COA 371839 CLARK COMMONS LTD DIVIDEND HOUSING V 67-5 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/9/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
In re CLARK COMMONS LIMITED DIVIDEND
HOUSING ASSOCIATION, LLC and
PREMIER PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC
CLARK COMMONS LIMITED DIVIDEND
HOUSING ASSOCIATION, LLC and
PREMIER PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC,
Petitioners-Appellants,
v No.
HON. HERMAN S. MARABLE, JR., LC No.
Respondent-Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
December 09, 2025
2:49 PM
No. 371839
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 24-120286-AS
Before: YATES, P.J., and BOONSTRA and YOUNG, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioners appeal by right the trial court’s order granting respondent’s motion for summary
disposition and dismissing petitioners’ complaint for superintending control. We affirm.
I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner Clark Commons Limited Dividend Housing Association, LLC is the owner and
operator of a multi-family housing development, while Petitioner Premier Property Management,
LLC is a property management company that manages the property of a number of owners of
multi-family housing developments. Respondent is a sitting 67th District Court judge.
In 2024, petitioners filed a complaint for superintending control in the trial court, alleging
that respondent had failed to comply with the law or court rules in several ways during summary
eviction proceedings initiated by petitioners. Specifically, petitioners alleged that respondent (1)
had failed to enter default judgments at certain hearings when a tenant failed to appear, (2) had a
pattern and practice of refusing to enforce conditional dismissal orders that he himself had signed,
(3) had unreasonably delayed signing orders of eviction in several cases, and had set hearings

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before signing them, despite the court rules not requiring a hearing, (4) frequently adjourned
eviction hearings and other proceedings to the benefit of tenants and without good cause, (5)
frequently asked petitioners questions at hearings that “surprised” petitioners and “use[d] their
failure to respond to his liking as a basis for further adjournment,” and (6) failed to adequately
control the scheduling of his docket, causing some cases to be delayed. Petitioners alleged in their
complaint that respondent’s actions were “intentionally designed to harm landlords to the benefit
of tenant defendants.”
In response, respondent moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(3), (4), (5),
(8), and (10). After a hearing, the trial court granted respondent’s motion, holding that respondent
was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction)
because an adequate legal remedy, see MCR 3.302(B), for petitioners’ complaints existed.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a request for
superintending control. In re Grant, 250 Mich App 13, 14; 645 NW2d 79 (2002). However, we
review de novo as a question of law whether a respondent has a clear legal duty to perform and
whether a petitioner has a clear legal right to the performance of any such duty. Adams v Parole
Bd, 340 Mich App 251, 258; 985 NW2d 251 (2022). We review de novo a trial court’s decision
on a motion for summary disposition. Moser v Detroit, 284 Mich App 536, 538; 772 NW2d 823
(2009). We also review de novo issues involving the interpretation of statutes and court rules.
Grand Rapids v Brookstone Capital, LLC, 334 Mich App 452, 457; 965 NW2d 232 (2020).
III. ANALYSIS
Petitioners argue that the trial court erred by determining that an adequate legal remedy
existed for their claims and accordingly by dismissing their complaint for superintending control.
Although we agree that the trial court erred by determining that it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction, we nonetheless affirm the trial court’s grant of respondent’s motion for summary
disposition and the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint for superintending control.
“The writ of superintending control supersedes the writs of certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition, and provides one simplified procedure for reviewing or supervising a lower court or
tribunal's actions.” Shepherd Montessori Center Milan v Ann Arbor Charter Twp, 259 Mich App
315, 346-347; 675 NW2d 271 (2003). “The filing of a complaint for superintending control is not
an appeal, but, rather, is an original civil action designed to order a lower court to perform a legal
duty.” Id. “When a reviewing court issues an order of superintending control, the reviewing court
is invoking an extraordinary power. Such an extraordinary power should only be exercised in
extraordinary circumstances[.]” People v Burton, 429 Mich 133, 144; 413 NW2d 413 (1987).
