Bell Atlantic Mobile Corporation, LTD, DBA Verizon Wireless v. Commissioner of Revenue and Boards of Assessors of 220 Cities and Towns; Board of Assessors of the City of Newton v. Commissioner of Revenue and Bell Atlantic Mobile LLC (February 27, 2007)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD


BELL ATLANTIC MOBILE CORPORATION, LTD. v.	COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE AND
DBA VERIZON WIRELESS	BOARDS OF ASSESSORS OF 220 CITIES AND TOWNS   

Docket Nos. C267959 through C268176,
C269027 and C269028
AND

BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF			v.	COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE AND
THE CITY OF NEWTON				BELL ATLANTIC MOBILE, LLC

Docket No. C269569				Promulgated:
							February 27,2007


	
	These consolidated appeals concern the Commissioner of Revenue's classification of Bell Atlantic Mobile Corporation, LLC, the predecessor to Bell Atlantic Mobile Corporation, LTD, (together, "Bell Atlantic Mobile") as a "telephone company" subject to central valuation under G.L. c. 59, § 39, the Commissioner's denial of the corporate utility exemption under G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 16(1)(d), and the Commissioner's valuation of Bell Atlantic Mobile's property under § 39 for fiscal year 2004 ("§ 39 appeals").
Commissioner Scharaffa heard these appeals and was joined by Commissioners Gorton, Egan and Rose in the decisions for the 220 appellee cities and towns in docket numbers C267959 through C268176, C269027 and C269028 and the decision for the appellant Board of Assessors of the City of Newton in docket number C269569.
Docket numbers C267959 through C268176, C269027 and C269028 are appeals by Bell Atlantic Mobile under G.L. c. 59, § 39 challenging the Commissioner's denial of the corporate utility exemption and his certification of value of certain property owned by Bell Atlantic Mobile and seeking abatements of the taxes assessed by the 220 appellee cities and towns, including the City of Newton.  Docket number C269569 is an appeal by the Board of Assessors of the City of Newton under G.L. c. 59, § 39 challenging the Commissioner of Revenue's classification of Bell Atlantic Mobile as a telephone company subject to central valuation under § 39 and alleging that Bell Atlantic Mobile did not qualify for the corporate utility exemption under any circumstance and that the Commissioner undervalued Bell Atlantic Mobile's § 39 property.
The Appellate Tax Board ("Board") also consolidated with the foregoing appeals 220 abatement appeals filed by Bell Atlantic Mobile under G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65 ("§ 65 appeals").  In the § 65 appeals, Bell Atlantic Mobile seeks abatement of taxes paid to the same 220 cities and towns on its machinery, on the grounds that such property is exempt from tax under G.L. c. 59, § 5, clause 16(1)(d) and that it was overvalued.  Bell Atlantic Mobile's stated reason for filing these appeals was to protect its right to contest the denial of the property tax exemption because, in its view, it is not clear whether it had a right to contest the exemption denial under § 39.  Further, as evidenced by the appeal filed by the City of Newton under § 39, the issue of whether § 39 applied at all to Bell Atlantic Mobile had also been raised and was before the Board. 
The Board then bifurcated the hearing of all consolidated appeals to first address all issues other than valuation: specifically, whether Bell Atlantic Mobile is a "telephone company" whose "machinery, poles, wires and underground conduits, wires and pipes" must be centrally valued by the Commissioner under § 39 and whether Bell Atlantic Mobile is entitled to the corporate utility exemption under G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 16(1)(d).  On May 15, 2006, the Board issued a Decision for the 220 appellee cities and towns and the appellant City of Newton in the § 39 appeals in which the Board determined that Bell Atlantic Mobile was not a telephone company subject to central valuation under § 39 and that, because the Board determined that § 39 did not apply to Bell Atlantic Mobile, the Commissioner did not have the authority to allow or deny the property tax exemption claimed by Bell Atlantic Mobile.  
Consistent with its Decision in the § 39 appeals, the Board issued an Order in the § 65 appeals, also on May 15, 2006, ruling that Bell Atlantic Mobile: 1) was not subject to central valuation under § 39; 2) was not entitled to the property tax exemption under § 5, cl. 16(1)(d); and 3) was taxable on all personal property owned by it on January 1, 2003 in each of the appellee cities and towns.  
The Board stayed further action on the § 65 appeals to allow the parties to seek appellate review of the Board's determination that Bell Atlantic Mobile was not subject to central valuation under § 39.  The Board determined that final appellate resolution of this issue prior to a hearing on valuation was necessary because the determination of the proper parties and the valuation and tax assessment parameters in any further Board proceedings are affected by whether Bell Atlantic Mobile is subject to § 39.  If the Board is affirmed in its ruling that § 39 is not applicable to Bell Atlantic Mobile, the Commissioner will no longer be a party to the proceedings and, because the valuation issues will be addressed only in the § 65 appeals, the Board's determination of value cannot exceed the assessed values of Bell Atlantic Mobile's property.  If, however, it is finally determined that Bell Atlantic Mobile is subject to § 39, the Commissioner would be a proper party to the valuation hearing and the Board could find values under § 39 in excess of those assessed, resulting in the assessment of additional taxes.  
	These findings of fact and report are promulgated at the request of Bell Atlantic Mobile, the Commissioner, and the Newton Assessors pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.


Kathleen King Parker, Esq., and Larry C. Kenna, P.C., Esq. for Bell Atlantic Mobile.

Daniel A. Shapiro, Esq. for the Commissioner. 

Richard G. Chmielinski, Esq. for the Newton Assessors.


FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
On the basis of a Statement of Agreed Facts, testimony and exhibits, the Board made the following findings of fact concerning the identity of the parties, the procedural history of these appeals and the Board's jurisdiction.
PARTIES
BELL ATLANTIC MOBILE
Bell Atlantic Mobile LLC (the "LLC") was organized in 1999 as a Delaware limited liability company and provided wireless cellular telecommunications services in Massachusetts under the name "Verizon Wireless."  Following this Board's Decision in RCN BECO-COM, LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue, et al, 2003 A.T.B. Findings of Fact and Report 410, aff'd 443 Mass. 198 (2005), which denied property tax exemptions under G.L. c. 59, § 5, clause 16(1)(d) (the "corporate utility exemption") to unincorporated entities such as limited liability companies, and the resulting change in policy by the Commissioner of Revenue's Division of Local Services adopting the Board's ruling in RCN, Bell Atlantic Mobile of Massachusetts, Ltd, (the "corporation" and, together with the LLC, "Bell Atlantic Mobile") was organized as a corporation under the Bermuda Companies Act of 1981 on January 31, 2003.  Bell Atlantic Mobile had a principal office located at 180 Washington Valley Road, Bedminster, New Jersey, with a usual place of business in Massachusetts.
Any personal property owned by the LLC as of January 1, 2003 was owned by the corporation on and after January 31, 2003.  The corporation also continued to provide the same wireless voice and data services under the name "Verizon Wireless" as had been provided by the LLC prior to January 31, 2003.  
COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE

