Cogle, Rachel v. PG County

*This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule
of stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms to Rule
1-104(a)(2)(B).
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No. C-16-CV-24-003968
UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 1361
September Term, 2025
______________________________________
RACHEL COGLE
v.
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY,
MARYLAND, ET AL.
______________________________________
Shaw,
Ripken,
Tang.
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Ripken, J.
______________________________________
Filed: October 14, 2026

— Unreported Opinion —
In August of 2024, appellant Rachel Cogle (“Cogle”) filed a complaint in the Circuit
Court 	for 	Prince 	George’s 	County, 	Maryland, 	against 	appellees 	James 	Thornley
(“Thornley”) and the Prince George’s County, Maryland (“the County”) (collectively,
“Appellees”). The complaint contained seven counts, including gross negligence and
ordinary negligence. The matter proceeded to a four-day trial commencing in July of 2025.
At the close of Cogle’s case, counsel for Thornley moved to dismiss both the gross
negligence count and the negligence count. The court granted the request, dismissing both
claims as a matter of law.
The remaining counts were either dismissed or sent to the jury, which reached a
verdict in favor of the Appellees. 1 The court subsequently entered judgment. Cogle noted
this timely appeal and presents the following issues for our review: 2
I. 	Whether the circuit court erred in dismissing the negligence claim as a
matter of law.
1 Cogle voluntarily dismissed the negligent hiring count and the negligent retention count;
the court dismissed the negligent training and supervision count and the intentional
infliction of emotional distress count; and the excessive force count brought under Articles
24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights was submitted to the jury, which rendered
a verdict in favor of the Appellees.
2 Rephrased from:
I. 	Did the trial court err in granting judgment on Ms. Cogle’s negligence claim
under the theory that there was only evidence of intentional conduct when
Appellee Thornley’s own defense to liability is that he acted unintentionally
when he pointed his gun at Ms. Cogle?
II. 	Did the trial court err in granting judgment on Ms. Cogle’s gross negligence
claim under the theory that Ms. Cogle cannot sustain a gross negligence
claim if the negligence claim is dismissed?

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II. 	Whether the circuit court erred in dismissing the gross negligence claim
as a matter of law.
For the following reasons, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Underlying Facts 3
On the morning of August 26, 2021, before 7:30 a.m., Cogle and Thornley drove in
their respective vehicles on Route 50 in Anne Arundel County, both planning to take Exit
22 onto Aris T. Allen Boulevard, which leads to Riva Road. Cogle was commuting to work,
while Thornley, a patrol officer for Prince George’s County Police Department, was
commuting home early from his overnight shift with the department, which was scheduled
to end at 7:30 a.m. in the morning in question. Thornley, having already deposited his
county cruiser in Prince George’s County, was driving his personal vehicle, an F-150 truck.
While he remained in his police uniform on the drive home, and though his shift was not
over at the time of the incident, he was no longer in Prince George’s County.
Cogle and Thornley both testified at trial, although each gave a different rendition
of how the incident unraveled. Cogle testified that while on Route 50, approximately one
mile prior to the exit, she observed Thornley’s truck “coming up behind [her] very, very
fast.” Cogle indicated that she moved into the other lane and that Thornley’s truck pulled
up next to her so closely that “his mirror [was] about to touch [hers].” Cogle testified that
in the process of moving away from the truck, she “pulled over to the right a little bit.”
According to Cogle, Thornley also pulled to the right. Cogle then slammed on her brakes,
3 The following facts were adduced from testimony at trial.

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and Thornley did the same. Cogle sped up, and Thornley again matched her. Cogle asserted
that when Thornley drove his truck again beside her car, she noticed his blue police uniform
through his open driver’s side window. Cogle asserted that Thornley yelled something at
her; however, Cogle could not determine Thornley’s words. According to Cogle, she
“blacked out” from the time she realized Thornley was a police officer until they reached
the red light at the Chinquapin Round Road and Forest Drive intersection.
Thornley testified at trial that he never interacted with Cogle on Route 50. Despite
video evidence depicting him telling the Anne Arundel County police that Cogle was
“literally . . . flying down [Route] 50,” at trial, Thornley testified that he first saw Cogle’s
vehicle while he was exiting Route 50 when she passed him on the right shoulder. Thornley
further testified that prior to their interaction at the red light, Cogle was not driving
aggressively and that she had not yelled at him or made any hand gestures towards him.
Upon reaching the red light, Cogle stopped her vehicle at the front of the farthest
left, non-turning lane. Thornley stopped his vehicle in the middle lane behind another car.
His driver’s side window was down. Cogle then exited her vehicle, walked to the back of
her vehicle, and yelled at Thornley, asking him why he “was trying to kill [her] and run
[her] off of the road.” Cogle testified that she did not leave the rear of her vehicle while
she questioned Thornley. She claimed that she intended to hold the police officer
accountable. Thornley testified that at the time, he did not know why Cogle was yelling
at him.
Cogle testified that once she saw that Thornley’s truck did not have a front license
plate, she stepped forward, at which point Thornley, who was still seated in his truck,

