COA 376028 PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL SHAUN MORIARTY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/10/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
August 10, 2026
12:22 PM
v No. 376028
Van Buren Circuit Court
MICHAEL SHAUN MORIARTY, LC No. 2022-023893-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and YOUNG and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Michael Shaun Moriarty, appeals by right his conviction of operating while
intoxicated causing death, MCL 257.625(4). Defendant contends that the prosecution presented
constitutionally insufficient evidence to support the conviction and that the verdict was against the
great weight of the evidence. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we disagree with defendant
and therefore affirm.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
On September 29, 2021, after 9:00 p.m., defendant was driving his motor vehicle, a Toyota
RAV4, on 27th Street in Van Buren County when he struck Todd Mullin, who was on the edge of
the roadway with his motorcycle. It was dark at the time of the collision with no streetlights or
ambient lighting in the area. The road is a rural two-lane roadway with a speed limit of 55 mph.
Each lane is approximately 10 feet wide; the road has no fog line. Mullin’s motorcycle had become
disabled on the shoulder of the roadway prior to the collision and was at a complete stop or at a
near-stop. At the time of impact, Mullin was either straddling the motorcycle or standing beside
it and pushing it. Mullin was wearing dark-colored clothing, a black authorized motorcycle
helmet, and retroreflective Nike shoes. When emergency responders arrived, they attempted to
resuscitate Mullin, but their efforts were unsuccessful, and he was declared dead at the scene. At
the scene, defendant admitted that he had consumed six to seven beers. The parties stipulated that
defendant’s blood alcohol content was 0.18% at the time of the collision.
Defendant was charged with operating while intoxicated causing death, MCL 257.625(4).
At his jury trial, the prosecution and defense each called their own expert accident

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reconstructionist. Both experts agreed on the location of maximum engagement, meaning the
precise moment in the crash when the two vehicles reached their deepest point of overlap, and the
overall measurements of the accident scene. However, the experts disagreed about whether the
accident was unavoidable. The prosecution’s expert concluded that the accident was not
unavoidable. The prosecution’s expert explained that although defendant may not have been able
to come to a stop to avoid hitting Mullin, defendant should have been able to make a lane change
or swerve to avoid hitting Mullin, so the accident was not “a hundred percent unavoidable.” The
defense expert disagreed; he concluded that the accident was unavoidable for any driver, regardless
of sobriety. Relying on nighttime visibility research, he stated that at the rate of 54 mph (roughly
80 feet per second), defendant was left with two seconds, or possibly less than one second, to
perceive, identify, and react. The black box data from defendant’s vehicle indicated that in the 4.2
seconds before impact, the vehicle increased in speed continuously from 49.1 mph to 54.7 mph
and that defendant applied his breaks sometime in the final two-tenths of a second before the crash.
The defense expert explained that although alcohol does increase the necessary perception-reaction
time, this factor was irrelevant here because even a sober driver could not have perceived and
reacted to Mullin in time.
The defense also called an expert in toxicology who opined that Mullin’s toxicology at the
time of death showed a blood alcohol content of .056% as well as THC and methamphetamine.
The toxicology expert’s opinion was that, at the drug interaction levels present in Mullin’s system
at the time of the collision, Mullin had global transient neurocognitive impairment—meaning
impairment of all normal functions of the brain. Specifically, Mullin would have experienced
significant impairment in cognition, physiological measures (movement, balance), reaction time,
learning, memory, and judgment; heightened euphoria; psychotic manifestations including panic
and paranoia; and increased tendency toward aggressive behavior. On cross-examination, the
toxicology expert acknowledged that he could not say specifically that Mullin’s drug levels
contributed to the crash; that determination was beyond his expertise.
Following the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of driving
while intoxicated causing death. As relevant here, detailed instructions on factual cause, proximate
cause, and superseding cause were provided as follows:
To prove this charge, the Prosecutor must prove each of the following elements
beyond a reasonable doubt:
* * *
Fifth, that the Defendant’s operation of the vehicle caused the death of Todd
Mullin.
To cause the death, the Defendant’s operation of the vehicle must have been
a factual cause of the death, that is, but for the Defendant’s operation of the vehicle,
the death would not have occurred. In addition, the Defendant’s operation of the
vehicle must have been a proximate cause of the death of Todd Mullin.
Proximate cause is a legal concept designed to prevent criminal liability
from attaching when the death is too remote or unnatural a consequence of the

