Commonwealth v. Todd J. Medeiros.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-431

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

TODD J. MEDEIROS.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury trial in the District Court, the defendant

was convicted of motor vehicle homicide by negligent operation,

G. L. c. 90, § 24G (b). The defendant appeals, challenging the

judge's decision not to give a requested jury instruction. We

affirm.

Background. In the early morning on June 23, 2019, the

defendant was driving eastbound in his pickup truck on American

Legion Highway. The weather was clear, and the sun was low on

the horizon. Because the "blinding" sun was in front of him,

the defendant put the truck's visor down and adjusted it several

times. He had a pair of sunglasses nearby in the vehicle, but

he did not put them on.
As the defendant approached an intersection, he noticed an

oncoming truck in the westbound lane, activated his left turn

signal, and came to a complete stop. After the oncoming truck

passed, the defendant made a left turn, and his vehicle struck

the victim's motorcycle. The victim was thrown from the

motorcycle to the side of the road, and he died shortly after

the collision from the injuries he suffered. The defendant

testified that he did not see the victim's motorcycle prior to

turning. He further testified that, a second or two after

beginning to make his turn, he was "blinded" by solar glare that

was no longer obstructed by his truck's visor.

Discussion. The defendant argues that the judge erred in

denying his request for a supplemental instruction regarding

intervening and superseding causes. See Instruction 5.160 of

the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District

Court, supplemental instruction (2009).1,2 Specifically, he

1 Model Jury Instruction 5.160 was revised in 2023 and no
longer includes a supplemental instruction concerning
intervening and superseding causes. See Instruction 5.160 of
the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District
Court (2023). Because this case was tried prior to the adoption
of the revised instructions, we discuss only the version of the
instructions that was applicable at the time the judge
instructed the jury.

2 The supplemental instruction requested by the defendant
provided, in relevant part, as follows:

"[T]he law does not consider the defendant to be the cause
of the death, and therefore must be acquitted, if some

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contends that solar glare acted as an intervening, superseding

cause of the victim's death, and that a supplemental jury

instruction was warranted in light of both the substantial

testimony at trial concerning the bright conditions on the

morning of the collision, and the defendant's testimony that he

was "blinded" after beginning to turn his vehicle. Because the

defendant objected to the judge's denial of his request to

instruct the jury on superseding and intervening causes, "we

review the denial . . . for prejudicial error." Commonwealth v.

Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 678 (2019). The denial of a requested

jury instruction is reversible error only if the instruction is

"(1) substantially correct, (2) was not substantially covered in

the charge given to the jury, and (3) concern[ed] an important

point in the trial so that the failure to give it seriously

impaired the defendant's ability to effectively present a given

defense" (emphasis omitted). Commonwealth v. DeGennaro, 84

other person or event was the direct and substantial cause
of the death, and the defendant's actions were only a minor
and remote link in the chain of events leading to the
death. The defendant must also be acquitted if the death
would not have occurred without the intervention of some
other person or event, and a reasonable person in the same
circumstances would not have foreseen the likely
possibility of such a result."

Instruction 5.160 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for
Use in the District Court, supplemental instruction (2009).

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Mass. App. Ct. 420, 431 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Adams,

34 Mass. App. Ct. 516, 519 (1993).

Here, the judge correctly instructed the jury on the

elements of motor vehicle homicide by negligent operation in

accordance with the model jury instructions, including the

standard instruction on causation. See Instruction 5.160 of the

Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court

(2009).3 The jury were instructed to consider all the facts when

determining whether the defendant acted negligently, including

"what the time of day was, [what] the weather and the condition

of the road were, [and] what any other vehicles . . . were

doing." We discern no error.

"[T]he appropriate standard of causation to be applied in a

negligent vehicular homicide case . . . is that employed in tort

law" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Angelo Todesca Corp.,

446 Mass. 128, 141 (2006). "[N]egligent conduct is the

proximate cause of an injury . . . [if] the injury to the

3 That instruction provides:

"The defendant caused the death if his actions directly and
substantially set in motion the entire chain of events that
produced the death. The defendant is the cause of the
death if his actions produced it in a natural and
continuous sequence, and the death would not have occurred
without the defendant's actions."

