COA 375849 PEOPLE OF MI V HASSAN ABID Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/15/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
September 15, 2026
12:02 PM
v No. 375849
Oakland Circuit Court
HASSAN ABID, LC No. 2024-291296-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: LETICA, P.J., and RICK and GARRETT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Hassan Abid, appeals as of right his jury-trial conviction of third-degree fleeing
and eluding, MCL 257.602a(3)(b).1 He was sentenced to six-months’ probation, two days in jail
with credit for two days served, and ordered to successfully complete a driving course. On appeal,
defendant contends that the trial court erred in giving a flight instruction because his offense
encompasses flight and erred in the improper admission of prior acts evidence involving
defendant’s police contacts. We affirm.
1 MCL 257.602a(1): “A driver of a motor vehicle who is given by hand, voice, emergency light,
or siren a visual or audible signal by a police . . . officer, acting in the lawful performance of his
or her duty, directing the driver to bring his or her motor vehicle to a stop shall not willfully fail to
obey that direction by increasing the speed of the motor vehicle, extinguishing the lights of the
motor vehicle, or otherwise attempting to flee or elude the officer. This subsection does not apply
unless the police . . . officer giving the signal is in uniform and the officer’s vehicle is identified
as an official police or department of natural resources vehicle.”
MCL 257.602a(3): “Except as provided in subsection (4) or (5), an individual who violates
subsection (1) is guilty of third-degree fleeing and eluding, a felony punishable by imprisonment
for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $1,000.00 or both, if 1 or more of the following
circumstances apply: * * * (b) A portion of the violation occurred in an area where the speed limit
is 35 miles an hour or less, whether that speed limit is posted or imposed as a matter of law.”

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On Saturday, August 17, 2024, the Woodward Dream Cruise2 was held. Berkley Public
Safety Sergeant Dennis Geary worked patrol and supervised the day shift. He testified that, to
apprehend someone for a moving violation, an officer could activate the police vehicle’s lights and
sirens. If not in a vehicle, hand motions and verbal commands may be used.
Sergeant Geary was working at the intersection of Twelve Mile Road (Twelve Mile) and
Coolidge Highway (Coolidge) at 9:35 p.m. He was wearing a full police bike uniform. It consisted
of a blue polo shirt with reflective sleeves, a yellow traffic vest with the word “POLICE” in capital
letters across the chest and back, and a baseball hat with a police badge displayed on the top. That
day, shut down procedure began at 9:00 p.m. and consisted of forcing all traffic off Woodward
Avenue (Woodward) to reflect that the event had ended. Traffic was required to travel westbound
on Twelve Mile toward Coolidge with no other option. Sergeant Geary was directing the traffic
through the intersection and stopped traffic for pedestrians walking on the sidewalks. Eastbound
traffic was diverted to southbound Coolidge. Barricades, traffic cones, police tape, marked police
cars with lights activated, and police officers with yellow vests and flashlights were used to
demonstrate that various roads, such as northbound Coolidge was shut down. The majority of
police contacts typically involved helping people navigate a new route home in light of the
barricades. Sergeant Geary stopped multiple people by just gesturing with his hand out.
Sergeant Geary was directing traffic when he heard a motorcycle. He turned to see a single
headlight coming north toward him. The driver, later determined to be defendant, appeared to
exceed the posted speed limit of 30 miles per hour (mph) and had driven around a barricade.
Sergeant Geary walked south toward the motorcycle with his hand and flashlight held out in a stop
or halt manner to get the driver’s attention. Sergeant Geary pointed his flashlight at the driver. He
could see there was a passenger on the back. Both defendant and the passenger were wearing full-
face helmets; the entire head and chin area was covered by the helmet and a face shield. Defendant
looked at the sergeant and “gassed” it into the gas station located at the intersection. Sergeant
Geary yelled out “Hey,” in an attempt to get the driver’s attention. He anticipated that the driver
would stop. Although Sergeant Geary did not yell out, “Stop,” his hand gesture reflected his
request. And earlier, this gesture caused other people to stop and turn around without incident.
