COA 372313 PEOPLE OF MI V JAYLIN OMAR BRAZIER Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 10/8/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
October 08, 2026
1:37 PM
v No. 372313
Wayne Circuit Court
JAYLIN OMAR BRAZIER, LC No. 23-003818-01-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: KOROBKIN, P.J., and RICK and MALDONADO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317,
and tampering with evidence in a criminal case, MCL 750.483a(6)(b). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant’s convictions arise out of events that occurred on January 4, 2022, and
January 5, 2022. It is undisputed that in the evening of January 4, 2022, defendant picked up the
victim from her home in Eastpointe, and the two returned to defendant’s home on Greenfield Road
in Detroit—a home that defendant shared with his two young children and the children’s mother,
Katrina Smith. It is also undisputed that in the early morning hours of January 5, 2022, defendant
loaded the victim’s body into the trunk of his car, traveled to Highland Park, and then dumped the
victim’s body into a dumpster. When the victim did not return home on January 5, 2022, her
mother became concerned and called the police.
Initially, defendant claimed that the last time he had seen the victim was months earlier.
However, later, defendant gave a statement to police admitting that on January 5, 2022, he dumped
the victim’s body into the dumpster. Despite significant efforts, including a five-month daily
search of a landfill by many volunteers, the victim’s body was never recovered. The investigation
into the victim’s disappearance took over a year. However, from January 2022 to January 2023,
defendant was incarcerated for lying to the Eastpointe police about his contact with the victim on
the night she went missing. On August 10, 2023, nineteen months after the victim’s disappearance,
defendant was charged with second-degree murder and tampering with evidence.

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The prosecutor’s case was based on the theory that in the months preceding the victim’s
disappearance, defendant, then 23 years old, groomed the 17-year-old victim, his “stepcousin,”
through sexually explicit text messaging and the sharing of controlled substances. Then, on the
evening of January 4, 2022, or the early morning hours of January 5, 2022, the victim rejected
defendant’s advances. Thereafter, defendant became violent, and this violence escalated to the
point that he caused the victim’s death, after which he attempted to conceal his actions by disposing
of the body and lying for months about the events. Defendant denied that he harmed the victim,
suggesting that the victim died by her own hand, a drug overdose, or a medical condition.
Ultimately, he argued to the jury that while the victim was in his home, she died from a seizure
disorder and, after he discovered she had died, defendant panicked and made the ill-conceived
decision to dispose of her body.
There were no eyewitnesses to any of the events, and much of the prosecutor’s case was
built of circumstantial evidence. The prosecution also relied on the opinion of a medical examiner,
the testimony of experts in cell phone extraction and mapping, security videos, and defendant’s
multiple inconsistent statements. At the conclusion of trial, defendant was found guilty of second-
degree murder and tampering with evidence. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. DIRECTED VERDICT
Defendant first argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a
directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence to sustain his second-degree murder
charge. We disagree.
“When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict, this Court
reviews the record de novo to determine whether the evidence presented by the prosecutor, viewed
in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, could persuade a rational trier of fact that the essential
elements of the crime charged were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Aldrich, 246
Mich App 101, 122; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). “Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
arising therefrom may constitute proof of the elements of the crime.” People v Head, 323 Mich
App 526, 532; 917 NW2d 752 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
To satisfy the elements of second-degree murder, the prosecution must prove the following:
“(1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or
excuse.”1 People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 463-464; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). “Malice is defined
as the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and
willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or
great bodily harm.” Id. at 464. Second-degree murder does not require a finding of a specific
intent to harm or kill. Id. at 466. Indeed, “the accused need not actually intend the harmful result.”
Id. “The intent to do an act in obvious disregard of life-endangering consequences is a malicious
1 In People v Spears, 346 Mich App 494, 517; 13 NW3d 20 (2023), this Court concluded that “the
often-recited fourth element of second-degree murder, ‘without justification or excuse,’ actually
is part of the ‘cluster of ideas’ of second-degree murder” and is not an element of the offense.

