COA 378295 IN RE NS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/23/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
-1-
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
July 23, 2026
11:22 AM
In re NS.
No. 378295
Wexford Probate Court
LC No. 2023-001287-MI
Before: MARIANI, P. J., and O’BRIEN and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent, NS, appeals as of right the probate court order which continued his
involuntary mental health treatment order as well as his continued hospitalization at Walter
Reuther Psychiatric Hospital (Reuther). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The Ingham County Probate Court issued an involuntary mental health treatment order,
often referred to as a civil commitment, for respondent under Michigan’s Mental Health Code,
MCL 330.1011 et seq., in September 2023. It found that respondent was a “person requiring
treatment” and ordered respondent to undergo a combination of hospitalization and assisted
outpatient treatment (AOT) for a mood disorder which made respondent a threat to himself and
others. Venue was subsequently changed to Wexford County (the probate court). The record
indicates that respondent’s outpatient treatment over the next year was largely unsuccessful. The
probate court ordered respondent to be hospitalized at Reuther in October 2024 after several
instances of noncompliance with his treatment orders, including making threats to hospital staff,
nonattendance of medical appointments, elopement from adult foster care facilities, and failure to
take prescribed medications.
Following a hearing in May 2025, the probate court entered an order for continuing mental
health treatment stating that services were to continue to be provided to respondent by Northern
Lakes Community Mental Health, including the following: a case management plan, case
management services, all services recommended by the treatment provider, medication, blood or
urinalysis to determine compliance with or effectiveness of prescribed medication, educational
training, supervised living, assertive community treatment team services, substance use disorder
treatment, substance use disorder testing, and any other services prescribed to treat the individual’s

-- 1 of 7 --

-2-
mental illness and either to assist the individual in living and functioning in the community or to
help prevent relapse or deterioration that may reasonably be predicted to result in suicide or the
need for hospitalization. The court’s order then specified a number of these other services, stating
that “the individual shall comply with the recommendation of the agency regarding living
arrangements, medication, individual/group psychotherapy, and any other appropriate aftercare
program.” Finally, injectable medications were authorized if deemed necessary and appropriate
by a psychiatrist or medical doctor.
In October 2025, following the filing of another six-month review report in which a
psychiatrist opined that respondent continued to be a person requiring treatment,1 respondent filed
a petition objecting to the report, requesting a hearing, and requesting entry of an order discharging
him from involuntary mental health treatment.2
The probate court held a hearing on the petition on November 4, 2025. It took testimony
from respondent and Dr. Daniel Blake, a clinical psychologist employed by Reuther. Dr. Blake
reported that respondent was currently doing well in a supervised structured setting, but it was his
opinion that respondent had “no insight of the severity of his difficulty” or of the “potential
seriousness of harm that he pose[d] to both himself and others.” Specifically, it was reported that
respondent believed that he only needed medication for Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
without any treatment for his mood disorders. Dr. Blake believed that respondent needed to go
through a “step-down process” and incrementally show that he was capable of managing himself,
first in a locked group home and eventually with more independence. However, Dr. Blake reported
that respondent was not working with that plan and did not like it—respondent wanted to be
discharged and told Dr. Blake that he wanted to live with his mother and sister.
Dr. Blake also described behavioral incidents at the hospital in August and October 2025,
including respondent punching a wall and having a physical altercation with another patient.
Hospital staff also reported that respondent tried to offer a friend money to help him escape the
hospital and that he told a friend that he had plans to kill his guardian and a community mental
health worker. Those incidents were, in Dr. Blake’s opinion, reflective of respondent’s
impulsiveness and continued poor judgment when agitated. Thus, it was Dr. Blake’s opinion that
respondent had not met his discharge criteria at that time. Dr. Blake also noted that respondent
had previously eloped from two adult foster care placements.
Respondent then testified that he wanted an AOT treatment order because “I’ve been doing
everything like I’m supposed to do, I’ve been taking my meds, I’ve been going to all my groups.”
Further, in describing the altercation with the other patient, he testified that the other patient
charged him, respondent tried to walk away, the other patient started punching him, and respondent
defended himself, i.e., he testified that it was a matter of self-defense. He denied punching a wall
1 In the report, the psychiatrist also listed the medications that he proposed prescribing to
respondent for the next six months.
2 NS is the respondent to the involuntary mental health treatment petition and so is referred to as
“respondent” herein, despite the fact that, somewhat confusingly, NS is appealing from the denial
of his petition for entry of an order discharging him from said treatment.