The Commissioner of Revenue ("Commissioner") is responsible for valuing, on an annual basis, all "machinery, poles, wires and underground conduits, wires and pipes of all telephone and telegraph companies" under G.L. c. 59, § 39 ("§ 39 property").  The Commissioner certifies his values under § 39 to all telephone and telegraph companies that own § 39 property and to the cities and towns where such property is located ("central valuation").  The Department of Revenue's Bureau of Local Assessment is the Bureau within the Department of Revenue responsible for making recommendations to the Commissioner for purposes of the Commissioner's obligations under G.L. c. 59, § 39 for the central valuation of § 39 property.
For the fiscal year 2004, the Commissioner classified Bell Atlantic Mobile as a telephone company for purposes of § 39 and centrally valued its property under § 39.  In connection with his central valuation, the Commissioner determined that January 1, 2003, and not July 1, 2003, was the relevant date for determining eligibility for the corporate utility exemption, and therefore denied the exemption to Bell Atlantic Mobile because the property at issue was owned by the LLC on January 1, 2003.  
CITY AND TOWN APPELLEES
The 220 cities and towns to which the Commissioner certified values for fiscal year 2004 for property owned by Bell Atlantic Mobile were named as appellees in accordance with appeal procedures set forth in § 39.  In addition, the Board of Assessors of the City of Newton ("Newton Assessors") filed its own appeal from the Commissioner's classification of Bell Atlantic Mobile as a telephone company under § 39 and his certification of value of Bell Atlantic Mobile's property located in Newton.  In its appeal, the Newton Assessors alleged that: 1) the Commissioner erred by classifying Bell Atlantic Mobile as a telephone company under § 39; 2) Bell Atlantic Mobile did not qualify for the corporate utility exemption, regardless of the qualification date; and, 3) the Commissioner undervalued Bell Atlantic Mobile's property in Newton.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Pursuant to G.L. c. 59, § 41, Bell Atlantic Mobile timely filed, on March 3, 2003, its fiscal year 2004 return of property it determined was subject to central valuation under § 39.  The return listed § 39 property owned by its predecessor, the LLC, on January 1, 2003.  
By letter dated March 20, 2003, the Commissioner informed Bell Atlantic Mobile that its return was incorrect because the owner of record as of January 1, 2003, and not its successor, had to file the return and that return should list all property owned by the LLC, including its machinery, as of January 1, 2003.  Bell Atlantic Mobile responded by letter of March 24, 2003, stating that the LLC no longer existed and that the corporation was the correct reporting entity.  Bell Atlantic Mobile also stated that July 1, 2003, and not January 1, 2003, was the date on which Bell Atlantic Mobile would need to satisfy the requirements set forth in G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 16(1)(d) to qualify for the utility exemption.  See G.L. c. 59, § 5 ("the date of determination as to age, ownership or other qualifying factors required by any clause shall be July first of each year unless another meaning is clearly apparent from the context"). 
By letter dated March 25, 2003, the Commissioner responded to Bell Atlantic Mobile's March 24, 2003 letter and reaffirmed its earlier position that the LLC, and not the corporation, was the proper party to file the return and that the return must include all § 39 property.  On April 4, 2003, Bell Atlantic Mobile filed an amended return which included all § 39 property, including machinery.
On or about May 15, 2003, the Commissioner issued his certified valuation to the LLC, not to the corporation, and to the boards of assessors of every city and town in which personal property listed on Bell Atlantic Mobile's return was located.  The Commissioner certified values totaling $469,539,600 for all 220 Massachusetts communities in which the LLC owned personal property on January 1, 2003.  Because he determined that January 1 was the relevant date for determining whether entities qualified for the utility exemption and that Bell Atlantic Mobile was an LLC as of January 1, 2003, the Commissioner denied the corporate utility exemption to Bell Atlantic Mobile and valued its machinery used in the conduct of the business, including: antennae, analogue and digital computer components, amplifiers, switching equipment, generators and power equipment.
On May 23, 2003, Bell Atlantic Mobile filed 220 appeals with the Board pursuant to § 39, naming the assessors of the 220 cities and towns, including Newton, and the Commissioner as appellees.  The Newton Assessors filed their appeal on June 13, 2003, and an Amended Petition on February 6, 2005, alleging that: 1) the Commissioner's classification of Bell Atlantic Mobile as a telephone company under § 39 was erroneous; 2) Bell Atlantic Mobile was not entitled to the corporate utility exemption regardless of the date used to determine its status; and, 3) the Commissioner's certification of the value of Bell Atlantic Mobile's property located in Newton was too low.  On the basis of the foregoing, the Board found and ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear these appeals.
WITNESSES
A.	Bell Atlantic Mobile
Bell Atlantic Mobile presented three witnesses at the hearing of these appeals.  Michael J. Mupo, Executive Director of Property Tax for Verizon Wireless, testified as to how the Verizon Wireless mobile wireless network operates.  Mr. Mupo described Bell Atlantic Mobile's equipment and its function.  Mr. Mupo also testified as to the types of services provided by Bell Atlantic Mobile in 2002 and 2003.
Katherine Abrams, formerly with NYNEX Mobile Communications and then Northeast Area General Counsel for Cellco Partnership (Bell Atlantic Mobile's owner), testified that she had reviewed documents pertaining to Bell Atlantic Mobile's predecessor mobile wireless companies, including their applications for certificates of public convenience, tariffs filed in Massachusetts, and annual reports filed with the Department of Public Utilities ("DPU").  She identified annual reports filed during the years 1988 through 1993 by Bell Atlantic Mobile's predecessors and testified that in certain transmittal letters sent by the DPU to Bell Atlantic Mobile's predecessors during that period, the DPU referenced reporting requirements under both G.L. c. 159 and G.L. c. 166.
As its final witness, Bell Atlantic Mobile offered Robert Werlin, whom the Board qualified as an expert witness in regulatory matters.  Mr. Werlin, a former General Counsel, Commissioner and Chairman of the DPU during the years 1984 through 1991, was of the opinion that telephone companies were and are subject to regulation under both G.L. c. 159 and G.L. c. 166.  Further, he opined that the deregulation of wireless providers in 1994 did not mean that they were no longer subject to G.L. c. 166.

B.	Commissioner
The Commissioner offered Marilyn Brown, Chief of the Bureau of Local Assessment, as his sole witness.  Ms. Brown testified as to the Bureau's procedures regarding central valuation under § 39 and the granting of the utility exemption under G.L. c. 59, § 5, clause 16(1)(d).  Ms. Brown also testified concerning the Bureau's dealings with Bell Atlantic Mobile for the tax year at issue, and the dispute concerning whether Bell Atlantic Mobile or its predecessor, the LLC, owned the property at issue as of the date of qualification for the utility exemption. 
C.	Newton
Newton offered the testimony of two witnesses in these appeals.  The first witness was Andrew Pigney, a consultant in wireless design engineering and related technologies, whom the Board qualified as an expert witness in the field of design engineering for wireless cellular telecommunications providers.  Mr. Pigney described the history of radio communications and technology and how it developed separately from, and not as a result of, developments in "land-line" telephone technology.  He also described how wireless cellular communications take place and the types of equipment used in wireless communications in general, and the equipment used by Bell Atlantic Mobile in particular.
Newton's second witness was Helen Golding, an attorney specializing in telecommunications and utility regulation who was formerly acting General Counsel to DPU.  The Board qualified Ms. Golding as an expert witness in the fields of regulatory and public utility law relating to telecommunications providers.  Ms. Golding testified that wireless communications providers are not subject to G.L. c. 166 and therefore are not "utilities" taxable under G.L. c. 63, § 52A whose machinery is exempt under the corporate utility exemption.  Underscoring this testimony was her opinion that the competitive nature of the wireless telecommunications industry and its lack of a physical infrastructure of poles, wires, pipes and conduits take wireless providers outside the gambit of G.L. c. 63, § 52A and G.L. c. 166.
On the basis of the testimony of the foregoing witnesses, exhibits and the Statement of Agreed Facts filed by the parties, the Board made the following findings of fact.
MOBILE WIRELESS SERVICE
Bell Atlantic Mobile provides wireless voice and data services using radio frequencies it licenses from the Federal Communication Commission ("FCC") to transmit voice and data over its network.  The two principle components of a mobile wireless system are the wireless handset, colloquially referred to as a "cell phone," and the wireless network itself.
A. WIRELESS HANDSET 
The wireless handset is a two-way radio device, which is able to maintain communication while moving over a wide area.  Through use of the handset, a subscriber can connect with other wireless handsets, a local land-line or "wired" telephone network, the long distance telephone network, the Internet, and other data networks.  Available functions in handsets range from basic "cell phones," which can only place and receive calls, to handsets capable of taking and sending photographs and videos, personal digital assistants, pocket and hand-held personal computers("PCs") and organizers, PC cards that plug into notebook PCs, and a host of other communication functions  
A cellular call is initiated when a cellular subscriber pushes the "send button" on a wireless handset, The handset emits a radio signal on a specific frequency, also referred to as a "channel," and automatically transmits information identifying the subscriber, the originating cell phone, and the number the subscriber is trying to call.  The handset must continually monitor and transmit its location so that connectivity is not lost as its location changes.
The handset uses an internal battery as a power source.  However, the electricity generated by the battery to power the handset does not leave the phone.  The voice or data signal sent and received by the handset is radio frequency, not electricity.