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intent.” Id. “A jury may infer malice from evidence that the defendant intentionally set in motion
a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 759; 597
NW2d 130 (1999). “Because of the difficulty in proving an actor’s intent, only minimal
circumstantial evidence is necessary to show that a defendant had the requisite intent.” People v
Stevens, 306 Mich App 620, 629; 858 NW2d 98 (2014).
Defendant does not contest that there was sufficient evidence of a death. Instead, defendant
contends that there was insufficient evidence that defendant caused the victim’s death and that he
did so with malice. We disagree.
There was substantial and compelling circumstantial evidence that defendant both caused
the victim’s death and that he did so with malice. Specifically, there was sufficient evidence from
which the jury could conclude that defendant sought to have a sexual encounter with the victim,
his stepcousin; that the victim resisted; that the encounter turned violent; and during this violent
encounter, defendant caused the victim’s death. The record established that for more than a year
before the victim’s disappearance, defendant groomed the victim. Defendant sent sexually explicit
text messages to the victim and, on more than one occasion, they met to smoke marijuana. From
defendant’s own text messages, it is clear that the relationship between defendant and the victim
had caused other family members to question the relationship. Then, there was indisputable
evidence that on the evening of January 4, 2022, defendant picked the victim up at her home and
they went to defendant’s home, where they spent several hours.
Moreover, from defendant’s internet activities, the jury could infer defendant’s intent when
he brought the victim back to his home. Evidence extracted from defendant’s cell phone in June
2023 demonstrated defendant used the internet to access rape and cousin-themed pornography.
From this evidence, the trier of fact could conclude that defendant brought the victim to his home
for purposes of a sexual encounter.
There was also compelling circumstantial evidence that a violent altercation ensued
sometime that evening or in the early morning hours of January 5, 2022. Testimony and text
messages establish that before defendant picked up the victim on the evening of January 4, 2022,
he dropped off Smith, his live-in girlfriend and the mother of his children, to her place of
employment. Smith was working the midnight shift that evening. Smith texted defendant
throughout the night indicating that she was not feeling well and wanted to come home. In these
text exchanges, defendant encouraged Smith to stay at work and made several excuses to delay
picking her up. In one text, defendant indicated that he needed to take a shower. Then, when
Smith saw defendant sometime after 2:30 a.m. on January 5, 2022, she noticed blood and a “big
scratch” on defendant’s collar bone. Defendant claimed that the family cat scratched him, but
Smith testified that the cat had never scratched that deep or drawn that much blood. There was
also some evidence, through home security footage, that defendant appeared to have changed his
clothes sometime that evening. Then, during a search of defendant’s home, investigators located
a broken table in the backyard. The table was in a condition where it appeared to one investigator
that it had not been out in the elements long. From this compelling circumstantial evidence, the
trier of fact could have easily concluded that whatever transpired between defendant and the victim
that night, it eventually turned violent.

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Evidence documenting defendant’s activities in the hours and days that followed the
victim’s disappearance also suggests that defendant caused the victim’s death and did so with
malice. Initially, defendant represented to law enforcement and the victim’s family that it had
been months, perhaps even years, since he had seen the victim. However, eventually, on
January 19, 2022, defendant gave a statement to police wherein he admitted being with the victim
during the relevant time period. In addition, defendant claimed that in the early morning hours of
January 5, 2022, the victim simply stopped breathing and died. During his statement, defendant
admitted that he panicked, and this caused him to put the victim’s body in the trunk of his car,
transport her to another city, and then dispose of her body in a dumpster. Even if defendant had
not made the foregoing admissions, cellular phone mapping documented defendant’s actions. This
same cellular mapping evidence also suggested that on January 6, 2022, defendant returned to the
dumpster to check on the victim’s body. A rational jury could infer defendant’s consciousness of
guilt from evidence that defendant destroyed, arguably, the most important evidence of the crime
of murder, the victim’s body. See, e.g., People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 226; 749 NW2d 272
(2008).
Lastly, that defendant initiated a factory reset on his phone on January 7, 2022, that
permanently deleted the contents of the phone that existed before the reset was also evidence of
defendant’s consciousness of guilt. It should also be noted that while investigators were not able
to extract from defendant’s cell phone his activities on the phone before January 7, 2022, a search
warrant permitted law enforcement to obtain a record of defendant’s Google searches in the days
after the victim’s disappearance. On January 6, 2022, a device associated with defendant searched
two phrases: (1) “are trash trucks also compactors,” and (2) “what is the force of a garbage truck
compactor.” Google searches performed on January 7, 2022 included: (1) “Are trash trucks also
compactors”; (2) “How do the police track your phone”; (3) “How do the police track missing
people’s phones”; and (4) “Can the police take my phone without a warrant?”
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was
sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that the essential elements of second-degree murder
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant’s suspicious actions on and after January 5,
2022, including disposing of the victim’s body, searching the internet to confirm that the evidence
would be destroyed, lying to authorities, destroying cellular phone history, interfering with
witnesses, and giving inconsistent statements to law enforcement, demonstrated a consciousness
of guilt. This was strong and compelling circumstantial evidence sufficient for the jury to
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant caused the victim’s death. Moreover, the
same body of evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that defendant acted with malice.
Accordingly, it was proper for the trial court to submit the second-degree murder charge to
the jury, and there was no error in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.
B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Next, defendant asserts that on multiple fronts he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel. We disagree.
Defendant preserved his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by moving for a new
trial in the lower court. See People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 188; 774 NW2d 714 (2009).

