COA 372252 ERIC LEIENDECKER V ASCENSION GENESYS HOSPITAL Opinion - Authored - Published 1/13/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
ERIC LEIENDECKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
FOR PUBLICATION
January 13, 2026
10:13 AM
v No. 372252
Genesee Circuit Court
ASCENSION GENESYS HOSPITAL, LC No. 2023-119302-NZ
Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff/Cross-
Defendant-Appellee,
and
B.K. TEACHOUT INVESTIGATIONS, INC., doing
business as TEACHOUT SECURITY SERVICES,
INC.,
Defendant/Cross-Defendant/Cross-
Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before: YATES, P.J., and BOONSTRA and YOUNG, JJ.
BOONSTRA, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
As it turns out, what is good for the goose is not always good for the gander.
The “goose” here is the doctrine of domitae naturae, while the “gander” is the doctrine of
ferae naturae. Domitae naturae relates to domesticated animals, while ferae naturae relates to
wild animals. See Massengile v Piper, 294 Mich 653, 657-658; 293 NW2d 897 (1940) (SHARPE,
J., dissenting), citing Andrews v Smith, 324 Pa 455; 188 A 146 (1936)1; Aikens v Dep’t of
Conservation, 387 Mich 495, 502; 198 NW2d 304 (1972), citing People v Zimberg, 321 Mich 655,
1 Massengile and Andrews used the term mansuetae naturae, which is the equivalent of domitae
naturae.

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658; 33 NW2d 104 (1948). Both are long-standing doctrines of our common law, but they are
distinct doctrines, they apply in distinctly different ways, and they require distinctly different
results in our legal system.
But the majority conflates them, and in doing so it opens the floodgates to a potential gaggle
of claims that are simply not recognized in the common law. Until now, at least. But the majority
has now determined that those on whose land wild animals enter may find themselves subject to
legal theories of liability that have never before been recognized in Michigan. They may find that
their goose is indeed cooked. The majority accomplishes this by ignoring Michigan caselaw and
by altering our common law despite lacking the authority to do so. I must therefore respectfully
dissent from the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor
of defendant Ascension Genesys Hospital on plaintiff’s premises liability claim. I otherwise
concur in the majority opinion.
As the majority recounts, Eric Leiendecker was attacked by a wild goose on one of
Ascension’s properties. He suffered unfortunate injuries. Leiendecker sued Ascension, as the
owner of the property, claiming that Ascension “owed a duty to maintain the subject premises in
a safe condition and to warn[2] of any dangers that they know, or should have known, may cause
harm to their invitees[3].”
The classic example of liability arising in the context of domitae naturae is a dog bite.
Under the common law in Michigan, the keeper of a domesticated animal can be held strictly
liable4 when “(1) one is the possessor of the animal, (2) one has scienter of the animal’s abnormal
dangerous propensities, and (3) the harm results from the dangerous propensity that was known or
should have been known.” Trager v Thor, 445 Mich 95, 99; 516 NW2d 69 (1994). “Possessor”
in this context means “owner” or “keeper,” and “keeper” “cannot be fairly construed as anything
short of the exercise of dominion and control similar to and in substitution for that which ordinarily
would be exerted by the owner in possession.” Id. at 100, 103 (citation omitted).
Alternatively, the common law of Michigan provides that the keeper of a domesticated
animal can be held liable under a negligence theory:
[A] negligence cause of action arises when there is ineffective control of an animal
in a situation where it would reasonably be expected that injury could occur, and
injury does proximately result from the negligence. The amount of control required
is that which would be exercised by a reasonable person based upon the total
2 Leiendecker does not argue on appeal that Ascension owed or breached a duty to warn; he instead
argues that Ascension “breached [its] legal duties to Leiendecker by failing to remove the goose
from the property.”
3 It is undisputed that Leiendecker was an invitee at the time of the incident.
4 Michigan has also enacted a statute imposing strict liability in certain circumstances.
MCL 287.351(1).

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situation at the time, including the past behavior of the animal and the injuries that
could have been reasonably foreseen.” [Id. at 106 (citation omitted).]