Instruction 5.160 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for
Use in the District Court (2009).

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[victim] was a foreseeable result of the defendant's negligent

conduct." Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 320 (2002).

"This formulation is not altered when the original negligent act

is followed by an independent act or event that actively

operates in bringing about a [victim's] injury, that is, a so-

called intervening cause," unless "the intervening event was of

a type so extraordinary that it could not reasonably have been

foreseen, [in which case,] that new event is deemed to be the

proximate cause of the injury and relieves a defendant of

liability." Delaney v. Reynolds, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 239, 242

(2005).

Our cases generally recognize intervening causes of harm as

those unforeseen events or acts of victims or third parties that

are independent, direct, and substantial causes of harm that

come after defendants' initial negligence. See, e.g., Purchase

v. Seelye, 231 Mass. 434, 436-437 (1918) (despite negligence of

victim's employer, surgeon's subsequent operation on wrong side

of injured victim was "wholly wrongful, independent and

intervening cause" of injury); Delaney, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at

244-245 (jury could find plaintiff's act of shooting herself was

intervening, superseding cause of her injury, relieving

defendant of liability for leaving loaded gun unsecured).

Here, the defendant does not cite to any Massachusetts

authority, and we are aware of none, to support the proposition

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that a weather condition such as solar glare might constitute an

unforeseen, intervening cause of a victim's death in a motor

vehicle collision, warranting a supplemental jury instruction or

otherwise relieving the defendant of liability for his initial

negligence. Because the solar glare was therefore not an

"independent act or event that actively operate[d] in bringing

about" the victim's death, Delaney, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 242,

and the defendant's act of turning into oncoming traffic and

striking the victim's motorcycle with his truck was more than

merely a "minor and remote link in the chain of events leading

to the death," Instruction 5.160 of the Criminal Model Jury

Instructions for Use in the District Court (2009), there was no

error in the judge's instructions to the jury here.

Moreover, even if the solar glare could be considered an

independent act or event, it is uncontested that the defendant

was aware of the "blinding" sun well before he reached the

intersection, and that he adjusted his visor several times to

account for it. It is further uncontested that the defendant

came to a complete stop and had an opportunity to look for

oncoming traffic with an unobstructed view. It was only after

beginning to turn his vehicle into the victim's lane of travel

that the defendant was "blinded" by the solar glare. In these

circumstances, even if we assume without deciding that solar

glare amounted to an independent "event," as an "intervening

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occurrence[, it] was foreseeable by [the] defendant, [and so]

the causal chain of events remain[ed] intact and the original

negligence remain[ed] a proximate cause of [the victim's]

injury." Delaney, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 242. See R.L. Currie

Corp. v. East Coast Sand & Gravel, Inc., 93 Mass. App. Ct. 782,

785-786 (2018) (third party causing property damage through

unauthorized use of defendant's idling front-end loader could be

reasonably foreseeable consequence of defendant's failure to

secure equipment). The judge, therefore, did not err in

declining to give a separate instruction on intervening and

superseding causes. See Commonwealth v. Anestal, 463 Mass. 655,

674 (2012) ("there must be some basis in evidence, viewed in the

light most favorable to the proponent, supporting the requested

instruction" [citation omitted]).

Separately, the defendant was afforded ample opportunity to

argue his theory of defense as presented through opening and

closing statements, his own testimony, and testimony elicited

from witnesses concerning weather conditions and solar glare on

the morning of the collision. Accordingly, the defendant was

not prejudiced by the judge's refusal to provide the requested

instruction. See Adams, 34 Mass. App. Ct. at 519-520 (absence

of instructions on inferences jury may draw did not undercut

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defense or prejudice defendant where defense counsel urged jury

to make those inferences in closing argument).

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Hand, Grant &
Wood, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: July 29, 2025.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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