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However, because the trial court denied defendant’s motion for new trial and did not hold an
evidentiary hearing, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is limited to errors
apparent on the existing record. People v Thorne, 322 Mich App 340, 347; 912 NW2d 560 (2017).
The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and law. People
v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 80; 829 NW2d 266 (2012). Effective assistance of counsel is presumed,
and a party claiming ineffective assistance bears a heavy burden to prove otherwise. People v
Putman, 309 Mich App 240, 248; 870 NW2d 593 (2015). “To establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and
that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” People v Riley (After Remand), 468
Mich 135, 140; 659 NW2d 611 (2003), citing Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S
Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). See also People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d
797 (1994). “In order to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient, the defendant must
show that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms. In so doing, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s performance
constituted sound trial strategy.” Riley, 468 Mich at 140. Establishing prejudice necessarily
requires demonstrating a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different but for counsel’s error. People v Nix, 301 Mich App 195, 207; 836 NW2d 224 (2013).
Further, the party claiming ineffective assistance bears the burden of establishing the factual
predicate for the claim. Putman, 309 Mich App at 248.
1. FAILURE TO REQUEST INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION
On appeal, defendant argues that trial counsel’s failure to request that the jury be instructed
on involuntary manslaughter deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
Defendant has failed to show that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance because there was
insufficient evidence in the record to support the giving of an involuntary manslaughter instruction,
and trial counsel’s actions were a matter of trial strategy.
In the present case, at the parties’ requests, the court reviewed a few jury instructions.
Regarding the second-degree murder charge, the court noted that there frequently is a concurrent
request for a manslaughter instruction. The court, however, indicated that because a manslaughter
instruction was not consistent with the evidence, i.e., there was no evidence of reckless conduct, it
was not inclined to give a manslaughter instruction. Defendant’s counsel agreed with the court’s
assessment that the giving of an involuntary manslaughter instruction was not supported by the
evidence and that defendant had maintained his innocence from the outset. Accordingly,
defendant’s counsel did not request an instruction on involuntary manslaughter and none was given
by the court.
In Michigan, involuntary manslaughter is defined as an unlawful killing that is “neither
murder nor voluntary manslaughter nor within the scope of some recognized justification or
excuse.” People v Holtschlag, 471 Mich 1, 21; 684 NW2d 730 (2004) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder, but an
instruction on involuntary manslaughter must be given only if supported by a rational view of the
evidence. People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 541; 664 NW2d 685 (2003). “Conversely, an

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instruction that is without evidentiary support should not be given.” People v Wess, 235 Mich App
241, 243; 597 NW2d 215 (1999).
Although the existing record does not support defendant’s claim that he was entitled to
have the jury instructed on involuntary manslaughter, it also did not make sense to request the
instruction considering defendant’s trial counsel’s strategy. The failure to request an instruction
that is inconsistent with a defense theory is a matter of trial strategy. People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich
636, 645; 664 NW2d 159 (2003). Notably, an “all or nothing” defense, in which the defendant
forgoes instructions on any lesser offenses, is a legitimate trial strategy. People v Nickson, 120
Mich App 681, 687; 327 NW2d 333 (1982). We do not substitute our judgment for that of counsel
on matters of trial strategy. Unger, 278 Mich App at 242-243. Moreover, that a trial strategy is
ultimately unsuccessful does not render counsel ineffective for using it. People v Kevorkian, 248
Mich App 373, 414-415; 639 NW2d 291 (2001).
In his defense, defendant dangled several theories in front of the jury, including that the
victim died from an untreated medical condition, from an overdose, or at her own hand. At the
end of the day, defendant’s counsel argued in his closing that the victim died from a seizure
disorder. All of defendant’s theories presuppose that defendant’s actions did not cause the victim’s
death. Indeed, it is apparent that trial counsel’s strategy focused on whether the victim died under
circumstances completely unrelated to defendant. Thus, defendant’s defense theory was
inconsistent with the theory that defendant fatally injured the victim but his actions amounted to
involuntary manslaughter rather than murder. Accordingly, trial counsel’s failure to request an
involuntary manslaughter instruction was reasonable trial strategy when the defense’s theory of
the case was that defendant did not cause the victim’s death. In sum, defendant has failed to
demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance was so deficient in this regard that it denied him
the effective assistance of counsel.
2. FAILURE TO REQUEST M CRIM JI 16.15 AND M CRIM JI 16.21
Defendant also contends that trial counsel’s failure to ensure that the jury was properly
instructed on the charge of second-degree murder deprived him of the effective assistance of
counsel. We disagree.
“A defendant in a criminal trial is entitled to have a properly instructed jury consider the
evidence against him or her.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 82; 732 NW2d 546 (2007).
“The trial court is required to instruct the jury concerning the law applicable to the case and fully
and fairly present the case to the jury in an understandable manner.” People v Montague, 338
Mich App 29, 37; 979 NW2d 406 (2021) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). Jury
instructions must include all the elements of the offenses charged against the defendant and any
material issues, defenses, and theories supported by the evidence. Id. “[J]ury instructions are
reviewed in their entirety, and there is no error requiring reversal if the instructions sufficiently
protected the rights of the defendant and fairly presented the triable issues to the jury.” Id. Model
jury instructions are to be given if they are applicable, accurately state the law, and are requested
by a party. MCR 2.512(D)(2).
Defendant was charged with second-degree murder. As discussed above, the elements of
second-degree murder are “(1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and

