COA 375242 PEOPLE OF MI V DWIGHT HALEAKALA KAPUNIAI Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
-1-
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
February 13, 2026
1:58 PM
v No. 375242
Washtenaw Circuit Court
DWIGHT HALEAKALA KAPUNIAI, LC No. 24-001052-AR
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and BOONSTRA and PATEL, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this criminal interlocutory appeal, the prosecution appeals by leave granted1 and
defendant cross-appeals the circuit court’s opinion and order vacating defendant’s conviction of
domestic violence on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct and reversing the district court’s order
denying defendant’s motion for a new trial. Defendant’s cross-appeal raises additional grounds
for granting a new trial. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
I. BACKGROUND
In the evening on July 2, 2023, the victim, CK, called 911 asking for an ambulance to
transport her to the hospital because she was “severely intoxicated” and had “hurt [her] wrist.” CK
told the 911 operator that it was not an emergency, but she had gotten into an altercation with
“somebody” and that her wrist looked “out of place.” Eventually, CK admitted that the altercation
was with defendant, her husband, but she refused to provide more information. CK stated that the
police could not help her and that she was not safe. She asked the 911 operator if she knew
anything about domestic violence. Trooper Dustin Pitcel of the Michigan State Police was
dispatched to the home. CK was “visibly distraught and crying.” CK’s right hand and wrist were
1 People v Kapuniai, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 11, 2025
(Docket No. 375242).

-- 1 of 8 --

-2-
visibly swollen, and she appeared to be bleeding from behind her left ear. CK did not say, however,
that defendant assaulted her.
CK was distraught and tearful at the hospital. She reported that she was in an altercation
with her husband and was injured in the process. CK explained that she was defending herself
from being punched in the head and arm by blocking punches. The examining doctor documented
that CK had “a lot of bruising to her wrist” and “a laceration on the back of [her] ear.” The nurse’s
triage notes reflected that CK “state[d] she was in a dispute with her husband who hit her multiple
times in the head with a closed fist and [she] injur[ed] her wrist [and] thumb while blocking.”
When asked if she felt safe at home, CK responded, “[S]ometimes.”
Defendant was later arrested. He was tried before a jury in the district court on the charge
of domestic violence (second offense). At trial, CK testified that she had gotten into an argument
with defendant on the way home from a friend’s house after defendant accused her of flirting with
his friend. CK testified that she backhanded defendant, causing a small cut on his nose. CK stated
that the verbal argument continued at their home but maintained that defendant did not assault her.
Over defendant’s objection, the 911 call was played for the jury.
In addition to testimony about the alleged assault in July 2023, the prosecutor asked about
a prior incident between CK and defendant from July 2018. CK testified that, in 2018, she and
defendant got into an argument that resulted in defendant’s arrest. CK stated that she did not
“remember much of anything that happened that day” but “was told that [she and defendant] got
into a physical altercation” that was observed by witnesses. CK recalled that she had “some
bruises” following the incident.
After the prosecution rested its case, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground
that there was insufficient evidence to find defendant guilty of domestic violence. The district
court denied the motion.
Defendant was convicted of domestic violence for the 2023 incident. He moved for a new
trial, arguing that (1) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence and
seeking to inflame the jury, (2) the other-acts evidence was improperly admitted, and (3) the
verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. The district court denied the motion.
Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial to the circuit court. The circuit
court held that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing that CK had “been in an abusive
relationship for years.” The circuit court concluded that a new trial was warranted because “there
was a substantial risk that the prosecution’s unfounded remarks . . . may have materially affected
the outcome of trial.” The circuit court otherwise would have affirmed the district court’s denial
of defendant’s motion for a new trial. The circuit court vacated defendant’s conviction, reversed
the district court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial, and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Both parties now appeal.