But defendant gassed it again and rode up on the sidewalk near the apron or entryway of the police
department located behind the gas station. Sergeant Geary opined that defendant saw him because
immediately after the attempted contact, he drove off. Defendant drove into the gas station and
traveled on the sidewalk to re-enter eastbound Twelve Mile. That evening, defendant was the only
one that did not stop for Sergeant Geary.
Defendant drove past a marked patrol unit stationed east of Coolidge on Twelve Mile. The
officer in the marked unit, Berkley Public Safety Officer Marc Robinson, activated his overhead
lights and siren to engage and stop defendant. In light of training and experience, Sergeant Geary
opined that, from the sound of the motorcycle, defendant was traveling at least double the speed
2 In the record, the Woodward Dream Cruise was described as a classic car parade that drew
thousands of people along Woodward Avenue. Because of the nature of the event, there was a
significant police presence.

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limit on Twelve Mile (posted speed of 35 mph) because the bike traveled a great distance in a short
amount of time. Officer Robinson’s marked unit appeared to follow the motorcycle so Sergeant
Geary continued to direct traffic for pedestrians in the intersection.
Berkley Detective Lieutenant Andrew Hadfield (Det. Hadfield) was the incident
commander for the cruise. Each year, the city closed intersections including Twelve Mile and
Woodward, Eleven Mile and Woodward, and Twelve Mile and Coolidge. He was in the median
at the intersection of Twelve Mile and Woodward when he heard a motorcycle approaching at a
high rate of speed. Over the radio, he heard an officer report that a motorcycle failed to stop for
him. Det. Hadfield could see the police vehicle with its lights activated traveling down Twelve
Mile. The police vehicle was a distance behind the red motorcycle. By stature, defendant appeared
to be a male traveling with a female passenger. The intersection was coned off; drivers could not
turn onto Woodward from Twelve Mile. Any such turn there would have been against the directive
of the police and the traffic control devices in place. Defendant turned and drove behind the
businesses. Det. Hadfield watched to see if defendant came out from behind the businesses. He
motioned for two officers to go to the back because the patrol car appeared to be searching for the
motorcycle.
From Det. Hadfield’s viewpoint, defendant drove at a high rate of speed with a marked,
lights and siren-activated police vehicle traveling behind him. Audio communication indicated
that the motorcycle did not stop for the officer, and defendant made an “evasive maneuver in the
back” of the businesses. Det. Hadfield learned that Officer Robinson stopped defendant behind
the back corner of the businesses.
Officer Robinson was assigned to patrol Twelve Mile during the process of shutting down
the Dream Cruise. He was in a fully marked patrol vehicle. The police car had lights on the roof,
a push bar, and fully visible decals. Officer Robinson was in a full uniform containing “police”
identification. He positioned his vehicle near the police station off Twelve Mile. The vehicle’s
windows were down. He heard the revving of an engine to his left, and an officer said something
to the effect of “stop” and “what are you doing.” Officer Robinson saw defendant drive his red
motorcycle over the sidewalk straight toward his patrol vehicle. He pulled out to block the area
and to prevent defendant from continuing to drive down the middle of the sidewalk. Defendant
drove “pretty fast” around the front of the police vehicle, proceeded onto Twelve Mile, and
accelerated at a high rate of speed as he drove away.
Before defendant drove away, Officer Robinson extended his hand out the window in a
manner to say stop by holding up his hand and displaying his fingers. He said something to the
effect of, “What are you doing?” The stop gesture was designed to end defendant’s driving on the
sidewalk. Officer Robinson activated his lights when defendant was in front of the police car, but
defendant continued out, causing the police pursuit on Twelve Mile by Officer Robinson. He
concluded that defendant ignored his instructions. Defendant turned onto Twelve Mile and
accelerated at a high rate of speed, traveling eastbound toward Woodward. Officer Robinson’s
vehicle lights were already activated. He pulled onto Twelve Mile, turned on his siren, and radioed
information about defendant’s motorcycle and its direction. At the end of his radio transmission,
Officer Robinson learned that defendant had already arrived at Twelve Mile and Woodward,
indicating he traveled at a high rate of speed. Initially, Officer Robinson attempted to catch up
with defendant, but stopped this effort after reaching 64 mph, deeming it unsafe. The officer

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estimated that defendant traveled between 70 and 80 mph but the posted speed limit was 35 mph.
