COA 381452 NAMITA SHARMA V BUREAU OF ELECTIONS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
NAMITA SHARMA, SUSHI DATTA-SANDHU,
and FRANCES DWIGHT,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
UNPUBLISHED
August 13, 2026
1:49 PM
v No. 381452
Court of Claims
BUREAU OF ELECTIONS, and DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF ELECTIONS,
LC No. 26-000125-MZ
Defendants-Appellees,
and
MICHIGAN DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION,
Amicus Curiae.
Before: YOUNG, P.J., and ACKERMAN and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the June 26, 2026 order of the Court of Claims granting
summary disposition to defendants in this election matter. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Namita Sharma is a district court judge who was barred from seeking reelection
in the upcoming November 2026 general election because of issues with her statutorily mandated
affidavit of identity (AOI). Plaintiffs Datta-Sandhu and Dwight are electors from Judge Sharma’s
district. The issues in this case concern whether Judge Sharma was required to file an AOI, or
whether she could still appear on the ballot despite what was, by all accounts, a faulty AOI.
Judge Sharma is currently a judge for the 8th District Court in Kalamazoo. Her term
expires on January 1, 2027. During her term, Judge Sharma has served in the Kalamazoo Circuit
Court Family Division. The same is permitted by MCL 600.401(2)(e), which allows circuit courts
to adopt a plan of concurrent jurisdiction pursuant to which a district court judge “may exercise
the power and jurisdiction of the circuit court.”

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This case arises from Judge Sharma’s attempts to seek reelection to the office of district
court judge in the upcoming November 2026 general election. It appears that, unbeknownst to
Judge Sharma, she owed late filing fees that were imposed for actions taken by the Treasurer of
the Committee to Retain Judge Namita Sharma. When Judge Sharma filed her AOI and affidavit
of candidacy to run for reelection, she certified that all late filing fees or fines due “from me or
any candidate committee organized to support my election” had been filed or paid. This statement
was, by all accounts, false, because all late filing fees had not been paid.
In May 2026, defendant Jonathan Brater, Director of the Bureau of Elections, informed
Judge Sharma that she was disqualified from appearing on the ballot because of the false statement
in the AOI regarding whether all late fees had been paid. Director Brater cited MCL 168.558(4)
and concluded that the false statement in the AOI meant that defendants were required to disqualify
Judge Sharma from the ballot.
In response to Director Brater’s letter, Judge Sharma paid the outstanding fees and gathered
signatures on nominating petitions. She notified the Bureau of Elections that she intended to re-
file a new AOI as well as nominating petitions. Adam Fracassi, the Deputy Director of the Bureau
of Elections, informed Judge Sharma that her nominating petitions would be rejected. In pertinent
part, Deputy Director Fracassi also told Judge Sharma that defendants could not certify her
candidacy because she filed an AOI that contained a false statement. Moreover, he told Judge
Sharma that the headings on her nominating petitions were incorrect. When Judge Sharma
subsequently filed her new AOI in June 2026, defendants rejected the filing.
Judge Sharma and the other named plaintiffs—electors who intended to vote for Judge
Sharma—began the instant proceedings by suing defendants in the Court of Claims in June 2026.
They asked for declaratory and injunctive relief and argued that requiring an incumbent district
court judge to file an AOI violated this state’s constitution.
The Court of Claims granted summary disposition to defendants in a 16-page opinion and
order. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
We review de novo the trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition. League of
Women Voters of Mich v Sec’y of State, 339 Mich App 257, 272; 981 NW2d 538 (2021). This
case requires an examination of our Constitution. “The primary objective in interpreting a
constitutional provision is to determine the text’s original meaning to the ratifiers, the people, at
the time of ratification.” O’Connell v Dir of Elections, 316 Mich App 91, 97; 891 NW2d 240
(2016).
CONST 1963, ART 6, § 22
Plaintiffs have not meaningfully disputed that the AOI filed by Judge Sharma contained a
false statement, contrary to MCL 168.558(4). Instead, they take the approach that Judge Sharma
was not required to file an AOI.
Before addressing the substance of these arguments, we note that, even assuming for
purposes of argument that Judge Sharma did not need to file an AOI, plaintiffs overlook that Judge