-- 2 of 8 --

-3-
II. PROSECUTOR’S STATEMENT DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT
The prosecution argues that the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument was a
reasonable inference on the basis of the evidence and thus defendant was not denied a fair and
impartial trial. We agree.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion.
People v Johnson, 502 Mich 541, 564; 918 NW2d 676 (2018). “An abuse of discretion occurs
when the court makes a decision that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes,
or makes an error of law.” People v Christian, 510 Mich 52, 75; 987 NW2d 29 (2022) (cleaned
up). Underlying questions of law are reviewed de novo, People v Duncan, 494 Mich 713, 722;
835 NW2d 399 (2013), while “[a] trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error,”
Johnson, 502 Mich at 565. “Clear error occurs if the reviewing court is left with a definite and
firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” Id. (cleaned up). In performing this review,
we give due regard to the “special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses who appeared before it.” MCR 2.613(C). A circuit court’s decision when reviewing a
district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is not entitled to deference because we apply the
same standard of review as the circuit court. See People v Hudson, 241 Mich App 268, 276; 615
NW2d 784 (2000).
“Generally, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is a constitutional issue reviewed de
novo.” People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 272; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). However,
unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct, as in this case, are reviewed for plain error
affecting substantial rights. People v Evans, 335 Mich App 76, 88-89; 966NW2d 402 (2020). “To
avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have
occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial
rights.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). To satisfy the third element,
the defendant must show that the error “affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Id.
“Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually
innocent defendant or when an error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence.” Id. at 763-764 (cleaned up).
“Further, we cannot find error requiring reversal where a curative instruction could have alleviated
any prejudicial effect.” People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 329-330; 662 NW2d 501 (2003).
We review prosecutorial misconduct issues on a case-by-case basis by reviewing “the
prosecutor’s remarks in context to determine whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial
trial.” People v Mullins, 322 Mich App 151, 172; 911 NW2d 201 (2017) (cleaned up). “The
prosecutor’s statements are to be evaluated in light of defense arguments and the relationship the
comments bear to the evidence admitted at trial.” Id. (cleaned up). “Generally, prosecutors are
given great latitude regarding their arguments and are free to argue the evidence and all reasonable
inferences from the evidence as they relate to their theory of the case.” Id. (cleaned up). Overall,
“given that a prosecutor’s role and responsibility is to seek justice and not merely convict, the test
for prosecutorial misconduct is whether a defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People
v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). See also Darden v Wainwright, 477 US
168, 181; 106 S Ct 2464; 91 L Ed 2d 144 (1986).

-- 3 of 8 --

-4-
The circuit court reasoned that CK’s limited testimony about the 2018 incident between
defendant and CK did not support an inference that CK had “been in an abusive relationship for
years” and that, therefore, the prosecutor’s argument “crossed the line” into arguing facts not in
evidence. We disagree.
The prosecutor’s argument that CK was “terrified” and had “been in an abusive relationship
for years” was a reasonable inference in light of the evidence. Although CK provided limited
testimony about the 2018 incident, CK admitted that a physical altercation with defendant occurred
in 2018 in which police were called, she suffered bruises, and he was arrested. Moreover, the
record contained evidence beyond the 2018 incident that clearly supported this inference. After
being evasive when asked questions by the 911 operator about how she was injured and by whom,
CK asked if the operator knew anything about domestic violence and then stated that the police
could not protect her. At the hospital, CK told medical professionals that defendant hit her multiple
times in the head with a closed fist and that the injuries to her wrist and thumb were from blocking
those punches. When asked if she felt safe at home, CK responded, “[S]ometimes.” Reviewing
the prosecutor’s remarks in context of the entire record, Mullins, 322 Mich App at 172, the
prosecutor’s statement that CK was “in an abusive relationship for years” was a reasonable
inference from the evidence and did not invade defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial.
Because there was no plain error, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
defendant’s motion for a new trial on this issue and the circuit court erred by concluding
otherwise.2
III. DEFENDANT’S CROSS-APPEAL
A. PRIOR ACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
In his cross-appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred by affirming the district
court’s decision to admit evidence of a prior act of domestic violence against CK. Although the
circuit court concluded that the other-acts evidence gave a more complete history of the
relationship between defendant and CK, defendant argues that the incident had very little probative
value and there was a substantial risk of prejudice. We disagree.
We review the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion,
but review de novo questions of law such as whether evidence is admissible under a particular rule
or statute. People v Denson, 500 Mich 385, 396; 902 NW2d 306 (2017). “A trial court necessarily
abuses its discretion when it admits evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law.” Id.
Generally, evidence of a defendant’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts may not be used to show
a defendant’s propensity to commit a crime. MRE 404(b). However, the prohibition against the
use of other-acts evidence to show propensity does not apply in the context of domestic violence.
2 The prosecution further argues that the circuit court erred by failing to apply the plain-error
standard of review or any appellate standard when reviewing the district court’s denial of
defendant’s motion for a new trial. Because we conclude that the prosecutor’s statement was a
reasonable inference from the evidence and did not invade defendant’s right to a fair and impartial
trial, it is not necessary for us to reach this issue.

-- 4 of 8 --

-5-
See MCL 768.27b; People v Pattison, 276 Mich App 613, 616; 741 NW2d 558 (2007).
MCL 768.27b(1) provides:
[I]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving
domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s commission of other acts of
domestic violence is admissible for any purpose for which it is relevant, if not
otherwise excluded under Michigan rule of evidence 403.
“The language of MCL 768.27b clearly indicates that trial courts have discretion to admit relevant
evidence of other domestic assaults to prove any issue, even the character of the accused, if the
evidence meets the standard of MRE 403.” People v Cameron, 291 Mich App 599, 609; 806
NW2d 371 (2011) (cleaned up). Under MCL 768.27b and subject to MRE 403, “prior-bad-acts
evidence of domestic violence can be admitted at trial because a full and complete picture of a
defendant’s history tends to shed light on the likelihood that a given crime was committed.” Id.
at 610 (cleaned up).
Relevant evidence is admissible under MRE 403 if its probative value is not substantially
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, which includes “the tendency of the proposed evidence
to adversely affect the objecting party’s position by injecting considerations extraneous to the
merits of the lawsuit, e.g., the jury’s bias, sympathy, anger, or shock.” Id. at 611. Unfair prejudice
may also exist when there is a danger that “marginally probative evidence will be given undue or
preemptive weight by the jury.” Id.
“[W]hen applying MRE 403 to evidence admissible under MCL 768.27b, courts should
weigh the propensity inference in favor of the evidence’s probative value rather than its prejudicial
effect.” People v Berklund, __ Mich App __, __; __ NW3d __ (2024) (Docket No. 367568); slip
op at 10. Considerations relevant to whether other-acts evidence must be excluded under
MRE 403 as unfairly prejudicial include:
(1) the dissimilarity between the other acts and the charged crime, (2) the temporal
proximity of the other acts to the charged crime, (3) the infrequency of the other
acts, (4) the presence of intervening acts, (5) the lack of reliability of the evidence
supporting the occurrence of the other acts, and (6) the lack of need for evidence
beyond the complainant’s and the defendant’s testimony. [Id. at __; slip op at 10,
quoting People v Watkins, 491 Mich 450, 487-488; 818 NW2d 296 (2012).]
At the outset, we find no merit in defendant’s argument that we should presume that the
district court erred because it did not make a ruling on the record at trial. Although the district
court did not state its reasoning on the record at trial, the court sufficiently explained its reasoning
when addressing defendant’s motion for a new trial. Relying on Cameron, the district court
concluded that the evidence was relevant. The district court also concluded that defendant had not
demonstrated that the other-acts evidence “swayed” the jury in “an irrational way.”
The other-acts evidence was relevant to show defendant’s propensity to commit domestic
violence against CK. See People v Rosa, 322 Mich App 726, 732; 913 NW2d 392 (2018). The
other-acts evidence provided information on the history and background of the parties and their
relationship. Like the 2023 incident, the 2018 incident involved a physical altercation between

-- 5 of 8 --

-6-
defendant and CK after they had consumed alcohol. The incidents were approximately five years
apart, which is not a substantial amount of time. The evidence at trial clearly implied that
defendant had committed other acts of violence against CK, so the 2018 incident was not an
isolated incident. Further, there was no evidence of intervening acts that would diminish the
relevancy of the 2018 incident. And evidence beyond CK’s testimony was necessary because CK
denied that defendant assaulted her during the 2023 incident.
The probative value of the other-acts evidence was not “substantially outweighed” by a
risk of unfair prejudice. See MRE 403. CK’s testimony was limited and provided no details that
were likely to inflame the jury’s bias, sympathy, anger, or shock. Further, there was no danger
that the other-acts evidence was given undue weight because the testimony was limited and there
was other evidence from which the jury could have found that defendant assaulted CK during the
2023 incident. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the other-acts evidence
and the circuit court did not err by affirming the district court’s decision.
B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he assaulted CK. We disagree.
“Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed de novo.” People v Xun Wang,
505 Mich 239, 251; 952 NW2d 334 (2020). “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this
Court must view the evidence—whether direct or circumstantial—in a light most favorable to the
prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Kenny, 332 Mich App 394, 402-403;
956 NW2d 562 (2020). “[A] reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and
make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 240; 917
NW2d 559 (2018) (cleaned up). “It is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine
what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded
those inferences.” Id. (cleaned up). Any and all conflicts that arise in the evidence must be
resolved “in favor of the prosecution.” People v Mikulen, 324 Mich App 14, 20; 919 NW2d 454
(2018).
There is sufficient evidence for a guilty verdict when “a rational trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Tennyson, 487 Mich 730, 735; 790 NW2d
354 (2010). “The prosecution need not negate every reasonable theory of innocence; instead, it
need only prove the elements of the crime in the face of whatever contradictory evidence is
provided by the defendant.” Mikulen, 324 Mich App at 20. “Circumstantial evidence and the
reasonable inferences that arise from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements
of the crime.” People v Blevins, 314 Mich App 339, 357; 886 NW2d 456 (2016).
Under MCL 750.81(2), an individual is guilty of the misdemeanor of domestic violence
when the individual “assaults or assaults and batters the individual’s spouse or former spouse, an
individual with whom the individual has or has had a dating relationship, an individual with whom
the individual has had a child in common, or a resident or former resident of the individual’s
household.” Assault is defined as “either an attempt to commit a battery or an unlawful act that
places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” People v Starks,

