In the Matter of Charles Rawlings v.

*This is a per curiam opinion. Under Rule 1-104, the opinion is not precedent within the
rule of stare decisis nor may it be cited as persuasive authority.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. C-24-CV-25-006338
UNREPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 2292
September Term, 2025
______________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF CHARLES
RAWLINGS
______________________________________
Graeff,
Ripken,
Eyler, Deborah S.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
PER CURIAM
______________________________________
Filed: October 16, 2026

‒Unreported Opinion‒
Charles Rawlings, appellant, appeals from an order issued by the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, which affirmed a decision issued by the Board of Appeals (the Board)
disqualifying him from receiving unemployment benefits. Appellant raises four issues on
appeal, which reduce to three: (1) whether there was substantial evidence to support the
agency’s factual findings; (2) whether the Board applied the correct legal standard for gross
misconduct; and (3) whether the hearing examiner for the Lower Appeals Division erred
in “prompt[ing] the employer to alter its stated basis for termination.” For the reasons that
follow, we shall affirm.
At the hearing in the Lower Appeals Division, a representative for appellant’s
employer, Genuine Parts Company, presented evidence that appellant had been employed
full-time as a delivery driver, but was discharged due to excessive absenteeism and
tardiness, including multiple “no call/no show” incidents. 	According to his employer,
appellant had received a verbal warning after being a no call/no show at work on July 30,
August 2, and August 6, 2024. 	When asked about the absences, appellant stated that he
was “messed up” and it wouldn’t happen again. 	Appellant also acknowledged his
understanding that if he could not make it to work, he needed to call a manager or human
resources directly.
The next week, the employer gave appellant a written warning after he had
unexcused absences on August 13 and 14, 2024. In that warning, the employer indicated
that his “unexcused absences are a disruption to business and our workday” and that he
could be terminated if the absences continued. 	Appellant then received a “final” written
warning on September 10, 2024, for excessive tardiness and absenteeism, including

‒Unreported Opinion‒
2
numerous late arrivals and no call/no shows. 	In that warning, the employer stated that
appellant’s absenteeism and tardiness were “an ongoing behavior that has not improved
with coaching” and that the next consequence for violating its attendance policies would
be termination. The employer further noted that appellant had been asked if he needed to
adjust his schedule to start at a later time to avoid transportation issues and that he declined.
The final incident leading to appellant’s termination was a no call/no show on
November 25, 2024. Although appellant had requested sick leave on that date, the request
had not been approved by the employer, and he failed to call in to let anyone know that he
would be absent. This violated the employer’s written attendance policy, which required
employees to call in personally before or during their shift if absent or late. 1 As such, the
employer treated the absence as a no call/no show and terminated appellant’s employment.
Appellant testified at the hearing and denied that his absences were unexcused.
Rather, he stated most were due to his caring for his adult daughter, who had mental health
issues, and that he had informed his supervisors about his daughter’s condition. Appellant
also acknowledged some tardiness but testified that it was due to Baltimore Metro train
delays, and that other employees had experienced similar issues. He also acknowledged
that he did not call in on November 25, 2024. However, he believed he did not need to call
in because he had submitted a sick day request, which was pending approval, and he had
not previously had to call in if he had submitted a leave request before his shift. Finally,
he disputed the employer’s claim that he was a no call/no show on other dates, asserting
1 That policy was admitted as an exhibit at the hearing.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
3
that on each of those dates he had either called in or had approval to be absent from his
supervisor.
Following the close of his testimony, the hearing examiner provided appellant three
business days post-hearing to submit objections to employer documents and to provide
supporting documentation for his claims regarding his daughter’s condition and his
absences having been approved. 	However, he ultimately did not do so. 	Thereafter, the
hearing examiner issued a final decision finding the employer’s evidence “credible and
consistent” and appellant’s explanations for his absences and tardiness not to be credible
in light of the evidence presented. Based on the employer’s evidence, the hearing examiner
concluded that Rawlings had been discharged for gross misconduct related to attendance
violations under Maryland Labor & Employment Article § 8-1002 and was therefore
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. 	Specifically, the hearing examiner
found that the employer’s attendance policy was clear about the requirement to call in when
absent or late, and that repeated violations, including multiple no call/no shows and
tardiness, despite warnings, constituted gross misconduct.
Appellant appealed to the Board, which affirmed the decision of the Lower Appeals
Division. In doing so, the Board declined to consider any evidence that appellant had failed
to present at the hearing. Appellant then filed a petition for judicial review, and the circuit
court affirmed the Board’s decision. This appeal followed.
Our task in reviewing an administrative decision “is precisely the same as that of
the circuit court[:] . . . we must review the administrative decision itself.” 	Wisniewski v.
Dep’t of Lab., Licensing and Regul., 117 Md. App. 506, 515 (1997) (quotation marks and

