PEOPLE OF MI V RICHARD ALLEN WHITE

Court of Appeals, State of Michigan
ORDER
PEOPLE OF MI V RICHARD ALLEN WHITE
Docket No. 382141
LC No. 26-002054-FH
Michelle M. Rick
Presiding Judge
Kristina Robinson Garrett
Daniel S. Korobkin
Judges
The motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED.
The motion to review bail is DENIED for lack of merit in the grounds presented.
_______________________________
Presiding Judge
Korobkin, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the trial court abused its discretion because the record does
not support a finding that requiring money bail in an amount that defendant cannot afford to pay is
necessary to assure defendant’s appearance or the protection of the public. MCR 6.106(E), (F), (H)(1).
Therefore, I would reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to modify bond and remand
with instructions to reduce bail to an amount that defendant can afford to pay. The trial court may order
other conditions of pretrial release that are reasonably necessary to ensure defendant’s appearance and the
safety of the public, including but not limited to conditions that prohibit defendant from driving, using
alcohol, or illicitly using controlled substances as well as conditions that require reporting, testing,
screening, and monitoring to ensure defendant’s compliance. MCR 6.106(D).
In addition to the above analysis under MCR 6.106, I agree with defendant that conditioning his
pretrial release on payment of money bail that he cannot afford violates his rights to due process and equal
protection under the law. See Bearden v Georgia, 461 US 660, 672-673 (1983); People v Collins, 239
Mich App 125, 135-136 (1999). Except in situations not applicable here, the Michigan Constitution
guarantees that “[a]ll persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties . . . .” Const 1963,
art 1, § 15. For individuals who cannot afford the amount of bail that has been set, this “right” to bail is
illusory and the pretrial release order is functionally equivalent to an order of pretrial detention. Although
pretrial detention may be justified when no conditions of release can reasonably assure a defendant’s
appearance at trial or the safety of the public, see United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 748-751, 755
(1987), it cannot be justified merely because a defendant cannot afford to pay. In the present case, under
the trial court’s pretrial release order, if defendant could afford to pay or post a $75,000 cash or surety
bond, then defendant would be released with conditions. Thus, the trial court has implicitly determined
that a hypothetical individual who is similarly situated to defendant but happens to be wealthier could be

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safely released with such conditions. It is therefore primarily defendant’s inability to afford money bail
that prevents his release. In my view, that is prohibited under Bearden, Collins, and Salerno, supra.1
1 Courts in other jurisdictions have held that conditioning pretrial release on the payment of money bail
that a defendant cannot afford is unconstitutional. See, e.g., In re Humphrey, 482 P3d 1008 (Cal, 2021);
Valdez-Jimenez v Eighth Judicial Dist Court, 460 P3d 976 (Nev, 2020); Brangan v Commonwealth, 80
NE3d 949 (Mass, 2017); State v Brown, 338 P3d 1276 (NM, 2014). “Decisions from other jurisdictions
are not precedentially binding, but they may be considered for their persuasive value.” People v Lillis,
___ Mich App ___, ___ n 3 (2026) (Docket No. 372637); slip op at 5 n 3.
September 4, 2026

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