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“pulled a gun on [her],” and rested it up against the steering wheel. Cogle asserted that at
that moment, Thornley “told [her] to get [her] fat a** back in the car or he will shoot [her],”
while pointing the firearm “at her face, not at a downward angle.” Cogle then walked past
the side of Thornley’s truck to the back to obtain his license plate number. Conversely,
Thornley testified that he first drew his gun when Cogle started approaching his truck.
Cogle testified that she maintained ten to twenty feet of distance while walking around to
the back of Thornley’s truck; however, Thornley testified that Cogle came within two to
four feet. The jury was provided with video of the interaction from which they could make
the appropriate factual determinations.
Thornley acknowledged at trial that it was not illegal for Cogle to approach him.
However, Thornley claimed that he “was in fear of [his] life” as Cogle approached his
vehicle. As Cogle approached Thornley’s truck, Thornley threw a cigarette out of his truck
window. According to Thornley, it was at this point that he then unholstered his firearm as
Cogle came within seven to eight feet of him. Thornley testified that he made the decision
to unholster his firearm based on Cogle’s anger, rage, yelling, and that he could not see
Cogle’s right hand.
According to Thornley, the barrel of his firearm pointed at Cogle while he was in
the process of pulling his firearm to his chest, explaining that “in a fluid[] motion coming
off of [his] hip, up to [his] chest, and then canted downward, [his] barrel would have been
facing [his] driver’s side window,” and then “canted towards [his] floorboard.” Thornley’s
firearm, which did not have an external safety, had a round of ammunition in its chamber
at this time.

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5
Thornley testified that Cogle saw his firearm and asked him if he was going to shoot
her, to which he replied that he did not want to do so. He testified that at that point he told
Cogle to “get [her] fat a** back in the vehicle,” acknowledging that he gave Cogle loud
verbal commands throughout the interaction at the traffic light. Thornley testified that he
re-holstered his firearm once he saw that Cogle was not holding anything in her hands.
After checking Thornley’s license plate on the rear of his truck, Cogle walked back
to her car, and Thornley began to drive through the intersection after the vehicle in front of
him was driven away. Cogle then got back into her car, called 911, and followed Thornley
for approximately three miles while she was on the phone with the 911 operator. 4
Procedural History
Cogle filed suit against the Appellees in August of 2024 in the Circuit Court for
Prince George’s County. The complaint contained the following seven counts: 1) a
violation of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights due to excessive
force, against both Appellees; 2) negligent hiring against the County; 3) negligent training
and supervision against the County; 4) negligent retention against the County; 5)
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Thornley; 6) gross negligence against
both Appellees; and 7) general negligence against both Appellees. At the conclusion of
discovery, the County filed dispositive motions, which were denied by the circuit court.
4 As a result of Cogle’s call with the 911 operator, later the same day Anne Arundel County
police officers interviewed both Cogle and Thornley. During his interview with the police,
Thornley made statements that were not accurate about the interaction. Prior to this civil
case, Thornley was charged with second-degree assault and adjudicated guilty via an Alford
plea in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, regarding his actions here. See Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County case number C-02-CR-21-001761.

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6
Thornley moved for partial summary judgment as to the intentional infliction of emotional
distress and gross negligence counts; however, the court did not rule on Thornley’s motion
prior to trial. 5
Trial Proceedings
A four-day jury trial commenced in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
in July of 2025. Both Cogle and Thornley testified in Cogle’s case-in-chief. At the close of
Cogle’s case, Thornley’s counsel moved to dismiss several counts, including the gross
negligence and ordinary negligence counts, which are the subject of this appeal.
In reference to gross negligence, Thornley’s counsel claimed that it “is not an
independent tort in Maryland.” Thornley’s counsel argued that
[g]ross negligence was used before Zenobia in 1992[6] to equate punitive
damages. There’s no Maryland pattern jury instruction on gross negligence.
Gross negligence is still relevant for purposes of immunity or exculpatory
contracts. Immunity doesn’t apply.
Cogle’s counsel argued that the Supreme Court of Maryland held in Cooper v. Rodriguez7
that an officer’s grossly negligent conduct could qualify as an independent tort. According
to Cogle, Thornley’s conduct met the standard of gross negligence that was identified and
defined in Cooper as “so indifferent to her rights as if they do not exist[.]”
5 Thornley’s counsel incorporated the pending motion in his requests for dismissal at trial.
6 Counsel appears to have been referencing Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md.
420 (1992).
7 443 Md. 680 (2015).

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Counsel for the County argued that Stracke v. Estate of Butler, 465 Md. 407 (2019)
establishes that gross negligence is a question of law. Cogle’s counsel argued that the
current matter differs from Stracke in that the “intentional actions [by Thornley] are far
worse.” The court then stated:
Now, in my mind, as far as this particular action of gross negligence, it’s an
issue of quality versus quantity. And what I mean by that is this. The quality
of the nature of the alleged offenses in this particular matter that lead
[Cogle’s] counsel to indicate that it is gross negligence is this -- what your
client claims to be this wild car chase. And then once the car chase ends,
[Cogle] 	approach[es] 	the 	vehicle 	and 	[Thornley] . . . brandishing 	a
handgun and threatening her for what all the parties seem to be a very brief
moment --
Here’s where I’m troubled by the count of gross negligence. The count of
gross negligence, certainly without this alleged car chase that went on, what
we have is . . . [Cogle] pulling up to the light, getting out of her car,
approaching a vehicle. And that person in that vehicle pulls a handgun, points
it at her for a brief moment, and then essentially this interaction as far as
gross negligence would be over. That’s not gross negligence. I don’t believe
anyone could reasonably find that that would be gross negligence.
The issue is, is what occurs prior to those circumstances. And [Cogle] is
claiming that a car chase is intended prior to those circumstances. [Thornley]
says no car chase ever existed. The only thing he saw was her pulling on a
curb. So that’s where I’m trying to make the determination versus whether
the quality of this is different. And if the quality of it is different, it’s not gross
negligence. But if the quantity of it is different, then it’s a question for the
jury. I know the way that I would rule if I was a juror, but that’s not the
standard.
I’m going to reserve on this because I don’t like to make snap judgments
regarding this particular issue.
(Emphasis added).
Counsel for Thornley then moved to dismiss the ordinary negligence count, arguing
that Cogle did not put forth any evidence of negligence since all the conduct complained

