COA 368822 KHALEEL SAQD V ESURANCE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/15/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
KHALEEL SAQD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
SPINE SPECIALISTS OF MICHIGAN, PC,
Intervening Plaintiff,
UNPUBLISHED
July 15, 2026
11:25 AM
v No. 368822
Wayne Circuit Court
ESURANCE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
LC No. 21-002082-NF
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: RICK, P.J., and MURRAY and BORRELLO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this dispute over no-fault benefits, plaintiff1 appeals as of right following a jury verdict
that awarded work loss benefits but also determined that plaintiff was not entitled to any recovery
for allowable expenses or replacement service expenses.2 For the reasons set forth in this opinion,
we affirm.
1 Intervening plaintiff, Spine Specialists of Michigan, PC, was dismissed by stipulation in the trial
court and is not part of this appeal. We therefore will simply refer to Khaleel Saqd as “plaintiff.”
2 Defendant contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the present appeal on the grounds that
the claim of appeal was not timely filed. In the alternative, defendant asserts that the scope of
appellate review should be limited solely to the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s initial motion for
a new trial on procedural grounds, rather than any consideration of the merits. Upon review of the
relevant procedural history and the applicable court rules, we find no jurisdictional defect. The

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I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident on December 27, 2019. On the morning
in question, plaintiff was driving to his place of employment at a party store when his brakes failed,
resulting in a collision with multiple vehicles. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was insured
under a no-fault policy issued by defendant.
Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against defendant, alleging entitlement to unpaid no-fault
benefits. Following a jury trial, plaintiff was awarded $5,600 in work loss benefits and $672 in
interest. The jury further found that plaintiff had not incurred allowable expenses or replacement
service expenses.
Plaintiff now appeals, raising several claims of error and requesting a new trial. None
warrant relief.
II. CLAIMS FILE
Plaintiff first contends on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to provide sufficient
time to review an updated claims file—comprising over 8,000 pages—that defendant produced
approximately two weeks prior to trial.
At a hearing on pretrial motions held the day before trial, plaintiff’s counsel objected to
defendant’s recent production of an approximately 8,000-page updated claims file, noting that
prior to this disclosure, only a 2,000-page file had been provided. The trial court took the matter
under advisement and instructed that any objections could be raised during trial. At trial, defendant
moved to admit the complete claims file, and plaintiff’s counsel affirmatively stated there was no
objection, provided the entire 8,093-page file was admitted.
However, now on appeal, plaintiff asserts that defendant failed to timely supplement the
production of records, resulting in prejudice because “the claims file potentially contained
documents that supported the Plaintiff’s claims.” Plaintiff’s argument on this point is speculative.
Nonetheless, plaintiff waived any objection to the admission of the claims file by expressly stating
at trial that there was no objection, after the trial court had instructed that any such objections could
be renewed during trial. Waiver constitutes the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a
known right, and a party who waives a right is precluded from seeking appellate review of its
denial. See Braverman v Granger, 303 Mich App 587, 608; 844 NW2d 485 (2014). Here,
plaintiff’s counsel affirmatively approved the admission of the entire claims file into evidence,
notice of appeal was filed within 21 days after entry of the November 8, 2023, order denying
plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the procedural ground that the motion exceeded the page limit
prescribed by MCR 2.119(A)(2)(a). That plaintiff subsequently submitted a revised motion for a
new trial, which was neither decided nor addressed on its merits by the trial court, and accordingly,
does not affect the timeliness of the appeal or this Court’s jurisdiction. See MCR 7.204(A)(1).
Accordingly, we conclude that this appeal is properly before the Court and that jurisdiction is not
lacking on the basis asserted by defendant.