He advised dispatch that he was not chasing the motorcycle, but in pursuit. Officer Robinson
believed that, unless defendant went through a set of barricades, he was trapped in the area of
Twelve Mile and Woodward because of the police presence and “funneling” of traffic.
Additionally, he knew the strip mall and parking lot that defendant drove into because of the brake
lights on the motorcycle.
Other officers ran up to Officer Robinson and advised where defendant had traveled, and
he was located behind the Crispelli’s restaurant. Between dash and body camera video, the
interaction was recorded. Defendant and his passenger remained on the running motorcycle.
Officer Robinson got out of his patrol car, ordered them to turn off the motorcycle, put the
kickstand down, and get off. Defendant advised that he had a gun.
The video was played for the jury. It depicted Officer Robinson asking defendant what he
was doing. Instead, defendant accelerated and left the gas station. Officer Robinson activated his
emergency lights. He made the decision not to chase defendant because of safety issues in light
of all the foot traffic, pedestrians, and cars in the area. But he continued to look for defendant.
Officer Robinson’s dash camera footage lasted 40 minutes and was admitted at trial, but the
prosecutor played the first two minutes for the jury. It depicted defendant’s attempt to stop
defendant, his acceleration at a high rate of speed away from the officer, and defendant’s location
on his motorcycle behind businesses.
Officer Robinson noted that defendant’s passenger was tapping on defendant’s shoulder as
he drove away from the officer. Additionally, she turned to look over her right shoulder. Officer
Robinson had expected defendant to stop in light of his hand gesture. But instead, he accelerated
away. On cross-examination, Officer Robinson acknowledged that defendant did not leave his
motorcycle and run away. And defendant advised the officer that he had a gun, and he had a
concealed weapons permit. Although defendant moved for a directed verdict, the request was
denied.
Defendant testified that he was 35-years-old and originally from Pakistan. He moved to
the United States in 2012 to attend college, studying electrical and computer engineering.
Defendant ultimately obtained three bachelor’s and one master’s degree and currently worked as
a design engineer. He received his driver’s license in 2012 and a motorcycle endorsement in 2015.
Defendant rode “crotch rockets” even when he lived in Pakistan. In 2023, he purchased his
motorcycle, a red Ducati V45. The mirrors on his motorcycle were not altered from the
manufacturer and showed the blind spot areas on the left and right and the area behind.
In the evening of August 17, 2024, defendant was traveling on his motorcycle to Mod Pizza
located at Thirteen Mile and Woodward with his passenger, his friend’s girlfriend’s daughter.
Defendant relied on his GPS, but when he came to Woodward, the police were “redirecting the
traffic.” Defendant’s GPS led him to Twelve Mile and Coolidge where there was a “road[]block”
and a gas station was present on the right side. Specifically, he could not travel north because of
“barricades and cones.” The gas station was “the only place to go.” “[T]here was a person who
was showing [defendant] the light to get [him] out of there.” Defendant did not hear anything or
anyone yelling at him to stop and pull over. A person with a flashing light gestured for defendant
to leave. Defendant saw “a cop backing up his car” and thought that he was supposed to travel

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over the sidewalk in front of the car. Because the motorcycle’s exhaust system was located under
his feet, defendant could not have hopped the curb in order to enter the main road; such action
would have destroyed the motorcycle’s underbody.
Ultimately, defendant believed that the officer that backed up his vehicle was the same
officer that arrested defendant. But defendant never heard the officer say anything. There was no
command to stop or hand gesture. Defendant testified that if he saw an officer with a hand out or
a command to stop, he would have stopped right away. And the officer did not activate his
overhead lights on the vehicle. Defendant claimed that when he drove off he did not hear sirens
behind him. Additionally, he could not see blue and red lights in his rearview mirror because of
the presence of a passenger. Defendant was traveling toward the end of Twelve Mile when he was
tapped by his passenger. He stopped in the Crispelli’s restaurant parking lot in order to hear her.
He did not just stop on the road because he “didn’t want to be in danger” in light of the traffic.
Initially, defendant pulled into the back of the Berkley Square Plaza but it was dark there. He
moved to the side where there was more light.