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of constituted “an intentional act.” Cogle responded that because Thornley had claimed
that he did not intentionally point the gun at Cogle, there remained a question for the jury
to decide whether the conduct was unintentional. Cogle further argued that the jury could
find negligence if it believed either party’s version of events regarding the driving or if it
believed Thornley’s contention that he did not intend to point the firearm at her because
“all the other elements . . . of negligence are met[,]” based on the testimony presented.
Counsel for the County responded that if Thornley’s actions were believed to be
intentional, “counsel could have charged in his complaint assault. He elected not to. This
is not a negligence case.”
After further argument by Cogle’s counsel concerning the evidence that could
support a finding that Thornley’s conduct was unintentional and the manner in which the
jury could determine the elements of negligence were met, the court ruled, stating
the following:
The facts that were cited in the testimony in this matter, the [c]ourt does not
believe that those facts support negligence in any way, shape or form. [This]
[c]ourt finds these actions, if anything, to be intentional acts. The [c]ourt will
strike the negligence counts. The [c]ourt notes any objection.
The court granted the motion for judgment as a matter of law, dismissing both the
gross negligence claim and the ordinary negligence claim. When Cogle’s counsel requested
clarification from the court regarding its ruling as to gross negligence, the court declared,
“in order for there to be gross negligence, there has to be negligence. . . . Since there’s no
negligence, there’s no gross negligence.” (Emphasis added). After another brief discussion

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regarding the definition of gross negligence, the court took a recess. Upon return, the court
reiterated its ruling regarding the dismissal of the gross negligence count.
The following morning, Cogle’s counsel made a motion for the court to reconsider
its decision as to the gross negligence count. Cogle argued that, given the court’s legal
determination that there was no negligence because only intentional acts were presented,
there was sufficient evidence of gross negligence, as gross negligence is premised on intent.
A further exchange ensued regarding the definition of gross negligence; however,
following counsel for Thornley’s reiteration that gross negligence is no longer an
independent tort in Maryland, the court declared that its ruling stood, thereby denying the
request to reconsider.
Cogle voluntarily dismissed the negligent hiring count and the negligent retention
count. The court dismissed the negligent training and supervision count, as well as the
intentional infliction of emotional distress count. The only remaining count—a violation
of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights due to excessive force—was
sent to the jury, which reached a verdict in favor of the Appellees.
Judgment was entered in favor of the Appellees on July 30, 2025. Cogle noted this
timely appeal. Additional facts are included below as relevant.
DISCUSSION
I. 	I N D ISMISSING THE NEGLIGENCE C LAIM AS A M ATTER OF LAW ON THE BASIS
THAT AN INTENTIONAL ACTION CANNOT F ORM THE BASIS OF N EGLIGENCE ,
THE TRIAL C OURT ERRED .
A. Party Contentions
Cogle contends that she presented evidence of negligence at trial sufficient to

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warrant submission to the jury. She claims that the court’s basis for granting judgment—
that intentional acts cannot support a negligence claim—was inconsistent with the law
because intentional acts can sustain a negligence claim, if the outcome was unintended.
Cogle asserts that even if Thornley’s driving or pointing of his firearm was intentional, a
jury could find that Thornley did not intend the consequences that either act produced.
Cogle posits that a question remains as to whether Thornley intended to brandish the
weapon and point it at Cogle, as well as whether pointing the firearm itself breached the
standard of care because no life-threatening situation existed to warrant such force
against Cogle.
On the other hand, Thornley contends that although Cogle presented evidence of the
intentional tort of assault, which she did not plead as a count in this case, she did not
introduce evidence of negligence. Thornley argues that neither Cogle’s assertion that he
intentionally tried to run her off the road nor his own testimony that the reckless driving
did not occur creates a claim for negligence. Moreover, Thornley contends that the
testimony establishes that he intended to use his weapon in a manner that he was trained,
and that he conformed to his training, and thus, did not act negligently. He further argues
that—with respect to whether intentional acts can cause unintended consequences—
Thornley only intended to defend himself in circumstances that Cogle created.
The County contends that the trial court did not misapply the negligence doctrine;
rather, according to the County, the court determined that the evidence presented at trial
did not generate a negligence issue distinct from the use-of-force claims, and therefore,
there was insufficient evidence to warrant submission to the jury. For this reason, the

