COA 373061 AHMED ALMESHAL V WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/10/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
AHMED ALMESHAL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
February 10, 2026
12:14 PM
v No. 373061
Macomb Circuit Court
WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY and
AMERICAN SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY,
LC No. 2020-002378-NF
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and CAMERON and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right the order denying their motion to vacate an arbitration award,
and granting plaintiff’s motion to enforce the same. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident after he was allegedly struck by an
unidentified hit-and-run driver who fled the scene. Plaintiff brought suit against defendants, who
insured his vehicle, seeking personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits and un- or underinsured
motorist (UM/UIM) benefits. The parties agreed to arbitrate plaintiff’s PIP claim, while his
UM/UIM claim proceeded to trial. A jury determined that plaintiff was not entitled to UM/UIM
benefits, answering “no” to the question: “Did a hit-and-run vehicle whose owner and operator
cannot be identified hit a vehicle occupied by Plaintiff on July 13, 2019?”
The arbitration panel later awarded plaintiff damages for his PIP claim, rejecting
defendants’ arguments that the UM/UIM verdict precluded the PIP claim under the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel. In so reasoning, the arbitration panel concluded that these
doctrines did not apply because the question answered by the jury on the verdict form did not
address “an issue to be decided by the fact finder in the PIP claim.”
Defendants moved to vacate the arbitration award, claiming that the arbitration panel
exceeded its powers and disregarded controlling law by failing to apply the doctrines of collateral
estoppel and res judicata. Plaintiff moved to enforce the arbitration award, arguing that the

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arbitrators correctly determined that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not preclude plaintiff’s
PIP claim and the award should be enforced. The trial court found that the arbitrators did not
exceed their power, denied defendants’ motion to vacate, and granted plaintiff’s motion to enforce.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to vacate or modify an
arbitration award.” Washington v Washington, 283 Mich App 667, 671; 770 NW2d 908 (2009).
“Whether an arbitrator exceeded his or her authority is also reviewed de novo.” Id. at 672.
Additionally, the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel are legal issues that are
reviewed de novo. C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive Mich Ins Co, 346 Mich App 197,
202; 12 NW3d 20 (2023).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that the arbitration panel and the trial court erroneously concluded that
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not preclude plaintiff’s PIP claim. We
disagree.1
Generally, review of an arbitration award is limited. TSP Servs, Inc v Nat’l-Std, LLC, 329
Mich App 615, 619; 944 NW2d 148 (2019). Courts may only reverse an arbitrator’s decision
where it is clear the arbitrator made an error of law. Id. at 620. Under MCL 691.1703(1)(d), an
arbitration award must be vacated if the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers. An arbitrator
exceeds his or her powers when he or she acts in contravention of controlling law. Cipriano v
Cipriano, 289 Mich App 361, 373; 808 NW2d 230 (2010). This Court has previously held that:
In order for a court to vacate an arbitrator award because of an error of law, the
error must have been so substantial that, but for the error, the award would have
been substantially different. Any such error must be readily apparent on the face
of the award without second-guessing the arbitrator’s thought processes, and the
arbitrator’s findings of fact are immune from review altogether. [Eppel v Eppel,
322 Mich App 562, 572; 912 NW2d 584 (2018) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).]
Both the legal doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel may be used to preclude a
party from relitigating a claim or issue. C-Spine Orthopedics, 346 Mich App at 203. “Courts use
the doctrine of res judicata to prevent multiple suits litigating the same cause of action.” Id.
Res judicata requires that (1) the prior action was decided on the merits, (2) the
decree in the prior action was a final decision, (3) the matter contested in the second
1 Defendants also argue the trial court erred when it held that it lacked the authority to vacate the
arbitration award. This argument is belied by the record; the trial court expressly found that the
arbitrators did not exceed their power in determining that plaintiff’s PIP claim was not precluded
by the UM/UIM verdict.