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Sharma did in fact file an AOI and that the AOI contained statements that were false. The filing
of an AOI with a false statement requires her exclusion from the ballot under the plain language
of MCL 168.558(4). Indeed, the statute demands that an election official “shall not certify. . . the
name of a candidate who executes an affidavit of identity that contains a false statement with
regard to any information or statement required under this section.” The statute demands strict
compliance, and a candidate who fails to achieve strict compliance does not have a right to appear
on the ballot. Moore v Genesee Co, 337 Mich App 723, 729-730; 976 NW2d 921 (2021); Stumbo
v Roe, 332 Mich App 479, 481; 957 NW2d 830 (2020). Here, regardless of whether an AOI could
be required, plaintiffs have not advanced a meaningful argument as to how the false statement in
the AOI that was in fact filed could be ignored. Plaintiffs’ arguments about whether Judge Sharma
could be required to file an AOI when she filed one that ran afoul of the statute do not bring them
closer to the relief they seek.
Furthermore, and turning to the merits of plaintiffs’ arguments, we agree with the Court of
Claims that plaintiffs’ arguments are not supported by the plain language of the Constitution.
Plaintiffs’ primary position is that, under Const 1963, art 6, § 22, an AOI cannot be required of
Judge Sharma. That section provides:
Any judge of the court of appeals, circuit court or probate court may become a
candidate in the primary election for the office of which he is the incumbent by
filing an affidavit of candidacy in the form and manner prescribed by law. [Const
1963, art 6, § 22. (emphasis added).]
Plaintiffs argue that because an AOI is not mentioned for incumbent judges in art 6, § 22,
one cannot be required in this case. The text of this section belies plaintiffs’ position. Judge
Sharma, a district court judge,1 does not occupy one of the three offices to which this section of
the Constitution applies. Plaintiffs’ position is that the plain text of art 6, § 22 should be ignored
and that this Court should, by inference, add the term “district court” somewhere in the list of
judges to whom the section would apply. This approach is contrary to the manner in which this
Court is to review the plain text of the Constitution, and we decline to adopt it here. See American
Axle & Mfg, Inc v Hamtramck, 461 Mich 352, 362; 604 NW2d 330 (2000).
In an apparent recognition that their approach would add words to art 6, § 22 that do not
appear in the text, plaintiffs argue that, because Judge Sharma has been performing the duties of a
circuit court judge under a plan of concurrent jurisdiction, she is both a “de facto” and “de jure”
circuit court judge. Plaintiffs’ briefing simply announces this position without meaningful
explanation, and it is cursory enough to be considered abandoned. See Yee v Shiawassee Co Bd
of Comm’rs, 251 Mich App 379, 406; 651 NW2d 756 (2002). Even if not abandoned, this
argument is meritless. Judge Sharma is, under a plan of concurrent jurisdiction in the Kalamazoo
Circuit Court, authorized to “exercise the power and jurisdiction of the circuit court.” MCL
600.401(2)(e). This does not make her a de jure circuit court judge. Indeed, a de jure officer is
who holds office by law; a de facto officer is one who performs the duty of a particular office
1 As defendants and the Court of Claims pointed out, the office of district court judge was created
by the Legislature as authorized by Const 1963, art 6, § 1. See MCL 600.8101(1) (establishing,
by statute, district courts).

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under a claim of appointment. See, generally, People v Townsend, 214 Mich 267, 271; 183 NW
177 (1921). Judge Sharma is not a de jure officer of the circuit court because she is, by law, a
district court judge. And the de facto officer doctrine does not transform the nature of her office.
Rather, the de facto doctrine simply gives validity to certain actions taken by an officer. See id.
Amicus curiae contends that Judge Sharma should be treated similarly to her circuit court
colleagues because she performs the same work that they do as a family division judge. However,
for the reasons noted above, the notion that Judge Sharma performs particular duties as allowed
by law does not transform the office she held and to which she sought reelection.
THE “PURITY OF ELECTIONS” CLAUSE
Plaintiffs next argue that, assuming the Constitution means what it says and that art 6, § 22
does not encompass district court judges, Judge Sharma is nevertheless entitled to any rights
extended to the judges listed in that section because the Constitution demands that all candidates
for public office be treated equally. In support, plaintiffs cite the Purity of Elections Clause in
Const 1963, art 2 § 4(2). That section provides that:
Except as otherwise provided in this constitution or in the constitution or laws of
the United States the legislature shall enact laws to regulate the time, place and
manner of all nominations and elections, to preserve the purity of elections, to
preserve the secrecy of the ballot, to guard against abuses of the elective franchise,
and to provide for a system of voter registration and absentee voting. No law shall
be enacted which permits a candidate in any partisan primary or partisan election
to have a ballot designation except when required for identification of candidates
for the same office who have the same or similar surnames. [Art 2, § 4(2) (emphasis
added).]
Plaintiffs argue that it is unfair to require incumbent district court judges to file an AOI because,
according to plaintiffs, art 6, § 22 allows incumbent Court of Appeals, circuit court, and probate
judges to appear on the ballot by filing an affidavit of candidacy only, and not an AOI.
As noted by the Court of Claims: “[t]he phrase ‘purity of elections’ does not have a single
precise meaning. However, it unmistakably requires fairness and evenhandedness in the election
laws of this state.” League of Women Voters of Mich v Sec’y of State, 333 Mich App 1, 25; 959
NW2d 1 (2020) (citation and quotation marks omitted). This clause has been interpreted to
embrace two concepts: “first, that the constitutional authority to enact laws to preserve the purity
of elections resides in the Legislature; and second, that any law enacted by the Legislature which
adversely affects the purity of elections is constitutionally infirm.” Taylor v Currie, 277 Mich App
85, 96; 743 NW2d 571 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiffs’ appeal to the purity-of-elections clause is meritless. Judicial officers, along with
all other candidates for “a federal, county, state, city, township, village, metropolitan district, or
school district office in any election” “shall file” along with affidavit of candidacy “2 copies of an

