COA 374891 IN RE P A LEADFORD MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/8/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
December 08, 2025
12:17 PM
In re P. A. LEADFORD, Minor.
No. 374891
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 22-050735-NA
Before: KOROBKIN, P.J., and MURRAY and MALDONADO, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father appeals as of right the trial court order terminating his parental rights to
the child because the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist and there was a
reasonable likelihood of harm to the child if returned to respondent’s care. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
At the time these proceedings were initiated against respondent-father, the child was
already in foster care because the child had been removed from her mother’s1 care, and respondent
had absconded from parole and refused to sign an affidavit of parentage. Respondent was
extradited to an Arkansas prison after he relinquished himself for his outstanding warrants, and
remained in that Arkansas prison throughout the pendency of this case. After respondent entered
a plea to the allegations of the petition, the trial court took jurisdiction on January 3, 2024, because
respondent had failed to provide for the child’s care and supervision, failed to present a viable care
plan for the child, failed to ensure the child’s safety and wellbeing, had anger management issues,
and lacked parenting skills.
Petitioner regularly sent respondent educational materials on parenting, anger
management, and substance abuse, which respondent was required to complete and return to
petitioner. Respondent returned some completed educational materials to petitioner in February
2024, but he did not return any educational materials after that date. Respondent asked petitioner
1 Mother’s parental rights were terminated and she does not join in this appeal.

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to investigate two possible relative placements for the child while he remained imprisoned, but
one relative declined and the other was found to be unsuitable.
On September 17, 2024, a supplemental petition for termination of parental rights was filed
against respondent and the trial court held a termination hearing on January 29, 2025. At the time
of the termination hearing, respondent had been granted parole and was attempting to get his parole
relocated to Michigan, but he was still incarcerated with no definite release date. The trial court
terminated respondent’s parental rights on February 11, 2025. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Respondent first argues that his parental rights should not have been terminated because
petitioner did not make reasonable efforts toward reunification.
To preserve a challenge that petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts toward
reunification, a respondent must raise the issue when services are offered. In re Frey, 297 Mich
App 242, 247; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Respondent raised issues about his lack of virtual parenting
time but not about the requirement that he complete the educational materials and return them.
Thus, this issue is unpreserved.
We review unpreserved challenges to the trial court’s finding that reasonable efforts were
made for plain error affecting substantial rights. See In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 135;
809 NW2d 412 (2011). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must
be met: 1) the error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the
plain error affected substantial rights.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Generally, an
error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the
proceedings.” In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 9; 761 NW2d 253 (2008).
Petitioner “has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunite a family before
seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637
(2017). And petitioner “is not relieved of its duties to engage an absent parent merely because that
parent is incarcerated.” In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). Making
reasonable efforts toward reunification requires creation of a service plan, which outlines the steps
that the agency and the parent “will take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to
achieve reunification.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85-86. However, respondent has a
commensurate responsibility to participate in the offered services. In re Frey, 297 Mich App
at 248.
The reunification services offered to respondent were minimal because the Arkansas prison
system was uncooperative with petitioner’s efforts to allow virtual parenting time and it did not
offer any parenting classes or other services. Therefore, petitioner’s efforts toward reunification
were limited to mailing defendant educational materials about parenting, anger management, and
substance abuse. Petitioner also investigated two possible relative placements for the child while
respondent was imprisoned, but the relative placements were not suitable due to factors outside of
petitioner’s control.

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Respondent argues that petitioner’s reasonable efforts toward reunification should have
included waiting for respondent’s release and return to Michigan so that respondent could more
fully engage with reunification services. However, it was not reasonable to continue waiting under
the circumstances given that the child had been in foster care for more than half of her life (839
days). Further, respondent did not fully participate in the reunification services that he was offered
because, even after being told that he needed to complete and return the educational materials, he
failed to do so. “In addition to DHHS’s duty to offer services to the respondent-parent, the
respondent-parent has a duty to participate in and benefit from the services.” In re MJC, 349 Mich
App 42, 50; ___ NW3d ___ (2023). Thus, the trial court did not err in finding that petitioner had
made reasonable efforts toward reunification even though respondent did not participate in those
services.
B. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
Respondent next argues that the facts do not support the trial court’s finding of statutory
grounds for termination.
We “review[] for clear error the trial court’s factual findings and ultimate determinations
on the statutory grounds for termination.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61
(2014). “A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App
30, 33; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). When applying the clear error standard in parental termination
cases, “regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses who appeared before it.” Id.
The trial court found two statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The
first ground was under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), which states that parental rights may be terminated
if the court finds clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he conditions that led to the adjudication
continue[d] to exist and there [was] no reasonable likelihood that the conditions [would] be
rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 710,
quoting MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). “This statutory ground exists when the conditions that brought
the children into foster care continue to exist despite time to make changes and the opportunity to
take advantage of a variety of services . . . .” Id. at 710 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Respondent argues that he would have overcome the barriers to reunification within a
reasonable time because respondent was likely to be released from prison in less than 45 days and
could have demonstrated progress if given another 30 to 60 days to obtain in-person services.
However, respondent’s lack of parenting skills and anger management issues remained
unaddressed due to his nonparticipation in reunification services. Respondent’s failure to provide
care, supervision, or a viable care plan for the child was also unaddressed. Respondent was still
incarcerated without a set release date, had no stable housing upon his release, and had offered no
viable alternative placement for the child. The child had already been in foster care for 839 days
and would have had to wait an additional indeterminate amount of time for respondent to address
the issues that led to her removal. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in finding clear and
convincing evidence supported this statutory ground for termination.

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A trial court need only find that one statutory ground has been established to support
termination of parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3). In re Martin, 316 Mich App 73, 90; 896
NW2d 452 (2016). Therefore, because termination of respondent’s parental rights was appropriate
based upon MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), we need not address the additional bases for termination
found by the trial court.
Affirmed.
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

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