COA 378938 YANA KREFMAN V MICHAEL KREFMAN Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/21/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
YANA KREFMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
September 21, 2026
10:28 AM
V Nos. 378938; 378999
Oakland Circuit Court
MICHAEL KREFMAN, LC No. 2019-872601-DM
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: BAZZI, P.J., and PATEL and ACKERMAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, plaintiff appeals by right the order denying her motion for
sole legal custody and by leave granted the same order denying her motion for suspended parenting
time.1 We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties married in 2016. The parties had two minor children. Plaintiff filed for divorce
in 2019. After submitting the case to arbitration, the parties stipulated to custody and parenting
time in March 2020. The parties agreed plaintiff would have sole physical custody and the parties
would have joint legal custody of the minor children. The agreement set forth a parenting-time
schedule for defendant and specified that defendant was not permitted to ingest alcohol or drugs
before parenting visits. Defendant agreed to comply with the directives of his psychiatrist,
physicians, and therapists and continue to take prescription medications. He also agreed to
coordinate with his psychiatrist to send quarterly letters to the arbitrator regarding his compliance
with his treatment.
1 Krefman v Krefman, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 5, 2026
(Docket Nos. 378938 and 378999).

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In December 2020, the final judgment of divorce was entered. The judgment reiterated
that plaintiff had sole physical custody and the parties had joint legal custody of the minor children.
The judgment included the requirement that defendant comply with the directives of the
psychiatrist and send quarterly letters to the arbitrator.
On September 29, 2025, defendant filed a notice of unavailability for “parenting time and
for any communications or case-related matters between September 24, 2025 and November 4,
2025, due to personal health reasons.”
The arbitrator withdrew from the case in November 2025. In an e-mail to plaintiff dated
November 5, 2025, the arbitrator stated that he received “5 pieces of recent written correspondence
from health care providers that attest to [defendant]’s compliance.”
In November and December 2025, plaintiff filed motions for sole legal custody and
suspended parenting time for defendant. She argued that defendant’s unavailability for parenting
time during the six-week period between September 24, 2025 and November 4, 2025 was because
of inpatient psychiatric hospitalization for bipolar disorder and substance abuse. Plaintiff
contended that defendant was increasingly engaging in erratic behavior as demonstrated by
interactions with police. She asserted that the psychiatric treatment, along with interactions with
police, amounted to a substantial change of circumstances warranting a change in legal custody
and parenting time. In a supplemental brief, plaintiff requested an evidentiary hearing on the issue
of custody.
Following a hearing, the trial court concluded that plaintiff’s arguments did not meet the
threshold to change legal custody and restrict parenting time. The trial court found that the
documentation from medical professionals demonstrated father’s compliance with his mental-
health treatment and that there were no concerns about his judgment or ability to function as a
parent. Plaintiff now appeals.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In a child-custody dispute, “all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed
on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or
committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue.” MCL 722.28;
see also Pierron v Pierron, 486 Mich 81, 85; 782 NW2d 480 (2010). As this Court has explained:
We apply three standards of review in custody cases. The great weight of
the evidence standard applies to all findings of fact. A trial court’s findings
regarding the existence of an established custodial environment and regarding each
custody factor should be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the
opposite direction. An abuse of discretion standard applies to the trial court’s
discretionary rulings such as custody decisions. Questions of law are reviewed for
clear legal error. A trial court commits clear legal error when it incorrectly chooses,
interprets, or applies to the law.