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affidavit of identity.” MCL 168.558(1).2 See Citizens Protecting Michigan’s Const v Sec’y of
State, 503 Mich 42, 105 n 197; 921 NW2d 247 (2018) (explaining that, under MCL 168.558,
“all candidates for elective office in Michigan (except those running for president or vice president
of the United States) are required to file an affidavit of identity”); see also Moore, 337 Mich App
at 728-729 (noting that “courts have treated MCL 168.558 as applying to all elections”).
Accordingly, even the judicial officers mentioned in art 6, § 22—of whom Judge Sharma is not
one—must file an AOI. The statute applies evenly and fairly to all who seek office in this state.
QUALIFICATIONS FOR OFFICE
Plaintiffs also argue that, if art 6, § 22 did not prevent the AOI requirement from applying
in this case, the AOI requirement is still unconstitutional for a different reason. That reason, they
argue, is that the AOI requirement imposes additional requirements beyond those set forth in Const
1963, art 6, § 19 for holding the office of judge in this state. To be qualified to serve as a judge in
this state, “a person shall have been admitted to the practice of law for at least 5 years.” Const
1963, art 6, § 19(2). In addition, the person cannot be elected or appointed to the office of judge
after turning 70 years old. Art 6, § 19(3). According to plaintiffs, requiring a candidate to file an
AOI impermissibly expands on the criteria for holding the office of judge beyond what is listed in
art 6, § 19.
It does not appear that plaintiffs raised this argument before the Court of Claims, making
it unpreserved, and we could decline to review it. Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs
& Mfg, LLC, 347 Mich App 280, 289, 293-294; 14 NW3d 472 (2023). Even overlooking the lack
of preservation, the issue is meritless. The statutory requirement of filing an AOI does not add
qualifications to the office of judge; rather, it specifies what a person seeking the office must do
to appear on the ballot. The Legislature plainly has authority under art 2, § 4 to regulate the manner
in which elections are conducted. See, e.g., Davis v Wayne Co Election Comm, 349 Mich App
355, 364; 28 NW3d 354 (2023).
THE AMENDED AOI AND NOMINATING PETITIONS
As an alternative, plaintiffs pivot toward the amended AOI that Judge Sharma filed. They
argue that defendants were required to accept the new AOI that Judge Sharma filed in June 2026.
Defendants rejected the amended AOI and cited MCL 168.558(4). The statute provides that an
election official “shall not certify to the board of election commissioners the name of a
candidate . . . who executes an affidavit of identity that contains a false statement with regard to
any information or statement required under this section.”
Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that defendants had a duty or obligation to accept her second
AOI. As the Court of Claims pointed out, MCL 168.558(4) contains mandatory language when it
declares that election officials “shall not certify” the name of a candidate who files an AOI that
contains false information. See Ellison v Dep’t of State, 320 Mich App 169, 180; 906 NW2d 221
2 The only exception to the AOI requirement is found in the final sentence of MCL 168.558(1).
To that end, “The affidavit of identity filing requirement does not apply to a candidate nominated
for the office of President of the United States or Vice President of the United States.”

