John Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 18837 v. Sex Offender Registry Board.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-334

JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 18837

vs.

SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, John Doe (Doe), appeals from a Superior

Court judgment affirming his reclassification by the Sex

Offender Registry Board (SORB) as a level three offender. Doe

argues that the hearing examiner abused his discretion by (1)

relying on uncorroborated hearsay evidence that Doe committed

additional sexual crimes, and (2) rejecting his expert's

opinion. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the facts as found by the hearing

examiner, "supplemented by undisputed facts from the record,"

and reserve certain facts for later discussion. Doe, Sex

Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,

459 Mass. 603, 606 (2011). Doe was classified as a level two
offender in January of 2002 after pleading guilty to rape of a

child in 2001. After a later incident involving a different

victim, Doe pleaded guilty to assault with intent to rape in

2009.

In November of 2021, SORB notified Doe of his duty to

register as a level three sex offender, based on recent

allegations that he had raped his ex-wife in 2018. Doe

challenged his level three reclassification based on his

acquittal of the 2018 charges.

After a de novo reclassification hearing in February and

May of 2023, at which Doe presented expert testimony in support

of his position that he posed a low risk of reoffending, a SORB

hearing examiner found that "[Doe] presents a high risk to re-

offend and a high degree of dangerousness," and therefore

ordered that he register as a level three offender. Doe filed a

complaint for judicial review in the Hampden Superior Court,

pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178M, and G. L. c. 30A, § 14. In

February of 2024, a Superior Court judge denied his motion for

judgment on the pleadings and entered a judgment affirming the

SORB hearing examiner's decision. Doe filed a timely appeal.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "We review a judge's

consideration of an agency decision de novo." Doe, Sex Offender

Registry Bd. No. 523391 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 95 Mass.

App. Ct. 85, 89 (2019) (Doe No. 523391). "To determine the

2
validity of an agency's decision, the reviewing court must

determine whether the decision is supported by substantial

evidence." Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 356011 v. Sex

Offender Registry Bd., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 73, 76 (2015), quoting

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10216 v. Sex Offender

Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 779, 787 (2006). In reviewing SORB's

decision, "we 'give due weight to the experience, technical

competence, and specialized knowledge of the [board].'" Doe,

Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex Offender Registry

Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 602 (2013), quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).

Doe therefore "bears a heavy burden of establishing that

[SORB's] decision was incorrect." Doe, Sex Offender Registry

Bd. No. 3177 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 486 Mass. 749, 757

(2021) (Doe No. 3177), quoting Boston Police Dep't v. Civil

Serv. Comm'n, 483 Mass. 461, 469 (2019). We may set aside

SORB's decision on a determination that the decision is

unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious,

an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with the law. See

Doe No. 3177, supra at 754.

2. Reliance on hearsay. Doe argues that the hearing

examiner abused his discretion by admitting and crediting

"uncorroborated hearsay evidence" that Doe had raped his ex-

wife, even though Doe was acquitted at trial. We disagree.

3
"The range of evidence that may be considered by hearing
examiners is not limited by the same rules of evidence that
apply in court proceedings; hearing examiners may exercise
their discretion to admit and give probative value to
evidence 'if it is the kind of evidence on which reasonable
persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious
affairs.'"

Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 339940 v. Sex Offender

Registry Bd., 488 Mass. 15, 26 (2021), quoting G. L. c. 30A,

§ 11 (2). "[H]earsay evidence bearing indicia of reliability

constitutes admissible and substantial evidence" (citation

omitted). Id. "Such indicia include 'the general plausibility

and consistency of the victim's or witness's story, the

circumstances under which it is related, the degree of detail,

the motives of the narrator, the presence or absence of

corroboration and the like.'" Id. at 26-27, quoting Doe, Sex

Offender Registry Bd. No. 10304 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 70

Mass. App. Ct. 309, 313 (2007). "The lack of a criminal

conviction does not render information contained within a police

report inadmissible in an administrative proceeding." Doe No.

523391, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 90. "[T]he board may consider

subsidiary facts . . . including subsidiary facts resulting in

acquittals, where those facts are nonetheless proved by a

preponderance of the evidence." Doe No. 3177, 486 Mass. at 757.

Here, the examiner properly considered the ex-wife's

detailed, consistent statements describing the multiple

incidents in which Doe allegedly raped her. The hearing

4
examiner had discretion to credit reliable hearsay statements,

and his consideration of the ex-wife's allegations was

adequately supported by his findings of fact establishing their

reliability. 1 Because the examiner determined that the ex-wife's

statements to police were sufficiently reliable, he did not

abuse his discretion in finding that Doe raped his ex-wife by a

preponderance of the evidence. See Doe No. 3177, 486 Mass. at

757.

3. Expert testimony. Doe argues that the hearing examiner

abused his discretion by disregarding expert testimony that Doe

posed a low risk of reoffending. Again, we disagree.

"Doe is not entitled to a guarantee that SORB will reach

the same conclusion as his expert; he is entitled only to

careful consideration of his expert's testimony." Doe, Sex

Offender Registry Bd. No. 23656 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,

483 Mass. 131, 137 (2019). Hearing examiners are not required

to accept expert opinions, but examiners are required to

Specifically, the hearing examiner found that the ex-wife
1

was able to recall specific facts, the ex-wife was able to give
a timeframe for the alleged assaults, and the alleged assaults
were factually similar to a previous sexual assault in 2000 to
which Doe pled guilty. See Doe No. 523391, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at
89 ("Common indicia of reliability include a detailed account
. . . [and] the consistency of the hearsay incident with other,
known behavior").

5
articulate a reasoned basis for rejecting uncontradicted expert

evidence. See id.

The examiner properly laid out his reasons for rejecting

the expert's assessment. The expert opined that Doe posed a low

risk of reoffending, despite his score of four on the Static-99R

assessment, which placed him in the "moderate-high" category

with an estimated 9.2% group recidivism rate over a period of

five years. The expert explained, however, that in his view the

ex-wife's allegations should not be considered in connection

with Doe's Static-99R risk assessment because he had been

acquitted of those crimes. In that event, the expert noted that

Doe would have received a score of two on the Static-99R

assessment, placing him in the average range to reoffend. But,

for the reason explained above, the hearing examiner permissibly

relied on the evidence that Doe had raped his ex-wife in

determining his risk of reoffense. Accordingly, the examiner

was also permitted to reject an expert opinion that did not

6
consider the evidence that Doe had raped his ex-wife in

determining his risk of reoffense.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Meade,
Desmond & Wood, JJ. 2),

Clerk

Entered: January 14, 2026.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

7