B.	WIRELESS NETWORK
A cellular network is composed of two principle components: base stations and switching stations.  A base station, or "cell site," receives and transmits radio signals over a particular geographic area; a typical cellular network consists of many such base stations or "cells" arrayed in a geometric pattern to maximize coverage over a wide area.  The cell site contains: an antenna, which is typically a series of domes arrayed in a circular fashion on a tower or tall building to send and receive radio signals from all directions; radio transmission, receiving, and related equipment, which sends and receives radio signals and processes, identifies, and tracks caller location; and a generator and batteries to provide power.  Although it owns the antennae and radio equipment located at the cell sites, Bell Atlantic Mobile generally leases, but does not own, space on or in the towers or buildings on which the antennae are located or the buildings which house its radio equipment.
When a subscriber presses the "send" button on the handset, a radio signal is transmitted to a nearby cellular base station.  The base station broadcasts information to the subscriber's telephone about the channel on which the call will be placed.  The base station receiving the signal sends the call to the nearest Mobile Telephone Switching Office ("MTSO"), where it is determined, among other things, if the call was placed by a valid subscriber, which base stations will handle the call, and on which of several radio channels the call should be handled.  
The MTSO acts as the interface between cellular callers and the intended recipients of the voice and data sent.  If the subscriber is calling or sending data to a land-line user, the MTSO "switches" the call to copper or fiber-optic wires owned by the local telephone office or a long-distance carrier; if the recipient is another wireless user, the call or data is transmitted by radio signal to a base station near the recipient.  In addition to routing calls from cellular users, the MTSO also performs the reverse function by transmitting calls from land-line users intended for cellular subscribers. The MTSO contains sophisticated computer switching equipment, which among other things, must track the location of one or more wireless users for the duration of a call, to perform its function. 
In the operation of its cellular network, Bell Atlantic Mobile does not need or own any poles, wires, pipes or underground conduits.  It therefore does not seek municipal grants of location, and does not locate, any wires, pipes or underground conduits upon, over, or beneath public ways.  Bell Atlantic Mobile also does not attach any of its personality to poles in public ways. 
HISTORY OF WIRELESS COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY

The history of wireless radio communications began in 1885, when Heinrich Hertz proved the existence of radio waves.  Within the following ten years, Guglielmo Marconi is credited with developing the wireless radio telegraph, which was installed on ships to allow for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications.  By 1901, the first transatlantic wireless telegraph signal was sent by radio from England to Newfoundland: the letter "s" in Morse code.
As wireless radio communications in the form of wireless telegraphy was just beginning at the turn of the twentieth century, wired telephone and telegraph communication technology was well under way.  The first permanent wired telegraph system linking the United States to Europe was established some thirty-four years earlier in 1866.  The first wired telephone was tested by Alexander Graham Bell in 1875, the first commercial telephone exchange was opened in 1878, the first commercially successful long distance line, linking Boston and Providence, began in 1881 and, as of 1901, there were approximately 860,000 telephones in use in the United States.  The world of wired telephone and telegraph communications was dominated by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company ("AT&T"), which was formed in 1885 and took over the business and property of the American Bell Telephone Company in 1899.  Accordingly, while one-way wireless telegraph technology was just beginning to develop at the turn of the twentieth century, AT&T was already offering real-time, two-way conversations over its telephone lines to nearly a million customers, using technology that had been in use for decades.
Meanwhile, radio communications developed during the early nineteen-hundreds, with the United States Navy installing radios aboard its ships, the invention of the diode enabling more efficient power use for the radio, and the first "long distance" wireless call - an eleven mile call from Brant Rock, Massachusetts - being made in 1906.  By that date, there were over 2.2 million telephones in use in the United States, more than double the number just five years earlier.  By 1910, the number of land-line telephones more than doubled again to 5.8 million.
Congress passed the Radio Act in 1912 to regulate access to radio frequencies and transmissions.  A radio message was first sent to an airplane in 1914, and wireless radio service connecting the United States and Japan began one year later.  Shortwave radio, allowing for greater range in the transmission of radio signals, was developed in 1919 and a one-way radio messaging service was put in use by the Detroit police department, enabling a dispatcher in the police station to send a message to an officer in his car.  By 1924, there were 2.5 million radio sets in the United States.  
By contrast, there were 15 million land-line telephones in the country by 1924. Given the growing proliferation of land-line telephones and the perceived need to regulate the communications industry, Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934, which created the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC").  
In addition to being the only telephone company at the time, AT&T also had a presence in the radio industry for a short period of time.  After the Radio Act of 1912, AT&T acquired and held a number of radio licenses.  However, AT&T decided to release its radio licenses and divest itself completely of radio, paving the way for the creation of the National Broadcasting Company ("NBC"), which was formed in 1926.  By 1934, half of the homes in the United States had radio sets capable of tuning into programming from NBC and other broadcasters.  
A breakthrough in wireless communications occurred in 1941, with the first two-way radio installed in a police cruiser.  This advance allowed a police officer at a remote location to receive a message from the station and to send a message back to the station.  By 1946, the first commercial wireless service was installed in St. Louis, Missouri.  Private citizens could now communicate from their vehicles throughout the city using radio signals.  
Up until this time, the notion of radio communications generally entailed a broadcaster transmitting a message on a given radio frequency while one or more receivers or listeners tuned into that frequency on their radios.  With the advent of two-way radio communication, real-time, two-way conversations could be maintained over radio frequencies, in a manner similar to the communications offered by AT&T's wired network for over half a century.  However, although the concepts of cellular communications were being developed with these advancements, it was not until the advent of sophisticated computer technology, enabling multiple users on a given frequency and the ability to maintain connection beyond a limited range, that mobile wireless communications were considered a reasonable and workable option.
It was not until almost forty years later, in 1983, that the first cellular network began operations.  By 1985, there were one hundred networks, and in just two more years, there were one million cellular subscribers. The number of cell sites and subscribers grew exponentially, with some 182 million cellular subscribers by 2002.
	On the basis of the foregoing, the Board found that wireless and wired, land-line communications are separate technologies, each with a distinct history and development.  Wireless technology did not grow out of telephone and telegraph technology; rather, it developed separately, from radio technology, using a completely different medium of communication - airborne radio waves, not electrical or light impulses over wires and cables - and employed unique equipment and infrastructure.  
	A review of the core equipment of each industry reveals the fundamental difference in their technologies.  A wired telephone company requires poles, aerial wires, underground conduits, wires and cables, and phones plugged into the wired network at a fixed location.  In contrast, wireless communications take place through the air, requiring radio transmission, receiving and amplification equipment, antennae, towers, and wireless hand units which can send and receive communications while traveling beyond city, state, and national borders.  
In addition, although both wired and wireless cellular communications require switching equipment, a wireless switch is significantly more complex and requires more robust computer power to monitor the locations of users and maintain a connection between caller and receiver, both of whom may be moving, and to switch the call to a different cell site or sites as sender or receiver or both move out of range of a particular cell site.  Although both a wired and wireless switch may start from the same basic platform, the customization and modification necessary for the wireless switch would be completely unnecessary for a wired switch.
The differences in required equipment and technology led directly to a difference in the competitive nature of the respective industries.  Given the significant investment in infrastructure necessary to operate a land-lined telephone network, including purchasing and maintaining poles, wires, underground conduits and wires, and securing the necessary easements and permits to dig under and affix poles on private and public property, there is generally only one local phone company serving a geographic region.  In fact, up until the court-ordered breakup of AT&T in 1983 into seven "Baby Bells," AT&T held a monopoly on telephone service in this country for approximately one-hundred years.  
In contrast, there generally is no need for a wireless provider to acquire these types of easement rights, permits to access public land, or to make the significant investment in infrastructure necessary to operate a wired network.  As a result, there have been various competitors offering the same or similar services as those offered by Bell Atlantic Mobile, including Cingular, Nextel, AT&T Wireless, T-Mobile and Sprint. 
The competitive nature of the wireless communication industry as compared with the monopolistic wired telephone industry and their separate developmental histories led to a marked difference in how these industries were regulated by federal and state authorities.  Following is an overview of how Commercial Mobile Radio Service ("CMRS") providers are regulated.
VI.	REGULATION OF CMRS PROVIDERS
To use the radio frequency spectrum in the United States, wireless communications systems must be authorized by the FCC to operate the wireless network and mobile devices in assigned spectrum segments, and must comply with the rules and policies governing the use of the spectrum as adopted by the FCC.  At all material times, Bell Atlantic Mobile was licensed to provide mobile wireless services on the 800 megahertz ("MHz") and 1800-1900 MHz portions of the radio spectrum.  
CMRS is a category of services that Congress created to encompass all mobile telecommunications services that are provided for profit and make interconnected service available to the public.  CMRS providers include all cellular licensees, as well as paging and specialized mobile radio licensees.  The common element of all CMRS providers is that they use a radio frequency or channel instead of a wire to provide communications to and from one or more mobile locations. Bell Atlantic Mobile is a CMRS provider under applicable federal law.
The FCC does not specify the rates wireless service providers may charge for their services nor does it require them to file tariffs for their wireless operations.  However, all CMRS providers are common carriers, and as such the FCC may regulate certain terms and conditions under which they provide service.  In addition, CMRS providers are defined as "telecommunications carriers" under federal law, which subjects them to further federal regulatory requirements.
Following the 1993 enactment of a federal statute preempting state and local entry and rate regulation of CMRS and private mobile radio service, the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities ("DPU") issued written Orders holding that it would no longer regulate CMRS providers with respect to rate and entry regulation, and terminated the requirement that CMRS providers obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity before offering services in a particular area.  Prior to the 1993 federal statute and the DPU Orders, CMRS providers, including Bell Atlantic Mobile's predecessors, were required by DPU to file annual returns of their business and financial conditions with DPU.  Bell Atlantic Mobile has not filed a return with DPU since 1993.
Further, G.L. c. 166, § 12, provides for penalties for a telephone company's failure to file the annual return required under § 11.  Although the Department of Telecommunications and Energy ("DTE"), the successor to DPU, initiated enforcement actions in 2003 against forty telecommunications companies for failure to file a return under § 11, neither Bell Atlantic Mobile nor any CMRS provider was among the forty.  
VII.	CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing and to the extent that it is a finding of fact, the Board found and ruled that Bell Atlantic Mobile is not a "telephone company" for purposes of G.L. c. 59, § 39.  Accordingly, the Board ruled that Bell Atlantic Mobile's "machinery, poles, wires and underground conduits wires and pipes" are not subject to central assessment by the Commissioner under G.L. c. 59, § 39.
In light of the Board's ruling, the issue of whether January 1 or July 1 is the relevant date for determining qualification for the corporate utility exemption under G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 16(1)(d) is irrelevant; because the Board determined that Bell Atlantic Mobile was not a telephone company for purposes of § 39 and therefore not subject to central valuation by the Commissioner, the Commissioner lacked the authority to allow or deny the corporate utility exemption claimed by Bell Atlantic Mobile.  Moreover, given the Board's analysis in the following Opinion of G.L. c. 63, § 52A and G.L. c. 166 in connection with the proper interpretation of § 39 and the Board's Order in the 220 consolidated § 65 appeals, it is clear that regardless of whether Bell Atlantic Mobile was an LLC or a corporation as of the relevant date, it would not qualify for the exemption because a CMRS provider is not a telephone company subject to taxation under § 52A as required by G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 16(1)(d).