-- 2 of 7 --

-3-
in August but admitted that he had punched a wall on another occasion. Respondent stated that he
wanted “a chance to prove [himself] out in the community.” He believed that he was able to stay
on his medications, get a part time job, and participate in online schooling. Thus, respondent did
not contest the underlying mental health order but wanted to be released from the psychiatric
hospital and continue outpatient therapy.
The trial court denied respondent’s petition for discharge. It found that respondent was
doing well in the structured environment of the psychiatric hospital, and that he would not be
released from the hospital until he had “demonstrated an ability to develop the insight and coping
skills necessary not to be a threat to himself or others.” The court indicated that all of the services
referenced in the May 2025 order, as delineated above, would be continued. The court then issued
a written order to that effect.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, respondent does not dispute his underlying mental health diagnosis, but argues
that the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that respondent should remain hospitalized.
Respondent also argues that his due-process rights were violated because petitioner did not meet
its statutory requirements to establish a treatment plan or case service plan and discuss it with
respondent, nor did the probate court consider respondent’s mental health service plan on the
record at the November 2025 hearing on respondent’s petition for discharge.
A. PETITION FOR DISCHARGE FROM TREATMENT ORDER
In civil-commitment proceedings, we review a probate court’s dispositional rulings for
abuse of discretion and the probate court’s underlying factual findings for clear error. In re Portus,
325 Mich App 374, 381; 926 NW2d 33 (2018). A probate court abuses its discretion when its
decision falls “outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes” or when it makes an error
of law. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). A probate court’s factual findings are clearly
erroneous when this Court “is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made,
even if there is evidence to support the finding.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We
review the probate court’s interpretation and application of the Mental Health Code de novo. Id.
First, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the portions of the Mental Health Code
relevant to this case. MCL 330.1472a provides:
(1) Upon the filing of a petition under section 434 and a finding that an
individual is a person requiring treatment, the court shall issue an initial order of
involuntary mental health treatment that shall be limited in duration as follows:
(a) An initial order of hospitalization shall not exceed 60 days.
(b) An initial order of assisted outpatient treatment shall not exceed 180
days.

-- 3 of 7 --

-4-
(c) An initial order of combined hospitalization and assisted outpatient
treatment shall not exceed 180 days. The hospitalization portion of the initial order
shall not exceed 60 days.
(2) Upon the receipt of a petition under section 473 before the expiration of
an initial order under subsection (1) and a finding that the individual continues to
be a person requiring treatment, the court shall issue a second order for involuntary
mental health treatment that shall not exceed 90 days.
(3) Upon the receipt of a petition under section 473 before the expiration of
a second order under subsection (2) and a finding that the individual continues to
be a person requiring treatment, the court shall issue a continuing order for
involuntary mental health treatment that shall not exceed 1 year.
(4) Upon the receipt of a petition under section 473 before the expiration of
a continuing order of involuntary mental health treatment, including a continuing
order issued under section 485a or a 1-year order of hospitalization issued under
former section 472, and a finding that the individual continues to be a person
requiring treatment, the court shall issue another continuing order for involuntary
mental health treatment as provided in subsection (3) for a period not to exceed 1
year. The court shall continue to issue consecutive 1-year continuing orders for
involuntary mental health treatment under this section until a continuing order
expires without a petition having been filed under section 473 or the court finds that
the individual is not a person requiring treatment.
The Mental Health Code also provides for periodic reviews of an individual’s status pursuant to
MCL 330.1482:
Each individual subject to a 1-year order of involuntary mental health
treatment has the right to adequate and prompt review of his or her current status
as a person requiring treatment. Six months from the date of a 1-year order of
involuntary mental health treatment, the executive director of the community
mental health services program responsible for treatment or, if private
arrangements for the reimbursement of mental health treatment services have been
made, the hospital director or director of the assisted outpatient treatment program
shall assign a physician or licensed psychologist to review the individual’s clinical
status as a person requiring treatment.
A report on the results of the periodic review must be prepared and provided to the individual
subject to the treatment order and their attorney, guardian, and nearest relative or designee.
MCL 330.1483. If the report
concludes that the individual requires continuing involuntary mental health
treatment and the individual or the executive director objects to the conclusions, the
individual or the executive director has the right to a hearing and may petition the
court for discharge of the individual from the treatment program. [MCL 330.1484.]

