COA 371800 NEW PRODUCTS CORPORATION V BUTZEL LONG Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/5/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
NEW PRODUCTS CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
February 05, 2026
11:25 AM
v No. 371800
Wayne Circuit Court
BUTZEL LONG, LC No. 21-003072-NM
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and YOUNG, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In 2008, defendant, Butzel Long (Butzel), represented plaintiff, New Products
Corporations (NPC), in a quiet-title case involving a parcel of land upon which a golf course was
being built that overlapped with NPC’s property. After some limited communications with the
city and exploration of the dispute, Butzel opined that NPC had no claim to prevent or delay the
construction of the golf course on NPC’s property. In a 2019 appeal, this Court stated that NPC
no longer could pursue a timely claim to recover or protect their property interest but stated that
“any error on counsel’s part may be remedied monetarily through a malpractice action.”1 After
remand from this Court,2 NPC appeals as of right the trial court order granting Butzel’s motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine dispute of material fact). We reverse
and remand.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arose from the events that transpired during a quiet-title case, starting in 2008, in
Berrien County. This Court provided the factual background for the underlying case in New Prods
1 New Prods Corp v Harbor Shores BHBT Land Dev, LLC (After Remand), 331 Mich App 614, n
3; 953 NW2d 476 (2019) (New Prods II).
2 New Prods Corp v Butzel Long, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeal, issued
May 18, 2023 (Docket No. 361412), p 4.

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Corp v Harbor Shores BHBT Land Dev, LLC, 308 Mich App 638, 641-643; 866 NW2d 850 (2014)
(New Prods I), stating:
In 1950, Elwood and Evelyn McDorman owned a 250–foot–wide parcel of
land running south from Higman Park Road to the then existing channel of the Paw
River, which served as the boundary between the city of Benton Harbor (Benton
Harbor) and Benton Charter Township (the Township). . . . The parcel in dispute
is that part of the McDormans’ land that was located in the Township before the
relocation of the river, but which is now south of the relocated river.
[NPC] owns and operates a manufacturing facility in Benton Harbor along
Klock Road. In 1955, [NPC] acquired the parcel that Benton Harbor transferred to
the McDormans as part of the project to relocate the river along with the disputed
parcel. Benton Harbor taxed both parcels and [NPC] paid the taxes. However, the
Township continued to tax the disputed parcel and listed the taxpayer of record as
Frank Hoffman.
In 1970, the Township foreclosed against Hoffman’s property for unpaid
taxes. The state acquired the property, but transferred it back to Hoffman in 1973.
Larry and Heidi Heald acquired the property from Hoffman and his co-owners in
1991. Harbor Shores Development then purchased the disputed parcel from the
Healds in 2007. As part of a large development project, Harbor Shores
Development conveyed a portion of the disputed parcel to Benton Harbor and a
portion to defendant Harbor Shores Golf Course, LLC (Harbor Shores Golf).
Harbor Shores Golf then constructed a golf course, which included the disputed
parcel.
NPC filed a claim to quiet title on the disputed parcel in September 2011. Id. Following a bench
trial, this Court reported the findings of the Berrien Circuit Court: (1) the parcel was properly
distributed to Harbor Shores through tax foreclosure; (2) NPC’s claim was delayed and barred by
the doctrines of laches, unclean hands, and estoppel; and (3) the Harbor Shores defendants had
title to the parcel under the Market Record Title Act (MRTA), MCL 565.101 et seq. New Prods
II, 331 Mich App at 624.
NPC appealed the Berrien Circuit Court’s decision in New Prods II. This Court: (1)
determined the Berrien Circuit Court’s analysis of the tax foreclosure was inaccurate and
incomplete; (2) affirmed the Berrien Circuit Court’s grant of equitable relief; and (3) determined
the MRTA applied and entitled the Harbor Shores defendants to summary judgment. Id. at 623-
626, 631-635.
NPC filed this complaint, alleging legal malpractice against Butzel. In lieu of an answer,
Butzel moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (dismissal appropriate under
statute of repose) and MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim), arguing: (1) NPC’s claim was
untimely under the statute of repose; (2) NPC’s claim was barred under the attorney-judgment
rule; and (3) NPC failed to establish causation. The trial court granted summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(7), which this Court reversed, finding the statute of repose did not apply on the
basis of the parties’ agreement. New Prods Corp v Butzel Long, unpublished per curiam opinion