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County argues that the proposition that intentional conduct may sometimes support
negligence does not resolve the issues here.
B. Standard of Review
“We review, without deference, the trial court’s grant of a motion for judgment in a
civil case.” D.C. v. Singleton, 425 Md. 398, 406 (2012) (citing Thomas v. Panco Mgmt. of
Md., LLC, 423 Md. 387, 393–94 (2011); see Webb v. Giant of Md., LLC, 477 Md. 121, 136
(2021). When the grant of a motion for judgment withdraws a claim from the jury, “we
must assume the truth of all credible evidence and all inferences of fact reasonably
deducible from it tending to sustain the contentions of the party against whom the motion
is granted.” McGarr v. Balt. Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 74 Md. App. 127, 131,
cert. denied, 313 Md. 7 (1988). We must “conduct the same analysis that a trial court should
make when considering the motion for judgment.” Singleton, 425 Md. at 406–07 (citation
omitted); Webb, 477 Md. at 136; Moore v. Myers, 161 Md. App. 349, 362 (2005); Tate v.
Bd. of Educ., Prince George’s Cnty., 155 Md. App. 536, 545 (2004). “If . . . the lower court
decides that the inference [of negligence] is impermissible, an appellate court will review
the court’s decision and decide whether it was legally correct.” Vito v. Sargis & Jones, Ltd.,
108 Md. App. 408, 417 (1996), aff’d sub nom. Cogan Kibler, Inc. v. Vito, 346 Md.
200 (1997).
Where, as here, the trial court’s decision “involves an interpretation and application
of Maryland statutory or case law, the appellate court must determine whether the lower
court’s conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review.” Credible
Behav. Health, Inc. v. Johnson, 466 Md. 380, 388 (2019) (quoting Nesbit v. Gov’t Emps.

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Ins. Co., 382 Md. 65, 72 (2004)) (brackets omitted). We give no deference to the trial
court’s legal analysis. See, e.g., Friendly Fin. Corp. Orbit Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Truck,
Inc., 378 Md. 337, 342–43 (2003).
C. Analysis
In Maryland, a negligence claim requires evidence demonstrating “(1) that the
defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant
breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the loss
or injury proximately resulted from the defendant’s breach of duty.” Moore, 161 Md. App.
at 363 (quoting Horridge v. Saint Mary’s Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 382 Md. 170, 182
(2004)). An individual owes a duty to refrain from certain conduct when a reasonable
person would know that the conduct would create “an unreasonable risk of harm to
another.” McCance v. Lindau, 63 Md. App. 504, 514 (1985). That duty is breached when
the individual’s conduct “falls below the standard of care owed.” Moore, 161 Md. App. at
375. Causation requires that the conduct is both the cause in fact and legal cause of the
plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 376–77 (describing the but-for test for actual causation and the
foreseeability test for legal causation). Actual injury may occur in the form of emotional
or mental damages that result in “clearly apparent and substantial physical manifestations.”
McCance, 63 Md. App. at 513; see also Hunt v. Mercy Medical Center, 121 Md. App. 516,
524, 	531 	(1998) 	(describing 	evidence 	needed 	to 	show 	an 	injury 	capable 	of
objective determination).
Ordinarily, whether an individual’s conduct qualifies as a breach of duty is a
question for the jury. See Keesling v. State, 288 Md. 579, 591 (1980). If there is any meager

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evidence that is legally sufficient to prove negligence, no matter how slight, a negligence
claim should be submitted to the jury, and, accordingly, a motion for judgment should be
denied. McGarr, 74 Md. App. at 131–32 (“Maryland has gone almost as far as any
jurisdiction that we know of in holding that meager evidence of negligence is sufficient to
carry the case to the jury.”) (quoting Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 246 (1965)) (brackets
and further citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court determined that there was no evidence of negligence
because Thornley’s “actions, if anything, [are] intentional acts.” Therefore, we must
examine whether intentional acts may form the basis of a claim of negligence.
Maryland case law supports the notion that an intentional act may, in fact, create a
negligence claim. McCance, 63 Md. App. at 513 (“That an intentional act can give rise to
an action in negligence is beyond question.”). In Ghassemieh v. Schafer, this Court held
that “[w]hile it is true that ‘the absence of intent is essential to the legal conception of
negligence,’ the presence of an intent to do an act does not preclude negligence.” 52 Md.
App. 31, 40 (1982) (quoting Adams v. Carey, 172 Md. 173, 186 (1937)) (internal citation
and ellipsis omitted), cert. denied, 294 Md. 543 (1982). We clarified that intentional acts
can 	constitute 	the 	foundation 	of 	a 	negligence 	claim 	if 	they 	produce 	unintended
consequences. Id. at 42; see also McCance, 63 Md. App. at 514; Walser v. Resthaven
Mem’l Gardens, Inc., 98 Md. App. 371, 393 (1993).
Ghassemieh involved a thirteen-year-old girl who pulled a chair out from under her
teacher, who hurt her back as a result. 52 Md. App. at 32–33. The girl claimed she intended
to make a joke by making the teacher fall, but she did not intend to injure her teacher. Id.