Defendant was stopped on his motorcycle when he was approached by Officer Robinson’s
police car. He had learned from his passenger that a police officer had been traveling behind them.
Defendant just sat on the motorcycle with the engine running because he was “waiting.” Defendant
testified that he would never run from the police if he knew they were pulling him over, answering,
“Absolutely not.” He asserted that no officer directed him to stop or pull over because he would
have stopped. Defendant denied having any warrants, drugs, or drinking.
Defendant was waiting in the parking lot for three to four minutes before he made contact
with Officer Robinson. At trial, defendant was asked, “Have you had prior contact with law
enforcement for traffic stops?” He answered, “Yes, I did.” He stated that he never failed to stop,
but stopped “[e]very single time.” Defendant’s motorcycle did not have aftermarket exhaust
features, but was manufactured as “loud.”
That day, defendant wore a thick motorcycle jacket that extended to his wrists. Defendant
and his passenger were wearing full-face helmets. Such helmets covered the entire face, had a
visor in the front, and muffled one’s hearing.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor inquired about defendant’s testimony on direct
examination by his counsel regarding past police contacts, and he answered that he never gave the
police a hard time. Defendant admitted that he had 17 prior police contacts. He acknowledged
that he owned his motorcycle, it came with a rearview mirror, it was very fast, and he took a seven-
day class to obtain the license endorsement. In the training, defendant was taught to drive with
caution and to look in his mirrors. He acknowledged that more caution should be taken on a
motorcycle because of the escalated risk of danger. Defendant denied the contention that he
disregarded a command to stop and fled the police. Defendant continued to assert that if he had
been aware of the police contact, he would have stopped sooner. Despite defendant’s contention
that he was unaware that the police were attempting to stop him, the jury convicted him as charged.

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II. FLIGHT INSTRUCTION
Defendant first alleges that he was denied a fair trial by the jury instruction on flight, M
Crim JI 4.4. We disagree.
A party must object to the jury instructions before the jury deliberates to preserve an
appellate challenge. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 767; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Head,
323 Mich App 526, 537; 917 NW2d 752 (2018). A contemporaneous or timely objection affords
the trial court the opportunity to correct the error, eliminates the need for further legal proceedings,
and provides the best time to address a defendant’s rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 764-765. “The
failure of the court to instruct on any point of law shall not be ground for setting aside the verdict
of the jury unless such instruction is requested by the accused.” MCL 768.29; see also People v
Marr, 13 Mich App 642, 644; 164 NW2d 678 (1968) (“Additionally [the] defendant on appeal
charges several errors in the charge of the trial court. No objections to the charge were made at
the trial. We will not consider objections to the charge on appeal not made at time of trial except
to prevent a miscarriage of justice.”).
Although defendant contends that this issue is preserved for appeal,3 we disagree because
defense counsel never gave a reason for his objection, only a wish to challenge the instructions on
appeal. After the prosecutor requested the flight instruction, the trial court stated, “And then, there
was evidence regarding potential flight, so I think that’s appropriate to read.” In response, defense
counsel stated, “I suppose, just for the record, I would object to that additional instruction. I – I
would – just for potential appeal purposes, I’d like to preserve the record that I - - I don’t stipulate
to the - - that particular instruction, which was - -”
The trial court asked for the grounds upon which defendant objected:
I mean, based on what? There is evidence the prosecution introduced that
there was flight. I know that you’re disputing that. Obviously, you’re disputing
that your client did anything wrong, but the - - the - - 4.04 [sic] is saying there’s
been some evidence that the defendant tried to run away, tried to hide, ran away, or
hid after the alleged crime he was accused of. This evidence does not prove guilt.
A person may run or hide for innocent reasons such as panic, mistake, or fear, but
they may also run or hide because of consciousness of guilt. You decide whether
the evidence is true, and whether you think that it shows the defendant had a guilty
state of mind.
3 On appeal, defendant acknowledges that trial counsel objected to “preserve the record.” He then
states, “Although he did not expand his argument at length, the objection was based on his position
that the evidence did not support a finding of intentional flight or concealment.” But this argument
is inconsistent with the claims raised on appeal that challenge the interaction and alleged overlap
between the charged offense and the flight instruction and the speculation regarding the jury’s
resolution of intent.