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of the Court of Appeal, issued May 18, 2023 (Docket No. 361412) (New Prods III), pp 1-2. This
Court declined to address the issues of attorney-judgment or causation, because the trial court did
not address them, and remanded the case. Id. at 4.
On remand, Butzel moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10),
arguing NPC failed to establish causation. Butzel relied on this Court’s decision in New Prods II,
which held the MRTA barred NPC’s claim, which tolled two years after Butzel terminated its
representation of NPC. NPC claimed there were disputes of fact regarding negligence and
causation, citing the Berrien Circuit Court’s opinion and the affidavit of its expert attorney, Steven
Matta. NPC also claimed discovery was incomplete regarding its claims of malpractice.
The trial court granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), finding there was
no dispute Butzel was not negligent, and NPC failed to demonstrate Butzel was the proximate
cause of its harm. With respect to negligence, the trial court determined Matta’s affidavit was
factually inaccurate and Butzel acted in good faith. On causation, the trial court determined NPC
hired a new attorney in 2009 but did not file its quiet-title action until 2011, establishing the
application of laches to Butzel was speculative. The trial court explained NPC could have filed its
complaint in 2009 when it retained new counsel but chose not to do so, making Butzel’s alleged
inaction not casually connected to NPC’s harm. On the issue of discovery, the trial court
determined Butzel’s liability ended when NPC retained new counsel, demonstrating “no fair
likelihood that further discovery will correct the new attorney’s failure.” NPC moved for
reconsideration, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION TO BUTZEL WAS IMPROPER
NPC claims the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10). We agree.
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.”
BC Tile & Marble Co v Multi Bldg Co, Inc, 288 Mich App 576, 583; 794 NW2d 76 (2010). “In
making this determination, the Court reviews the entire record to determine whether defendant
was entitled to summary disposition.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817
(1999).
Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual sufficiency of a claim.”
El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019) (emphasis
omitted). “In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under this subsection, a trial
court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the
parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Maiden,
461 Mich at 120. “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no
genuine issue of material fact.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160. “A genuine issue of material fact
exists when reasonable minds could differ on an issue after viewing the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Auto-Owners Ins Co v Campbell-Durocher Group Painting
& Gen Contracting, LLC, 322 Mich App 218, 224; 911 NW2d 493 (2017) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “When reviewing a decision on a motion for summary disposition, this Court

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will not consider evidence that had not been submitted to the lower court at the time the motion
was decided.” In re Estate of Rudell, 286 Mich App 391, 405; 780 NW2d 884 (2009). “The
reviewing court should evaluate a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) by
considering the substantively admissible evidence actually proffered in opposition to the motion.”
Maiden, 461 Mich at 121.
B. QUESTIONS OF FACT REMAIN REGARDING WHETHER BUTZEL COMMITTED
MALPRACTICE
NPC alleged Butzel committed legal malpractice.3 “To state a claim for legal malpractice,
a plaintiff must allege (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship, (2) negligence in the
legal representation of the plaintiff, (3) that the negligence was the proximate cause of an injury,
and (4) the fact and the extent of the injury alleged.” Kloian v Schwartz, 272 Mich App 232, 240;
725 NW2d 671 (2006). “As in other tort actions, the plaintiff has the burden of proving all the
elements of the suit to prevail.” Charles Reinhart Co v Winiemko, 444 Mich 579, 586; 513 NW2d
773 (1994)
For the first element: “The rendering of legal advice and legal services by the attorney and
the client’s reliance on that advice or those services is the benchmark of an attorney-client
relationship.” Macomb County Taxpayers Ass’n v L’Anse Creuse Pub Sch, 455 Mich 1, 11; 564
NW2d 457 (1997). “The attorney’s right to be compensated for his advice and services arises from
that relationship; it is not the definitional basis of that relationship.” Id. Our Supreme Court further
elaborated:
[T]he relation of attorney and client is not dependent on the payment of a fee, nor
is a formal contract necessary to create this relationship. The contract may be
implied from conduct of the parties. The employment is sufficiently established
when it is shown that the advice and assistance of the attorney are sought and
received in matters pertinent to his profession. [Id. (citation omitted).]
“The second element requires proof that the defendant breached a professional standard of
care.” Patel v FisherBroyles, LLP, 344 Mich App 264, 273; 1 NW3d 308 (2022). “Stated
generally, an attorney ‘must only act as would an attorney of ordinary learning, judgment, or skill
under the same or similar circumstances.’ ” Id., quoting Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 650; 532
NW2d 842 (1995). “[M]ere errors in judgment by a lawyer are generally not grounds for a
3 For the first time on appeal, NPC also argues Butzel failed to establish the factual basis for its
motion for summary disposition, making it unpreserved. Glasker-Davis v Auvenshine, 333 Mich
App 222, 228; 964 NW2d 809 (2020). “Michigan generally follows the ‘raise or waive rule of
appellate review.” Walters v Nadell, 481 Mich 377, 387; 751 NW2d 431 (2008). NPC failed to
raise the issue regarding the factual basis for Butzel’s motion, thus waiving it. Id. Additionally,
NPC failed to include this issue in its statement of questions presented. “Independent issues not
raised in the statement of questions presented are not properly presented for appellate review.”
Bouverette v Westinghouse Electric Corp, 245 Mich App 391, 404; 628 NW2d 86 (2001). As
such, we decline to address this issue.

