In re Children of Quincy A.

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2023 ME 49
Docket: Ken-23-42
Argued: July 6, 2023
Decided: August 15, 2023

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

IN RE CHILDREN OF QUINCY A.

JABAR, J.

[¶1] Quincy A. and Sharon C. appeal from a judgment of the District Court

(Augusta, Nale, J.) terminating their parental rights to their children. See

22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2) (2023). On appeal, the father contends

(1) that the court erred when it found by clear and convincing evidence that the

father was unfit as a parent and (2) that the Department failed to meet its

statutory obligations pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4041(1-A)(A) (2023), and both

parents contend that the court erred and abused its discretion when it found

that terminating the parents’ parental rights, rather than establishing a

permanency guardianship, was in the best interests of the children.1 For the

reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

1 The mother does not contest the trial court’s unfitness findings, and competent evidence in the
record supports the court’s findings of the mother’s unfitness. See In re Child of Louise G., 2020 ME
87, ¶ 8, 236 A.3d 445.
2

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] On July 27, 2021, the Department sought, and the District Court

(Augusta, Davis, J.) signed, an order of preliminary protection as to the children

at issue here. The court (Churchill, J.) scheduled a summary preliminary

hearing for August 6, 2021, at which both parents appeared and waived their

right to a hearing.

[¶3] By agreement of the mother and the Department, the court

(Montgomery, J.) issued a jeopardy order that was entered as to the mother on

March 14, 2022. Jeopardy was based on the mother’s misuse of substances

while caring for the children, her continued relationship with the father despite

the father’s history of domestic violence against her, and her lack of recognition

of the serious emotional and physical risk that the father posed to her and the

children. On March 14 and March 15, 2022, the court held a jeopardy hearing

as to the father. After the hearing, the court found jeopardy as to the father due

to his history of domestic violence against the mother. Specifically, the court

noted its concern about the father’s continued denial of his domestic violence

against the mother. The court called the denials “remarkable and

unbelievable,” and further noted that the oldest child had witnessed some of
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these episodes of domestic violence. Thereafter, on August 25, 2022, the court

held a judicial review and permanency planning hearing.

[¶4] On August 29, 2022, the Department petitioned to terminate the

parents’ parental rights as to the children. On October 5, 2022, the Department

filed its first reunification plan as to each parent. Neither plan had been signed

by the parent to whom the plan applied. The court (Nale, J.) held a two-day

hearing on the termination petitions on December 16, 2022, and January 12,

2023. On February 6, 2023, the court issued its judgment terminating the

parental rights of both parents as to both children.

[¶5] The court found the following facts, which are fully supported by

competent evidence in the record, by clear and convincing evidence. See In re

Child of Amber D., 2020 ME 30, ¶ 6, 226 A.3d 1157. The parents are the

biological parents of both children at issue in this case. This case is the most

recent in a series of child protection cases involving the parents within the past

seven years. The oldest child has been in the care and custody of the

Department three separate times in his life.

[¶6] The parents have a history of domestic violence in their relationship

that they have consistently denied. There have been numerous reports of

domestic violence between the parents, including by the oldest child. Although
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the parents ultimately acknowledged during the termination of parental rights

hearing that there was domestic violence in their relationship, the court found

the previous denials “absolutely stunning” considering the extent of the history

of domestic violence between the parents. The parents minimize the domestic

violence and refuse to acknowledge the impact that the domestic violence has

had on their children, with the father outright denying that the children had

ever witnessed domestic violence and saying the domestic violence made no

impact on them. The mother also refuses to acknowledge the impact that the

domestic violence has had on the children, and she has not put the children’s

needs over her own. Similarly, the mother has a limited understanding of the

impact that her substance use disorder has had on her children. For example,

the mother tested positive for illicit substances at least once, but she continued

to deny using any illicit substances when asked about the positive tests.

[¶7] Although the parents have engaged in services, they would require

a long period of time to complete those services and be able to take

responsibility for the children and protect them from jeopardy. The mother

would require at least three to six months to complete her services, if not

longer. It is unclear how long reunification would take for the father because

the Department knows little about whether the father has made any progress.
5

The father failed to provide the Department with updated contact information

and releases for his services in a timely manner, and family team meetings had

to be rescheduled multiple times to ensure the father’s participation. The

Department offered to make referrals to service providers for the father, but he

said that he would self-refer. The trial court found that reunification for both

parents could take substantial amounts of time given both parents’ lack of

progress at the time of the termination hearing and their failure to recognize

the impact of their lack of progress in these services on their ability to take

responsibility for the children and protect them from jeopardy.