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I think it’s appropriate. The prosecution has introduced evidence. It’s a
standard instruction as well. It’s not a special instruction.
After being told that there was evidence to support the instruction, defendant did not offer the
objection raised on appeal, claiming that evidence of flight was essentially included in the
instruction for third-degree fleeing and eluding and that it allowed the jury to avoid deciding the
intent element. The decision to object at trial without providing an underlying rationale was
insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. Carines, 460 Mich at 764-765.
Unpreserved claims of instructional error are reviewed for plain error affecting a
defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 764; People v Miller, 326 Mich App 719,
725-726; 929 NW2d 821 (2019). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three
requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious,
3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” Carines, 460 Mich at 763. “The third
requirement generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of
the lower court proceedings.” Id. “It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the
burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Even
if a defendant satisfies these three elements, “[r]eversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited
error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously
affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the
defendant’s innocence.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted; second alteration in original).
“A criminal defendant is entitled to have a properly instructed jury consider the evidence
against him.” People v Flores, 346 Mich App 602, 612; 13 NW3d 668 (2023) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). When a defendant claims instructional error, this Court examines the
instructions as a whole not piecemeal to establish error. Id. Somewhat imperfect instruction do
not create error if the issues to be tried are fairly presented and sufficiently protects the defendant’s
rights. Id.
We conclude that defendant failed to demonstrate plain error affecting substantial rights
arising from the presentation of the flight instruction to the jury.
The trial court instructed the jury regarding flight4:
4 M Crim JI 4.4 entitled “Flight, Concealment, Escape or Attempted Escape” provides:
(1) There has been some evidence that the defendant [tried to run away / tried to
hide / ran away / hid] after [the alleged crime / (he / she) was accused of the crime
/ the police arrested (him / her) / the police tried to arrest (him / her)].
(2) This evidence does not prove guilt. A person may run or hide for innocent
reasons, such as panic, mistake, or fear. However, a person may also run or hide
because of a consciousness of guilt.
(3) You must decide whether the evidence is true, and, if true, whether it shows that
the defendant had a guilty state of mind.

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There’s been some evidence that the defendant tried to run away, tried to
hide, ran away or hid after the alleged crime he was accused of. The evidence does
not prove - - this evidence does not prove guilt. A person may run or hide for
innocent reasons such as panic, mistake, or fear. However, a person may run or
hide because of a consciousness of guilt. You must decide whether the evidence is
true, and if true, whether it shows that the defendant had a guilty state of mind.
[Emphasis added.]
The elements of third-degree fleeing and eluding are:
(1) the law enforcement officer must have been in uniform and performing his
lawful duties and his vehicle must have been adequately identified as a law
enforcement vehicle, (2) the defendant must have been driving a motor vehicle,
(3) the officer, with his hand, voice, siren, or emergency lights must have ordered
the defendant to stop, (4) the defendant must have been aware that he had been
ordered to stop, (5) the defendant must have refused to obey the order by trying to
flee from the officer or avoid being caught, which conduct could be evidenced by
speeding up his vehicle or turning off the vehicle’s lights among other things, and
(6) some portion of the violation must have taken place in an area where the speed
limit was thirty-five miles an hour or less, or the defendant’s conduct must have
resulted in an accident or collision, or the defendant must have been previously
convicted of certain prior violations[.] [People v Grayer, 235 Mich App 737, 741;
599 NW2d 527 (1999).]
Although defendant contends that the flight instruction overlapped with the elements of third-
degree fleeing and eluding, he fails to delineate and analyze the elements. Here, Officer Robinson
testified that he was in uniform and driving a marked police vehicle. Defendant approached on a
motorcycle, and Officer Robinson testified that he held his hand out the window to stop defendant
from driving on the sidewalk. Defendant testified that he was unaware that he was ordered to stop
and claimed that he thought Officer Robinson moved to allow defendant to leave. On the contrary,
Officer Robinson opined that defendant was aware of the request that he stop because of the hand
gesture, the activation of the lights, and the speed at which defendant left the scene. Officer
Robinson testified that the speed limit on Twelve Mile was 35 mph in that area. Thus, there was
sufficient evidence admitted at trial to support the elements of third-degree fleeing and eluding.