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at 33. This Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the girl because
the teacher neither requested an instruction on negligence nor took a clear position at trial
that she was pursuing a negligence claim. Id. at 43. Nevertheless, we observed that the
intentional act of pulling the chair could have formed a negligence claim because it “had
two possible consequences: the intended one of embarrassment and the unintended one of
injury.” Id. at 42–43.
Likewise, in Moore v. Myers, a boy urged his pit bull to pursue a group of girls
following an argument with them, which prompted one girl to run away into the path of an
oncoming car, where she was subsequently struck. 161 Md. App. at 358, 360. This Court,
in determining that the evidence sufficiently showed that the boy’s conduct met all the
elements of negligence, rejected the contention that, due to his intentional conduct in
facilitating the attack, the boy’s conduct constituted an assault rather than negligence. Id.
at 375–78. The Court ultimately held that because “the jury could have reasonably found
that [the boy’s] intentional act (urging the pit bull to pursue [the girl] and her friends)
produced an unintended consequence ([the girl’s] flight into the path of an on-coming car),
it had a basis upon which to find [the boy] negligent.” Id. at 378.
In another analogous case, a driver, who later claimed to be trying to serve legal
papers, blocked a family’s car in a parking lot and then followed them in a “high speed”
car chase, during which he “frequently” struck the bumper of the family’s car. McCance,
63 Md. App. at 506–07. The trial judge initially held that the family’s negligence count
“alleged the same facts set forth in the assault and battery count[s]” and because they were
intentional acts, the conduct “could not be disguised as negligent acts.” Id. at 513. This

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Court disagreed, observing that even if a tortfeasor intended to perform a particular act, the
act could produce unintended consequences, and while the driver “could have intended
merely to have the [family] accept service of process,” in doing so, “he may have acted in
such a negligent manner as to cause the [negligent] infliction of emotional distress.” Id.
at 514.
Turning to the case sub judice, the trial judge—like the trial judge in McCance, see
id. at 513—granted Thornley’s motion for judgment on the negligence claim on the basis
that “the [c]ourt does not believe that [the facts in evidence] support negligence in any way,
shape, or form. [The] [c]ourt finds these actions, if anything, to be intentional acts.”
In viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Cogle, the nonmoving party, she
testified as to three different intentional acts: 1) Thornley’s driving, which made her feel
as though he “was trying to kill [her] and run [her] off the road”; 2) Thornley’s “pull[ing]
a gun on [her]”; and 3) Thornley’s pointing of his firearm “at [her] face, not at a downward
angle.” See, e.g., id. at 514 (holding that an intentional act that caused unintended
consequences warranted a reversal of summary judgment in favor of the defendant as to a
negligence count). Notably, there is also evidence of an unintentional act, as Thornley
testified on cross examination during Cogle’s case-in-chief that he did not intend to point
the gun at Cogle. See Ghassemieh, 52 Md. App. at 40 (“While it is true that the absence of
intent is essential to the legal conception of negligence, the presence of an intent to do an

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act 	does 	not 	preclude 	negligence.”) 	(internal 	quotation 	marks, 	ellipses, 	and
citations omitted). 8
Further, there was evidence to support a finding that Cogle suffered injury due to
Thornley’s conduct. Cogle testified that she was concerned that Thornley might “retaliate
against” her, that she “would hide in the stockroom if [she] saw somebody that resembled
him and or a car that resembled” Thornley’s car, and that she “still get[s] [wary] around
police officers . . . or when big trucks” are next to her on the road.
Thornley acknowledges Ghassemieh in his brief, agreeing that the intent to do an
act does not preclude negligence, yet he argues that such law does not stand for the
proposition that every case that contains an intentional tort and an unintentional tort based
on the same facts should be submitted to the jury. The County similarly argues that a
separate submission of the negligence claim was not required because the negligence
counts were premised on the same alleged facts as the excessive force claim. However, this
Court has determined that evidence regarding one event may qualify either as an intentional
tort or negligence. See McCance, 63 Md. App. at 513–14 (disagreeing with the trial court’s
assessment that the same facts alleged to constitute assault and battery “could not be
disguised as negligent acts”; stating that “[w]hat the trial court characterizes as a
restatement of a claim for assault, [this Court] perceive[s] to be a claim for the negligent
8 At oral argument, Cogle argued that Thornley’s expert witness, Chief Deputy William
Gleason of the Cheverly Police Department in Cheverly, Maryland, testified regarding the
duty element of negligence. However, Gleason did not testify until after the court dismissed
the negligence count and the gross negligence count; thus, the trial court did not rely on
Mr. Gleason’s testimony in its decision.

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infliction of emotional distress—inartfully worded, but legally sufficient”; and holding that
the actions also supported a negligence claim because the driver may not have intended to
cause the harm inflicted); see also Ghassemieh, 52 Md. App. at 40 (“The concepts of
negligence and battery are not mutually exclusive.”).
Thornley contends in his brief, as reflected in evidence by his testimony at trial, that
his intention during the interaction with Cogle was to deter Cogle. Nevertheless, in viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to Cogle, a jury could find that Cogle’s testimony
demonstrated that the series of Thornley’s actions—from his driving to the brandishing
and pointing of his firearm—caused Cogle harm—a consequence that Thornley seemingly
contends that he did not intend. See, e.g., McCance, 63 Md. App. at 514.
Accordingly, because intentional acts that cause unintended results can form a
foundation for a negligence claim, the trial court erred in granting Thornley’s motion for
judgment on that basis. See id.
II. 	I N D ISMISSING THE GROSS N EGLIGENCE CLAIM AS A M ATTER OF LAW ON THE
BASIS 	THAT 	GROSS 	N EGLIGENCE 	CANNOT 	EXIST 	WITHOUT 	ORDINARY
N EGLIGENCE , THE TRIAL C OURT ERRED .
A. Party Contentions
Cogle contends that she presented sufficient evidence at trial to justify submission
of the claim of gross negligence to the jury. Cogle claims that there are two mental states
to gross negligence—utter indifference of rights and intentional infliction of injury—such
that intentional or unintentional conduct can constitute gross negligence. Cogle further
contends that whether gross negligence exists is a question for the jury, and that a jury
could find sufficient evidence of gross negligence with respect to Thornley’s driving,