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(4) without justification or excuse,” and “[m]alice is defined as the intent to kill, the intent to cause
great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that
the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.” Goecke, 457 Mich
at 463-464. Consistent with the foregoing and M Crim JI 16.5, the trial court instructed the jury:
The defendant is charged with the crime of second-degree murder. To prove
this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a
reasonable doubt:
First, that the Defendant caused the death of [the victim]. That is, that [the
victim] died as a result of the Defendant’s actions.
Second, that the Defendant had one of these three states of minds. He
intended to kill, or he intended to do great bodily harm to [the victim], or he
knowingly created a very high risk of death or great bodily harm knowing that death
or such harm would be the likely result of his actions.
Third, that the killing was not justified, excused, or done under
circumstances that reduce it to a lesser crime.
Notwithstanding the foregoing recitation of the elements the prosecution was required to
prove, defendant contends that his trial counsel should have requested that the jury be instructed
pursuant to M Crim JI 16.15 and M Crim JI 16.21.
M Crim JI 16.15 provides:
[There may be more than one cause of death.] It is not enough that the
defendant’s act made it possible for the death to occur. In order to find that the
death of [name deceased] was caused by the defendant, you must find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the death was the natural or necessary result of the
defendant’s act.
The use note to M Crim JI 16.15 provides that “[t]his instruction is designed for use where there
is an issue as to whether the act of the defendant caused death, or whether death was caused by
some intervening cause.” This is consistent with People v Bailey, 451 Mich 657, 677; 549 NW2d
325 (1996), amended 453 Mich 1204 (1996), in which the Court held that if a third party’s
independent act “intervenes between the act of a criminal defendant and harm to a victim, that act
may only serve to cut off the defendant’s criminal liability where the intervening act is the sole
cause of harm.” Accordingly, by its very language and accompanying caselaw, M Crim JI 16.15
is appropriate when there is evidence of an intervening cause of death sufficient to cut off
defendant’s criminal responsibility.
Similar to the prior instruction, including M Crim JI 16.15 would have been inconsistent
with defendant’s trial strategy as it would have suggested that defendant was involved in the
victim’s death. Defendant denied any involvement throughout the trial and, instead, argued that
the victim died from, among other things, a seizure disorder. Therefore, trial counsel’s decision
not to request M Crim JI 16.15 was consistent with the apparent trial strategy. Further, there was