By contrast, wild animals (ferae naturae) are by their very nature not subject to human
control, they therefore “belong[] to the state and [are] subject to the state’s power of regulation
and control,” and an individual may “acquir[e] in such game only the qualified property interest
which the state permits.” Glave v Michigan Terminix Co, 159 Mich App 537, 539.540; 407 NW2d
36 (1987). As a consequence, when a wild animal causes injury, a person may be held liable “[b]y
asserting dominion over [it] and keeping it.” Id. at 540. But the person “could not be liable without
exercising dominion, control or possession over [the animal].” Id. at 541.5
The majority entirely ignores Glave’s preclusion of liability, in the ferae naturae context,
unless the defendant exercised “dominion, control or possession” over a wild animal. Instead, the
majority misapplies Tripp v Baker, 346 Mich App 257, 266-268; 12 NW3d 45 (2023), a domitae
naturae case, to this ferae naturae case. Tripp was a dog bite case arising in the premises liability
context. The Court noted that a premises possessor generally “has a duty of care, not only to warn
the invitee of any known dangers, but the additional obligation to also make the premises safe,
which requires the landowner to inspect the premises and, depending upon the circumstances,
make any necessary repairs or warn of any discovered hazards.” Id. at 263 (citation omitted).
Ultimately, this Court held, under Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512; 629 NW2d 384
(2001),6 that there remained a genuine issue of fact as to whether the dog “was an open and obvious
danger.” But the Court nonetheless affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s premises
liability claim on the ground that the plaintiff was a trespasser, not an invitee.
There are a number of problems with the majority’s reliance on Tripp. First, Tripp’s
premises liability analysis relied on Lugo, which was reversed by Kandil-Elsayed, 512 Mich at
132-143. Second, Tripp’s premises liability analysis was in any event dictum, because it was not
essential to the Court’s ruling. See Auto Owners Inc Co v Seils, 310 Mich App 132, 160 n 7; 871
NW2d 530 (2015). Third, the premises liability claim in Tripp was asserted not against the dog-
owner (who was a tenant at the property), but rather against the landlords for their failure to repair
a fence and their alleged knowledge of the aggressive nature of the dog it contained. Further, Tripp
5 In Glave the defendants had sprayed city buildings in an effort to encourage the departure of
pigeons, which the plaintiff alleged caused the pigeons to flock to her neighborhood and home.
The Court distinguished those facts from those in Andrews v Andrews, 242 NC 382; 88 SE2d 88
(1955), in which the defendant had “deliberately attracted large numbers of wild geese to a large
artificial pond constructed within four hundred feet of plaintiffs’ lands, and over a period of years
the pond became a base for the ever-widening and increasingly expensive predations of the geese
on plaintiffs’ crops.” Glave, 159 Mich App at 540-541. In any event, even if actions that attract
wild animals could properly fall within an exception to the doctrine of ferae naturae, Leiendecker
does not allege in this case that Ascension took any action to induce, entice, or otherwise attract
the goose onto its property.
6 Lugo was overruled by our Supreme Court in Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil Inc, 512 Mich 95; 1
NW3d 44 (2023).

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appears to reflect a lack of clarity as to whether, in that domitae naturae context, the Court was
considering the premises possessor’s liability (for the dog bite injury) under a strict liability or a
negligence standard. For example, while noting that “premises liability required a plaintiff to
prove the elements of negligence,” Tripp, 346 Mich App at 266 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted), it concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint was “facially valid” because it alleged,
in part, that “the defendant had knowledge of the dog’s dangerous tendencies,” id. at 269, (a strict
liability standard, see Trager, 445 Mich at 99).
Most importantly, the majority errs by importing into the law of ferae naturae the distinctly
different legal principles that apply in the context of domitae naturae.7 As this Court made clear
in Glave, liability does not arise in the ferae naturae context “without exercising dominion, control
or possession” over the wild animal. Glave, 159 Mich App at 541. As in Glave, plaintiff made no
such allegation in his complaint in this case. Consequently, plaintiff failed to state a claim on
which relief could be granted, and the trial court properly granted summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8).8
7 The majority inaccurately characterizes Tripp as holding that an “animal” can be a dangerous
condition of the land for purposes of a premises liability claim. However, Tripp actually held that
a “dog” can be a dangerous condition of the land. Tripp, 346 Mich App at 267-269. And while
the Court in Tripp may not have highlighted the domesticated nature of the dog, it would have had
no reason to do so, or to consider or distinguish the ferae naturae doctrine, because the entire
context of the matter before it was that of a domesticated dog to which the doctrine of domitae
naturae applied. The majority’s characterization of Tripp (a) is inaccurate, (b) flaunts our holding
Glave, (c) takes Tripp out of its proper context, and (d) mechanically applies its out-of-context
reading of Tripp to alter our common law of ferae naturae.