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18
intentional drawing of his firearm, and unintentional pointing of his firearm. Finally, Cogle
contends that because this Court and the Supreme Court of Maryland have recognized gross
negligence claims on several occasions since Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420
(1992) and Stracke, 465 Md. 407, it does constitute an independent tort in Maryland.
Thornley contends that the evidence at trial did not amount to gross negligence
because Thornley did not act with wanton and reckless disregard or an utter indifference
toward Cogle. Accordingly, Thornley argues that his lack of deliberateness in his actions
supported the trial court’s decision to grant the motion for judgment as a matter of law.
The County makes no contention as to whether gross negligence can exist
independent of ordinary negligence or whether Cogle produced sufficient evidence of gross
negligence to warrant submission of the claim of gross negligence to the jury. Rather, the
County avers that governmental immunity shields the County from liability as to gross
negligence, as it argues that Thornley acted outside the scope of his employment as a Prince
George’s County police officer. 9
9 On appeal, the County raises the issue of governmental immunity with respect to the
ordinary negligence count and the gross negligence count, referring to both claims
collectively as “the negligence counts.” The County argues that this Court should affirm as
to the County regardless of its ruling on the negligence and gross negligence issues because
Thornley acted outside the scope of employment as a Prince George’s County police
officer, and governmental immunity is a bar to common-law negligence claims. At trial,
the question of whether Thornley was acting within the scope of his employment as a
Prince George’s County police officer was raised by the court—not the County’s counsel.
During the discussion about gross negligence, the court asked whether Cogle’s counsel was
arguing that it was irrelevant whether Thornley was acting as a police officer or private
citizen. Cogle’s counsel responded that while it depends on whether the Maryland Tort
Claims Act (“MTCA”) or Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”) applied, it was
up to the jury to decide who is liable and whether Thornley was acting within the scope of
his employment. In response, counsel for the County stated that Stracke, 465 Md. 407

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B. Standard of Review
We review a “trial court’s decision to allow or deny judgment . . . to determine
whether it was legally correct, while viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. . . .” Cooper v.
Rodriguez, 443 Md. 680, 706 (2015) (quoting Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville, 418
Md. 496, 503 (2011)). Ordinarily, the determination of whether an individual’s conduct
constitutes gross negligence “is usually a question for the jury and is a question of law only
when reasonable men could not differ as to the rational conclusion to be reached.”
Romanesk v. Rose, 248 Md. 420, 423 (1968) (citations omitted). We review a trial court’s
decision under a de novo standard of review if, as here, the decision “involves an
interpretation and application of Maryland statutory or case law[.]” Johnson, 466 Md. at.
388 (quoting Nesbit, 382 Md. at 72) (brackets omitted). In that scenario, we must
“determine 	whether 	the 	lower 	court’s 	conclusions 	are 	legally 	correct. 	. 	. 	.” 	Id.
(citations omitted).
establishes that gross negligence is a question of law; however, counsel did not address the
question of governmental immunity. Ultimately, the court did not base its decision to grant
the motion to dismiss gross negligence on whether Thornley was acting within the scope
of employment. Notably, the issue was never raised with respect to ordinary negligence at
trial, and the court did not consider it in its decision to grant the motion to dismiss the
ordinary negligence claim. Thus, although the County raises governmental immunity in its
brief, because the County did not raise the particular issue of scope of employment specific
to the count of gross negligence or the count of ordinary negligence at trial, and the court
did not decide the issue, it is not preserved for this Court’s review. See Md. Rule 8-131(a)
(“[A]n appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record
to have been raised in or decided by the trial court. . . .”). As the governmental immunity
issue was not the basis of the trial court’s ruling and is not preserved for this Court, we do
not intend to say that the trial judge cannot decide the issue if properly raised on remand.