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Defendant’s operation of the motor vehicle. For the Defendant’s operation of the
motor vehicle to be regarded as a proximate cause of the victim’s death, the death
must be a direct and natural result of the Defendant’s actions. To determine if the
Defendant’s operation of the motor vehicle was a proximate cause of the death, ask
yourself the following question: Was there an intervening cause that superseded the
Defendant’s conduct such that the causal link between the Defendant’s conduct and
the victim’s injury was broken. The standard by which to gauge whether an
intervening cause supersedes and thus severs the causal link is generally one of
reasonable foreseeability. The linchpin in the superseding cause analysis[] is
whether the intervening cause was foreseeable based on an objective standard of
reasonableness. If it was reasonably foreseeable, then the Defendant’s conduct will
be considered a proximate cause. If, however, the intervening act by the victim or
a third party was not reasonably foreseeable that is, gross negligence or intentional
misconduct then, generally, the causal link is severed and the Defendant’s conduct
is not regarded as a proximate cause of the victim’s death. Gross negligence is not
merely an elevated form of ordinary negligence. Gross negligence means
wantonness and disregard of the consequences which may ensue and indifference
to the . . . rights of others that is equivalent to a criminal intent. Ordinary
negligence by the victim or a third party will not be regarded as a superseding cause
because ordinary negligence is reasonably foreseeable.
Defense counsel indicated to the court that they were satisfied with the jury instructions and had
no objections.
The jury deliberated for approximately 50 minutes before returning its guilty verdict.
Defendant subsequently filed a motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the
verdict and motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. Defendant now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant first contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant’s operation of his motor vehicle proximately caused the death as required by MCL
257.625(4). We disagree.
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s determination that there was sufficient evidence
to support a conviction de novo. People v Prude, 513 Mich 377, 384; 15 NW3d 249 (2024). “We
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime to have been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” People v Meissner, 294 Mich App 438, 452; 812 NW2d 37 (2011). “The
standard of review is deferential: a reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences
and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” People v Bailey, 310 Mich App 703,
713; 873 NW2d 855 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Appellate courts “do not

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interfere with the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of witnesses or the evidence.”
People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 582; 831 NW2d 243 (2013).
There are five elements of operating while intoxicated causing death: (1) The defendant
operated a motor vehicle; (2) the vehicle was operated on a highway or another place open to the
general public or generally accessible to motor vehicles; (3) while operating the defendant was
intoxicated; (4) the defendant operated the vehicle voluntarily, knowing that they had consumed
an intoxicating substance; and (5) the defendant’s operation of the vehicle caused the death of
the victim. MCL 257.625(1), (4); see also People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 433; 703 NW2d
774 (2005). In the present case, only the fifth element—causation—is in dispute.
To prove causation, the prosecution must prove two distinct subelements beyond a
reasonable doubt: (1) actual (factual) cause and (2) proximate, or legal cause. See id. at 435.
Factual cause concerns whether, “ ‘but for’ the defendant’s conduct,” the result would have
occurred. Id. “[P]roximate causation . . . is a legal construct designed to prevent criminal liability
from attaching when the result of the defendant’s conduct is viewed as too remote or unnatural.”
Id. at 436. “For a defendant’s conduct to be a proximate cause, the victim’s injury must be a ‘direct
and natural result’ of the defendant’s actions.” Id. (citation omitted). The conduct will not be
deemed a proximate cause if an “intervening cause . . . superseded the defendant’s conduct such
that the causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s injury was broken.” Id. at
436-437.
“Whether an intervening cause supersedes a defendant conduct is a question of reasonable
foreseeability. Ordinary negligence is considered reasonably foreseeable, and it is thus not a
superseding cause that would sever proximate causation.” People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184, 195;
196 NW2d 67 (2010). But because it is not reasonably foreseeable, “ ‘gross negligence’ or
‘intentional misconduct’ on part of a victim is considered sufficient to ‘break the casual chain
between the defendant and the victim.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Gross negligence means
“wantonness,” or “[c]onduct indicating that the actor is aware of the risk but indifferent to the
results and usually suggests a greater degree of culpability than recklessness,” and “disregard of
the consequences which may ensue[.]” Id. at 195-196 (citations and quotation marks omitted). A
“victim’s negligence . . . is an important factor to be considered by the trier of fact in determining
whether proximate cause has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 196. “[P]roximate
causation must be decided on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 201.
Defendant argues that Mullin’s intoxication and actions were grossly negligent and
therefore a superseding cause that relieved defendant of criminal liability. That is, defendant
emphasizes Mullin’s physical condition and the choices he made prior to the accident, and he
argues that they were not reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, defendant argues, the evidence
presented to the jury demonstrated a break in the casual link between defendant’s conduct and
Mullin’s death and the jury did not properly consider that evidence.
But defendant’s framing of the argument misapplies the standard of review for a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. Defendant asks this Court to view the evidence in his favor,
but this we cannot do. Instead, we must draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility
choices in support of the jury verdict. See Bailey, 310 Mich App at 861. Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, as we must, a rational trier of fact could have found