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thereby intentionally abandoning any right to object. “A party who expressly agrees with an issue
in the trial court cannot then take a contrary position on appeal,” nor may a party “assign as error
on appeal something which his or her own counsel deemed proper at trial, since to do so would
permit the party to harbor error as an appellate parachute.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Additionally, plaintiff did not request an adjournment of trial or seek sanctions based on
the timing of the file’s production, despite the substance of the appellate argument being a lack of
time for review. Michigan adheres to the “raise or waive rule of appellate review” in civil cases,
requiring that the basis for alleged error on appeal be brought to the trial court’s attention. See
Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, LLC, 347 Mich App 280, 289; 14 NW3d
472 (2023). Accordingly, plaintiff has waived review of this issue.
III. SURVEILLANCE VIDEO
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence on the first day of
trial surveillance video taken of plaintiff that was not previously produced to plaintiff.
On the first day of trial, as the parties were dealing with certain procedural matters before
beginning jury voir dire, plaintiff’s counsel informed the trial court that she had spoken to defense
counsel “[a]bout a week or so ago” and learned that there was “video surveillance of the Plaintiff
that ha[d] never been sent” to plaintiff’s counsel. Defense counsel, however, believed that
“everything” had been sent “years ago.”3 Defense counsel further explained:
That surveillance has been in everything that we’ve filed for years, facilitation
summaries, case evaluation summaries. The screen shots are in everything. At no
point has anyone said, hey, I don’t have this.
Defense counsel also stated that the surveillance video was listed on the exhibit list and
was part of the claims file that had been provided to plaintiff’s counsel. The trial court concluded
that the video must have been overlooked somehow and ordered defense counsel to provide it to
plaintiff’s counsel. As plaintiff admits on appeal, the video was then provided that same day.
The surveillance video was shown to plaintiff during his cross-examination and played for
the jury. Plaintiff’s counsel specifically requested that the entire video be played. When defense
counsel moved to admit the video, plaintiff’s counsel stated that she had no objection.
Accordingly, plaintiff waived this challenge to the admissibility of the video. Braverman, 303
Mich App at 608. To the extent plaintiff also appears to complain on appeal that the trial court
failed to impose discovery sanctions on defendant based on the timing of the video production,
plaintiff does not direct our attention to any portion of the record showing that such a request was
made in the trial court. This argument is thus also waived. Tolas Oil & Gas, 347 Mich App at
289.
3 The case had been proceeding for approximately two years by the time trial began.

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IV. JURY VOIR DIRE
Next, plaintiff argues that because plaintiff and his counsel4 are Middle Eastern, the trial
court erred by prohibiting plaintiff’s counsel from inquiring during jury voir dire whether potential
jurors harbored any biases about people of Middle Eastern descent.
“Voir dire is the process by which litigants may question prospective jurors so that
challenges to the prospective jurors can be intelligently exercised.” Bynum v ESAB Group, Inc,
467 Mich 280, 283; 651 NW2d 383 (2002). “It is indispensable to a fair trial that a litigant be
given a reasonable opportunity to ascertain on the voir dire whether any of the jurors summoned
are subject to being challenged for cause or even peremptorily.” Fedorinchik v Stewart, 289 Mich
436, 438-439; 286 NW 673 (1939). “The scope of voir dire examination of prospective jurors is
within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion.” In re Spears, 250 Mich App 349, 351-352; 645 NW2d 718 (2002). However, the
scope of voir dire “must not be so limited as to exclude a showing of facts that would constitute
ground for challenging for cause or the reasonable exercise of peremptory challenges.”
Fedorinchik, 289 Mich at 439.
Here, plaintiff concedes that the record contains no indication the trial court denied a
request to conduct specific lines of inquiry during jury voir dire. Plaintiff maintains that such a
request was made and denied in an off-the-record discussion with the trial court. However, our
review is confined to the record established in the trial court. Meisner Law Group PC v Weston
Downs Condo Ass’n, 321 Mich App 702, 724-725; 909 NW2d 890 (2017). The appellant bears
the burden of presenting a record adequate for review and supporting any claim for appellate relief.
Petraszewsky v Keeth, 201 Mich App 535, 539-540; 506 NW2d 890 (1993). Here, is it clear that
Plaintiff did not create a record in the trial court to facilitate review of this issue. Moreover,
plaintiff’s argument regarding the effect of not pursuing this line of inquiry during voir dire is
speculative and unsupported by evidence of prejudice. Relief for claims of undetected juror bias
due to voir dire defects requires proof of actual prejudice or that a challenge for cause would have
been successful. Bynum v ESAB Group, Inc, 467 Mich 280, 286; 651 NW2d 383 (2002). Jurors
are presumed qualified, and the burden of establishing disqualification rests with the party alleging
it. Id. at 283. Clearly, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief on this issue.
V. REVOCATION OF ASSIGNMENT
Plaintiff next asserts that the trial court erred by precluding him from presenting bills to
the jury from ZMC Pharmacy following the execution of a mutual revocation of assignment
between plaintiff and ZMC. Plaintiff contends that this revocation reinstated his status as the real
party in interest for claims related to ZMC’s services and, accordingly, he should have been
permitted to seek recoupment of those costs at trial.
The record reflects that, on February 7, 2023—one week prior to the scheduled trial date—
plaintiff and ZMC jointly executed a document titled “Mutual Revocation of all Assignments,”
4 Plaintiff is represented by the same attorney on appeal that represented him in the trial court.