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The trial court’s determination whether a party has demonstrated proper
cause or a change of circumstances is also reviewed under the great-weight-of-the-
evidence standard. A finding of fact is against the great weight of the evidence if
the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.
Similarly, orders concerning parenting time must be affirmed on appeal
unless the trial court’s findings were against the great weight of the evidence, the
court committed a palpable abuse of discretion, or the court made a clear legal error
on a major issue. In child custody cases, [a]n abuse of discretion exists when the
trial court’s decision is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it
evidences a perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or
bias. [Stoudemire v Thomas, 344 Mich App 34, 42-43; 999 NW2d 43 (2022)
(cleaned up).]
III. CUSTODY
Plaintiff argues that she established a proper cause or change of circumstances to modify
custody, and that the trial court erred by dismissing her motion without holding an evidentiary
hearing. We disagree.
A party seeking to modify a custody order must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that there is proper cause or a change of circumstances to warrant revisiting the custody
arrangement. Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509; 675 NW2d 847 (2003). This
threshold must be met “before the trial court can consider whether an established custodial
environment exists . . . and conduct a review of the best interest factors.” Id. at 509. A proper
cause to modify a child’s custody exists if there are “one or more appropriate grounds that have or
could have a significant effect on the child’s life to the extent that a reevaluation of the child’s
custodial situation should be undertaken.” Id. at 511. “[T]o establish a ‘change of circumstances,’
a movant must prove that, since the entry of the last custody order, the conditions surrounding
custody of the child, which have or could have a significant effect on the child’s well-being, have
materially changed.” Id. at 513. To warrant revisiting the custody arrangement, “the change of
circumstances must have occurred after entry of the last custody order.” Id. at 514. Importantly,
this Court concluded that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary to resolve the initial factual
question whether proper cause or change in circumstances exist—“[o]ften times, the facts alleged
to constitute proper cause or a change of circumstances will be undisputed, or the court can accept
as true the facts allegedly comprising proper cause or a change of circumstances, and then decide
if they are legally sufficient to satisfy the standard.” Id. at 512.
In this case, plaintiff maintains that the status of defendant’s mental health was a change
in circumstances that warranted a change in legal custody. She argues that at the time of the
judgment of divorce, defendant’s mental-health issues “were being managed with therapy and
medication.” She claims that defendant’s unavailability for six weeks, his recreational use of
laughing gas, and his interactions with the police all demonstrate that defendant was unable to
make positive child-rearing decisions and safely parent the children. According to defendant, his
unavailability for six weeks was “due to personal health reasons.” Defendant claimed that he
participated in a voluntary partial hospitalization program and an intensive outpatient program for
his physical and emotional health.

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In denying plaintiff’s motion, the trial court noted that it had long been aware of
defendant’s mental-health issues, which had been addressed in the judgment. Defendant’s
treatment in 2025 was consistent with the treatment contemplated by the judgment of divorce and
demonstrates that defendant was complying with the requirements of the judgment of divorce by
seeking treatment as needed. Plaintiff’s claims regarding defendant’s mental-health issues and
treatments do nothing more than verify that defendant is a person who struggles with mental-health
issues. If anything, defendant’s decision to deal with his mental-health problems and leave his
children safely with plaintiff supports that defendant is capable of making adequate child-rearing
decisions. The trial court concluded that defendant’s mental-health issues were not proper cause
or change of circumstances to warrant revisiting legal custody, and we cannot conclude that this
finding was against the great weight of the evidence. See Stoudemire, 344 Mich App at 42.
Next, plaintiff argues that several police reports documenting defendant’s erratic behavior
demonstrate a change in circumstances. But details surrounding the incidents are vague and
plaintiff presented no evidence suggesting that defendant was ever charged or convicted of any
crimes.
Plaintiff also contends that defendant recreationally used laughing gas and that his mental-
health status was unstable as demonstrated by a September 12, 2025 police report. Although the
officers responded to a complaint alleging that defendant had “self-destructive tendencies” and
“use[d] laughing gas recreationally,” there is nothing in the report that verified the truth of those
allegations. Defendant informed the responding officers that he had “been experiencing hardship
since his divorce” and had been “assaulted the night before.” Defendant denied using laughing
gas and denied emergency services. Though plaintiff alleges that these incidents establish a
concerning pattern of erratic behavior, the trial court concluded that the incidents “did not rise to
the level where his mental health hadn’t been treated or addressed.” Because the police reports do
not establish that defendant’s mental health was in an unstable state, we cannot conclude that the
trial court’s findings were against the great weight of the evidence. See Stoudemire, 344 Mich
App at 42.
Plaintiff further argues that the trial court’s consideration of letters documenting
defendant’s mental-health treatment status violated her due-process rights. This argument was not
presented in the trial court and is unpreserved. “[O]rdinarily in civil cases, we would decline to
reach an unpreserved claim on appeal under our raise-or-waive jurisprudence.” Quint v Quint, 351
Mich App 162, 174-175; 34 NW3d 616 (2024), citing Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach
Servs & Mfg, LLC, 347 Mich App 280, 289; 14 NW3d 472 (2023). But “judicial prudence favors
applying the plain-error standard to an unpreserved claim in a child-custody proceeding.” Id.
at 175.
“Parents have a significant interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management
of their children, and the interest is an element of liberty protected by due process.” In re JK, 468
Mich 202, 210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). “Due process is a flexible concept, the essence of which
requires fundamental fairness. The basic requirements of due process in a civil case include notice
of the proceeding and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Al-Maliki v LaGrant, 286 Mich App
483, 485; 781 NW2d 853 (2009) (cleaned up).