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case was or could have been resolved in the first, and (4) both actions involved the
same parties or their privies. [Peterson Novelties, Inc v Berkley, 259 Mich App 1,
10; 672 NW2d 351 (2003).]
Res judicata “bars not only claims already litigated, but also every claim arising from the same
transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not.” Adair
v State, 470 Mich 105, 121; 680 NW2d 386 (2004). “The burden of establishing the applicability
of res judicata is on the party asserting the doctrine.” Richards v Tibaldi, 272 Mich App 522, 531;
726 NW2d 770 (2006).
There is no dispute that plaintiff’s UM/UIM claim was decided on the merits, the jury
issued a final decision, and both the UM/UIM and PIP actions involved the same parties. It is
illogical, however, to conclude that plaintiff’s PIP claim could have been resolved at the UM/UIM
trial given that both parties agreed to resolve the PIP claim in arbitration. Indeed, plaintiff initially
brought both his PIP and UM/UIM claims in the same action before the trial court ordered the
claims be split, consistent with the parties’ arbitration agreement. Defendants fail to explain how
plaintiff could have resolved the PIP claim during the UM/UIM case after the trial court ordered
the parties to arbitrate the PIP claim. Thus, plaintiff’s PIP claim was not barred by res judicata.
“Whereas res judicata involves preclusion of an entire claim, collateral estoppel focuses on
preclusion of a specific issue.” C-Spine Orthopedics, 346 Mich App at 204.
Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent,
different cause of action between the same parties when the prior proceeding
culminated in a valid final judgment and the issue was actually and necessarily
determined in that prior proceeding. Collateral estoppel is a flexible rule intended
to relieve parties of multiple litigation, conserve judicial resources, and encourage
reliance on adjudication.
Generally, application of collateral estoppel requires (1) that a question of
fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, (2) that the same parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue, and (3) mutuality of estoppel. [Rental Props Owners Ass’n of Kent Co v
Kent Co Treasurer, 308 Mich App 498, 528-529; 866 NW2d 817 (2014), lv den
498 Mich 853 (2015) (citations omitted, emphasis added).]
The no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., requires an insurer to pay PIP benefits for
“accidental bodily injury arising out of the use of a motor vehicle,” subject to the provisions of the
no-fault act. Grange Ins Co of Mich v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475, 490; 835 NW2d 363 (2013). PIP
benefits are payable for “[a]llowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for
reasonably necessary products, services, and accommodations for an injured person’s care,
recovery, or rehabilitation.” MCL 500.3107(1)(a). “A person injured in an accident arising from
the ownership, operation, or maintenance of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle is immediately
entitled to PIP benefits without the need to prove fault.” Adam v Bell, 311 Mich App 528, 534;
879 NW2d 879 (2015), citing MCL 500.3105(2) and MCL 500.3107.

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By contrast, “an injured person’s claim for [UM] benefits involves compensation for past
and future pain and suffering and other economic and noneconomic losses rather than
compensation for immediate expenses related to the injured person’s care and recovery.” Id.
at 535. To establish the right to UM benefits, “an injured person must—as provided in the
insurance agreement—be able to prove fault: he or she must be able to establish that the uninsured
motorist caused his or her injuries and would be liable in tort for the resulting damages.” Id. Thus,
the burden of proof governing an UM claim is higher than that of a PIP claim.
Defendants contend that collateral estoppel precludes plaintiff’s PIP claim because the jury
in the UM/UIM case found that no accident occurred. Defendants oversimplify the jury’s verdict.
The UM/UIM jury responded “no” to the question: “Did a hit-and-run vehicle whose owner and
operator cannot be identified hit a vehicle occupied by Plaintiff on July 13, 2019?” This verdict
does not address an essential question of plaintiff’s PIP claim; i.e., whether any accident occurred
as a result of plaintiff’s use of his motor vehicle, or whether plaintiff was injured. Instead, the jury
only determined that plaintiff was not hit by a hit-and-run vehicle whose owner and operator could
not be identified—an element that was only required in the UM/UIM case.2 Because a question
of fact essential to plaintiff’s PIP claim was not actually litigated and determined by the judgment
in the UM/UIM case, collateral estoppel does not apply. Accordingly, the arbitrators did not
exceed their authority by acting contrary to controlling law. Cipriano, 289 Mich App at 373.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
2 Defendants rely on Radwan v Ameriprise Ins Co, 327 Mich App 159; 933 NW2d 385 (2018), but
Radwan is distinguishable. The jury in Radwan found no cause of action for the plaintiff’s third-
party suit against the other driver, because the plaintiff was not injured. Id. at 162. This Court
held that the plaintiff’s first-party PIP claim in arbitration was barred by collateral estoppel because
the third-party-claim jury had already determined an essential question to the first-party-PIP claim,
i.e., whether the plaintiff sustained an injury. Id. at 173. Unlike Radwan, the specific question
answered by the jury regarding plaintiff’s UM/UIM claim was not an element plaintiff needed to
prove for his PIP claim.

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