[¶8] The children struggled early in this case but ultimately have found

stability in a resource placement with their half-sister. The older child has

spent one-third of his life in foster care and the younger child has spent one-half

of her life in foster care, and they require permanency. In less than a year, the

Department had to move the children multiple times due to the oldest child’s

behavioral problems stemming from the domestic violence that the child

witnessed between the parents. In January 2022, the Department placed the

children with their maternal half-sister. Their needs are being addressed in this

placement, and their maternal half-sister has been a strong advocate for the

children. However, the trial court found that the children require permanency
6

immediately. The oldest child has reported a fear of being “swept away” to yet

another placement at some point in time, and both children have been affected

by the domestic violence between their parents.

[¶9] The court found that both parents were unfit because they (1) were

unwilling or unable to protect the children from jeopardy and these

circumstances were unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to

meet the children’s needs, (2) were unwilling or unable to take responsibility

for the children within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the

children’s needs, and (3) failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and

reunify with the children; and that terminating both parents’ parental rights

was in the best interests of the children. The court further found that the

Department’s proposed permanency plan of adoption was in the best interests

of the children. Both parents timely appealed. See 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2023);

M.R. App. P. 2B(c).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

[¶10] “We review the court’s findings of fact for clear error and the

court’s ultimate determination that termination of the parental rights is in the
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child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.” In re Children of Jason C., 2020

ME 86, ¶ 7, 236 A.3d 438 (quotation marks omitted).

B. Parental Unfitness

[¶11] On appeal, the father contends that the court erred when it found

by clear and convincing evidence that the father was unfit as a parent and that

the Department failed to meet its statutory obligations pursuant to 22 M.R.S.

§ 4041(1-A)(A).

[¶12] We will set aside a finding of parental unfitness “only if there is no

competent evidence in the record to support it, if the fact-finder clearly

misapprehends the meaning of the evidence, or if the finding is so contrary to

the credible evidence that it does not represent the truth and right of the case.”

In re Child of Katherine C., 2019 ME 146, ¶ 2, 217 A.3d 68 (quotation marks

omitted).

[¶13] To find parental unfitness, a court must find by clear and

convincing evidence one of four statutory grounds. In re Child of Olivia F., 2019

ME 149, ¶ 6, 217 A.3d 1106; see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(iv). “Where

the court finds multiple bases for unfitness, we will affirm if any one of the

alternative bases is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re K.M.,

2015 ME 79, ¶ 9, 118 A.3d 812 (quotation marks omitted). In evaluating
8

parental unfitness, “the court must examine from the child’s perspective—not

the parent’s—the time within which the parent can take responsibility for a

child and protect that child from jeopardy.” In re Child of Walter C., 2019 ME

121, ¶ 7, 213 A.3d 113 (quotations marks omitted).

[¶14] Pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4041, “the Department is obligated, with

the participation of the parent, to develop a rehabilitation and reunification

plan that sets out, inter alia, the reasons the child was removed from the home,

the changes the parent must implement to eliminate jeopardy to the child, and

the services the Department will provide that must be completed before the

child may be returned to the parent’s custody.” In re Child of Rebecca J., 2019

ME 119, ¶ 6, 213 A.3d 108. “The rehabilitation and reunification plan is the

roadmap by which the Department and a parent are expected to cooperatively

seek to rehabilitate the conditions that resulted in jeopardy to the child.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted).

[¶15] Looking first to the Department’s efforts, although the Department

did file a rehabilitation and reunification plan as to the father, we note that this

plan was unsigned by the father and was filed after the Department had filed its

petition to terminate the father’s parental rights.2 We are concerned with the

2Additionally, in its judicial review order, dated August 25, 2022, the court (Montgomery, J.)
ordered the Department to file a reunification plan as to the father, with a copy provided to the
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Department’s filing a petition to terminate a parent’s parental rights prior to

filing the plan that is intended to help the parent understand what that parent

must do to alleviate jeopardy and maintain parental rights. See In re Thomas D.,

2004 ME 104, ¶ 26, 854 A.2d 195 (“If the Department files a petition for

termination of parental rights, the plan establishes benchmarks by which to

assess whether a parent has successfully ameliorated the problems that led to

the initial finding of jeopardy.”). The reunification plan also protects the rights

of parents by providing notice of how the parent can achieve reunification

within a timeframe that will reasonably meet the child’s needs. Id. Absent

those circumstances where the Department does not have the obligation to

reunify, the Department and the parent share the obligation to pursue

reunification, and the reunification and rehabilitation plan is the centerpiece of

the Department’s obligation. See id. ¶¶ 23, 26 (“Unless the Department has

been excused from reunification efforts, the rehabilitation and reunification

parties, no less than fourteen days after the entry of the jeopardy order. Although the record contains
evidence that the Department did go through the plan with the father, we note that the docket reflects
that the plan was not filed until October 5, much later than fourteen days after the judicial review
hearing. We also note that the trial court did not have the benefit of the reunification plan at the
judicial review and permanency planning hearing, which would, of course, have aided the trial court
in reviewing the Department’s efforts and the parents’ efforts in reunification. See In re Thomas D.,
2004 ME 104, ¶ 26, 854 A.2d 195.
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plan is the centerpiece of child protective proceedings following a jeopardy

determination.”).