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Under the terms of the stipulated order regarding custody and parenting time and the
judgment of divorce, the arbitrator was to be provided quarterly letters from defendant’s mental-
health treatment providers. After the arbitrator withdrew from the case, the trial court confirmed
that defendant had submitted the letters to the arbitrator and then to the trial court. In light of
plaintiff’s implicit agreement with the stipulated arbitration award and custody order, which
permitted and required the letters to be sent to the arbitrator, plaintiff has not demonstrated plain
error in the trial court’s consideration of the letters after the arbitrator’s withdrawal from the case.
See Quint, 351 Mich App at 175.
Plaintiff further argues that the trial court erred by considering the letters from defendant’s
mental-health treatment providers that were hearsay in violation of her Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation. This argument is also unpreserved and thus reviewed for plain error. “Hearsay” is
“a statement that: (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing;
and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” MRE
801(c). First, “[t]he Confrontation Clause does not apply to civil proceedings.” Demski v Petlick,
309 Mich App 404, 458; 873 NW2d 596 (2015) (cleaned up). Even if the letters were hearsay,
plaintiff has not demonstrated that the trial court was not permitted to consider hearsay statements
when considering the threshold question of whether plaintiff had demonstrated that there was
proper cause or a change in circumstances. The trial court was permitted to consider the facts
“allegedly comprising proper cause or a change of circumstances, and then decide if they are
legally sufficient to satisfy the standard.” Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512. Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate plain error in this regard. See Quint, 351 Mich App at 175.
Plaintiff relies on In re Conservatorship of GT, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026)
(Docket Nos. 371518, 371519, and 371523) to support her argument regarding the letters. In that
case, this Court interpreted a probate court rule. The rule provides, “[a]ny interested person shall
be afforded an opportunity to examine and controvert reports received into evidence.” MCR
5.121(D)(2)(a). This Court noted that “it was procedurally unfair for the court to consider and rely
on information that was not made available to all interested persons.” In re Conservatorship of
GT, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3 n 3. But plaintiff fails to identify a rule that establishes that
she was entitled to receive the letters from defendant’s psychiatrist. In re Conservatorship of GT
is factually and legally distinguishable from the present matter and does not address constitutional
issues related to due process or confrontation.
Finally, plaintiff argues that she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether
there should be a change in legal custody of the children. We disagree. “Although the threshold
consideration of whether there was proper cause or a change of circumstances might be fact-
intensive, the court need not necessarily conduct an evidentiary hearing on the topic.” Corporan,
282 Mich App at 605. A party is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her motion for change
of custody when she fails “to make the required threshold showing of a change of
circumstances . . . .” Id. at 609. Because plaintiff has not made a threshold showing of proper
cause or a change of circumstances, the trial court did not err in declining to hold an evidentiary
hearing on the custody issue.