OPINION
The fundamental issue raised in these appeals is whether Bell Atlantic Mobile is a "telephone company" for purposes of G.L. c. 59, § 39.  In deciding that issue, the Board also looked to the meaning of the phrase "telephone company" as it is used in related statutory provisions, including G.L. c. 63, § 52A and G.L. c. 166.  An analysis of the phrase "telephone company" for purposes of these provisions follows.
"TELEPHONE COMPANY" FOR PURPOSES OF § 39
G.L. c. 59, § 39 provides that the valuation of the "machinery, poles, wires and underground conduits, wires and pipes of all telephone and telegraph companies" shall be determined annually by the commissioner, subject to appeal to this Board.  The commissioner certifies his values to the telephone companies and to the boards of assessors of each city and town in which the companies' machinery, poles, wires and underground conduits, wires and pipes ("§ 39 property") is located.  The local assessors use the commissioner's certified values in their tax assessments of telephone companies' § 39 property.
Section 39 contains no definition of the phrase "telephone companies."  In determining whether an entity is a "telephone company" for purposes of § 39, the Supreme Judicial Court has determined that § 39 is a "remedial measure" that must be "construed and applied expansively in order to achieve the Legislature's goals."  RCN-BecoCom, LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue, 443 Mass. 198, 201 (2005).  In RCN, the Court held that a company "undeniably engaged in providing telephone services" was a telephone company for purposes of § 39 even though it provided Internet and cable television services in addition to wired telephone services.  Id.  
A review of the legislative history of § 39 reveals that the goal of the Legislature was to address the specific problem of valuing and assessing the distribution system of wired telephone and telegraph companies: 
The purpose of central valuation is to ensure consistency and competence in the valuation of parts of a Statewide system.  The central valuation system began in 1915, following a report from the tax commissioner setting forth local assessors' problems in attempting to value a portion of a system that crossed municipal boundaries and the resulting disparate valuations for affected companies.  Report of the Tax Commissioner for Year Ending November 30, 1914, Pub. Doc. No. 16, 27-30 (1915).  "It cannot be doubted that [§ 39] was intended to adopt the recommendation of the tax commissioner" to value certain property of telephone and telegraph companies centrally to rectify "inequality in standards of valuation."  Assessors of Springfield v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Company, 330 Mass. 198, 202 (1953).  

RCN, 443 Mass. at 199.  
In his report, the tax commissioner: 
forcefully directed attention to the difficulties involved in the assessing of poles, wires, and underground conduits by local assessors . . . who were obligated to place values upon fragments of a system which ought to be valued as a whole.  He complained that "there has thus grown up in the various cities and towns of the Commonwealth the greatest inequality in standards of valuation for poles, wires and underground conduits.  It has been impossible to establish any proper standard of depreciation or to secure adequate consideration of the factors of disuse and abandonment of property.  The companies themselves are put to unnecessary inconvenience, and justly complain of the various standards of valuation adopted by the different cities and towns.  They find themselves justly irritated where a line of poles and wires is valued at one basis of value per mile in one town and at quite another basis of value in the adjoining town, whereas the property in the two towns is the same in character, in cost of construction and in general condition."

Assessors of Springfield v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, 330 Mass. at 202.
	Unlike RCN and New England Telephone and Telegraph, Bell Atlantic Mobile has no physical distribution infrastructure that crosses municipal boundaries.  It owns none of the very property that concerned the Legislature in 1915 in enacting § 39 - poles, wires and underground conduits, wires and pipes.  The property that it does own does not present the type of difficulties which § 39 was intended to address; there is no evidence that Bell Atlantic Mobile's property crossed municipal boundaries, that depreciation, disuse or abandonment of property are relevant considerations for CMRS providers, or that its property in adjoining towns is of the same character, cost of construction, or condition. Accordingly, construing § 39 to include CMRS providers as among the "telephone companies" whose property is to be centrally valued would not serve to achieve the Legislative goal in enacting § 39.
In addition, when the Legislature enacted § 39 in 1915, radio communication was already in existence and presumably known to the Legislature.  For example, ship-to-shore radio communications were common and the Radio Act had been passed by Congress in 1912 governing access to radio frequencies.  Despite the existence of radio communications in 1915, the Legislature chose not to include radio communications within § 39.  
Relying on RCN, Bell Atlantic Mobile essentially argues that it is a telephone company because it provides telephone service, which it defines as two-way, party-to-party voice communication and data transmission. Because, in its view, it uses equipment similar to wired telephone companies to provide a service that crosses municipal boundaries, Bell Atlantic Mobile maintains that it is a telephone company for purposes of § 39.  Finally, it argues that RCN requires an expansive reading of § 39 that would include CMRS providers within its scope to avoid a "chill" in the advancement of telecommunications as new technology becomes available.  RCN, 443 Mass. at 203-4.
	In RCN, the Court rejected the Commissioner's argument that only entities "that engage solely in telephone or telegraph service, to the exclusion of any other business activity" such as Internet and cable television services are telephone companies for purposes of § 39.  RCN, 443 Mass. at 203.  The Court ruled that this interpretation was "overly restrictive and not consistent with the unambiguous language or underlying purpose of the statute.  The Legislature is quite capable of saying 'exclusive' when it means 'exclusive.'" Id. 
	Further explaining its rejection of an exclusivity test, the Court recognized that "traditional" telephone companies were providing other services and ought not to lose § 39 treatment as these companies made technological advances:
Neither does an exclusive interpretation comport with the historical role of telephone and telegraph companies that have provided services other than strictly land-based telephone or telegraph services, as the board discussed in its findings below.  Finally, adoption of an exclusivity test undoubtedly would act to chill advances in the telecommunication field as new technology becomes available, for fear of outpacing the 1915 definition of a "real" telephone company.