[¶16] However, as we have previously articulated, if a parent has notice

of the issues that must be addressed to alleviate jeopardy, and the trial court’s

finding of unfitness is not solely supported by the parent’s failure to engage in

good faith in rehabilitation and reunification efforts, then we will not vacate a

trial court’s unfitness finding. In re Child of Rebecca J., 2019 ME 119, ¶¶ 7-11,

213 A.3d 108. In In re Child of Rebecca J., the Department failed to file a

reunification and rehabilitation plan, but we affirmed the termination of

parental rights by the trial court because the mother was aware of what the

Department required, and her unfitness was based on her inability to protect

the child from jeopardy and take responsibility for the child. Id.

[¶17] Here, the trial court found that the father was unfit on grounds

besides his failure to engage in good faith reunification with his children, and

competent evidence in the record reflects that the father had notice of the

issues that he needed to address to alleviate jeopardy. The trial court found

that the father was unfit because the father (1) was unwilling or unable to

protect the children from jeopardy and these circumstances were unlikely to

change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs,
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(2) was unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children within a time

which is reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs, and (3) failed to

make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the children, meaning

that the unfitness finding was based on more than only the father’s failure to

make good faith efforts to comply with a reunification plan that he did not sign

and that the Department filed after it filed its petition to terminate the father’s

parental rights. Competent evidence in the record reflects that the father knew

what the Department expected of him, and during oral argument, the father’s

counsel confirmed multiple times that the father knew what the Department

expected of him. The Department caseworkers testified that they told the

father that he needed to engage in mental health treatment, and the father

himself testified that he tried to seek mental health treatment and complete

parenting classes and a certified batterer’s intervention program to comply

with the Department’s expectations. Although the trial court did not make an

explicit finding that the father knew what the Department expected of him, the

father’s counsel did not move for further findings of fact pursuant to Maine Rule

of Civil Procedure 52, and therefore “we assume that the court implicitly made

all findings consistent with the evidence that are necessary to support the

judgment.” Francoeur v. Berube, 2023 ME 27, ¶ 11, 293 A.3d 418. Therefore,
12

competent evidence in the record reflects that the father knew what the

Department expected of him to alleviate jeopardy as to his children.

[¶18] Further, there is sufficient competent evidence in the record to

support the trial court’s findings of unfitness. The court found that the father

failed to recognize the impact that domestic violence had on the children and

that he had been unable to make sufficient progress towards alleviating

jeopardy and taking responsibility for the children in a timeframe reasonably

calculated to meet the children’s needs. See In re Children of Corey W., 2019 ME

4, ¶¶ 7, 20, 199 A.3d 683 (affirming termination of the mother’s parental rights

when she made no progress toward understanding her children’s needs, she

showed no insights into how her parenting deficiencies impacted her children,

and the children needed certainty immediately); In re Hope H., 2017 ME 198,

¶ 10, 170 A.3d 813 (“Marginal progress toward reunification and a simple

desire to remain parents is not enough to ameliorate jeopardy and meet the

children’s needs.”).

[¶19] Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it

found that both parents were unfit.
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C. Best Interests of the Children

[¶20] Both parents contend that the court abused its discretion when it

found that terminating the parents’ parental rights, rather than establishing a

permanency guardianship, was in the best interests of the children.

[¶21] “[A] court must consider many factors” in making its best interest

determination, and that decision “is not limited to whether or not there is

affirmative evidence that contact with an absent parent will be harmful to the

child;” rather, “[t]he constellation of relevant circumstances will be different in

each case.” Adoption by Jessica M., 2020 ME 118, ¶¶ 21, 23, 239 A.3d 633

(alteration and quotation marks omitted). “Permanency in a particular case

must be fashioned from the actual circumstances and needs of the children

before the court.” Id. ¶ 21 (quotation marks omitted). After each permanency

hearing, the trial court must adopt a permanency plan for a child that contains

determinations on permanency options for the child. 22 M.R.S. § 4038-B(3),

(4)(A) (2023).3

[¶22] The Legislature has provided five different permanency options,

including adoption and permanency guardianship. Id. § 4038-B(4)(A)(1)-(5).