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III. PARENTING TIME
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred by denying her request for defendant’s suspended
parenting time pending mental-health and substance-abuse evaluations. We disagree.
In Shade v Wright, 291 Mich App 17, 22; 805 NW2d 1 (2010), this Court analyzed what
constituted proper cause or change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a hearing to consider a
change in parenting time. This Court concluded that the Vodvarka threshold should not apply to
a request for a change in parenting time unless the change in parenting time results in a change in
the established custodial environment. Id. at 25-27. Instead, this Court concluded and explained
as follows:
[A] more expansive definition of “proper cause” or “change of circumstances” is
appropriate for determinations regarding parenting time when a modification in
parenting time does not alter the established custodial environment.
The Vodvarka definitions of “proper cause” and “change of circumstances”
are inapplicable to this case, in part, because the rationale for imposing more
stringent constructions on the terms “proper cause” and “change of circumstances”
with respect to custody determinations is far less applicable with respect to
parenting time determinations. With respect to child custody disputes, “[t]he goal
of MCL 722.27 is to minimize unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody
orders, except under the most compelling circumstances.” Corporan v Henton, 282
Mich App 599, 603; 766 NW2d 903 (2009). “Providing a stable environment for
children that is free of unwarranted custody changes . . . is a paramount purpose of
the Child Custody Act. . . .” Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 511. Therefore, in the
context of a child custody dispute, the purpose of the proper cause or change of
circumstances requirement is “to ‘erect a barrier against removal of a child from an
established custodial environment and to minimize unwarranted and disruptive
changes of custody orders.’ ” Id. at 509, quoting Heid v AAASulewski (After
Remand), 209 Mich App 587, 593-594; 532 NW2d 205 (1995).
Such concerns do not exist, however, when a modification of parenting time
does not alter the established custodial environment because determinations
regarding child custody and parenting time serve different purposes. Whereas the
primary concern in child custody determinations is the stability of the child’s
environment and avoidance of unwarranted and disruptive custody changes, the
focus of parenting time is to foster a strong relationship between the child and the
child’s parents. . . . [Shade, 291 Mich App at 28.]
In this case, parenting time was governed by the judgment of divorce. Plaintiff sought
suspension of defendant’s parenting time. On appeal, plaintiff claims that she was merely
requesting a temporary modification so that parenting time with defendant would be supervised
pending independent substance-abuse and psychological evaluations. However, in the trial court,
plaintiff sought suspended parenting time pending independent substance-abuse and psychological
evaluations. Thus, the trial court was considering the suspension of parenting time, not a request
for supervised parenting time.

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In concluding that plaintiff had not established proper cause or a change of circumstances
regarding custody or parenting time, the trial court did not identify whether the children had an
established custodial environment with defendant or whether the proposed parenting-time
restrictions would amount to a substantial modification of parenting time such that it would result
in a change in the children’s established custodial environment. “An established custodial
environment exists ‘if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that
environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.’ ” Pierron v
Pierron, 282 Mich App 222, 244; 765 NW2d 345 (2009), aff’d 486 Mich 81 (2010), quoting MCL
722.27(1)(c). The parties did not address whether defendant had an established custodial
environment with the children. Because defendant had joint legal custody and weekly overnight
parenting time, the children likely had an established custodial environment with defendant.
Despite the trial court’s failure to identify whether the proposed change was a substantial
modification, an indefinite suspension of defendant’s parenting time amounts to a substantial
modification of parenting time because it would significantly reduce the amount of time that
defendant, with whom the children had an established custodial environment, would spend with
the children.2 “If a change in parenting time results in a change in the established custodial
environment, then the Vodvarka framework is appropriate.” Shade, 291 Mich App at 27. Thus,
before the trial court could substantially alter plaintiff’s parenting time, the court needed to first
determine whether there was proper cause or changed circumstances under Vodvarka, 259 Mich
App at 508.
As explained above, plaintiff has failed to make a threshold showing under Vodvarka that
there was proper cause or change in circumstances. The trial court determined that the police
contacts and defendant’s six-week treatment were not a change in circumstances. Because plaintiff
identifies no evidence that demonstrates that defendant’s mental-health status had declined or that
2 In Lieberman v Orr, 319 Mich App 68, 90; 900 NW2d 130 (2017), this Court provided several
examples of what types of changes to parenting time constitute changes to a custodial environment:
Rains v Rains, 301 Mich App 313, 323-324, 836 NW2d 709 (2013) (indicating that
even when parents have joint physical custody and have established a “joint
custodial environment,” changes that “substantially reduce the time a parent spends
with a child would potentially cause a [change] in the established custodial
environment”); Shade, 291 Mich App at 25-28 (stating that a change in parenting
time did not affect the established custodial environment because it left the parties
with approximately the same number of parenting-time days); Powery v Wells, 278
Mich App 526, 528; 752 NW2d 47 (2008) (holding that a modification of parenting
time that would relegate a parent who had been equally active in the child’s life to
the role of a “weekend parent” would amount to a change in the child’s established
custodial environment with that parent); Brown v Loveman, 260 Mich App 576,
596; 680 NW2d 432 (2004) (indicating that the modification of parenting time from
each parent having nearly equal parenting time to one parent having parenting time
during the school year and the other having parenting time during the summer
“necessarily would amount to a change in the established custodial environment”).

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he was unable to parent the children, she failed to establish that the trial court’s decision was
against the great weight of evidence. See Stoudemire, 344 Mich App at 42-43.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman

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