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C. Analysis
Although the trial court initially reserved judgment as to Thornley’s motion for
judgment as to the gross negligence claim, it ultimately dismissed the claim on the grounds
that “in order for there to be gross negligence, there has to be negligence. . . . Since there’s
no negligence, there’s no gross negligence.” We note that in light of our decision to reverse
the trial court’s ruling as to the ordinary negligence count, we could summarily reverse the
court’s ruling on the gross negligence count; nevertheless, we shall address the gross
negligence issue to provide guidance for the trial court below. Cf. Carroll Cnty. Ethics
Comm’n v. Lennon, 119 Md. App. 49, 60, 67–68 (1998) (noting the benefit that appellate
review provides considering that summary reversal supplies little interpretive guidance).
Accordingly, we are tasked with determining whether a gross negligence claim may
survive without ordinary negligence.
“[A] fine line exists between allegations of negligence and gross negligence.”
Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 187 (2007). In Maryland, ordinary negligence is defined as
“any conduct, except conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others, which falls
below the standard established by law for protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Hart, 395 Md. 394,
410 (2006)). On the other hand, courts liken gross negligence to reckless conduct, as it is
“something more than simple negligence.” Id. (quoting Taylor v. Harford Cnty. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 384 Md. 213, 229 (2004)); see also Stracke v. Estate of Butler, 465 Md. 407,
421 (2019) (noting that the Supreme Court of Maryland has “set[] the evidentiary hurdle
at a higher elevation” for a gross negligence claim) (citations omitted).

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Gross negligence is defined as:
an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the
consequences as affecting the life or property of another, and also implies a
thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the exertion of any effort
to avoid them. Stated conversely, a wrongdoer is guilty of gross negligence
or acts wantonly and willfully only when he or she inflicts injury intentionally
or is so utterly indifferent to the rights of others that he or she acts as if such
rights did not exist.
Cooper, 443 Md. at 708 (emphasis added) (brackets and citation omitted). Although some
cases indicate that fact finders must determine whether negligent conduct amounts to gross
negligence, the Supreme Court of Maryland has noted that “[g]ross negligence is not just
big negligence.” Contrast Cooper, 443 Md. at 709 (quoting Taylor, 384 Md. at 229)
(stating that “it is for the trier of fact to determine whether a defendant’s negligent conduct
amounts to gross negligence”), with Stracke, 465 Md. at 421 (citations and ellipses omitted)
(determining that because gross negligence is not merely “big negligence,” it “must be
sufficient 	to 	establish 	that 	the 	defendant 	had 	a 	wanton 	or 	reckless 	disregard 	for
human life.”).
Notably, in Stracke, the Supreme Court of Maryland disagreed with a previous
ruling that seemed to blend ordinary negligence and gross negligence. See 465 Md. at 421
(discussing Beall v. Holloway-Johnson, 446 Md. 48, 64 (2016)). The Beall v. Holloway-
Johnson Court stated that “a legally sufficient case of ordinary negligence will frequently
be enough to create a jury question of whether such negligence was or was not gross.” 446
Md. at 64 (brackets and citation omitted). In disagreement, Stracke reasoned that first
responders, who enjoy immunity for ordinary negligence claims, would be deprived of that
immunity if all cases which establish negligence were sent to the jury to also consider gross

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22
negligence. 465 Md. at 421–22. Because the Supreme Court of Maryland expressed
concern that such a result would run the risk that gross negligence would be treated as “just
big 	negligence,” 	and 	would 	“run[] 	contrary 	to 	the 	heightened 	threshold 	of 	gross
negligence,” the Court declined to follow the morphed distinction of ordinary negligence
and gross negligence set out in Beall. Id. at 422 (internal quotations omitted).
Likewise, this Court, in Torbit v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, explained that the
threshold question for gross negligence “is not whether [one] violated a standard of care,”
like the requirement in ordinary negligence claims, “but rather whether a reasonable juror
could conclude that [a person’s] conduct strayed so grossly from the ordinary standard of
care as to support a finding of utter indifference to the rights of others.” 231 Md. App. 573,
589 (2017) (emphasis added).
The County at trial, and Thornley in his briefs, suggest that Stracke stands for the
proposition that gross negligence is solely a question of law. The Supreme Court of
Maryland indicated in Romanesk that “[w]hether or not gross negligence exists necessarily
depends on the facts and circumstances in each case” and “is usually a question for the
jury and is only a question of law when reasonable [people] could not differ as to the
rational conclusion to be reached.” 248 Md. at 423 (emphasis added); Cooper, 443 Md. at
708–09. Gross negligence is therefore typically an issue for the jury because the difference
between ordinary negligence and gross negligence is typically a factual issue. See Brooks
v. Jenkins, 220 Md. App. 444, 461, 464 (2014).
In cases where the evidence is insufficient to find gross negligence, the actor’s
conduct neither demonstrates an intent to injure nor a conscious disregard of a particular

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23
outcome. See, e.g., Bailey v. City of Annapolis, 252 Md. App. 83 (2021). For example, in
Bailey, a man was arrested twice for a crime he did not commit because he had the same
name and date of birth as the person for whom the warrants were intended. See 252 Md.
App. at 89–92. He subsequently sued police personnel, alleging gross negligence, among
other counts. Id. at 89. This Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
officer who applied for the warrants, determining that a claim for gross negligence could
not be supported where no facts suggested that the officer acted with malicious intent or
violated an order of a superior or court rule in applying for the warrants. Id. at 105, 107.
We likewise determined that because no facts showed that the police personnel who made
the second mistaken warrant knew of the first mistaken warrant, she did not act with
reckless disregard of the consequence that the wrong person may be arrested. Id. at 108.
Meanwhile, in cases where facts indicate sufficient evidence of gross negligence,
the actors’ conduct signifies deliberate intent to injure or “utter indifference” to the rights
and consequences. See, e.g., Brooks, 220 Md. App. 444; Barbre, 402 Md. at 190. For
instance, in Barbre, the Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the grant of summary
judgment due to the existence of facts that could support an inference of gross negligence
where a deputy sheriff, attempting to stop a vehicle, approached the driver, drew his
firearm, and shot the driver in the neck. Id. at 163, 190 (noting that the driver was unarmed
and complied with the sheriff’s request to raise his hands). In Brooks, this Court found that
facts adduced at trial could support “either . . . the intent to inflict injury or . . . ‘utter
indifference’ to the rights of [the dog owners]” when a deputy intentionally shot a dog,
despite there being no evidence that the dog was vicious, and the deputy could have used