Id.
	In RCN, the Court and the Board were "faced with a company undeniably engaged in providing telephone services" and had to determine whether the company's provision of Internet and cable television services prevented it from coming within § 39.  RCN at 201.  The Board's detailed description of RCN's operation reveals the "undeniable" nature of its telephone services: it used a telephone switch to create dial tone and route calls similar to switches used by its telephone company competitors; it used other property at the switching facility dedicated solely to telephone service; it transported telephone, cable television, and Internet signal across a "fiber optic backbone" to "hubs" located in communities serviced by RCN; the signal was then distributed along the backbone to optical receivers located on telephone poles near customers' homes that transformed the signal to travel on coaxial cable; the signal was then delivered to customers over "line drops" connected to "residential service units" located on the outside of a customer's home or business; the telephone line was then separated out on twisted copper lines.  RCN-BecoCom, LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue, et al 2003 ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 410, 420-21.  
	In contrast, Bell Atlantic Mobile's distribution system does not rely on the extensive physical infrastructure of "fiber optic backbone," "cable," "line drops," "copper lines," or other equipment located on telephone poles or customers' homes or businesses.  Rather, the connectivity of its distribution network depends on the transmission and receipt of radio waves.  Further, its switching equipment is far more sophisticated and performs a function unnecessary in the wired telephone industry: monitoring the location of mobile users and switching cellular callers and receivers to different cell sites depending on their location.  Accordingly, while the equipment used by RCN was generally the same as any other land-line phone company, albeit adaptable to other uses such as Internet and cable television, Bell Atlantic Mobile's distribution equipment is markedly different, negating a finding that it is "undeniably" engaged in providing telephone service.  
	Another reason that RCN was found to be "undeniably engaged" in providing telephone service was that RCN was regulated as a telephone company.
From a regulatory standpoint, [RCN] submitted filings and was granted rights as a telephone company.  For example, [RCN] filed an operating Tariff with DTE.  Telephone and telegraph companies operating in Massachusetts were required to file Tariffs with DTE.  The Tariff filed by the Company identified all of the telephone services that it offered in the Commonwealth.  Under the Tariff, [RCN] was required to offer 411 or directory assistance, 911 or emergency service, operator service, and other such services customarily provided by telephone companies.  Any revisions to the Tariff had to be approved by DTE.  [RCN] also submitted Annual Telephone Returns to DTE in accordance with G.L. c. 166, § 11.

RCN 2003 ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 425.  As will be detailed in sections to follow, Bell Atlantic Mobile is not regulated as a phone company under chapter 166, is not subject to Tariffs and has not filed a telephone company return under G.L. c. 166, § 11 since 1993.
Further, the Court's concern that adoption of an exclusivity test "would act to chill advances in the telecommunication field as new technology becomes available for fear of outpacing the 1915 definition of a 'real' telephone company" (RCN, 443 Mass. at 203) is inapplicable to these appeals because wireless mobile communication is not an advancement in telephone technology; rather, it grew out of technological developments in radio technology. Telephone and radio technology grew on parallel but distinct tracks, as detailed in the Findings section of this Report.  When § 39 was enacted in 1915, the burgeoning telephone industry and its necessary distribution infrastructure of poles, wires and underground conduits, wires and pipes was spreading across Massachusetts and the country, with approximately six million land-line telephones in use.  Section 39 was enacted to address the problems with valuing and assessing this spreading infrastructure; its application to providers such as RCN in the early twenty-first century was still consistent with the legislative goal of enacting § 39, even with the technological advances in the telephone industry that allowed cable television and Internet connectivity signals to travel on the same cables and wires, given the extensive physical infrastructure RCN used in providing telephone and other services.  
In contrast, radio communications technology was basically providing one-way communications in 1915 using transmission and receiving equipment that did not traverse municipal boundaries.  The technology was being used primarily as ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications, and later by police departments, as well as for the broadcasting of programming by networks such as NBC.
When it finally became technologically feasible to offer mobile cellular communications to the general public in the early 1980s, there were over eighty million telephones in use, fiber optic cable offering multiple communication channels for land-line communication had been in use for over fifteen years, and AT&T had been forced to break up into seven "Baby Bells."  Despite the rapid development of cellular technology since the 1980s, there is still an absence of the physically interconnected multi-jurisdictional distribution infrastructure that was the problem which § 39 was enacted to remedy.  
	In addition, the Board found in RCN that RCN, like other wired telephone service providers, was a competitive local exchange carrier ("CLEC") under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-53.  RCN, 2003 ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 413, 422.  The 1996 Act required local exchange carriers ("LECs"), who were the established wired telephone service providers, to enter into interconnection agreements with CLECs to allow them to tie their own wired network into the LEC's existing, broader network.  RCN, 2003 ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 413.  See also G.L. c. 166, §§ 13 and 14.  The parties agree in the present appeals that Bell Atlantic Mobile in not a CLEC, an LEC, an incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC"), or a wired telephone company of any sort.
	In RCN, the Board relied on the extensive similarities between RCN and other § 39 telephone companies to determine that RCN, although providing services in addition to telephone service, qualified as a telephone company for purposes of § 39:
On the basis of these facts, the Board found that [RCN] used property, provided services, submitted regulatory filings, was granted rights, generated revenue, maintained connections, and allocated resources consistent with classification as a telephone company under § 39.  The mere fact that [RCN] provided other services and used progressive technology did not defeat its status as a telephone company under § 39 where its telephone service constituted a substantial part of its business.

RCN, 2003 ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 429.
	The issue presented by the present case is far different from that addressed in RCN.  RCN provided the same wired telephone service connecting one stationary user with another, employed the same physical distribution infrastructure, and was regulated by DPU/DTE in the same manner under G.L. c. 166, as any other wired telephone company that qualified for § 39 central valuation.  The Board and the Court agreed with RCN that providing other services, in addition to telephone service, should not deprive the company of telephone company status under § 39, where its telephone service constituted a substantial part of its business.  Id. and RCN, 443 Mass. at 204.
That analysis and determination is quite different from the question presented in these appeals of whether Bell Atlantic Mobile, whose service, technology, distribution infrastructure and regulatory environment are markedly different from wired telephone companies such as RCN, is still a telephone company for purposes of § 39.  The factual basis for the conclusion in RCN that RCN was "undeniably" providing telephone service cannot be made in these appeals; it cannot be found in these appeals that Bell Atlantic Mobile "used property, provided services, submitted regulatory filings, was granted rights, generated revenue, maintained connections, and allocated resources consistent with classification as a telephone company under § 39." RCN, 2003 ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 429.  Rather, the analysis of the Court and Board in RCN concerning the legislative history of § 39 and the factual similarities between RCN and other § 39 telephone companies support the Board's conclusion that Bell Atlantic Mobile is not a telephone company for purposes of § 39.
	Further, § 39 is part of the overall regimen of telephone company taxation in Massachusetts, which also includes G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 16(1)(d) (granting exemption for certain machinery owned by, among other entities, incorporated telephone companies taxable under G.L. c. 63, § 52A) and G.L. c. 63, § 52A (governing taxation of certain utility corporations, including telephone companies subject to G.L. c. 166).  As the following analysis details, Bell Atlantic Mobile is not a telephone company under any of those provisions, thereby further supporting the Board's conclusion that the taxpayer is not a § 39 telephone company.  See FMR Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 441 Mass. 810, 819 (2004) ("Where two or more statutes relate to the same subject matter, they should be construed together so as to constitute a harmonious whole consistent with the legislative purpose.").
CORPORATE UTILITY EXEMPTION
Under G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 16(1)(d), a foreign corporation subject to taxation under certain enumerated sections of G.L. c. 63, including § 52A, is exempt from property tax on all of its property other than "real estate, poles, underground conduits, wires and pipes, and machinery used in manufacture or in supplying or distributing water." 
In contrast, under G.L. c. 59, cl. 16(2), business corporations are taxable on "machinery used in the conduct of the business."  Accordingly, if Bell Atlantic Mobile is taxable under § 52A and therefore entitled to the exemption under cl. 16(1)(d), the only personal property it owns that would be subject to property tax would be its "machinery used in manufacture" - that is, its electrical generating equipment.  However, if it is not taxable under § 52A and is therefore not entitled to the exemption under cl. 16(1)(d), all of its machinery and equipment, including its antennae, transmitters, receivers, amplifiers, and switching equipment, would be subject to tax.
G.L. c. 63, § 52A
Section 52A provides that every "utility corporation" doing business in the commonwealth must pay an annual tax on its corporate franchise.  A "utility corporation" is defined in § 52A(1)(a) to mean:
(i) every incorporated electric company and gas company subject to chapter one hundred and sixty-four; (ii) every incorporated water company and aqueduct company subject to chapter one hundred and sixty-five; (iii) every incorporated telephone and telegraph company subject to chapter one hundred and sixty-six; (iv) every incorporated railroad and railway company subject to chapter one hundred and sixty; and every corporation qualified under section one hundred and thirty-one A of said chapter one hundred and sixty to acquire, own and operate terminal facilities for steam, electric or other types of railroad; (v) every incorporated street railway subject to chapter one hundred and sixty-one; (vi) every incorporated electric railroad subject to chapter one hundred and sixty-two; (vii) every incorporated trackless trolley company subject to chapter one hundred and sixty-three; (viii) every domestic or foreign pipe line corporation engaged in the transportation or sale of natural gas within the commonwealth; and (ix) every foreign corporation which is not subject to the above chapters but which does an electric, gas, water, aqueduct, telephone, telegraph, railroad, railway, street railway, electric railroad, trackless trolley or bus business within the commonwealth and has, prior to January first, nineteen hundred and fifty-two been subject to taxation under sections fifty-three to sixty, inclusive.