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malpractice action where the attorney acts in good faith and exercises reasonable care, skill, and
diligence.” Id. at 658. Thus, “[a]lthough gross errors in judgment can be actionable, mere errors
in judgment by attorneys acting in good faith are not.” Estate of Mitchell v Dougherty, 249 Mich
App 668, 679; 644 NW2d 391 (2002) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “This Court
recently explained that professional malpractice claims ordinarily require expert testimony to
establish the applicable standard of care and that the defendant breached that standard.” Patel,
344 Mich App at 273.
For the third element: “As in any tort action, to prove proximate cause a plaintiff in a legal
malpractice action must establish that the defendant’s action was a cause in fact of the claimed
injury.” Charles Reinhart Co, 444 Mich at 586. “Often the most troublesome element of a legal
malpractice action is proximate cause.” Id. “Hence, a plaintiff must show that but for the
attorney’s alleged malpractice, he would have been successful in the underlying suit.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “ ‘In other words, the client seeking recovery from his
attorney is faced with the difficult task of proving two cases within a single proceeding.’ ” Patel,
344 Mich App at 273, quoting Charles Reinhart Co, 444 Mich at 586.
NPC argues the trial court erred when it: (1) determined there was no dispute Butzel acted
in good faith; (2) determined Butzel was not the cause of NPC’s injury; and (3) granted summary
disposition before discovery was complete.
1. QUESTIONS OF FACT REMAIN REGARDING WHETHER BUTZEL BREACHED THE
STANDARD OF CARE
NPC contends the trial court improperly determined Butzel acted in good faith, despite
Matta’s affidavit establishing a breach of the standard of professional care and incomplete
discovery. NPC does not cite which element it is contesting, but the trial court discussed good
faith in the negligence and causation prongs of legal malpractice and in the attorney-judgment rule,
noting the issue of good faith was “intertwined” with both prongs. However, the trial court
determined Butzel acted with good faith in the negligence prong of the analysis.
NPC claims the trial court made a factual determination that Butzel acted in good faith
when Butzel determined NPC had no claim to the disputed property. The trial court stated: “Thus,
as to the second element of legal malpractice, negligence in the representation, [Butzel] cannot be
held liable in malpractice for failing to file a complaint due to its honest and good faith belief that
NPC had no claim to the disputed parcel.” To establish negligence, NPC must demonstrate Butzel
breached a professional standard of care, which is what an ordinary attorney of ordinary education,
judgment, or skill would do under those circumstances. Patel, 344 Mich App at 273. Generally,
professional malpractice claims now require expert testimony to establish the applicable standard
of care. Id.
Butzel did not address this claim in its motion for summary disposition. NPC claimed
Butzel was negligent for failing to file the quiet-title action in 2008 and for its mishandling of the
quiet-title case. NPC argues Matta’s affidavit established a question of fact on whether Butzel
breached the professional standard of care. Matta stated Butzel: (1) failed to file the quiet-title
complaint; (2) failed to provide its reasoning for not filing the complaint; (3) never provided NPC

