Thomason, Dennis C. v. State

*This is a per curiam opinion. Under Rule 1-104, the opinion is not precedent within the
rule of stare decisis, nor may it be cited as persuasive authority.
Circuit Court for Washington County
Case No.: C-21-CR-24-000283
UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 1244
September Term, 2025
______________________________________
DENNIS C. THOMASON
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Graeff,
Ripken,
Eyler, Deborah S.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
PER CURIAM
______________________________________
Filed: October 16, 2026

‒Unreported Opinion‒
A jury in the Circuit Court for Washington County convicted appellant Dennis C.
Thomason of three counts of violating a protective order. The court then imposed three
consecutive 90-day sentences, all suspended, with three years of probation. As a condition
of 	his 	probation, 	the 	court 	prohibited 	Thomason 	from 	having 	any 	“romantic
relationship/relations with [the] opposite sex[.]” Thomason later moved to correct an illegal
sentence, asking the court to strike the condition. After a hearing, the court denied his
motion. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Thomason argues that the court erred in denying his motion to correct
an illegal sentence because the probation condition bore no reasonable relationship to his
convictions for violating a protective order. The State agrees. So do we. 1
Under Maryland Rule 4-345(a), a “court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time.” A sentence is “inherently illegal” for purposes of Rule 4-345(a) where there was no
conviction warranting any sentence, Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 466 (2007); where the
sentence imposed was not a permitted one, id.; or where the sentence imposed exceeded
the sentence agreed upon as part of a binding plea agreement, Matthews v. State, 424 Md.
503, 514 (2012). We review de novo whether a sentence is an illegal sentence. State v.
Crawley, 455 Md. 52, 66 (2017).
“Probation is a creature of statute, and as such, the terms of probation are derived
from statutory authority.” Bailey v. State, 355 Md. 287, 293 (1999). A circuit court has
1 	Because 	we agree 	that the condition 	is 	unreasonable, we do 	not address
Thomason’s alternative, constitutional arguments. See Sumpter v. Sumpter, 427 Md. 668,
683 n.10 (2012).

‒Unreported Opinion‒
2
“broad authority to formulate conditions of probation.” Id. at 294. Even so, each condition
must be, among other things, “reasonable and have a rational connection to the offense.”
Allen v. State, 449 Md. 98, 111 (2016) (cleaned up). “[A] condition cannot stand . . . if it is
not related to the crime of which [the] defendant has been convicted and if it has no
reasonable relation to future criminality.” Henson v. State, 212 Md. App. 314, 327–28
(2013) (cleaned up).
The probation condition here fails this test. To begin with, the condition did not
protect—and was not designed to protect—the victim of the crimes for which Thomason
was convicted; she was the subject of a separate no-contact provision. Indeed, according
to the circuit court, the condition was designed to protect Thomason from “that segment of
the population [with] whom he has expressed dissatisfaction, disrespect and failure.”
Similarly, the condition has no reasonable relation to future criminality. Despite the court’s
reasoning, neither Thomason’s criminal history nor the fact that he had “been married and
divorced three times” and “uses demeaning language and cites [his previous partners’]
faults for the relationship failures” suggest that he might: enter into a new relationship,
become the subject of a new protective order, and then violate that protective order.
At bottom, the record failed to demonstrate that Thomason—any more than any
other person convicted of a crime—had taken advantage of his circumstances “to commit
the [crimes] for which he was convicted and sentenced” such that there would be “a
deterrent value in preventing [him] from occupying such a position with respect” to any
and all future romantic partners. Allen, 449 Md. at 120. The condition simply was “not
related to the crime of which [Thomason] ha[d] been convicted and . . . it ha[d] no

‒Unreported Opinion‒
3
reasonable relation to future criminality.” Henson, 212 Md. App. at 327–28 (cleaned up).
It was, therefore, unreasonable and, as such, illegal. Thus, the circuit court erred in denying
Thomason’s motion to correct an illegal sentence, and we must reverse its judgment. 2
JUDGMENT 	OF 	THE 	CIRCUIT
COURT 	FOR 	WASHINGTON
COUNTY 	REVERSED. 	CASE
REMANDED 	FOR 	FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS 	CONSISTENT
WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO
BE 	PAID 	BY 	WASHINGTON
COUNTY.
2 Also pending before the Court is Thomason’s “Motion to Expedite Issuance of
Opinion and Mandate.” We shall deny as moot the request to expedite issuance of this
Opinion but grant the request to expedite the mandate. Upon entry of this Opinion, the
Clerk shall issue the mandate forthwith.