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no evidence of intervening causes of death that would have warranted including such an
instruction.
Because M Crim JI 16.15 did not properly apply within the context of the instant case’s
facts, charges, and theories, and because the trial court’s instructions otherwise fully and fairly
presented the case to the jury, trial counsel’s decision not to request this jury instruction did not
constitute deficient performance or ineffective assistance of counsel. “Defense counsel is not
ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction if there was insufficient evidence that the jury
instruction would apply to the defendant’s case.” People v Geary, ___ Mich App ___, ____; ____
NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 371889); slip op at 3. Moreover, trial counsel is not required to
advocate a meritless position. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
Similarly, we find no merit in defendant’s argument that trial counsel’s failure to request
M Crim JI 16.21 deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. M Crim JI 16.21 provides:
(1) You must think about all the evidence in deciding what the defendant’s
state of mind was at the time of the alleged killing.
(2) The defendant’s state of mind may be inferred from the kind of weapon
used, the type of wounds inflicted, the acts and words of the defendant, and any
other circumstances surround the alleged killing.
[Use paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) for inferring intent from the use of a
dangerous weapon, where appropriate.]
(3) You may infer that the defendant intended to kill if [he/she] used a
dangerous weapon in a way that was likely to cause death. Likewise, you may infer
that defendant intended the usual results that follow from the use of a dangerous
weapon.
(4) A gun is a dangerous weapon.
(5) A dangerous weapon is an instrument that is used in a way that is likely
to cause serious physical injury or death.
[Use paragraph (6) for inferring premeditation and deliberation, where
appropriate.]
(6) Premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from any actions of the
defendant which show planning or from any other circumstances surrounding the
killing. The prosecutor need not prove a motive for the killing. But, you may
consider evidence of motive in deciding if there was premeditation and
deliberation. Motive by itself does not prove premeditation and deliberation.
At the outset, it is readily apparent that Paragraphs (3) through (6) of M Crim JI 16.21 are
simply not applicable considering the case’s facts, charges, and theories. There was no evidence
that any weapon was used, let alone a dangerous weapon. Giving this instruction as written would
have likely confused the jury.

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Nonetheless, defendant argues that he was prejudiced when M Crim JI 16.21 was not given
because this instruction would have informed the jury “to look to the use of a weapon, the type of
weapon, how a weapon was used when deciding whether to infer a state of mind.” But this
rationale is precisely why it would have been inappropriate for the trial court to give M Crim JI
16.21. The model jury instruction is consistent with caselaw that intent to kill can be inferred from
the use of a dangerous weapon. See, e.g., People v DeLisle, 202 Mich App 658, 672; 509 NW2d
885 (1993). Taking defendant’s argument to its logical extreme, giving M Crim JI 16.21 in its
entirety in a case where there is no evidence that a weapon was used would give the jury permission
to infer a lack of intent to kill simply because a dangerous weapon was not used. In any event, the
jury instruction’s parenthetical makes it clear that the use of Paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) is only
appropriate where there is some evidence that the defendant used a dangerous weapon. Moreover,
Paragraph (6) would similarly create confusion because premeditation and deliberation are not
elements of second-degree murder. People v Walker, 330 Mich App 378, 383; 948 NW2d 122
(2019) (“First-degree premeditated murder is only distinguished from second-degree murder by
the element of premeditation.”).
To the extent that defendant argues trial counsel should have requested that the court
instruct the jury on intent in accordance with M Crim JI 16.21(1) and (2), the record confirms that
the court did as much. The trial court instructed the jury that “[t]he defendant’s intent may be
proved by what he said, what he did, how he did it, or by any other facts and circumstances in
evidence.” This instruction embodied the language and intent of the first two paragraphs of
M Crim JI 16.21. Because a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating both deficient
performance and prejudice, the defendant necessarily bears the burden of establishing the factual
predicate for his claim of error. Since the record confirms that the jury was instructed consistent
with the language of M Crim JI 16.21(1) and (2), defendant has failed to establish the necessary
factual predicate of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590,
600-601; 623 NW2d 884 (2001).
C. OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE
Lastly, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that
defendant accessed legal pornography. Defendant asserts that this evidence was not relevant, and
it invited the jury to make the unreasonable inference that someone who watches pornography is
motivated to rape and kill. We disagree.
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence.
People v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 251-252; 934 NW2d 693 (2019). “A trial court abuses its
discretion when it selects an outcome that does not fall within the range of reasonable and
principled outcomes.” People v Snyder, 301 Mich App 99, 104; 835 NW2d 608 (2013) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “Preliminary issues of law, including the interpretation of the rules
of evidence and the effect of constitutional provisions, are reviewed de novo.” People v Benton,
294 Mich App 191, 195; 817 NW2d 599 (2011).
The admission of other-acts evidence is governed by MRE 404(b). This rule of evidence
provides:

