to Michael.
“Whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim is a question of law
that we review de novo.” Ryan v Ryan, 260 Mich App 315, 331; 677 NW2d 899 (2004). “This
Court has long recognized that the jurisdiction of a divorce court is strictly statutory and limited
to determining the rights and obligations between the husband and wife, to the exclusion of third
parties . . . .” Cassidy v Cassidy, 318 Mich App 463, 493; 899 NW2d 65 (2017) (quotation marks
and citation omitted; ellipsis in original). However, there is an exception to this rule that applies
when fraud is alleged, which allows third parties to be joined in a divorce action “only if they have
conspired with one spouse to defraud the other spouse of a property interest.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Hence, as this Court has also explained:
Absent allegations of fraud, the trial court in a divorce action may only
adjudicate the rights of the spouses whose marriage is being dissolved. Thus, the
trial court’s jurisdiction is limited to the dissolution of the marriage, and to matters
ancillary to the marriage’s dissolution, such as child support, spousal support, an
equitable division of marital assets, and the award to one spouse of the other
spouse’s property in certain circumstances. So, in a divorce action, the trial court
lacks the authority “ ‘to compel a party to convey property or a property interest to
a third person, even a child of the parties, or to adjudicate claims of third parties.’ ”
[Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 157-158; 693 NW2d 825 (2005) (citations
omitted).]
Here, defendant contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
property interests attributable to Michael. Notwithstanding this assertion, it is a fundamental
principle of law that a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests and may not
seek relief premised upon the legal rights or interests of third parties. Id. at 159. Accordingly,
even assuming arguendo that defendant’s jurisdictional argument is legally sound, defendant has
failed to articulate a cognizable basis for appellate relief in his own right. Id.

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Next, defendant argues that the trial court’s property division was not supported by the
necessary findings and should therefore be reversed. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial
court materially erred by awarding the Garrison and Lebanon properties entirely to plaintiff
without discussing defendant’s interests in those properties. Defendant further argues that the trial
court also did not make findings concerning the overall equity of the property division.
The goal for property division in an action for divorce is equity. Cassidy, 318 Mich App
at 477. “Although marital property need not be divided equally, it must be divided equitably in
light of a court’s evaluation of the parties’ contributions, faults, and needs.” Id. Our standard of
review in this context is well settled:
In deciding issues on appeal involving division of marital property, this
Court first reviews the trial court’s findings of fact. Findings of fact, such as a trial
court’s valuations of particular marital assets, will not be reversed unless clearly
erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record, the
reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was
made. If the trial court’s findings of fact are upheld, this Court must decide whether
the dispositive ruling was fair and equitable in light of those facts. The dispositional
ruling is discretionary and will be affirmed unless this Court is left with a firm
conviction that the division was inequitable. [Id. at 476-477, quoting Butler v
Simmons–Butler, 308 Mich App 195, 207-208; 863 NW2d 677 (2014).]
The following factors, as well as any other factors that may be relevant in a particular case,
are to be considered, as they are relevant, in determining the property division in a given case:
(1) duration of the marriage, (2) contributions of the parties to the marital estate,
(3) age of the parties, (4) health of the parties, (5) life status of the parties, (6)
necessities and circumstances of the parties, (7) earning abilities of the parties, (8)
past relations and conduct of the parties, and (9) general principles of equity.
[Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 159-160; 485 NW2d 893 (1992).]
Furthermore, the determination of an equitable property division is not based on a rigid
framework or strict mathematical formula, but the trial court nonetheless has an obligation to make
specific findings of fact justifying and explaining its decision so as to facilitate meaningful
appellate review. Id. at 158-159. “The determination of relevant factors will vary with the
circumstances of each case, and no one factor should be given undue weight. The trial court must
make specific findings regarding the factors it determines to be relevant.” Butler, 308 Mich App
at 208-209 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, the trial court did not explain how its property distribution was equitable. It merely
divided the property, without any discussion of relative values of the property, and essentially
implied that it was “equitable” in the court’s unsubstantiated opinion. This is insufficient to permit
meaningful appellate review. Sparks, 440 Mich at 158-159; Butler, 308 Mich App at 208-209.
We therefore remand this matter for the trial court to make appropriate factual findings under the
Sparks framework justifying its property distribution.

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Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction. No costs are awarded. MCR 7.219(A).
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman

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