3 Title 22 M.R.S. § 4038-B(4)(A) (2023) provides the following permanency options: (1) returning

the child to the parent; (2) adoption; (3) a permanency guardianship; (4) placing the child with a fit
and willing relative; and (5) placing the child in another planned permanent living arrangement.
14

“[A] permanency guardianship may be ordered to establish safe, long-term care

for a child, but it is not appropriate when the child needs the certainty and

stability of adoption and the parties otherwise need clarity in their respective

roles.” In re Child of Dawn B., 2019 ME 93, ¶ 11, 210 A.3d 169 (alteration and

quotation marks omitted). Unlike adoption, a permanency guardianship allows

for a court to order that a parent have reasonable contact with the child where

it is in the best interests of the child. 22 M.R.S § 4038-C(3) (2023). If a trial

court finds that a child needs permanency, then the trial court should not

automatically conclude that terminating the parents’ parental rights and

adoption is the best way to effectuate permanency. The Legislature has

determined that both adoption and permanency guardianships are equally

available to further the goal of permanency for children, see 22 M.R.S

§ 4038-B(4)(A)(2), (3), and courts should consider the particularities of what

kind of permanency and stability a child needs before determining whether

adoption, rather than one of the other equally available options, is the best

course. A finding that a child needs permanency cannot, without more, be

enough to conclude that termination is in the best interest of the child because

this would never allow a court to conclude that any other permanency option,

including a permanency guardianship, would be in the best interest of the child.
15

[¶23] In In re Emma C., 2018 ME 7, ¶ 4, 177 A.3d 628, we discussed the

option of a permanency guardianship instead of a termination and adoption.

We affirmed the trial court’s decision to terminate a parent’s parental rights,

concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in finding that

adoption, rather than permanency guardianship, was in the best interest of the

child “because, as the GAL testified, the child is at an age where stability and

permanency within a family unit that has demonstrated its commitment to her

is of the utmost importance.” Id. Although the child’s need for permanency

factored into the trial court’s determination that terminating the father’s

parental rights was in the best interest of the child, the court also considered

the particularities of that child, such the child’s age and her circumstances. Id.

Given the child’s need for permanency, we discussed two of the Legislature’s

permanency options and affirmed the trial court’s determination that adoption,

rather than a permanency guardianship, would be in the best interest of that

particular child. Id.

[¶24] In sum, to ensure that terminating a parent’s parental rights is in

the best interest of the child, there must be some reason besides a general need

for permanency that adoption is the best permanency option for that child. The

risk of a generalized finding that permanency always requires adoption, and
16

therefore termination of a parent’s parental rights, is that a court might

terminate a parent’s parental rights when it is not in the best interest of a child

and another, better permanency option exists. See Adoption by Jessica M., 2020

ME 118, ¶ 21, 239 A.3d 633 (“Permanency in a particular case must be

fashioned from the actual circumstances and needs of the children before the

court.” (alteration and quotation marks omitted)).

[¶25] This case presents such a risk. Here, the trial court concluded that

the children needed permanency and that adoption would provide the children

with that permanency without discussing why adoption, rather than a

permanency guardianship, was in the best interests of these children. The trial

court’s determination that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in

the best interests of the children contradicted some of the trial court’s findings,

such as that the court hoped that the mother would not be shut out of the

children’s lives, that the children love their parents, and that “[o]ne thing the

court cannot do is say [the mother] is not the mother. She will always be the

mother, whatever the adoptive parent does now . . . .” The trial court’s findings

seem to suggest that a permanency guardianship, rather than adoption, could

have been in the children’s best interests because it could allow the mother to

stay involved with the children. See 22 M.R.S § 4038-C(3).
17

[¶26] However, in the absence of a Rule 52 motion for further findings,

wherein the court could have been asked to discuss the reason for determining

that adoption, rather than a permanency guardianship, was in the children’s

best interests, “we assume that the court implicitly made all findings consistent

with the evidence that are necessary to support the judgment,” Francoeur, 2023

ME 27, ¶ 11, 293 A.3d 418, and we assume that the trial court considered both

options and determined that terminating the parents’ parental rights was in the

best interests of the children. See In re Child of Danielle F., 2019 ME 65, ¶ 7, 207

A.3d 1193 (rejecting the mother’s argument that the trial court should have

ordered a permanency guardianship because “the court found that the child

needs permanency now, not years down the road”); In re Child of Nicole M.,

2018 ME 75, ¶ 26 & n.9, 187 A.3d 1 (“In cases where the evidence raised the

prospect of disruptive disputes between a parent and a guardian, we affirmed

decisions of the trial court that a permanency plan of adoption—and not a

permanency guardianship—is in the child’s best interest.”). We conclude that

the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion when it determined that

terminating the parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
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III. CONCLUSION

[¶27] In conclusion, the trial court did not err in its findings of unfitness

regarding the mother and father and did not err or abuse its discretion in

determining that terminating the parents’ parental rights was in the best

interests of the children.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

Henry W. Griffin, Esq. (orally), Auburn, for appellant Qunicy A.

Allison Muir Kuhns, Esq. (orally), Law Office of Allison Muir Kuhns, Portland,
for appellant Sharon C.

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen.
(orally), Office of the Attorney General, Bangor, for appellee Department of
Health and Human Services

Augusta District Court docket number PC-2021-38
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY