COA 371683 PEOPLE OF MI V DENNIS JAMES ELKINS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/15/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
December 15, 2025
11:34 AM
V No. 371683
Ingham Circuit Court
DENNIS JAMES ELKINS, LC No. 22-000940-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and O’BRIEN and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial conviction of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (sexual penetration of victim under 13 years of age), for which the
trial court sentenced him to serve 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
I. FACTS
This case arises out of defendant’s sexual assault of the victim, who was 11 years old at
the time. The victim was close friends with defendant’s granddaughter, ME. In August 2022, the
victim and ME had a sleepover at defendant’s home. The victim testified that after she fell asleep,
she woke up to “[p]ressure and a stinging sensation” in her vagina. The victim testified that while
defendant touched the outside of her vagina, he mostly touched the inside of it with a “pushing”
motion. She also stated that she texted her mother for help while defendant’s fingers were still in
her vagina. According to the victim, she used the light from her cell phone to see defendant staring
back at her, and defendant stopped touching her shortly afterward.
The victim disclosed the incident to her mother and stepfather, who contacted the police.
Sharon Goodfellow, a registered nurse, collected the victim’s underwear and took sample swabs
of the victim’s vulva and perianal area for DNA testing. After her examination, the victim
discussed the details of her assault during a forensic interview and identified defendant as her
assailant.
The Michigan State Police Laboratory tested the collected swabs and underwear and
detected the possible presence of male DNA, but only the victim’s perianal and underwear swabs

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had sufficient DNA for additional testing. Samantha Hopcraft, a forensic scientist with the biology
and DNA unit, explained that when samples potentially contain semen, they will attempt to
separate the sperm cells from the nonsperm cells. The result is that “fraction 1” will contain the
nonsperm cells, and “fraction 2” will contain the sperm cells. Hopcraft conducted autosomal DNA
testing on the fraction 2 sample from the underwear swabs,1 the results of which indicated very
strong support for the contention that defendant was not a contributor to the male DNA. However,
Hopcraft did not perform such testing with the fraction 1 sample. Cassandra DeRuiter, a lab
manager with the DNA unit, conducted Y-STR DNA tests on the fraction 1 samples from the
underwear swabs and the perianal swabs.2 The Y-STR haplotype identified in the testing matched
defendant’s haplotype, and DeRuiter testified that she would probably have to look at 3,062 males
before she saw that haplotype again in the population at large.
Defendant was convicted after a four-day jury trial. Defendant then filed motions for a
directed verdict of acquittal and for a motion for a new trial, arguing that there was insufficient
evidence for his conviction to stand. The trial court denied both motions and proceeded to
sentencing. This appeal followed.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
“A challenge to the sufficiency of evidence underpinning a conviction implicates due
process.” People v Parkinson, 348 Mich App 565, 575; 19 NW3d 174 (2023). “Due process
requires that a prosecutor introduce evidence sufficient to justify a trier of fact to conclude that the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Tombs, 260 Mich App 201, 206-207;
679 NW2d 77 (2003), aff’d 472 Mich 446 (2005).
We “review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.” People v Baskerville,
333 Mich App 276, 282; 963 NW2d 620 (2020). We review the evidence “in a light most favorable
to the prosecut[ion] to determine whether any trier of fact could find the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The
standard of review is deferential: a reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences
and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392,
400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). “It is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what
inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those
inferences.” People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). Further, “[a]ll
conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution[,] and we will not interfere
with the jury’s determinations regarding the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
1 Autosomal testing was described as follows:
[I]n the autosomal testing . . . , you get a random combination of all the
chromosomes from either of your parents, so that will give you a uniqueness
because that assortment is random compared to . . . any other siblings you might
have from those parents, so you would have a unique DNA assortment of
chromosomes than from your siblings.
2 Y-STR testing is designed to isolate and identify the male portion of the DNA in a sample.

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witnesses.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 222; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). The prosecution
“is not obligated to disprove every reasonable theory consistent with innocence to discharge its
responsibility; it need only convince the jury ‘in the face of whatever contradictory evidence the
defendant may provide.’ ” Nowack, 462 Mich at 400, quoting People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263,
273 n 6; 536 NW2d 517 (1995).
In this case, to convict defendant of first-degree criminal sexual assault, the prosecution
was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant engaged in sexual penetration
of a person under 13 years of age. MCL 750.520b(1)(a). “Sexual penetration means sexual
intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any
part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body,
but emission of semen is not required.” MCL 750.520a(r). Defendant does not challenge any
specific elements of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, except to assert that there was
insufficient evidence to show that he was the perpetrator. “[I]t is well settled that identity is an
element of every offense.” People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 356; 749 NW2d 753 (2008).
At trial, the victim testified unequivocally that she woke up to find defendant touching the
inside and outside of her vagina with his fingers, and that she saw defendant’s face with the light
from her phone. The victim did not recall ever telling the police that she could not see the face of
the person touching her,3 and her identification of defendant was consistent with the testimony
from the witnesses that she interacted with after the assault. The victim’s mother testified that the
victim identified defendant as the assailant immediately after the assault, and Goodfellow testified
that the victim identified defendant as her assailant during her examination. The victim also
identified defendant as the person who assaulted her during a forensic interview.
Defendant asserts on appeal that the victim’s identification was “motivated by the revenge
she sought against the person she incorrectly believed to be the perpetrator of the assault,” but no
evidence suggests that the victim’s identification was inaccurate, untruthful, or fabricated on
account of “revenge.” The victim’s clear and consistent testimony was sufficient to support
defendant’s conviction, even if it lacked any corroboration. See MCL 750.520h; People v
Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 181; 891 NW2d 255 (2016). Moreover, determining the credibility
of the victim was a question for the jury to resolve, and this Court will not interfere with that role.
Solloway, 316 Mich App at 181-182.
Although not needed to resolve the issue before us, we address defendant’s assertion that
the DNA evidence was largely exculpatory. While the autosomal DNA testing of the fraction 2
sample from the victim’s underwear showed that that it was 7.6 billion times more likely that the
DNA came from the victim and an unrelated, unknown contributor than from the victim and
defendant, defendant ignores the DNA testing performed on other samples. Y-STR testing was
conducted on a different sample—fraction 1—and did provide a possible connection to defendant.
DeRuiter testified that the Y-STR testing on the victim’s underwear swabs-fraction 1 shows that
3 Defendant asserts that the victim did in fact tell authorities that she could not see the face of the
perpetrator, but he has identified no evidence to support that claim. Although defense counsel
suggested this was the case during cross-examination, the questions of attorneys are not evidence,
M Crim JI 2.10, and defendant has not identified any evidence.