Mere departure or walking away from the scene of a crime is insufficient to support the
giving of the flight instruction. People v Hall, 174 Mich App 686, 691; 436 NW2d 446 (1989).
But feared apprehension at the time one leaves the scene after committing a crime may provide
evidentiary support for the instruction. See id. When a defendant fled or ran away after the alleged
crime was committed and when the police were approaching, the rational view of the evidence
supports the flight instruction. People v Armstrong, 305 Mich App 230, 240; 851 NW2d 856
(2014).

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We reject defendant’s contention that the flight instruction is subsumed within the
commission of third-degree fleeing and eluding. Defendant admittedly rode his motorcycle on the
sidewalk of a gas station that was blocked off by cones. Officer Robinson testified that he directed
defendant with a hand gesture and then activated the lights on his police vehicle. Despite that
direction, defendant left the scene at a high rate of speed. Officer Robinson opined that defendant
was aware that he was a police officer and commanded him to stop because of the speed at which
defendant left the scene. Defendant claimed that he thought he was being told to leave the area.
The credibility of defendant’s knowledge and his intent presented an issue for the jury to resolve.
See People v Anderson, 322 Mich App 622, 632-633; 912 NW2d 607 (2018) (it is the province of
the jury to resolve issues of credibility and intent).
The flight instruction applies to conduct after the completed crime. Defendant claimed he
was unaware that he was asked to stop at the gas station by a police officer. Yet, defendant then
proceeded to drive off with a police vehicle behind him with activated lights and sirens. Defendant
claimed that he could not see any lights because of his passenger and could not hear because of his
helmet. But he acknowledged that the passenger was tapping his shoulder. Defendant did pull
over, but went to the back parking lot of a business. There was evidence to support the flight
instruction because defendant drove an estimated 70 to 80 mph away from the gas station, contact
was attempted by his passenger but he did not stop, and when he did stop, he did so in the back
area of a business. Defendant’s challenge to the flight instruction in light of the elements of third-
degree fleeing and eluding does not entitle him to appellate relief. Defendant’s actions after the
officer gestured to stop and activated his lights supported the flight instruction. Armstrong, 305
Mich App at 240.
Finally, defendant argues that the third-degree fleeing and eluding charge and the flight
instruction may have caused the jury to abandon its obligation to decide intent. But the jury is
presumed to follow its instructions. People v Mahone, 294 Mich App 208, 217-218; 816 NW2d
436 (2011). There is no indication that the flight instruction caused juror confusion regarding the
elements of third-degree fleeing and eluding. Without any record evidence, it is pure speculation.
Id. Defendant failed to show plain error affecting his substantial rights arising from his failure to
state a legal challenge to the flight instruction.
III. PRIOR ACTS OF POLICE ENCOUNTERS
Next, defendant contends that it was erroneous to admit MRE 404(b) evidence regarding
prior police contacts and there was no notice of an intent to introduce this evidence. Because
defendant opened the door to this testimony, reversal is not warranted. And, in any event, he failed
to show plain error affecting his substantial rights.
“To preserve an evidentiary issue for review, a party opposing the admission of evidence
must object at trial and specify the same ground for objection that it asserts on appeal.” People v
Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 113; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Defendant did not object to the
prosecutor’s questioning of defendant regarding the number of his prior police contacts. This issue
is not preserved for appellate review.
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse
of discretion. People v Edwards, 328 Mich App 29, 34; 935 NW2d 419 (2019). “Unpreserved

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claims of evidentiary error are reviewed for plain error affecting the defendant’s substantial
rights.” People v Brown, 326 Mich App 185, 195; 926 NW2d 879 (2019) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Under the plain-error standard, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) an error
occurred, (2) that the error was clear or obvious, and (3) that the error affected substantial
rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763. If these requirements are satisfied, the appellate court may
exercise its discretion regarding reversal. Reversal is only warranted when the error “resulted in
the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error that seriously affect[ed] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s
innocence.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original).