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that the victim’s conduct was merely negligent and did not break the causal chain. See Meissner,
294 Mich at 452.
A rational trier of fact could have concluded that although Mullin was intoxicated, his
intoxication did not cause him to act in a manner that was not reasonably foreseeable. A victim’s
conduct of driving while intoxicated does not automatically amount to a superseding cause as a
matter of law; instead, proximate causation must be decided by the jury on a case-by-case basis.
Feezel, 486 Mich at 201. It is likewise reasonable for a trier of fact to find that the failure to wear
more reflective gear while operating a motorcycle at night constitutes ordinary negligence and
does not rise to the level of gross negligence or intentional misconduct. Moreover, evidence about
the effect of Mullin’s intoxication on the crash was mixed. The toxicology expert testified that
Mullin would have experienced significant impairment in cognition, reaction time, and judgment
due to the drug interaction levels in his system, but the expert acknowledged he could not say with
certainty how Mullin’s impairment contributed to the crash. Although defendant’s expert testified
that the crash was unavoidable because of victim’s conduct and the environment, the prosecution’s
expert described the crash as avoidable because defendant could have swerved. Because we “do
not interfere with the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of witnesses or the evidence,”
Dunigan, 299 Mich App at 582, the jury was free to credit the prosecution’s expert’s testimony
over that of the defense expert. As for the environment of the accident, it was reasonably
foreseeable that a country road would be dark with no ambient lighting at 9:00 p.m. in September
and that there could be a disabled vehicle on or near the shoulder. Considering these factors in
totality, we conclude that a rational jury could have found that Mullin’s actions amounted to mere
ordinary negligence such that defendant’s operation of his vehicle was the proximate cause of the
accident.
Defendant argues that this case “is eerily like” Feezel. But in that case, our Supreme Court
reversed the defendant’s conviction because the trial court had not allowed the jury to consider
evidence of the victim’s blood alcohol content when determining the element of proximate
causation. Feezel, 486 Mich at 196, 216-217. There, the intoxicated victim was walking in the
middle of the roadway with his back turned to traffic during a rainstorm despite the availability of
a sidewalk. Id. at 199. “Thus, the proofs were sufficient to create a jury-submissible question
about whether the victim was grossly negligent, and the victim’s high level of intoxication would
have aided the jury in determining whether the victim acted with ‘wantonness and a disregard of
the consequences with may ensue . . . .’ ” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In this case, by
contrast, the jury was allowed to hear evidence about Mullin’s intoxication. Feezel does not
mandate that the jury reach a particular outcome; instead, Feezel concerns whether evidence
should have been submitted to the jury regarding whether a victim was grossly negligent. See id.
at 199. Again, because we “do not interfere with the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility
of witnesses or the evidence,” Dunigan, 299 Mich App at 582, the jury was free to evaluate and
consider the credibility of the toxicology expert’s testimony when determining whether Mullin’s
intoxication was a superseding cause that relieved defendant of criminal responsibility. In essence,
the trial court complied with Feezel by submitting the issue to the jury, and the jury rendered its
verdict.
Defendant also argues that due to the length of time it took for the parties to agree on jury
instructions and their complexity, the jurors could not possibly have understood the trial court’s
instructions. But it is well established that jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. People

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v Hana, 447 Mich 325, 351; 524 NW2d 682 (1994). Moreover, defense counsel admitted that the
parties and trial court discussed the jury instructions in great length before they were ultimately
given to the jury. When asked if “counsel was satisfied with the instructions as a whole,” defense
counsel responded “yes.” When asked if there were any objections to place on the record with
regard to the jury instructions, defense counsel responded “no, your Honor.” “[A]n affirmative
statement that there are no objections to the jury instructions constitutes express approval of the
instructions, thereby waiving review of any error on appeal.” People v Hershey, 303 Mich App
330, 351; 844 NW2d 127 (2013). Therefore, any challenge to the complexity or accuracy of the
jury instructions as they relate to proximate causation is waived, and we need not consider it. See
id.
B. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for
new trial because the great weight of the evidence preponderates against a finding that defendant’s
operation of his vehicle was the proximate cause of Mullin’s death. Again, we disagree.
A trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against
the great weight of the evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when “a trial
court chooses an outcome falling outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.”
People v Lacalamita, 286 Mich App 467, 469; 780 NW2d 311 (2009). “The test to determine
whether a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence is whether the evidence preponderates
so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.”
Id. “Generally, a verdict may be vacated only when the evidence does not reasonably support it,
and it was more likely the result of causes outside the record such as passion, prejudice, sympathy,
or some other extraneous influence.” Id.
Defendant relies on his prior assertions to support his claim that the verdict was against the
great weight of the evidence. But because, as discussed above, the evidence reasonably supports
the conclusion that Mullin was simply negligent as opposed to grossly negligent, the evidence does
not preponderate so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow
the verdict to stand, and there is also no indication that the jury’s decision was motivated by
passion, prejudice, or some other extraneous influence. See id. Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a new trial. See id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin

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