‒Unreported Opinion‒
4
citations omitted). If the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, and if it
committed no error of law, we must affirm. Paek v. Prince George’s Cnty. Bd. of License
Comm’rs, 381 Md. 583, 590 (2004).
Appellant first claims that the agency’s finding that he willfully violated his
employer’s attendance policies was not supported by substantial evidence. 	Specifically,
he alleges that most of his tardiness was due to issues with the Maryland Transit
Administration rail system. He also asserts that he did not need to call in when he requested
sick leave and time off in the employer’s electronic system because those requests were
“routinely approved.” 	However, the employer’s attendance policy, which was admitted
into evidence, specifically provided that all employees were required to call in and
personally speak to their supervisor if they were “going to be late or absent from work[.]”
And nothing in the employer’s attendance policy provided an exception for previously
requested absences, especially where, as in this case, the absence request had not been
approved. 	Moreover, in his previous written warning, appellant acknowledged that if he
couldn’t make it to work, he was required to call in.
To be sure, appellant provided contrary testimony regarding the reasons for his
absences and whether he was required to call in to work after submitting a leave request.
But the hearing examiner found that testimony not to be credible, a finding we cannot say
is clearly erroneous. Consequently, we hold that there was substantial evidence to support
the hearing examiner’s findings that appellant had violated appellee’s attendance policies
by having multiple unexcused absences and tardiness, as well as being a “no call/no show”
on November 25, 2024.

‒Unreported Opinion‒
5
Appellant next contends that “[e]ven if disputed, [the] facts cannot, as a matter of
law, establish deliberate and willful disregard” of the employer’s interests such that would
support a finding of gross misconduct. 	Again, we disagree. 	If an employee deliberately
and knowingly ignores his or her employer’s requirement that he or she arrive or leave at
a certain time, such behavior can evidence a gross indifference to the employer’s interests
and a defiance of standards that the employer has a right to expect to be followed. Dep’t
of Econ. & Emp. Dev. v. Propper, 108 Md. App. 595, 611 (1996). 	That is “particularly
true if the employee continues this conduct in the face of a warning that such behavior is
not acceptable.” 	Id. 	Here, there was sufficient evidence that appellant acted willfully in
violating the employer’s attendance policies as he continually violated the policy despite
multiple verbal and written warnings and being informed that his unexcused absences were
“a disruption to business and our workday[.]” Moreover, the hearing examiner found his
explanations for his chronic absenteeism and tardiness not to be credible. Thus, the Board
did not err in finding gross misconduct as a matter of law.
Finally, appellant contends that the hearing examiner erred in prompting the
employer to alter its stated reason for termination by asking the employer’s representative
whether he “was terminated only because of the ‘no call, no show’ of November 25th or
was that just the final straw, and he was terminated for all these infractions[.]” However,
nothing in the records suggests that the hearing examiner was attempting to “prompt”
appellant’s employer or that the employer changed its stated reason for termination in
response to the question. 	Rather, we agree with the Board’s conclusion that the hearing

‒Unreported Opinion‒
6
examiner asked a “relevant, open-ended question[] to clarify the testimony of the witness.”
JUDGMENT 	OF 	THE 	CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
AFFIRMED. COSTS WAIVED.