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“a real work product in a timely manner laying out [Butzel’s] concerns;” and (4) failed to respond
to Harbor Shores’ counsel.
The trial court determined Matta’s affidavit was factually inaccurate, because this Court
never imputed malpractice to Butzel and only mentioned the issue in a footnote, making it dictum.
“Dictum is a judicial comment that is not necessary to the decision in the case.” Pew v Mich State
Univ, 307 Mich App 328, 334; 859 NW2d 246 (2014). “[D]ictum does not constitute binding
authority.” Id. “But if a court intentionally addresses and decides an issue that is germane to the
controversy in the case, the statement is not dictum even if the issue was not decisive.” Id.
In New Prods II, 331 Mich App at 629 n 3, this Court stated: “To the extent that plaintiff
blames its delay on its counsel, we note that plaintiff could have ended its relationship with its
counsel and hired alternative counsel. In any event, any error on counsel’s part may be remedied
monetarily through a malpractice action.” The issue on appeal was whether NPC was barred from
asserting its property rights over the disputed parcel, making this Court’s statement regarding
malpractice dictum. Pew, 307 Mich App at 334.
While this Court’s statement concerning malpractice was dictum, this Court held NPC’s
“silence on the title issue inequitably induced defendants’ belief that the issue was resolved and
that the Harbor Shores defendants justifiably relied on this belief to complete their development
of the disputed parcel and related property.” New Prods II, 331 Mich App at 629. One of NPC’s
claims of malpractice was Butzel not properly asserting its interests in the parcel. The Matta
affidavit alleged Butzel failed to respond to the letters of Harbor Shores’ legal counsel, requesting
to open a dialog on the issue.
Matta also relied on the Berrien Circuit Court’s opinion, which stated: “[NPC], through []
Miller, knew and was fully aware that [it] should have commenced the present action no later than
September 2008, when she saw Harbor Shores begin construction on the 18th hole.” The Berrien
Circuit Court also stated: “Regardless of why [NPC’s] prior counsel failed or refused to file a
timely claim in 2008 as [NPC] repeatedly demanded, that counsel’s failure is imputed to [NPC].”
Matta cited the Berrien Circuit Court’s and this Court’s opinions in his affidavit. The trial
court never addressed Matta’s reliance on the Berrien Circuit Court’s opinion. Further, the trial
court never addressed Matta’s claims regarding Butzel’s failure to provide competent
representation or Butzel’s reasoning for determining NPC had no claim to the disputed parcel.
Even if Matta was inaccurate in his interpretation of New Prods II, it was improper for the trial
court to decide how the factual inaccuracies impacted Matta’s credibility on his opinion concerning
Butzel’s alleged breach of the professional standard of care. See Pioneer State Mut Ins for Publ’n
Co v Dells, 301 Mich App 368, 377; 836 NW2d 257 (2013) (“The trial court is not permitted to
assess credibility, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes, and if material evidence
conflicts, it is not appropriate to grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10).”). Moreover, the trial court failed to explain how Matta’s erroneous interpretation
of New Prods II impacted his claims Butzel failed to adequately communicate with NPC and
Harbor Shores.
The trial court focused its analysis on Butzel’s good-faith belief NPC had no claim to the
disputed parcel because of the tax foreclosure. The trial court cited the Berrien Circuit Court

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reaching the same conclusion as Butzel for support, but admitted this Court determined the analysis
was incorrect. The trial court relied on Simko, where our Supreme Court established the attorney-
judgment rule and held: “Where an attorney acts in good faith and in honest belief that his acts and
omissions are well founded in law and are in the best interest of his client, he is not answerable for
mere errors in judgment.” Simko, 448 Mich at 658. The trial court concluded Butzel “cannot be
held liable in malpractice for failing to file a complaint due to its honest and good faith belief that
NPC had no claim to the disputed parcel.”
The trial court discarded Matta’s affidavit as unreliable, which claimed Butzel did not
conduct thorough research and failed to advise NPC of the tax issue. While the trial court noted
the Berrien Circuit Court agreed with Butzel regarding the tax issue, Matta claimed Butzel never
thoroughly researched the issue. Matta claimed Butzel provided NPC a number of reasons for not
pursuing litigation, which included: (1) statute of limitations; (2) damages; (3) notice issues; and
(4) “bona fide purchaser.” Matta also noted Butzel never provided NPC with a written brief on
the issues.
The trial court cited no evidence supporting its finding that Butzel acted in good faith and
ignored Matta’s affidavit, which suggested Butzel failed to properly advise NPC of the case and
its issues. Even if the Berrien Circuit Court reached the same conclusion as Butzel, NPC provided
evidence demonstrating Butzel did not act in good faith or with the professional standard of care
when it reached its conclusion. Further, the trial court focused its findings on Butzel’s failure to
file the quiet-title complaint. NPC alleged multiple instances of malpractice, including Butzel’s
failure to file a lis pendens and failing to respond to the communication of Harbor Shores counsel.
The trial court never discussed Butzel’s alleged negligence for these claims. Matta’s affidavit
established a dispute whether Butzel’s judgment was on the basis of a good-faith belief NPC had
no claim to the disputed parcel.
The trial court was correct that the Berrien Circuit Court agreed with Butzel’s conclusion,
but Matta’s affidavit established questions of fact regarding Butzel’s good-faith belief regarding
the position. Matta’s affidavit and the Berrien Circuit Court’s opinion provide evidence to contest
the trial court’s finding there was no dispute of fact Butzel acted in good faith. As such, the trial
court erred.
2. QUESTIONS OF FACT REMAIN REGARDING WHETHER BUTZEL PROXIMATELY
CAUSED NPC’S INJURY
NPC claims there was a dispute of fact regarding whether Butzel was the cause of its injury.
For causation: “As in any tort action, to prove proximate cause a plaintiff in a legal malpractice
action must establish that the defendant’s action was a cause in fact of the claimed injury.” Charles
Reinhart Co, 444 Mich at 586. A law firm may not be liable for “the failure to pursue or timely
file a claim where its representation of plaintiff[] had ceased before the applicable period of
limitation expired on the claim.” Estate of Mitchell, 249 Mich App at 682, see also Boyle v Odette,
168 Mich App 737, 745; 425 NW2d 472 (1988) (holding an attorney cannot be held liable for
failing to file a claim prior to the expiration of the claim when the plaintiff hired new counsel
before the expiration of the claim).