Superintending control is an extraordinary power that may only be invoked when the plaintiff has
no adequate legal remedy and the lower court has failed to perform a clear legal duty. Shepherd
Montessori Center Milan, 259 Mich app at 347; see also In re Gosnell, 234 Mich App 326, 341;
594 NW2d 90 (1999).

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The availability of an appeal generally requires that a complaint for superintending control
must be dismissed. See Gosnell, 234 Mich App at 341; Shepherd Montessori Center Milan, 259
Mich App at 347; Choe v Flint Charter Twp, 240 Mich App 662, 667; 615 NW2d 739 (2000); see
also MCR 3.302(D)(2). However, a party may lack an adequate legal remedy when challenging
the general policies and procedures of a lower court. Gosnell, 234 Mich App at 341-342. “A clear
legal duty, like a clear legal right, is one that is inferable as a matter of law from uncontroverted
facts regardless of the difficulty of the legal question to be decided.” Adams, 340 Mich App at
260. A clear legal duty is generally one that is ministerial in nature, rather than discretionary. See
Barrow v Wayne Co Bd of Canvassers, 341 Mich App 473, 483-484; 991 NW2d 610 (2022). A
ministerial duty is one that the law “prescribes and defines . . . with such precision and certainty
as to leave nothing to exercise of discretion or judgment.” Berry v Garrett, 316 Mich App 37, 42;
890 NW2d 882 (2016). The party seeking an order of superintending control “bears the burden of
establishing the grounds for issuing the order.” Gosnell, 234 Mich App at 342. An order of
superintending control should not issue “where the petitioner seeks to employ the court’s power
to superintend as a substitute for an appeal or to evade a statutory prohibition of an appeal.” Public
Health Dep’t v Rivergate Manor, 452 Mich 495, 518; 550 NW2d 515 (1996).
MCR 3.302 governs orders of superintending control, and provides in relevant part:
(B) Policy Concerning Use. If another adequate remedy is available to the party
seeking the order, a complaint for superintending control may not be filed. See
subrule (D)(2) and MCR 7.306(A).
* * *
(D) Jurisdiction
(1) The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the circuit court have jurisdiction
to issue superintending control orders to lower courts or tribunals.
(2) When an appeal in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or the circuit court
is available, that method of review must be used. If superintending control is sought
and an appeal is available, the complaint for superintending control must be
dismissed.
At the outset, we conclude that petitioners are correct that the trial court erred by granting
respondent’s motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). In discussing
MCR 3.302(D)’s predecessor, GCR 711.4 (which contained identical language to MCR 3.302(D)),
our Supreme Court stated that the provision indicating that a complaint for superintending control
must be dismissed is not jurisdictional in nature; that is, the availability of an appeal does not
deprive a court of the subject-matter jurisdiction to issue an order of superintending control; rather,
the subrule is “a procedural requirement to be met before relief can be granted.” In re Hague, 412
Mich 532, 546-547; 315 NW2d 524 (1982). In Hague, our Supreme Court adopted the
recommendation of the Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) holding that the respondent judge was
guilty of misconduct by, among other actions, refusing to follow several orders of superintending
control issued by a higher court, related to his “wholesale dismissal” of “virtually all the
prostitution cases being brought to the court.” Id. at 540, 543. The respondent judge argued that

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the circuit court had been without jurisdiction to issue the order of superintending control, due to
the availability of an appeal; our Supreme Court rejected that argument for the reasons stated. Id.
at 546-547. The Court also noted that the “availability of an appeal in the individual case does not
preclude superintending relief when that procedure does not provide an adequate remedy.” Id. at
546.
There is no reason that Hague’s rationale should not apply to MCR 3.302(D). The trial
court accordingly erred by granting respondent’s motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(4). However, respondent moved for summary disposition on several grounds,
including that no genuine issue of material fact existed such that respondent was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10). Even if a trial court errs by granting summary
disposition under the wrong subrule, this Court may review the matter under the correct subrule,
and may affirm the trial court if the correct result was reached for the wrong reason. Computer
Network, Inc v AM General Corp, 265 Mich App 309, 313; 696 NW2d 49 (2005). Because the
trial court did not err by holding that an adequate legal remedy existed (such that petitioners’ claim
for superintending control was properly dismissed on that basis), the trial court’s error was
harmless.