-- 6 of 8 --

-7-
473 Mich 227, 234; 701 NW2d 136 (2005). Battery is defined as “an intentional, unconsented and
harmful or offensive touching of the person of another . . . .” People v Reeves, 458 Mich 236, 240
n 4; 580 NW2d 433 (1998).
At trial, there was evidence that defendant accused CK of flirting with his friend, which
resulted in an argument. Shortly after the argument, CK called 911 and stated that her wrist was
“out of place” and that she was too intoxicated to drive to the hospital. CK evaded the 911
operator’s questions about how she was injured and who assaulted her, but she eventually admitted
that she was in an altercation with defendant. CK asked the operator if she knew anything about
domestic violence and stated that the police could not protect her. At the hospital, CK was
reluctant to call the incident anything more than an altercation and did not want her husband to get
in trouble. CK told medical personnel that it was a “fair fight,” and she injured her wrist and thumb
blocking punches as defendant “hit her multiple times in the head with a closed fist.” At trial, CK
testified repeatedly that defendant did not assault her.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient
evidence to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of domestic
violence. Determining what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and determining
the weight of the evidence is the role of the jury. Oros, 502 Mich at 240. The district court did
not err by denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, and the circuit court did not err by
affirming the district court’s decision.
C. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that his conviction was against the great weight of the evidence because
CK testified that defendant did not assault her. We disagree.
“A verdict is against the great weight of the evidence and a new trial should be granted
when the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict and a serious miscarriage of justice
would otherwise result.” Evans, 335 Mich App at 87 (cleaned up). “Generally, a verdict may be
vacated only when the evidence does not reasonably support it and it was more likely the result of
causes outside the record, such as passion, prejudice, sympathy, or some other extraneous
influence.” People v Lacalamita, 286 Mich App 467, 469; 780 NW2d 311 (2009). As our
Supreme Court has explained, “absent exceptional circumstances, issues of witness credibility are
for the jury, and the trial court may not substitute its view of the credibility for the constitutionally
guaranteed jury determination thereof.” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 642; 576 NW2d 129
(1998) (cleaned up). Therefore, when issues involving witness credibility arise, “if it cannot be
said as a matter of law that the testimony thus impeached was deprived of all probative value or
that the jury could not believe it, the credibility of witnesses is for the jury.” Id. at 643 (cleaned
up).

-- 7 of 8 --

-8-
Defendant’s argument rests solely on the credibility of CK’s testimony that she was not
assaulted by defendant.3 Motions for a new trial based solely on a witness’s credibility are not
favored. Id. at 639. CK’s testimony was contradicted by her prior statements and did not
overcome the other evidence that led to the reasonable inference that defendant assaulted CK. It
was the role of the jury to weigh the evidence. Defendant has not identified any exceptional
circumstances that would warrant invading the jury’s role and it cannot be said that CK’s testimony
deprived all the other evidence of any probative value. See id. at 642-643. The district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a new trial and the circuit court did not
err by affirming the district court’s decision.
We reverse the circuit court’s opinion and order that vacated defendant’s conviction on the
basis of the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument but affirm in all other respects. We
do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Sima G. Patel
3 Defendant argues that the 911 call was inadmissible hearsay; however, defendant waived this
issue because he did not raise it in his questions presented. See People v Fonville, 291 Mich App
363, 383; 804 NW2d 878 (2011); see also MCR 7.212(C)(5) (stating that an appellant’s brief must
contain “[a] statement of questions involved, stating concisely and without repetition the questions
involved in the appeal.”).

-- 8 of 8 --