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the major Y-STR haplotype obtained matched the Y-STR haplotype from defendant’s DNA
sample. DeRuiter similarly testified that the partial Y-STR haplotype from the victim’s perianal
swabs-fraction 1 matched the Y-STR haplotype from defendant’s DNA sample. DeRuiter
emphasized that she used different samples in her testing from those Hopcraft used. From the
results of the Y-STR testing of the victim’s anal perianal swabs-fraction 1, as noted, DeRuiter
estimated that she would have to examine on average 3,062 men to find one who matched the
haplotype other than defendant or his close male relatives. Accordingly, contrary to defendant’s
argument, the DNA evidence presented at trial was not exonerating, and it does not diminish the
sufficiency of the evidence establishing defendant’s identification.
III. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
A trial court’s decision whether to grant a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. People v Johnson, 502 Mich 541, 564; 918 NW2d 676 (2018). “An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside the range of principled
outcomes.” People v Buie, 491 Mich 294, 320; 817 NW2d 33 (2012). “A mere difference in
judicial opinion does not establish an abuse of discretion.” Johnson, 502 Mich at 564.
A court may grant a new trial “on any ground that would support appellate reversal of the
conviction or because it believes that the verdict has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” MCR
6.431(B). However, a new trial may not be granted
on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or the improper admission or rejection of
evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the
opinion of the court, after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively
appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. [MCL
769.26.]
“Generally, a verdict may be vacated only when the evidence does not reasonably support it and
it was more likely the result of causes outside the record, such as passion, prejudice, sympathy, or
some other extraneous influence.” People v Lacalamita, 286 Mich App 467, 469; 780 NW2d 311
(2009). But “[c]onflicting testimony, even when impeached to some extent, is an insufficient
ground for granting a new trial.” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 647; 576 NW2d 129 (1998).
“[D]ue process requires the prosecution to disclose evidence in its possession that is
exculpatory and material, regardless of whether the defendant requests the evidence.” People v
Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 590-591; 808 NW2d 541 (2011). However, “[f]or due process
purposes, there is a crucial distinction between failing to disclose evidence that has been developed
and failing to develop evidence in the first instance.” People v Anstey, 476 Mich 436, 461; 719
NW2d 579 (2006). Further, “the police have no constitutional duty to assist a defendant in
developing potentially exculpatory evidence,” id., and the prosecution does not have a duty to
search for evidence or investigate to aid the defendant’s case, People v Burwick, 450 Mich 281,
289 n 10; 537 NW2d 813 (1995).
In his motion for a new trial, defendant asserted that buccal swabs from his grandson, CE,
would have both excluded defendant as the victim’s assailant and positively identified CE as the

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only contributor of DNA on the victim’s underwear swab. The trial court properly characterized
defendant’s assertions as “wholly, completely, totally speculation.”
Defendant on appeal does not argue that the jury was misdirected, that evidence was
improperly admitted, or that any error of pleading or procedure occurred that would justify a new
trial. See MCL 769.26. Further, defendant cannot establish that the jury’s verdict was more likely
the result of passion, prejudice, sympathy, or some extraneous influence than the evidence
provided at trial. See Lacalamita, 286 Mich App at 469. Instead, defendant repeatedly argues that
the prosecution failed to undertake efforts that might have produced exculpatory evidence.
However, defendant’s argument fails for the simple reason that the prosecution did not have any
duty or obligation to search for exculpatory evidence in his case. See Burwick, 450 Mich at 289 n
10. Further, the record does not support defendant’s argument.
The detective investigating the assault testified that he observed the victim’s forensic
interview, and, on the basis of it, obtained a search warrant to collect defendant’s DNA. When the
detective asked defendant and his wife for information about the case, they declined to cooperate.
The detective testified that he later learned of the allegation that CE might have been involved in
the assault, but he was not able to substantiate any such claim. The investigation therefore
indicated that only defendant, his wife, ME, and the victim were present in defendant’s home when
the assault occurred, leaving the detective without a reasonable basis for requesting a DNA sample
from CE. Further, we note that, although defendant relies on his wife’s testimony that CE was
present at the time of the assault, she admitted at trial that she never spoke with law enforcement
about CE’s alleged presence in the home during the investigation. And, as noted, several witnesses
contradicted defendant’s wife regarding CE’s presence at the home. There was therefore nothing
in the record to indicate that a DNA sample from CE would have conclusively identified CE, to
the exclusion of defendant, as the assailant. And neither law enforcement nor the prosecution was
required to obtain a DNA sample from CE. See Anstey, 476 Mich at 461; Burwick, 450 Mich at
289 n 10.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion
for a new trial did not fall outside the range of principled outcomes. See Buie, 491 Mich at 320.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

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