As an initial matter, we note that defendant’s statement of the issue challenges the
admission of the evidence under MRE 403 and MRE 404(b) and the prosecutor’s failure to provide
the appropriate notice. But defendant was the first party to introduce evidence of his prior contacts
with the police and to elicit that he previously stopped for the police during those incidents. There
is no indication that the prosecutor contemplated admission of such other-acts evidence and that
she would have been required to give notice. Additionally, defendant does not allege in the
statement of questions presented that the prosecutor engaged in error or misconduct by introducing
the number of contacts or that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
prosecutor’s inquiry. But because defendant failed to include prosecutorial misconduct in his
statement of questions presented or any substantive analysis in the text of his brief, any such claim
was abandoned. See MCR 7.212(C)(5); People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 188; 774 NW2d 714
(2009).
Moreover, “a party may not harbor error at trial and then use that error as an appellate
parachute.” People v Szalma, 487 Mich 708, 726; 790 NW2d 662 (2010). That is, a party may
not waive objection to an issue before the trial court and then challenge it as “error” on appeal.
People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214-215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). In the present case, defendant
introduced evidence that he had prior police contacts and, during those interactions, he obeyed
police commands. When the prosecutor questioned defendant regarding the large number of
contacts, defense counsel did not object. Instead, on redirect examination, defense counsel
reinforced that in all of those contacts, defendant always stopped for the police. The questioning
during the trial does not reflect improper admission of MRE 404(b) evidence by the prosecutor.
Instead, it indicates defendant’s introduction of the evidence and a purposeful failure to object to
the prosecutor’s question because it reinforced defendant’s theory of the case: that he routinely
stopped for police-initiated contact but that he did not stop on this occasion because he did not see
a gesture to stop or hear a command.
Indeed, a defendant’s direct examination testimony may open the door for the prosecutor
to further question a defendant on the subject matter. People v Benton, 294 Mich App 191, 201;
817 NW2d 599 (2011). Defendant introduced the evidence of prior contacts to show his
compliance. The prosecutor was entitled to expand on defendant’s testimony. Moreover, at
sentencing, it was revealed that those prior contacts resulted in tickets for reckless driving.
Nonetheless, the prosecutor only questioned defendant about prior contacts and did not seek to
introduce the results of those contacts. This claim of error, as improper admission of MRE 404(b)
evidence, is not supported by the record.

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With regard to other-acts evidence:
MRE 404(b)(1) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
inadmissible to prove a person’s character to show action in conformity
therewith. However, such evidence is admissible for a proper purpose, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or scheme in doing
an act. In determining the admissibility of other-acts evidence, the trial court must
determine (1) whether the evidence is offered for a proper purpose under
MRE 404(b), (2) whether the evidence is relevant under MRE 401 and 402, and
(3) whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by
unfair prejudice under MRE 403. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74-75; 508
NW2d 114 (1993). Also, upon request, the trial court may provide a
limiting instruction. Id. at 75. [People v Roscoe, 303 Mich App 633, 645-646; 846
NW2d 402 (2014).]
Notably, the threshold for relevant evidence is minimal. Id. at 646.
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, it does not appear that the prosecutor sought to admit
other-acts evidence. At trial, the prosecutor did not call police officers that previously stopped
defendant and delineate the nature of their contacts with him. Thus, it is impossible to address
whether prior other-acts evidence would have been admissible because the prior acts were not
presented through police witnesses, any passengers present with defendant at the time of a stop, or
even police reports. Because there was never any discussion about admitting prior contacts, it is
impossible to conclude that the criteria for admission of the evidence was improper. Roscoe, 303
Mich App at 645-646.
Finally, evidence that is responsive to material presented by the defense or to a defense
theory is properly classified as rebuttal evidence. People v Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 399; 547
NW2d 673 (1996). While defendant seemingly indicated that he did not flee and elude because
he had a history of obeying police officers’ orders, the prosecutor theorized that defendant’s
actions were disingenuous. That is, if defendant would be unaware of a police command through
words or acts to stop and to pull over promptly, why did he next drive off at a high rate of speed
and wait behind a restaurant? The prosecutor may have highlighted the large number of police
contacts but did not argue the import of the prior contacts. Only defendant claimed that it was an
issue of significance and it favored him because he acted consistent with his past practice when
being stopped by the police. Defendant has failed to establish any error, let alone, plain error
affecting his substantial rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

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