-- 4 of 7 --

-5-
The resultant hearing is conducted as follows:
(1) Upon a hearing under section 484, if the court finds that an individual
under an order of involuntary mental health treatment is no longer a person
requiring treatment, the court shall enter a finding to that effect and shall order that
the individual be discharged.
(2) Upon a hearing under section 484, if the court finds that an individual
under a 1-year order of involuntary mental health treatment continues to be a person
requiring treatment, and after consideration of complaints submitted under section
483(2), the court shall do 1 of the following:
(a) Continue the order.
(b) Issue a new continuing order for involuntary mental health treatment
under section 472a(3) or (4). [MCL 330.1485a.]
In this case, respondent effectively conceded on appeal that he was still a person requiring
treatment, that “[he was] willing to have the court continue the AOT order,” and that he only
objected to his continued hospitalization.
Because the probate court found at the hearing that respondent was still a person requiring
treatment, it was required to either continue respondent’s treatment order or issue a new continuing
treatment order. MCL 330.1485a. In this case, the trial court chose to continue the current
treatment order, which meant that respondent remained hospitalized. This decision was not an
abuse of discretion. Dr. Blake testified that respondent had a history of nonparticipation with his
previous court-ordered outpatient treatment and elopement from adult foster care facilities. He
further testified that respondent showed improvement in the structured environment of the
psychiatric hospital, but that he was not ready to be discharged, as evidenced by respondent’s
multiple instances of threatening and assaultive behavior in the months before the hearing.
Thus, the probate court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered respondent’s treatment
and hospitalization to continue.
B. MENTAL HEALTH SERVICE PLAN
Respondent also argues that his due-process rights were violated because there was no
evidence that petitioner created a mental health service plan or discussed it with respondent as
required under the Mental Health Code.
“Whether a person has been afforded due process is a question of law that is reviewed de
novo.” In re Jestila, 345 Mich App 353, 355 n 3; 5 NW3d 362 (2023) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). However, we note that this issue was not raised before the probate court and so
is unpreserved. To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must raise objections before the
probate court while it has the opportunity to correct the error. See id. A party’s failure to timely
raise an issue in a civil case generally waives appellate review of that issue. In re Guardianship
of AMMB, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 368915), slip op at 2.
However, “there are certain discrete civil matters in which plain error applies.” Id. (quotation

-- 5 of 7 --

-6-
marks and citation omitted). The constitutional protections implicated by civil-commitment
proceedings under the Mental Health Code make plain error analysis appropriate in this case. See
In re MAT, ___ Mich App ___, ___-___ & ___ n 1; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 369255);
slip op at 2-3 & 3 n 1.
In order to avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that an error occurred, that the error was clear or obvious, and that the error affected
the appellant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
An error affects an appellant’s substantial rights if it “affected the outcome of the lower court
proceedings.” Id. Even if the appellant establishes plain error that affected his or her substantial
rights, “an appellate court must exercise its discretion in deciding whether to reverse.” Id.
Reversal will be warranted when the error “seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted).
The Mental Health Code states the following requirements in regard to the creation of a
mental health service plan:
The responsible mental health agency for each recipient shall ensure that a
person-centered planning process is used to develop a written individual plan of
services in partnership with the recipient. A preliminary plan shall be developed
within 7 days of the commencement of services or, if an individual is hospitalized
for less than 7 days, before discharge or release. The individual plan of services
shall consist of a treatment plan, a support plan, or both. A treatment plan shall
establish meaningful and measurable goals with the recipient. The individual plan
of services shall address, as either desired or required by the recipient, the
recipient’s need for food, shelter, clothing, health care, employment opportunities,
educational opportunities, legal services, transportation, and recreation. The plan
shall be kept current and shall be modified when indicated. The individual in
charge of implementing the plan of services shall be designated in the plan.
[MCL 330.1712(1).]
Respondent argues that, at the November 2025 hearing, “testimony should have been
brought before the court as to the specific service plan, goals, measures of achievement, and who
was responsible for implementing it, as the statute requires.” But respondent fails to mention that
he did not petition the court to address the lack of a service plan, inadequacy of the service plan,
or otherwise allege that petitioner failed to comply with MCL 300.1712(1). Instead, the petition
only alleged that respondent was not a person requiring continuing involuntary mental health
treatment and should be discharged. While respondent’s counsel argued at the hearing on the
discharge petition that there was no plan in place for respondent’s eventual discharge, counsel did
not argue that petitioner failed to comply with the statute.
Regardless, respondent does not explain on appeal why petitioner should have brought a
witness to the hearing to testify about an issue that was never before the court. In other words,
respondent cannot demonstrate that petitioner should have known that respondent would raise the
service plan issues for the first time at the hearing, and that it should have brought a witness to the
hearing to testify about that issue as a result. Respondent likewise does not explain how it was
clear or obvious error that affected his substantial rights for the court to fail to require such

-- 6 of 7 --

-7-
testimony under these circumstances. Carines, 460 Mich at 763. Again, respondent bears the
burden of persuasion on this issue, not petitioner. See id. Thus, we cannot find that respondent
met his burden of demonstrating that plain error occurred in this matter when the trial court did
not require testimony regarding the service plan, goals, etc., at the November 2025 hearing.3 Id..
In summation, we find that Dr. Blake’s testimony supported the probate court’s findings,
and the probate court did not err when it ordered that respondent was to remain hospitalized.
Affirmed.
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
3 To be clear, this Court agrees that the mental health agency responsible for respondent’s treatment
is required to comply with MCL 330.1712, but that issue was not properly before the trial court at
the time of the November 2025 hearing. Nothing in this opinion should be construed to deny
respondent’s right to properly raise this issue in the probate court.

-- 7 of 7 --