(emphasis added).  A review of the public utility corporations enumerated in § 52A reveals a common characteristic: an extensive physically interconnected distribution infrastructure, composed of wires, pipes, conduits or tracks strung over or laid in or under public ways or private property.  
Unlike the physical interconnectivity of the distribution networks employed by the § 52A utilities, the CMRS providers' network of cell sites and switching stations are "connected" by radio signals, with a minimal amount of wiring connecting the switching station to the land lines of local telephone companies.  Accordingly, Bell Atlantic Mobile's lack of a significant physical distribution infrastructure suggests that it is not a utility corporation for purposes of § 52A.  
	A utility's extensive infrastructure and other economic, operational, and technical characteristics of its business make it unlikely, if not practically impossible, for a second provider to enter the utility's business, resulting in a "natural monopoly" for the utility, in the absence of governmental intervention requiring access to the utilities infrastructure by other providers.  See, e.g., 47 USC § 251 (requiring telecommunication carriers to allow other telecommunication carriers to interconnect with their infrastructure).  For example, a gas company will incur a large initial capital outlay to purchase pipes, dig up streets, install pipes and other necessary distribution equipment, and connect to homes. It will also need to secure easements and government permits to install and access its distribution system.  It would make little practical and economic sense for a competitor to enter the market and essentially dig up the same streets and private property to lay a set of pipes parallel to the utility's pipes and attempt to gain market share from the utility's customers. 
As a result, government typically allows utilities like those listed in § 52A to operate as monopolies, in return for which the government regulates many aspects of the utility, including: its ability to enter a market and construct and maintain its infrastructure; the rates it can charge its customers; and, requiring access to its infrastructure by other providers.  See generally James C. Bonbright, et al., Principles of Public Utility Rates, at 17-25 (2d ed. 1988); 47 USC § 251.  Government regulation of utilities is evidenced by the fact that the definition of each utility mentioned in § 52A includes the statute by which that utility is regulated.  
The specific definitional reference in § 52A to the regulatory authority by which each utility is governed suggests that entities providing services similar to those offered by the utility, but not subject to the same regulatory statute, are not § 52A utilities.  For example, under § 52A(a)(1), electric and gas companies subject to chapter 164 are defined as utilities. Although both electricity and gas are used for home heating, that does not mean that companies selling other home-heating fuels, such as oil, coal, or wood, that have no extensive distribution infrastructure and are not regulated under § 164, would qualify as utilities for purposes of § 52A.
Similarly, there are a number of functional substitutes for rail and trolley transportation that do not have embedded physical infrastructures and are not subject to the regulatory statutes referenced in § 52A, including buses, taxis, trucks, airplanes, and boats.  However, it is only the enumerated trains and trolleys, regulated under specific sections of the General Laws, which constitute utilities taxable under § 52A.  
In an analogous situation, satellite television providers offer a service arguably similar to cable television providers; multi-channel and pay-per-view television programming.  While cable television providers, such as RCN, have a physical distribution infrastructure similar to wired telephone companies, satellite television providers use airborne waves, transmitters and receivers to distribute their service.  The Board is aware of no instance where satellite television providers have been held subject to the rate and entry regulation of cable television providers under G.L. c. 166A.
The specific section at issue in this appeal, § 52A(1)(a)(iii), requires that a telephone company be "subject to chapter one hundred and sixty-six."  Accordingly, chapter 166 must be analyzed to determine whether Bell Atlantic Mobile is subject to its provisions and therefore taxable as a utility corporation under § 52A and entitled to the personal property tax exemption under cl. 16(1)(d).
G.L. c. 166
Like G.L. c. 59, § 39 and G.L. c. 63, § 52A(1)(a)(iii), G.L. c. 166 contains no definition of the term "telephone company."  G.L. c. 166, § 11, does define the term "company" to include "every person, partnership, association and corporation engaged in the business of transmission of intelligence by electricity."  However, this definition provides only that all telephone and telegraph companies, regardless of the company's form of organization, must file the annual return required under § 11, but sheds no light on what constitutes a telephone company.  Further, the evidence in these appeals established that cellular handsets do not transmit intelligence by electricity; the electricity used to power the handset does not leave the phone and the "intelligence" is transmitted by radio waves.  Accordingly, G.L. c. 166 must be examined to determine whether CMRS providers are subject to its provisions.
Much of chapter 166 has nothing to do with CMRS providers in general or Bell Atlantic Mobile in particular.  The first sentence of the first section of chapter 166 states that a telegraph or telephone company "shall not commence the construction of its line" until certain stock subscription and filing requirements are met.  G.L. c. 166, § 1.  See also G.L. c. 166, §§ 2-10 (relating to certain financial requirements referenced in § 1); § 15D (relating to excavation of underground wires or cables); §§ 16-20 (relating to the provision of telegraph services); §§ 21-42B (relating to poles and wires). Bell Atlantic Mobile has no line to construct, underground wires or cables to excavate, telegraph services to provide, or poles or wires.  
Bell Atlantic Mobile relies on the annual return requirement under G.L. c. 166, § 11 as principal support for its argument that it is "subject to" chapter 166.  Section 11 provides in pertinent part:
Every telephone or telegraph company doing business in the commonwealth shall annually, on or before March thirty-first or such subsequent date as the department of telecommunications and energy, for good cause shown in any case, may fix, file with said department a report of its doings for the year ending December thirty-first preceding, which report shall be in such detail as the department prescribes, and shall be called the "Annual Return."

It is not disputed that prior to 1994, the Department of Public Utilities ("DPU"), the predecessor to the Department of Telecommunications and Energy ("DTE") referenced in § 11, required CMRS providers to file an annual return.  There is also no dispute that prior to 1994, G.L. c. 159, §§ 12-12D, not Chapter 166, authorized DPU to regulate the rates charged by CMRS providers and required that CMRS providers obtain a certificate of public necessity from DPU prior to offering service in Massachusetts.  
	On August 10, 1993, the federal Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 was signed into law, amending the Communications Act of 1934 by preempting state and local regulation of commercial and private mobile radio services.  In pertinent part, the amendment stated:
No state or local government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile service, except that this paragraph shall not prohibit a State from regulating the other terms and conditions of commercial mobile services.

47 USC 332(c)(3).  The amendment allowed states to petition the FCC for authority to regulate the rates of CMRS providers if the state could demonstrate that market conditions failed to protect subscribers from unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory rates or the CMRS is a replacement for a substantial portion of the land line services within the state.
	In response to the federal amendment, DPU issued DPU Order 94-73.  After conducting an investigation and reviewing written comments from interested parties, the DPU determined that:
Market forces in the state are adequate to protect the public from unjust and unreasonable wireless service rates or from rates that are unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory.  Also we find that wireless service in Massachusetts is not a replacement for land-line telephone exchange service for a substantial portion of the land-line exchange service within the Commonwealth.  Therefore, the Department shall not petition the FCC for authority to continue rate regulation of [CMRS providers] in Massachusetts.

DPU Order 94-73 at 13.  On the basis of its findings and conclusions, the DPU ordered that:
As of August 10, 1994, the Department will no longer regulate the rates of [CMRS providers] in Massachusetts . . . and will no longer regulate the entry of [CMRS providers] into the market.  We have found that market forces in the state are adequate to protect the public from unjust and unreasonable wireless service rates; these market forces also make it unnecessary for the Department to regulate other terms and conditions of [CMRS] in Massachusetts.  Therefore, as of August 10, 1994, the Department will not regulate other terms and conditions of [CMRS] in Massachusetts.

