COA 374088 SUSAN CARROLL V MARSHALL RAY OLGER Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/4/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
SUSAN CARROLL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
February 04, 2026
9:57 AM
v No. 374088
Iosco Circuit Court
MARSHALL RAY OLGER, LC No. 2023-003550-DO
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and BORRELLO and LETICA, JJ.
ACKERMAN, P.J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. We lack jurisdiction over this claim of appeal because the attorney
fee award at issue is merely a form of compensatory damages imposed as part of a civil-contempt
order. Such an order is not a final order under In re Moroun, 295 Mich App 312; 814 NW2d 319
(2012). See also Alpena Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs v Tadajewski, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___
NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 374166); slip op at 4 (“An order of civil contempt is . . .
‘reviewable only on application for leave to appeal’ under MCL 600.308(2)(c).”).
Acting under MCR 7.203(F)(1), this Court previously administratively dismissed all issues
in this appeal except the attorney fee award, reasoning that this portion of the order qualifies as a
“final order” under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv), which includes a “postjudgment order awarding or
denying attorney fees and costs under court rule or other law.” See Carroll v Olger, unpublished
order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 17, 2025 (Docket No. 374088). But as this Court
explained in Tadajewski, an attorney fee award imposed as part of a compensatory civil-contempt
order is not a freestanding postjudgment award of attorney fees; it is part of the contempt sanction
itself. Because a compensatory civil-contempt order is not appealable by right, neither is one of
its constituent parts. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction, and the remainder of this appeal should be
dismissed.
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman

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