8 The majority characterizes Glave as applying only to a claim for “negligence,” not premises
liability. However, premises liability is a form of a negligence claim. Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil
Inc, 512 Mich 95; 1 NW3d 44 (2023) (“All negligence actions, including those based on premises
liability, require a plaintiff to prove four essential elements: duty, breach, causation, and harm.).
Moreover, the plaintiff in Glave brought claims for both nuisance and negligence, and the
circumstances of Glave obviously could not have supported a premises liability claim because the
defendants were not in “possession and control over the land,” Scola v JP Morgan Chase Bank,
Nat’l Assoc, 506 Mich 924 (2020), on which the alleged injury (pigeons on plaintiff’s property)
was incurred. But the holding in Glave broadly precluded liability for any form of negligence
claim with regard to a wild animal, under the doctrine of ferae naturae. Again, Glave held that a
person may be held liable “[b]y asserting dominion over [a wild animal] and keeping it,” but that
the person “could not be liable without exercising dominion, control or possession over [the
animal].” Glave, 159 Mich App at 540-541. The Court concluded, “Defendants never asserted
dominion over the birds or reduced them to possession; hence the birds remained free, and the
defendants were not responsible for their migrations. To hold otherwise would put the imagination
to ludicrous shifts.” Id. at 541 (citation omitted). Like the plaintiff in Glave, Leiendecker “did not
allege such dominion, control or possession” and accordingly “failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.” Id.

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This Court’s unpublished opinion in Heuschneider v Wolverine Superior Hospitality, Inc,
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 4, 2019 (Docket No. 341053)
further supports this conclusion.9 In Heuschneider, the plaintiff filed suit against a hotel owner
after suffering a spider bite while staying in a hotel room. As this Court recounted:
The trial court granted summary disposition for lack of legal duty and failure to
present evidence of foreseeability. The court found that no legal duty was owed to
the plaintiff based on the doctrine of ferae naturae, or wild things, over which
defendant had no control. . . . The trial court found that no duty was owed to the
plaintiff based on the holding in Glave v. Michigan Terminix Co., 159 Mich App.
537; 407 N.W.2d 36 (1987), which ascribed a duty only where a wild animal is
under the control of an alleged tortfeaser. “By asserting dominion over a wild
animal and keeping it, an individual may be held liable for personal injuries caused
by the animal’s conduct.” Id. at 540. Here, the court found the fact that the spider
was a wild animal an absolute defense to each of plaintiff’s claims of premises
liability, innkeeper’s liability, negligence, and nuisance. [Heuschneider, unpub op
at 2.]
This Court concluded that the trial court erroneously dismissed the plaintiff’s claim under
the innkeeper’s statute, because a spider meets the common definition of “vermin” and the
innkeeper’s statute therefore applied. The Court stated:
The doctrine of ferae naturae has its genesis in the common law. The common law
remains in force until modified. Wold Architects and Engineers v. Strat, 474 Mich
223, 233; 713 W.2d 750 (2006). “Our statute limiting the liability of an innkeeper
is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed.” Davis v.
Cohen, 253 Mich 330, 335; 235 NW 173 (1931). The trial court explicitly found
that the innkeepers’ liability statute was inapplicable to this case because it found
that spiders were not vermin. This was erroneous. [Heuschneider, unpub op at 3.]
Significantly, this Court in Heuschneider only found the doctrine of ferae naturae to be
inapplicable with respect to the plaintiff’s claim under the innkeeper’s statute. And that, of course,
is because the Legislature is empowered to alter the common law. See People v Woolfolk, 304
Mich App 450, 475; 848 NW2d 169 (2014). Heuschneider left the doctrine of ferae naturae in
place with respect to the plaintiff’s premises liability, negligence, and nuisance claims, reversing
the trial court’s grant of summary disposition only on the plaintiff’s statutory “innkeeper’s” claim.
As our Supreme Court recently reiterated in Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil Inc, 512 Mich 95;
1 NW3d 44 (2023):
All negligence actions, including those based on premises liability, require a
plaintiff to prove four essential elements: duty, breach, causation, and harm. The
9 “Unpublished opinions may be considered persuasive, even if they are not binding.” Elizabeth
Trace Condominium Ass’n v America Global Enterprises, Inc, 340 Mich App 435, 444; 986 NW2d
412 (2022).