DPU Order 94-73 at 14.  In addition to determining that it would no longer regulate rates or entry of CMRS providers, the DPU also repealed its regulations at 220 CMR 35 et seq., promulgated pursuant to G.L. c. 159, § 12B, that governed the procedures by which DPU regulated CMRS providers.  DPU Order 94-73 at 15-16.
	There is no evidence that Bell Atlantic Mobile filed an annual return with DPU or DTE in any year since 1993.  Bell Atlantic Mobile failed to produce such a return at the hearing of these appeals, during discovery despite this Board's Order allowing Newton's Motion to Compel Further Discovery, or through its own witnesses.  Further, although G.L. c. 166, § 12 provides for penalties for failure to file the annual return required under § 11, there is no evidence that DPU or DTE took any enforcement action against Bell Atlantic Mobile or any CMRS providers for failure to file a return.  In contrast, DTE initiated enforcement actions in 2003 against some forty telecommunications companies for failure to file their annual returns; neither Bell Atlantic Mobile nor any CMRS provider was among those forty.  
	The fact that between 1988 and 1993 DPU sent Bell Atlantic Mobile's predecessors form returns and an undated and unsigned cover letter or "friendly reminder" that referenced the annual return requirement under chapter 166, and provided excerpts of both G.L. c. 166 and G.L. c. 159, does not establish that CMRS providers were subject to G.L. c. 166, § 11.  At most, all this proves is that prior to the federal amendment and DPU Order 94-73, someone at DPU sent forms and a cover letter referencing § 11 to CMRS providers; it proves nothing about whether Bell Atlantic Mobile was at any time subject to Chapter 166. Further, the evidence of record established that the letter and forms were sent out as an administrative or ministerial function and did not constitute a binding determination that CMRS providers were subject to the reporting requirements of § 11 or any other provision of G.L. c. 166.  Administrative "missteps" do not constitute an authoritative or persuasive interpretation of a relevant statute.  See BankBoston Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 156, 164 (2007) (ruling that Commissioner not bound by language in tax form and instructions).  
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, the Board ruled that at no time relevant to these appeals was Bell Atlantic Mobile subject to the annual reporting requirement of G.L. c. 166, § 11 and related §§ 12 and 12A.  In addition, Bell Atlantic Mobile has not shown that it was subject at any time to any provision of Chapter 166, which in context clearly refer and relate to wired telephone and telegraph companies.  For example, G.L. c. 166, §§ 1-10 concern the financial structure and integrity of a telephone and telegraph company, issues which are important to DPU/DTE in the case of an entity that has a franchise to operate a natural monopoly in an area, but not in the case of a competitive provider where the financial failure of an entity is not a public concern.  In addition, there is no evidence to show that DPU ever sought to regulate or enforce the provisions of §§ 1-10 against a CMRS provider.
Further, if CMRS providers were telephone and telegraph companies subject to chapter 166, DPU/DTE would have been obligated to impose utility assessments on CMRS providers pursuant to G.L. c. 25, § 18. Section 18 authorizes the DPU/DTE to assess:
against each electric, gas, cable television, telephone and telegraph company under the jurisdictional control of the department and each generation company and supplier licensed by the department to do business in the commonwealth, based upon the intrastate operating revenues subject to the jurisdiction of the department of each of said companies derived from sales within the commonwealth of electric, gas, cable television, telephone and telegraph service, respectively, as shown in the annual report of each of said companies to the department.

	Bell Atlantic Mobile was not included in the DPU/DTE utility assessment base for the relevant tax year because it did not file an annual return.  There is no evidence that DPU/DTE pursued Bell Atlantic Mobile or any other CMRS provider for failure to file an annual return or that it attempted to calculate Bell Atlantic Mobile's utility assessment by some alternative means.  The most reasonable inference from the failure of DPU/DTE to enforce the return filing and utility assessment obligations is that DPU/DTE concluded that Bell Atlantic Mobile and other CMRS providers were not public utilities.
CMRS providers do not fit legally or technologically within the statutory rubric of Chapter 166, which applies to entities distinctly different from competitive telecommunications providers without a physically interconnected infrastructure distribution system.  Like the other chapters referenced in § 52A, Chapter 166 is focused on the obligations of a traditional public utility, including: the construction and operation of its physical distribution system (e.g., §§ 21, 22, 22C through 22N, 25 through 27, 36-37, 39-40); its obligation to serve customers "without discrimination" throughout its franchise area (§§ 13, 14); and detailed financial oversight (§§ 1-10).  Rather, CMRS providers are more appropriately, and are in fact explicitly, governed by the statutory obligations imposed on all common carriers under G.L. c. 159.
G.L. c. 159
DPU/DTE is also charged with regulating common carriers under G.L. c. 159, § 12, which includes regulating "the transmission of intelligence within the commonwealth by electricity, by means of telephone lines or telegraph lines or any other method or system of communication."  G.L. c. 159, § 12(d) (emphasis added). It is not disputed that Bell Atlantic Mobile, as a provider of wireless cellular telecommunications services, constitutes a common carrier under G.L. c. 159, § 12(d). 
In addition to its general supervisory authority over common carriers, DPU/DTE is specifically authorized to regulate mobile radio telephone utility companies under G.L. c. 159, §§ 12A-12D.  A radio utility is defined in § 12A as "any person or organization which owns, controls, operates, or manages a mobile radio telephone utility system, except a land-line telephone utility or land-line telegraph utility regulated by" the FCC.  Section 12A goes on to define a mobile radio telephone utility as "any facility within the commonwealth which provides mobile radio telephone service, including one-way mobile radio telephone service, on a for-hire basis to the public, whether or not such mobile radio telephone service is provided on frequencies allocated to the Domestic Public Land Mobile Radio Services and whether or not such facility is interconnected with a public land-line telephone exchange network."  
Although the definition includes pagers, there is nothing to suggest that the section is limited to pagers; such a reading would render the rest of the provision superfluous.  See, e.g., Globe Newspapers Company v. Commissioner of Education, 439 Mass. 124, 129 (2003) ("In interpreting statutes, none of the words of a statute is to be regarded as superfluous").  If pagers were the only mobile radio telephone service that constituted a mobile radio telephone utility, the Legislature could clearly have so limited the definition, rather than making clear that pagers were included in the more general definition. See, e.g., Commissioner of Revenue v. Cargill, Inc., 429 Mass. 79, 82 (1999).
	Sections 12A through 12D were added to the General Laws by Chapter 936 of the Acts of 1973, entitled "An Act Placing the Massachusetts Mobile Radio Telephone Utility Companies Under the Jurisdiction of the Department of Public Utilities."  The 1973 legislation specifically differentiates between land-line telephone company utilities and mobile radio telephone service providers.  For example, § 12A defines a "radio utility" as "any person or organization which owns, controls, operates or manages a mobile radio telephone utility system,, except a land-line telephone utility or land-line telegraph utility regulated by the United States Federal Communications Commission." (emphasis added).
	Further, the regulation of mobile radio telephone utility systems under the 1973 legislation was made expressly inapplicable to any telephone and telegraph utility already regulated by the DPU.  See § 12D ("The provisions of sections twelve A to twelve C, inclusive, are not applicable to any telephone or telegraph utility regulated by the department or to the facilities, systems or services of such utilities.").  Such telephone and telegraph utilities included New England Telephone Company ("NET"), the major land-line telephone company in Massachusetts at the time the 1973 legislation was enacted.  See Wolf v. Department of Public Utilities, 407 Mass. 363, 368 (1990).  
In Wolf, the Court clearly distinguished between "telephone utilities" under the 1973 amendment, which it equated with land-line telephone companies, and the mobile radio telephone service providers which the amendment sought to bring within the regulatory authority of the DPU: "Wolf correctly notes that telephone utilities such as NET are excluded from the application of § 12B, see G.L. c. 159, § 12D, and that telephone utilities are excluded from the definition of "radio utility" in both G.L. c. 159, § 12A, and the transfer regulation, 220 Code Mass. Regs. § 35.02." (emphasis added).  The "telephone utilities" excluded from the definition of "radio utility" under § 12A are "land-line" telephone or telegraph utilities.
	Moreover, decisions and regulations promulgated by DPU/DTE uniformly cite chapter 159, and not 166, as the source of its regulatory authority.  In DPU Order 94-73 discussed above, which terminated state rate and entry regulation of CMRS providers based on the 1993 federal act preempting such regulation, the DPU states clearly that "G.L. c. 159, §§ 12, 12A-12D, provides the Department jurisdiction over [CMRS] in Massachusetts."  See also DPU Order 93-98 (deciding that CMRS providers "still would be required to file an annual return with the Department pursuant to General Laws Chapter 159, Section 32.").
	In DPU Order 95-59-B, the DPU explicitly refers to Chapter 159, not Chapter 166, in describing its residual regulatory authority over CMRS providers after federal preemption.  "Rather, the Budget Reconciliation Act did not completely preempt state regulation of CMRS carriers, and the Commonwealth retains meaningful authority under G.L. c. 159 to regulate CMRS carriers."  DPU Order 95-59-B at 2.  In all DPU decisions entered into evidence by the
parties, DPU explicitly refers to Chapter 159, not Chapter 166, as the statutory authority for its regulatory power over CMRS providers.
	Similarly, Chapter 159 is the enabling statute by which DPU derives its authority to promulgate regulations governing CMRS providers.  G.L. c. 159, § 12B provides that DPU "shall issue rules and regulations governing the issuance of certificates."  Similarly, G.L. c. 159, § 12C provides that the DPU "may establish rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this section."  Each and every one of the specific regulations found in 220 CMR § 35.00 et seq. specifically refers to G.L. c. 159, § 12B under the heading "Regulatory Authority."  None of the regulations found at 220 CMR § 35.00 et seq. reference Chapter 166.
	The DPU decisions and the regulations promulgated by DPU recognize that Chapter 159 is the source of DPU's regulatory authority over CMRS providers.  As the very agency charged with regulating CMRS providers, DPU's interpretation of their own regulatory authority is entitled to weight.  See Greater Media, Inc. v. Department of Public Utilities, 415 Mass. 409, 414 (1993). 