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purporting to revoke and nullify all prior assignments from plaintiff to ZMC relating to services
and medications provided as a result of the December 27, 2019 accident. The timing and
procedural posture of this revocation form the crux of the dispute.
At a hearing on the eve of trial, the trial court concluded that plaintiff’s attempt to present
the ZMC bills was untimely, reasoning that the revocation of assignments and the corresponding
effort to litigate those costs at such a late stage would prejudice the proceedings. On appeal,
plaintiff maintains that he and ZMC retained the right to revoke the assignments at any time, and
that the trial court was obligated to recognize the revocation and allow plaintiff to present those
claims to the jury.
“Michigan courts have long recognized that a plaintiff who assigns a claim cannot then
bring suit to collect on that claim as that plaintiff is no longer the real party in interest.” C-Spine
Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Mich Ins Co, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025)
(Docket No. 165537); slip op at 15. In C-Spine, our Supreme Court held that a party who has
assigned away their claims for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits has standing to file a
lawsuit pursuant to MCL 500.3112 but is not the real party in interest with respect to the claims
assigned to a third party. Id. at ___, ___; slip op at 3, 26. The C-Spine Court further held that
although “failure to bring suit in the name of the real party in interest is a ground for dismissal,” it
is nonetheless “possible, in some circumstances, for a plaintiff to cure this defect” if the plaintiff
takes “proper steps to do so.” Id. at ___; slip op at 22-23. The plaintiff “may not fix real party in
interest defects by unilateral actions taken outside of court” and must instead “take some action in
the litigation that would allow the court to assess the effect of the change in parties.” Id. at ___;
slip op at 23. Such actions in the litigation to accomplish this effect may include filing an amended
complaint joining or substituting the proper plaintiff, intervention by the real party in interest, or
filing an amended complaint reflecting that the plaintiff has become the real party in interest
through an assignment. Id. A plaintiff may also seek the equitable remedy of rescission with
respect to the prior assignment. Id. at ___; slip op at 24.
Crucially, here, plaintiff’s position overlooks the principle, reaffirmed by our Supreme
Court, that rescission of an assignment during ongoing litigation does not automatically and
retroactively restore the assignor’s status as the real party in interest. As our Supreme Court
explained in Wallace v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, the companion case to C-
Spine, although mutual rescission may be recognized as an equitable remedy, its effect on ongoing
litigation involving third parties is contingent on judicial approval. See C-Spine, ___ Mich at ___;
slip op at 10-12, 33-35. The Court made clear that, even if the assignor and assignee mutually
agree to rescind the assignment, such rescission “could not be given legal effect as to a third party
without a ruling from a court.” Id. at ___; slip op at 35. Thus, any purported revocation between
plaintiff and ZMC, absent court approval and appropriate litigation steps, was insufficient to
reinstate plaintiff’s claims as to the ZMC bills for purposes of trial.
Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff’s actions could be construed as a request to amend
the pleadings to account for the revocation and reassert the ZMC claims, the trial court acted well
within its discretion in denying such relief. The case had been pending for nearly two years,
discovery had closed, and the revocation was presented only one week before trial—circumstances
our courts have consistently recognized as justifying denial of amendments due to undue delay