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(2017) (“The term ‘shall’ is mandatory”) (citation omitted). Candidates must comply strictly with
the AOI requirements. Moore, 337 Mich App at 730. Moreover, there is nothing in the pertinent
election statutes that gives candidates a right to file a second or amended AOI. And while the
Secretary of State has promulgated administrative rules for amending AOIs, the rules do not apply
in the case of false statements, such as occurred here. Mich Admin Code, R 168.3(2).
Plaintiffs next argue that defendants were required to accept Judge Sharma’s nominating
petitions. Plaintiffs’ position fails to account for the idea, expressed by Deputy Director Fracassi,
that Judge Sharma’s nominating petitions were flawed. Even assuming for the sake of argument
that plaintiffs’ underlying legal position were correct, plaintiffs’ failure to show that the petitions
complied with necessary requirements leaves them short of showing that defendants had a duty to
accept the nominating petitions. Moreover, as the Court of Claims held, Judge Sharma’s
nominating petitions were irrelevant after defendants declined to certify her candidacy due to the
prior false statements contained in the first AOI.
RIGHTS OF ELECTOR PLAINTIFFS
For their final issue, plaintiffs contend that denying Judge Sharma access to the ballot
harms the rights of voters, such as plaintiff Datta-Sandhu and Dwight. They cite Const 1963, art
2, § 4(1), which guarantees qualified electors the right to vote. That section provides that:
(1) Every citizen of the United States who is an elector qualified to vote in Michigan
shall have the following rights:
(a) The fundamental right to vote, including but not limited to the right, once
registered, to vote a secret ballot in all elections. No person shall: (1) enact or use
any law, rule, regulation, qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or
procedure; (2) engage in any harassing, threatening, or intimidating conduct; or (3)
use any means whatsoever, any of which has the intent or effect of denying,
abridging, interfering with, or unreasonably burdening the fundamental right to
vote.
Plaintiffs raise two arguments about art 2, § 4(1). First, they argue that the Court of Claims
“seriously erred in its analysis” of this issue by applying an incorrect legal framework to the
analysis. However, as defendants point out, the Court of Claims applied a standard that
corresponded with the manner in which plaintiffs framed this issue in their complaint, which was
different from the theory presented in their brief in response to summary disposition, which raised
a theory that more closely aligns with their brief on appeal.
The second argument advanced by plaintiffs with respect to art 2, § 4(1) is their contention
that they were completely denied their right to vote by way of Judge Sharma’s disqualification.
However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that plaintiffs have been or will be prevented
from voting in this state’s upcoming election in November. Plaintiffs have attempted to twist what
occurred here—the rejection of a particular candidate from the ballot—into a “complete denial”
of the right to vote. But a “denial of the right to vote” is not what occurred here. Rather, Judge
Sharma was simply disqualified as a candidate because she failed to comply with state election
law. Plaintiffs remain free to vote in the upcoming election.

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When viewed as a disqualification of a particular candidate and not as a denial of the right
to vote, the issue becomes subject to a “flexible review” known as the Anderson-Burdick3 test.
League of Women Voters of Mich v Sec’y of State, 508 Mich 520, 554-555; 975 NW2d 840 (2022).
“This test requires a reviewing court to weigh the character and magnitude of the burden the State’s
rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends justify that burden, and
consider the extent to which the State’s concerns make the burden necessary.” Id. at 555 (citation
and quotation marks omitted). With respect to this test, the Supreme Court of the United States
has rejected the idea that state eligibility laws impose unreasonable restrictions on the right to vote.
Timmons v Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 US 351, 359; 117 S Ct 1364; 137 L Ed 2d 589 (1997),
citing Burdick v Takushi, 504 US 428, 440 n 10; 112 S Ct 2059; 119 L Ed 2d 245 (1992) (“It seems
to us that limiting the choice of candidates to those who have complied with state election law
requirements is the prototypical example of a regulation that, while it affects the right to vote, is
eminently reasonable.”). Accordingly, the character and magnitude of the burdens imposed by
ballot qualification statutes such as MCL 168.558 are relatively small.
Turning to the state’s interests, it is well established that the state has an interest in
protecting the fairness and integrity of the ballot. See, e.g., McDonald v Grand Traverse Co
Election Comm, 255 Mich App 674, 686; 662 NW2d 804 (2003). As the Court of Claims
recognized, insisting “upon full and complete identification of candidates for public office” is
useful for providing “the electorate with the information necessary to cast their ballots effectively
for the candidates of their choice.” Sullivan v Sec’y of State, 373 Mich 627, 631; 130 NW2d 392
(1964). See also Evans v Detroit Election Comm, 15 Mich App 260, 263; 166 NW2d 467 (1968)
(noting that ensuring that candidates are properly identified helps with “the intelligent selection of
candidates which, after all, is the heart of our elective process”). Stated otherwise, the state has a
significant interest in ensuring the accuracy of the identity of candidates for public office.
With respect to balancing these interests, the Court of Claims remarked that “[r]equiring
candidates to accurately and truthfully complete AOIs is a minor inconvenience to fulfill” the
state’s goal of providing complete identification of candidates. Further, the Court of Claims held
that “Requiring defendants not to certify the candidacy of an individual who does not accurately
and truthfully complete an AOI supports compliance with the requirement” and “does not
unconstitutionally burden the rights of the electorate.” On appeal, plaintiffs do not challenge the
Court of Claims’ balancing analysis, instead opting to insist that strict scrutiny should apply, rather
than the Anderson/Burdick balancing test. We will not make that argument for them, and the Court
of Claims’ analysis appears sound in any event.
3 This test is named after the Supreme Court of the United States’ decisions in Anderson v
Celebrezze, 460 US 780; 103 S Ct 1564; 75 L Ed 2d 547 (1983) and Burdick v Takushi, 504 US
428; 112 S Ct 2059; 119 L Ed 2d 245 (1992).

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CONCLUSION
The opinion and order of the Court of Claims is affirmed.
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

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