	Bell Atlantic Mobile argued that the Board should give weight to the determination of the Department of Revenue, embodied in an April 9, 1999 letter from the Department's General Counsel to representatives of the wireless industry and an April 13, 1999 internal memorandum, and implemented by the Department since that time, that CMRS providers may "reasonably be viewed" as utility corporations subject to Chapter 166 and therefore entitled to the utility exemption.  The 1999 determination, however, represented a change of direction by the Department, which in previous communications with the wireless industry had indicated that based on "changes in both federal and Massachusetts regulation," wireless providers were "not currently subject to Chapter 166."  In addition, internal memoranda dated August 21, 1997 ("SAM 97-13") and November 13, 1998 ("SAM 98-17") analyzed the relevant statutes and determined that CMRS providers: were not subject to Chapter 166; were not "utility corporations" under G.L. c. 63, § 52A; and, did not qualify for the utility exemption under G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 16(1)(d).

	It is clear that the Department's April, 1999 determination that CMRS providers were entitled to the utility exemption was a policy decision to extend the property tax exemption to CMRS providers.  Unlike the previous internal memoranda, which thoroughly analyzed the relevant statutory provisions to conclude that CMRS providers were not subject to Chapter 166, both the April 9, 1999 letter and the April 13, 1999 internal memorandum view the issue of whether CMRS providers were regulated under Chapter 159 or Chapter 166 as "not entirely clear" and concluded that it was "reasonable" to view CMRS providers as being subject to Chapter 166.  
	Departmental pronouncements based on policy determinations rather than statutory analysis are not entitled to weight.  See Bloomingdale's Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue 2003 Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 163, 189.  In addition, regulation of CMRS providers is not an area in which primary statutory interpretation is left to the Department of Revenue.  Administrative interpretations of the agency charged with interpreting a statute, if reasonable and adopted contemporaneously with the enactment or amendment of that statute, are accorded weight in interpreting that statute.
Lowell Gas Co. v. Commissioner of Corps. & Tax'n, 377 Mass. 255, 262 (1979); Ace Heating Service, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 371 Mass. 254, 256 (1976); Assessors of Holyoke v. State Tax Comm'n, 355 Mass. 223, 243-44 (1960).  However, it is DPU/DTE, not the Department of Revenue, who is charged with interpreting the statutes regulating telecommunications companies.  Finally, interpretations which are not consistent with the underlying statute are not accorded weight.  See Massachusetts Hospital Association, Inc. v. Department of Medical Security, 412 Mass. 340, 346 (1992) ("an incorrect interpretation of a statute . . . is not entitled to deference").  
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Board ruled that CMRS providers are regulated as common carriers, i.e. mobile radio telephone utilities, under Chapter 159, and not as telephone company utilities under Chapter 166.  
Although the inevitable conclusion of the Board's analysis of the foregoing statutes is that Bell Atlantic Mobile does not qualify for the corporate utility exemption under G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 16(1)(d), such a ruling in these appeals would be inappropriate, given the Board's ruling that Bell Atlantic Mobile is not a telephone company and
that § 39 therefore does not apply.  Such a ruling would be appropriate and warranted if it were found that § 39 was applicable and it is certainly appropriate for the Board to have so ruled in the § 65 appeals, which are not at issue in the Board's § 39 Decision and these Findings.
Rather, for purposes of these appeals, the Board analyzed the corporate utility exemption, as well as G.L. c. 63, § 52A and Chapter 166, to determine the overall legislative treatment of telephone companies for purposes of taxation and regulation.  Reading these statutes together, the Board ruled that Bell Atlantic Mobile simply does not fit within the concept of "telephone companies" governed by these provisions.  See FMR Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 441 Mass. at 819 (Where "two or more statutes relate to the same subject matter, they should be construed together so as to constitute a harmonious whole consistent with the legislative purpose."). 
	Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Board ruled that the proper interpretation of G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 16(1)(d), G.L. c. 63, § 52A, and G.L. c. 166
supports the Board's conclusion that Bell Atlantic Mobile is not a "telephone company" for purposes of G.L. c. 59, § 39.
  
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the Board ruled that as a CMRS provider, Bell Atlantic Mobile is not properly classified as a telephone company under § 39, based on the language of § 39 and its legislative history as interpreted by the Court and Board in RCN.  Further, interpreting related provisions concerning the taxation and regulation of telephone companies supports this conclusion. 
Bell Atlantic Mobile is not a telephone company subject to taxation under G.L. c. 63, § 52A because it is not a "utility" with an extensive physically interconnected distribution infrastructure and was at no time subject to Chapter 166.  Further, Bell Atlantic Mobile was not subject to Chapter 166 because its provisions are applicable to land-line telephone companies and DPU/DTE was authorized to regulate CMRS providers under Chapter 159, not Chapter 166.

Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Board ruled that Bell Atlantic Mobile is not a telephone company subject to central valuation of its machinery, poles, wires and underground conduits, wires and pipes under § 39.  The Board therefore issued decisions for the appellee cities and towns in docket numbers C267959 through C268176, C269027 and C269028 and a decision for the appellant Assessors of Newton in docket number C269569.

					THE APPELLATE TAX BOARD



By:____________________________________
    Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman






A true copy,

Attest:_____________________________
  	     Assistant Clerk of the Board

 A list of the 220 cities and towns named as appellees pursuant to G.L. c. 59, § 39 is appended to these findings.  
 Because the Board's decision in these appeals does not depend on whether the personal property at issue was owned by a corporation or an LLC, these Findings will use the term "Bell Atlantic Mobile" to refer to the LLC and Bell Atlantic Mobile, unless the context requires otherwise.
 Bell Atlantic Mobile conceded that generators and power equipment constitute "machinery used in manufacture" and do not qualify for the utility exemption, irrespective of the entity owning such equipment. 
 On July 16, 2004, Bell Atlantic Mobile also filed 220 appeals under G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65 seeking to recover the taxes paid to the 220 cities and towns in which Bell Atlantic Mobile owned machinery, on the grounds that such property is exempt from tax under G.L. c. 59, § 5, clause 16(1)(d) and that the property was overvalued.  These appeals have been stayed for the reasons detailed at pages 3-4 of these Findings. 
 There is no allegation that Bell Atlantic Mobile is a "telegraph" company.  Accordingly, the Board, like the parties, focuses on whether Bell Atlantic Mobile is a telephone company.
 In discussing the legislative history of § 39, the Court in RCN and Assessors of Springfield v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co. did not separately address a 1918 amendment which added "machinery" to § 39 property. See St. 1918, c. 138, § 1.  Since the Court looked to the legislative history of the original 1915 enactment in its interpretation of § 39, the Board infers that the addition of "machinery" to § 39 property was consistent with the original legislative intent behind the enactment of § 39.  Accordingly, machinery that is part of the physical distribution infrastructure of telephone and telegraph service should also be centrally valued to ensure consistency and competence in the valuation of portions of a statewide system that crosses municipal boundaries.
 The Commissioner raises similar arguments in support of its decision to centrally value Bell Atlantic Mobile's § 39 property.
 The Board is aware that this ruling is contrary to an Order of a Board Member issued in consolidated appeals by cellular mobile wireless providers for fiscal years 1991 and 1992 (Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., et al. v. Boards of Assessors of various cities, Docket Nos. 188474, etc. and New York Cellular Geographic Service Area, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, Docket No. 190799).  The Order was issued pursuant to a settlement and agreement between the parties and was signed by a single member of the Board.  The issue was therefore not fully litigated, nor did the Order constitute a final decision of the Board, which required the vote of a majority of Board members, not a single member.  See G.L. c. 58A, §§ 1 and 13. Accordingly, the Order does not constitute precedent in these appeals.
 Bell Atlantic Mobile relies solely on § 52A, which governs the taxation of utility corporations including telephone and telegraph companies, to support its argument that it qualifies for the exemption under G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 16(1)(d). 
 Bell Atlantic Mobile, organized nearly half a century after 1952, makes no argument that it is a utility corporation under § 52A(1)(ix).
 This minimal amount of wiring is apparently owned by the land-line phone companies, given Bell Atlantic Mobile's position that its only personal property subject to tax is its electrical generating equipment.
 Thirteen CMRS providers provided written comments to the DPU, giving some indication of the level of competition among CMRS providers.  DPU Order 94-73, at 2-3.
 The Commissioner's denial of the corporate utility exemption in these appeals is based on its status as an LLC, not because it is a CMRS provider.

ATB 2007-185