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and resulting prejudice. See Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 659-660; 563 NW2d 647 (1997)
(noting that prejudice may be found where a new claim or theory is raised on the eve of trial
without reasonable notice to the opposing party). 5
Although our Supreme Court in Wallace remanded the matter for the trial court to balance
the equities and determine whether the equitable remedy of rescission was warranted in that case,
the procedural posture in Wallace was fundamentally different than that of the present case. C-
Spine, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 36-37. In Wallace, the appeal was from the trial court’s summary
disposition ruling. Id. at ___; slip op at 12. Here, the issue arose within a week of trial, the trial
court determined that the issue had been untimely presented, and the trial has been held. We
discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding of undue, prejudicial delay regarding
plaintiff’s attempt to unilaterally declare a rescission of the assignments and add the ZMC bills to
the trial at the last minute. Weymers, 454 Mich at 659-660. Plaintiff has thus failed to demonstrate
on appeal that he is entitled to any relief with respect to this issue.
VI. CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff raises two challenges pertaining to defense counsel’s conduct during closing
argument. First, plaintiff alleges that defense counsel made improper remarks by insinuating that
plaintiff’s healthcare providers were engaged in fraudulent or excessive billing practices and were
rendering treatment primarily to generate medical expenses rather than for legitimate medical
need. Upon review of the record, however, it is apparent that plaintiff failed to make a
contemporaneous objection to these remarks at trial. It is well-established that an appellate court
will generally decline to consider allegations of improper argument where the aggrieved party did
not object at the time the remarks were made, thereby depriving the trial court of the opportunity
to address or cure the alleged error. See Tolas, 347 Mich App at 289. Because plaintiff did not
preserve this issue with a timely objection, appellate review is precluded, and the claim is deemed
waived.
Plaintiff next contends that defense counsel presented a demonstrative exhibit to the jury
during closing argument that had not been disclosed prior to its use. Once again, the trial record
is devoid of any objection by plaintiff’s counsel to the introduction or use of this demonstrative
exhibit. The failure to contemporaneously object to the use of an undisclosed demonstrative
waives appellate review of the issue. As with the previous claim, the absence of a timely objection
precludes appellate consideration. Id.
Although plaintiff asserts in his appellate brief that his counsel interposed objections to
both the improper remarks and the demonstrative exhibit, but that such objections were not
transcribed, this Court is bound to review only the record as it exists. See Meisner, 321 Mich App
at 724-725. It is the appellant’s burden to ensure that the record on appeal is sufficient to verify
5 A trial court’s decisions regarding the amendment of pleadings are “within the sound discretion
of the trial court and reversal is only appropriate when the trial court abuses that discretion.”
Weymers, 454 Mich at 654.

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the basis for any claimed error. Where the record is silent, and no objection appears, this Court is
constrained from granting relief. Id.
VII. TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT’S MEDICAL EXPERT
Plaintiff next contends that the testimony of defendant’s expert, Dr. Hammoud, should
have been stricken because Dr. Hammoud testified that he personally examined plaintiff, whereas
plaintiff testified on rebuttal that the examination was actually conducted by another individual in
Dr. Hammoud’s office. Upon review, however, the record does not indicate that plaintiff raised
this issue or requested that Dr. Hammoud’s testimony be stricken on this ground at any time during
the trial proceedings. Again, it is well established that appellate review is generally limited to
issues preserved in the trial court, and an appellant must demonstrate that the same basis for the
alleged error was presented below. See Tolas, 347 Mich App at 289. Because plaintiff failed to
preserve this issue for appellate review, it is deemed waived and will not be considered further.
VIII. DUI REFERENCE
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by failing to sanction defendant for not
redacting testimony regarding plaintiff’s previous DUI charges and convictions from one expert’s
recorded deposition when the court had already ordered that such testimony be stricken.
As plaintiff acknowledges, the trial court provided a curative instruction following
plaintiff’s objection during trial. The trial court stated as follows:
So there is a portion of this that should have been redacted that was not,
okay. And when the -- when the Plaintiff was in the accident, you know, that’s
what you need to focus on and just in terms of the accident and nothing else. Okay.
So, yeah, certain things should have been redacted because that’s -- none of that’s
relevant to what you have to decide here, okay.
Plaintiff’s counsel subsequently stated, “I’m satisfied with the Court’s instruction.” “Jurors
are presumed to follow their instructions, and jury instructions are presumed to cure most errors.”
People v Zitka, 335 Mich App 324, 348; 966 NW2d 786 (2020) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Plaintiff’s purely speculative assertion on appeal that the jury “likely” took the
improperly presented testimony into account when reaching its verdict is not sufficient to
overcome the presumption that the curative jury instruction was sufficient. Plaintiff has not shown
that he is entitled to any appellate relief on this issue.
IX. INDIVIDUAL EXHIBITS FROM CLAIMS FILE
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by not allowing him to individually mark
documents contained within the admitted claims file to send back to the jury during deliberations.
The claims file was admitted into evidence at trial by stipulation. During deliberations, the jury
asked for the “evidence,” and the request was granted. On appeal, plaintiff does not cite any legal
authority granting a right to modify the manner in which the evidence is presented or the state in
which it exists after the jury has begun its deliberations. This issue is therefore abandoned. “It is
not sufficient for a party simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to