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first element, duty, is essentially a question whether the relationship between the
actor and the injured person gives rise to any legal obligation on the actor’s part for
the benefit of the injured person. [Id. at 110 (citation and quotation marks
omitted).]
The Court also noted that “[i]t is well settled in Michigan that the question whether the defendant
owes an actionable legal duty to the plaintiff is one of law which the court decides.” Kandil-
Elsayed, 512 Mich at 112.10
This Court made clear in Glave and Heuschneider that, absent the exercise of dominion,
control, or possession over a wild animal, there exists no legal duty with respect to any injuries
that the wild animal may cause. That is because the doctrine of ferae naturae eliminates that duty.
There consequently can be no liability under a premises liability theory and, the question of duty
being one of law, Kandil-Elsayed, 512 Mich at 112, the majority errs by allowing plaintiff’s
premises liability claim to go forward instead of affirming the trial court’s dismissal of that claim
under MCR 2.116(C)(8).
The majority compounds its errors by implicitly applying (and even expanding upon) the
caselaw of other jurisdictions. It does so by blindly applying Tripp—which expressly relied upon
out-of-state cases in concluding that a dog can be a dangerous condition of the land. Yet, the out-
of-state cases on which Tripp relied11 were themselves, in addition to other distinguishing features,
“dog bite” cases, i.e., domitae naturae, having nothing whatsoever to do with the doctrine of ferae
naturae. See Village Green Alzheimer’s Care Home, LLC v Graves by and through Graves, 650
SW3d 608 (Tex App 2021), and Giacalone v Housing Auth of Town of Wallingford, 306 Conn
399, 51 A3d 352 (2012).12
Even if we were to look to out-of-state cases for guidance, a more appropriate one would
be Nicholson v Smith, 986 SW2d 54, (Tex App 1999). In Nicholson, the plaintiff sued a
10 As the majority notes, the trial court granted summary disposition to Ascension under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted). But this does not
mean, as the majority describes, that we are “limited to reviewing the facts alleged in plaintiff’s
second amended complaint.” Certainly, we must accept those factual allegations as true for
purposes of a (C)(8) analysis. But we have a broader duty than just that; we have a duty to assess
the “legal sufficiency of a claim based on the factual allegations.” El-Khalil v Oakwood
Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159-160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). Simply put, Leiendecker’s
premises liability claim fails because, accepting his factual allegations as true, his claim is legally
insufficient.
11 The majority properly does not rely on other out-of-state cases cited by Leiendecker. Indeed,
one need only take a gander at those cases to discern that they also are not supportive of the
majority’s conclusion in this case.
12 Although this Court may look to the law of other jurisdictions for guidance, we generally do so
when “there is a lack of controlling Michigan precedent.” Butler v Simmons-Butler, 308 Mich
App 195, 214 n 4; 863 NW2d 677 (2014).

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recreational park and its owners after her now-deceased husband was stung by fire ants while he
worked on the underside of his house trailer. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal
of the plaintiff’s claim because “[t]he doctrine of ferae naturae defeats [the plaintiff’s] premises
liability claim as a matter of law.” Id. at 64. I appreciate that the court in Nicholson did not
establish a bright line rule, and it thus left open the possibility, under the common law of Texas,
that a claim might conceivably be actionable “with regard to wild animals found in artificial
structures or places where they are not normally found; that is, stores, hotels, apartment houses, or
billboard, if the landowner knows or should know of the unreasonable risk of harm posed by an
animal on its premises, and cannot expect patrons to realize the danger or guard against it.”13 Id.
at 62. But the Texas Court of Appeals found that such exceptional circumstances did not exist and
were not alleged. Instead, the court in Nicholson—citing Glave, no less—affirmed the dismissal
of the claim under the applicable law:
In general, the law does not require an owner or possessor of land to anticipate the
presence of, or guard invitees against the harm from, wild animals unless he or she
has reduced them to possession, harbors them, or has introduced onto the premises
wild animals which are not indigenous to the locality. [Id. at 61.]14
The majority also errs in a couple of other respects. First, it does not establish a clear and
workable new standard for this new type of premises liability claim. Specifically, it finds that
Leiendecker sufficiently alleged that Ascension “knew or should have known” that the goose was
an “artificial risk to visitors” that created “a dangerous condition of the land.” But it ultimately
concludes that “because plaintiff alleged that the goose was a condition of the land whose
13 Even if the common law of Michigan arguably should be altered to create an exception for such
circumstances, Leiendecker has not alleged that any such circumstances exist in this case.