In this case, as stated, petitioners alleged in their complaint that respondent violated his
clear legal duty in several ways. Generally speaking, petitioners’ allegations involved respondent
either refusing to sign or unnecessarily delaying the signing of eviction orders, setting hearings
that were not required by law or court rule, failing to control his docket so that cases proceeded in
a timely manner, refusing to enter default judgments, questioning petitioners about what action
they had taken to verify that tenants had actually vacated the property, and adjourning cases
without good cause. Petitioners also alleged that respondent’s actions were intentional and
demonstrated a bias in favor of tenant defendants or against landlord litigants.
Although the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the grounds that an adequate
legal remedy was available, we note that many of petitioners’ complaints, if true, do not appear to
indicate that respondent violated a clear legal duty. See Gosnell, 234 Mich App at 341. As noted,
a clear legal duty is generally one that is ministerial in nature, rather than discretionary. See
Barrow, 341 Mich App at 483-484. Yet, many of petitioners’ allegations against respondent
concern discretionary tasks, such as the scheduling of hearings that petitioners deem unnecessary,
or the adjournment of hearings that petitioners feel was unwarranted. Petitioners also allege that
respondent asked them whether they had taken affirmative steps to verify whether a tenant had
vacated a premises, even though petitioners believe they owe no duty to take such steps under the
relevant court rules and statutes. These allegations seem to be based on discretionary, rather than
ministerial, acts by respondent; we are not convinced that respondent owed petitioners a clear legal
duty to, for example, refrain from asking them certain questions when they appear before him, or
to schedule or refrain from scheduling hearings in a manner that best suits them. And while
petitioners frequently point out that our court rules and statutes did not require respondent to hold
or adjourn a hearing, or require petitioners to undertake certain actions to verify whether a tenant
is in fact still living in a property before issuing an order evicting that tenant, the court rules and
relevant statutes do not forbid such actions. Barrow, 341 Mich App at 483-484. A trial court has
the inherent power to control its own docket. Baynesan v Wayne State University, 316 Mich App
643, 651; 894 NW2d 102 (2016). A trial court also possesses the inherent authority to control its
courtroom, including control over order and the manner in which those who appear before it are

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questioned, see People v Johnson, 315 Mich App 163, 177; 889 NW2d 513 (2016). The exercise
of that inherent power may only be disturbed “upon a finding that there has been a clear abuse of
discretion.” Baynesan, 316 Mich App 651. Regarding these allegations, therefore, the trial court
could have granted respondent’s motion for summary disposition on the grounds that petitioners
had not demonstrated that respondent violated a clear legal duty. Gosnell, 234 Mich App at 341.
Some of petitioners’ allegations, such as the allegation that respondent makes a practice of
unaccountably delaying signing default judgments or eviction orders, concern more ministerial
acts that are prescribed by our court rules. See, e.g., MCR 4.201(M)(2). And some of these
allegations do concern conduct for which an appeal is not legally or practically available, although
we note that petitioners have not shown that they even attempted to avail themselves of the
appellate process in the example cases cited in their complaint and brief on appeal. But even
assuming that petitioners did not have an appeal available with respect to certain challenged
conduct, petitioners still had an adequate remedy at law to address their complaints against
respondent. The JTC is empowered by the Michigan constitution to recommend that our Supreme
Court “censure, suspend with or without salary, retire or remove a judge for . . . misconduct in
office, persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance or conduct that is clearly
prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Const 1963, art 6, § 30; see also MCR 9.211(A). To
that end, our court rules provide the JTC with the power to investigate complaints against judges,
take evidence, issue subpoenas, hold hearings, and institute formal proceedings against a judicial
respondent, including a trial; the JTC is also empowered to make dismissal of a grievance
contingent on respondent satisfying conditions imposed by the commission, including successful
completion of a monitoring period. MCR 9.223.