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(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses. If it is material, the evidence may be admissible for
another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme,
plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident.
MRE 404(b) does not prohibit all evidence of other acts simply because it may implicate
character. “MRE 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, meaning it permits the admission of any logically
relevant evidence ‘even if it also reflects on a defendant’s character,’ so long as the evidence is
not ‘relevant solely to the defendant’s character or criminal propensity.’ ” People v Spaulding,
332 Mich App 638, 649; 957 NW2d 843 (2020), quoting People v Mardlin, 487 Mich 609, 615-
616; 790 NW2d 607 (2010). Thus, other-acts evidence may be admissible if (1) the evidence is
offered for a proper purpose, (2) the evidence is relevant, and (3) the probative value of the
evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. People v Denson, 500 Mich 385,
398; 902 NW2d 306 (2017), citing People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55, 63-65; 508 NW2d 114
(1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994).
“Under the first prong of the VanderVliet test, the question is whether the prosecution has
articulated a proper noncharacter purpose for admission of the other-acts evidence.” Denson, 500
Mich at 398. The list of proper purposes set forth in MRE 404(b)(2) is not exhaustive. Mardlin,
487 Mich at 616. In this case, the prosecution identified motive and intent as proper noncharacter
purposes for admission of the evidence. This recitation satisfied the first prong of the VanderVliet
test.
Under the second prong of the VanderVliet test, the evidence must be relevant. Logical
relevance is determined by the application of MRE 401 and MRE 402. Denson, 500 Mich at 400.
Pursuant to MRE 401, evidence is relevant if (a) “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence,” and (b) “the fact is of consequence in determining
the action.” Relevant evidence is admissible unless prohibited by the United States Constitution,
the Michigan Constitution, the Michigan Rules of Evidence, or another rule prescribed by the
Michigan Supreme Court. MRE 402. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. Id.
With regard to the second element of the VanderVliet test, we find that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when ruling that the evidence was both material and probative under
MRE 401. The prosecution asserts that evidence that defendant accessed pornographic material
was relevant to establish motive, which is always a material issue in a murder case. See Unger,
278 Mich App at 223 (“Although motive is not an essential element of the crime, evidence of
motive in a prosecution is always relevant.”). For the purposes of MRE 404(b), “motive” is
defined as “[c]ause or reason that moves the will and induces action. An inducement, or that which
leads or tempts the mind to induce a criminal act.” People v Hoffman, 225 Mich App 103, 106;
570 NW2d 146 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Motive is the moving power which
impels to action for a definite result. Intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such
result.” Id.

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In this case, the prosecutor’s theory of the case was that defendant groomed the victim, his
much younger stepcousin, through months of sexually explicit text messaging and the sharing of
controlled substances. Then, on the evening of January 4, 2022, or the early morning hours of
January 5, 2022, the victim rejected defendant’s sexual advances. Thereafter, defendant became
violent, and this violence escalated to the point that he caused the victim’s death, after which he
attempted to conceal his actions by disposing of the body and lying for months about the events.
Considering the charges against defendant and the prosecution’s theory of the case, the accessing
of pornographic material, particularly rape and cousin-themed, was relevant to establishing that
defendant fantasized about having sex with his cousin and that when the victim rejected his
advances, he intended to kill her because there was a probability that family, particularly his
pregnant partner, would learn of his behavior. In short, the evidence was logically relevant for a
proper purpose under MRE 404(b).
Moreover, regarding the third element of the VanderVliet test, the probative value of the
evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403 provides
that the court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. “Unfair prejudice
may exist where there is a danger that the evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by
the jury or where it would be inequitable to allow use of the evidence.” People v Blackston, 481
Mich 451, 462; 751 NW2d 408 (2008). Moreover, it is frequently recognized that “[a]ll evidence
offered by the parties is ‘prejudicial’ to some extent, but the fear of prejudice does not generally
render the evidence inadmissible. It is only when the probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice that evidence is excluded.” People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75; 537
NW2d 909 (1995), mod on other grounds 450 Mich 1212 (1995).
In this case, considering the prosecution’s theory, the pornography evidence and internet
searches were highly probative of defendant’s motive. Indeed, this evidence was the primary way
by which the prosecution could establish defendant’s motive and his intent. The probative value
was also not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice because the jury was only
exposed to a general description of the pornography defendant accessed on the internet. Although
defendant accessed pornographic videos, none of these videos were shown to the jury. Thus, the
trial court limited the prejudicial effect of the evidence. Further, we also do not find that the
evidence was too remote to be relevant just because defendant’s search for cousin-themed
pornography occurred in June 2023. Notably, MRE 404(b) has no temporal limitations, and the
remoteness of other-acts evidence affects the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. People
v Rosa, 322 Mich App 726, 735; 913 NW2d 392 (2018). Accordingly, on this record, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion because there was no basis to exclude the evidence.
Affirmed.
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

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