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this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his
arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Wilson v Taylor,
457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
X. EXPERT WITNESSES
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by allowing the video deposition testimony of
defendant’s expert witnesses to be played for the jury at trial when there was no foundation laid
for their expertise and defendant did not move to have them admitted as experts during the
depositions.
“This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion the qualification of a witness as an expert
and the admissibility of the testimony of the witness . . . .” Lenawee Co v Wagley, 301 Mich App
134, 161; 836 NW2d 193 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted; ellipsis in original). “An
abuse of discretion occurs when a circuit court chooses a result that falls outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes.” Id. at 162.
Video depositions may be admitted into evidence at trial in accordance with the Michigan
Rules of Evidence. MCR 2.308(A); MCR 2.315(F)(2). A party may object at trial to the
admissibility of the deposition, or part of the deposition, “for any reason that would require the
exclusion of the evidence.” MCR 2.308(B). At the time of trial, MRE 702 provided as follows:
If the court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if
(1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
At trial, defendant presented the testimony of six doctors by playing their video
depositions. Before trial, plaintiff had moved to strike those witnesses on the grounds that there
was no foundation laid as to the witnesses’ knowledge or experience in their respective fields and
defendant did not move during the depositions to have those witnesses admitted as experts. Thus,
plaintiff raised the same argument before the trial court that is now raised on appeal. The trial
court denied plaintiff’s pretrial motion to strike, explaining that each witness had testified to their
respective qualifications.
We have reviewed the transcripts of these witnesses’ depositions provided to this Court as
part of the record on appeal. Each doctor testified about their professional background, knowledge,
and experience. Plaintiff’s contention about the lack of foundation is simply not supported by the
record. To the extent plaintiff had any objections to the sufficiency of the foundational testimony,
plaintiff should have made those objections during the deposition when those concerns could have
been addressed. By failing to do so, plaintiff waived this challenge because this Court has held
that an objection to the sufficiency of the foundation laid in a deposition “falls within the category
of formal objections that may be obviated during the taking of the deposition.” Komendat v

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Gifford, 334 Mich App 138, 148-149; 964 NW2d 75 (2020) (quotation marks and citation
omitted); MCR 2.308(C)(3)(a).
Furthermore, plaintiff does not cite any authority to support his contention that any specific
motion or additional formality by defendant was necessary for the expert testimony to be presented
to the jury. Plaintiff has therefore abandoned this argument. Wilson, 457 Mich at 243.
Plaintiff has again not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
the expert testimony presented by defendant. Lenawee Co, 301 Mich App at 161.
XI. DR. MONTOYA’S TESTIMONY
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Eduardo Montoya’s testimony
that was critical of the testimony of plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Lewis Smith. Plaintiff’s
argument is extremely vague and does not cite any specific testimony by Dr. Montoya. Moreover,
it also does not appear that plaintiff ever made any objection to Dr. Montoya’s testimony on this
ground in the trial court. This Court is neither obligated nor permitted to craft arguments on behalf
of a party. As repeatedly emphasized by Michigan appellate courts and in this opinion, it is
incumbent upon the appellant to adequately present and develop legal arguments in support of the
relief sought. See Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959) (“It is not enough
for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to
this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his
arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.”). When a party
fails to properly develop an argument or cite supporting authority, appellate review is not
warranted.
XII. INCONSISTENT VERDICTS
Plaintiff further asserts that the trial court erred by accepting the jury’s verdict and by
denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was internally inconsistent and
contrary to the great weight of the evidence because the jury awarded wage loss benefits but failed
to award medical expenses for the same period. Upon review of plaintiff’s appellate brief,
however, it is apparent that plaintiff has failed to cite any relevant legal authority or substantively
develop this argument beyond conclusory assertions. Again, a party may not merely announce a
position and leave it to this Court to rationalize or elaborate an argument, nor may a party rely on
mere assertions of error unsupported by legal authority. See Mitchum, 355 Mich at 203; Wilson,
457 Mich at 243. Where a party fails to adequately brief the merits of an allegation of error, the
issue is deemed abandoned on appeal. As plaintiff has not properly presented or supported this
claim, appellate review is unwarranted. Id.
Affirmed. Defendant having prevailed in full is entitled to tax costs. MCR 7.219(A).
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello

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