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There is no dispute Butzel started representing NPC in 2008, but there is a dispute when
that representation ended. However, this dispute is not material. NPC’s malpractice claim
concerns Butzel’s representation before the December 15, 2008 letter, when Butzel noted it was
not providing services for NPC. As established by this Court’s and the Berrien Circuit Court’s
opinions, the equitable relief was premised on NPC’s delay in bringing its quiet-title action, which
it should have done in September 2008. There is no dispute Butzel represented NPC during the
referenced time frame.
While there is evidence establishing Butzel’s alleged negligence as the cause for NPC
losing its claim to the disputed property, NPC was partially responsible for the delay. With respect
to the Berrien Circuit Court’s decision on equity, this Court determined: (1) NPC had knowledge
of the construction of the golf course on the disputed parcel in March 2008; (2) NPC’s silence on
the issue was pivotal in Harbor Shores reaching the conclusion there was no dispute; (3) NPC’s
inaction from 2008 to 2011 supported Harbor Shores’ belief there was no dispute; and (4) Harbor
Shores justifiably relied on its belief to complete development of the golf course. New Prods II,
331 Mich App at 628-629. The events this Court and the Berrien Circuit Court cite supporting the
equitable relief began in September 2008, which was when the parties agreed Butzel represented
NPC. NPC did not retain new counsel until August 2009. In New Prods II, this Court was not
clear on which law firm was responsible for the failure, but explained NPC’s silence was a key
factor in Harbor Springs concluding there was no dispute. There was evidence demonstrating
Butzel was responsible for the inaction and lack of communication with Harbor Shores. However,
NPC additionally claimed the delay was also a result of its “preoccupation with the bankruptcy of
one of its most important clients, General Motors.” New Prods II, 331 Mich App at 629 n 3.
There is a question of fact regarding proximate cause. While Butzel focuses on this Court’s
determination NPC filed its quiet-title action in 2011, after construction was complete, it ignores
its actions before 2011. This Court noted Harbor’s Shores’ conclusion regarding the disputed
parcel, stating: “Indeed, this belief could only have been enhanced by [NPC’s] silence on the issue
throughout the entirety of the construction of the 18th hole.” Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
Construction began in September 2008 when Butzel represented NPC and initially asserted NPC’s
claim to the disputed parcel. This Court and the Berrien Circuit Court agreed NPC should have
been aware of this issue by at least May 2008. Id. at 268. While Butzel terminated its
representation of NPC in December 2008 or early 2009, there was no dispute it was representing
NPC during a portion of the time this Court and the Berrien Circuit Court referenced.
While Butzel is correct after its termination it was not the cause of NPC’s harm, the equity
issues the Berrien Circuit Court and this Court cite began while Butzel represented NPC. There is
a question of fact whether Butzel was the proximate cause of NPC’s loss of title to the disputed
property. As such, the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition.4
4 NPC further argues the trial court prematurely granted summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10) because discovery was not complete. Because we find questions of fact remain, we
vacate the lower court’s decision to grant summary disposition, which would then reopen the
question of continuing discovery. We note that NPC provided evidence through Matta’s affidavit

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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the trial court decision and remand for further
proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
of the contents of the depositions it sought from Butzel’s attorneys. See Bellows v Delaware
McDonald’s Corp, 206 Mich App 555, 561; 522 NW2d 707 (1994) (“This Court has held that a
grant of summary disposition is premature if granted before discovery on a disputed issue is
complete.”)

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