It is clear that the JTC has significant power to address judicial misconduct. Judicial
misconduct includes “persistent incompetence in the performance of judicial duties,” “persistent
neglect in the timely performance of judicial duties,” and “persistent failure to treat persons fairly
and courteously.” MCR 9.202(B)(1). The JTC is also empowered to address “conduct in violation
of the Code of Judicial Conduct or the Rules of Professional Conduct.” MCR 9.202(B)(2). The
Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to “be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence in it,” and “dispose promptly of the business of the court,” Code of Judicial Conduct,
Canon 3(A)(1) (6), as well as raise the issue of disqualification whenever the judge has cause to
believe that grounds for disqualification may exist, Canon 3(C). Grounds for disqualification
include bias or the appearance of bias for or against a party. MCR 2.003(C)(1).1
Petitioners’ complaints against respondent, if true, could easily fall into several of the
categories listed above. Many of them involve the accusation that respondent regularly fails to
timely perform his duties, or imposes requirements on certain litigants that are not mandated by
statute or court rule. In general, petitioners have alleged that respondent has engaged in a pattern
of behavior that demonstrated bias against either them in particular or landlord litigants in general,
and demonstrated bias in favor of tenant defendants. Petitioners do not explain why the availability
of a complaint to the JTC against respondent, which could lead to respondent’s censure, suspension
1 We note that it does not appear that petitioners ever sought respondent’s disqualification in their
cases before him, as our court rules permit. See MCR 2.003(B).

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or termination as well as corrective action to address the challenged conduct, is an inadequate
remedy; rather, they merely argue that holding that an adequate remedy at law existed in this case
would send us down a slippery slope where “no person could seek to correct a judge’s misconduct
through a superintending control complaint” because of the availability of a JTC complaint.
Besides being hyperbolic, petitioners’ argument is illogical—the availability of an alternate legal
remedy does preclude the “extraordinary relief” of superintending control; therefore, if in fact
complaints of judicial misconduct are generally, or even always, resolvable by an alternative
method rather than by an order of superintending control, that is not a fault that must be corrected,
but rather merely a class of complaints that are not remediable by the extraordinary relief of
superintending control. Burton, 429 Mich at 144.
But we need not establish such a bright line rule today to conclude that the relief petitioners
sought in the form of an order of superintending control was not available. Petitioners argue that
they seek to challenge a general practice of an inferior court, and argue that, as in Hague, a “case-
by-case appeal was neither an adequate nor realistic remedy.” Hague, 412 Mich at 532. But in
Hague, the respondent judge had dismissed “hundreds” of prostitution and gun-control cases as
soon as they were filed, and continued to do so after being ordered to stop by several higher courts.
See id. at 562-564. Moreover, while our Supreme Court did opine that the orders for
superintending control were validly issued inasmuch as the appellate process was not an adequate
remedy, it also noted that the respondent judge was required to follow the orders of superintending
control unless the superior court had lacked the jurisdiction to issue them, even if the orders were
“clearly incorrect.” See id. at 545. Additionally, Hague itself was a judicial disciplinary
proceeding arising out of a complaint from the JTC. See id. at 539. Hague does not aid petitioners
in arguing that no adequate remedy could be found for their complaints through a JTC complaint;
in fact, the complained-of judicial conduct in Hague was considerably more “wholesale,”
involving “dozens upon dozens” of cases dismissed without legal justification. See id. at 547-551.
In contrast with Hague, in this case petitioners have identified certain actions taken by
respondent in some eviction cases, many of which did ultimately resolve in the favor of the
landlord litigant, that they feel violated Michigan law or court rules, and demonstrated a bias in
favor of tenant defendants and against landlord litigants. Petitioners’ complaints can be resolved
without resorting to the extraordinary relief of an order of superintending control. Burton, 429
Mich at 144. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to respondent
and the dismissal of petitioners’ claim for superintending control.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher P. Yates
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Adrienne N. Young

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