Consequently, allowing Leiendecker’s premises liability claim to survive a motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), as the majority now does, simply sends the parties and the
judicial system on a wild goose chase.
14 The case cited by my concurring colleague, Hillis v McCall, 602 SW3d 436, 442 n 10 (Texas
Sup Ct, 2020), is no different. Indeed, Hillis reversed the Texas Court of Appeals’ reversal of the
trial court’s grant of summary disposition to the defendant property owner. And, like the court in
Nicholson, it only recognized—under the common law of Texas—a limited exception to the
doctrine of ferae naturae “with regard to wild animals found in artificial structures or places where
they are not normally found; that is, stores, hotels, apartment houses, or billboards, if the landowner
knows or should know of the unreasonable risk of harm posed by an animal on its premises, and
cannot expect patrons to realize the danger or guard against it.” Hillis, 602 SW3d at 441 (citations
omitted). But no such exception exists in the common law of Michigan and, in any event, it would
not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. The court in Hillis also did not, as is
suggested, “describe” any broader exception to the doctrine of ferae naturae. To the contrary, it
expressly declined to address whether any additional exception might exist. Id. at 442 n 10. The
majority in this case, by contrast, creates out of whole cloth a vastly broader exception to the
doctrine of ferae naturae than has ever been recognized in Michigan (or perhaps anywhere).

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dangerousness was known to Ascension and Ascension failed to warn15 [Leiendecker] about the
dangerous goose, he has raised a legally sufficient premises liability claim against Ascension.” I
am left wondering what precisely will be required, under the now-revised common law of
Michigan, for a plaintiff to plead and succeed on a premises liability claim arising out of an injury
caused by a wild animal. And I am sure the trial courts will have goose bumps anticipating the
“ludicrous shifts” to which our imaginations will be put going forward. Glave, 159 Mich App at
541.
Second, and importantly, the majority drastically alters our legal landscape by, as noted,
effecting a change in our common law. And it not only does so without a proper legal basis, but
it does so without authority and without exercising appropriate prudence. As this Court has stated:
[W]e are mindful that we are an error-correcting court. Burns v Detroit (On
Remand), 253 Mich App 608, 615; 660 NW2d 85 (2002). As such, we must confine
our role to that function. Were we inclined to effect a significant change to
Michigan law, such as by abrogating established common law in favor of a rule
more to our liking, “prudence would counsel against it because such a significant
departure from Michigan law should only come from our Supreme Court [or the
Legislature], not an intermediate appellate court.” Teel v Meredith, 284 Mich App
660, 666; 774 NW2d 527 (2009) (declining to recognize a cause of action for
spoliation of evidence); see also Dahlman v Oakland Univ, 172 Mich App 502,
507; 432 NW2d 304 (1988) (declining to recognize a cause of action for breach of
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing “because such a radical departure
from the common law and Michigan precedent should come only from the Supreme
Court”). [Woolfolk, 304 Mich App at 475.]
See also, MK by Next Friend Knaack v Auburnfly, LLC, unpublished opinion per curiam of the
Court of Appeals, issued December 17, 2024 (Docket No. 364577), unpub op at 4 (“[I]t is not our
role, as an intermediate appellate court, to change the common law; any such change should instead
come from the Legislature or our Supreme Court.”) (citation omitted). The majority nonetheless,
without waiting for those who might properly change the common law, plunges forward headlong
into uncharted waters. Its decision may prove to be the goose that laid the golden egg for the more
litigious members of our society.
I would instead uphold and apply Michigan’s existing and well-established common-law
doctrine of ferae naturae and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of
Ascension on Leiendecker’s premises liability claim. Because the majority does not do so, I
respectfully dissent in that regard and otherwise concur in the majority opinion.
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
15 Again, Leiendecker does not argue on appeal that Ascension owed or breached a duty to warn;
he instead argues that Ascension “breached [its] legal duties to Leiendecker by failing to remove
the goose from the property.”

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