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24
“some lesser form of force or deterrent.” See 220 Md. App. at 461–62. Similarly, in Anne
Arundel County v. Reeves, the Supreme Court of Maryland found that sufficient facts could
lead to the reasonable inference that an officer acted with “utter indifference towards [a
dog owner’s] rights” when the officer shot the dog owner’s dog twice when the dog
approached him in broad daylight, and facts could indicate that the dog was not attacking
him. See 474 Md. 46, 74 (2021).
Upon examination of the line of gross negligence cases, a theme emerges in which
the likely consequences of the actors’ conduct were either deliberate or consciously
disregarded. See, e.g., Brooks, 220 Md. App. at 461–62. Notably, deliberateness and
conscious disregard are distinct from the definition of ordinary negligence, which expressly
excludes conduct that recklessly disregards others’ interests. See, e.g., Barbre, 402 Md. at
186 (“Negligence, as we have defined the term, is any conduct, except conduct recklessly
disregardful of an interest of others, which falls below the standard established by law for
protection 	of 	others 	against 	unreasonable 	risk 	of 	harm.”) 	(citations 	and 	internal
quotations omitted).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Cogle in the context of gross
negligence, a finder of fact could conclude that Thornley drove in a manner that led Cogle
to think he “was trying to kill [her] and run [her] off of the road.” The evidence could
further support a conclusion that Cogle exited her vehicle without carrying anything in her
hands, intending to hold Thornley accountable. By Thornley’s own testimony, Cogle had
not done anything illegal before he pulled out his gun. Cogle testified regarding the
consequences she suffered due to Thornley’s conduct. Therefore, a jury could infer that

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25
Thornley’s actions displayed an intent to injure or an utter indifference to Cogle’s rights or
the consequences she suffered. See Reeves, 474 Md. at 74–76.
At trial, counsel for Thornley argued that since Zenobia was decided in 1992,
Maryland no longer recognizes gross negligence as an independent tort. This argument is
absent from Thornley’s brief to this Court. Nevertheless, this position is incorrect for two
reasons. First, Zenobia involved strict products liability and punitive damages with respect
to injuries from asbestos exposure. 325 Md. at 428. There, the Supreme Court of Maryland
examined the correct standard for punitive damages in negligence and products liability
cases and ultimately decided that punitive damages for non-intentional torts require actual
malice, overruling the gross negligence standard for punitive damages. Id. at 450–60.
Zenobia does not stand for the proposition that gross negligence as an independent tort is
eliminated in general. See id. Second, as Cogle suggests, Maryland courts have recognized
gross negligence on multiple occasions since Zenobia. See, e.g., Cooper, 443 Md. at 712.
In fact, in Reeves, a 2021 decision, which was decided after Stracke, the Supreme Court of
Maryland found that there were facts sufficient to warrant submission of a gross negligence
claim to the jury when there was no claim of ordinary negligence against the defendant.
See 474 Md. at 52, 73–74 (listing the claims brought against the defendant, which included
trespass to chattel, gross negligence, and violation of rights under Articles 24 and 26 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights).
Because a finding of negligence requires the absence of intent to harm, and
expressly excludes conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others, and because
gross negligence is found only when an actor inflicts injury intentionally or is so utterly

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26
indifferent to the rights of others that he or she acts as if such rights did not exist, a gross
negligence claim may survive without a finding of ordinary negligence. Contrast Moore,
161 Md. App. at 378 (“[T]he absence of intent to harm is essential to the concept of
negligence . . . .”), with Stracke, 465 Md. at 420–21 (contrasting the definitions of ordinary
negligence and gross negligence) (emphasis added); see also Reeves, 474 Md. at 52, 73–74.
Accordingly, as gross negligence is distinct from ordinary negligence and, therefore,
can exist without ordinary negligence, the trial court erred in granting Thornley’s motion
for judgment on that basis. See Stracke, 465 Md. at 420–21; Reeves, 474 Md. at 52,
73–74. 10
JUDGMENT 	OF 	THE
CIRCUIT 	COURT 	FOR
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
REVERSED. 	COSTS 	TO 	BE
PAID BY APPELLEES.
10 Both Thornley and the County argue that reversal is only warranted upon a showing of
error and prejudice. However, this Court has said that “[i]n reviewing the granting of a
motion for judgment that serves to withdraw a case from the jury” it would be “invading
the province of the jury” to grant the motion “[i]f there is any legally relevant and
competent evidence, however slight, from which a rational mind could infer a fact in issue.”
McGarr, 74 Md. App. at 131; see also Six Flags Am., L.P. v. Gonzalez-Perdomo, 248 Md.
App. 569, 581 (2020) (“The same standard of review applies for a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for judgment at the close of evidence.”).