COMMONWEALTH vs. JENNIFER L. ANGELO.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1259
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
JENNIFER L. ANGELO.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
On May 13, 2013, the defendant, Jennifer L. Angelo,
admitted to sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty on a
charge of operating a motor vehicle under the influence (OUI),
G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1), in the District Court. Following
the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Commonwealth v.
Hallinan, 491 Mass. 730 (2023), the defendant filed a motion for
a new trial on June 18, 2024. The defendant appeals from the
judge's (motion judge) order denying the motion for a new trial.
Concluding that the defendant's waiver of counsel at the time of
her plea was invalid, we reverse the denial of the defendant's
motion for a new trial and remand the case for further
proceedings if the Commonwealth wishes to seek a new trial.

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Background. On March 18, 2013, the defendant was arraigned
on charges of OUI, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1); negligent
operation of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a); and a
civil infraction for a marked lanes violation, G. L. c. 89,
§ 4A. On the date of her arraignment, the defendant signed a
waiver of counsel form and proceeded as a self-represented
litigant.1 At a hearing on May 13, 2013, the defendant,
representing herself, admitted to sufficient facts to warrant a
finding of guilty on the OUI charge.2 A judge (plea judge)
conducted a plea colloquy and accepted the defendant's tender of
plea.
On June 18, 2024, the defendant filed a motion for a new
trial arguing that: (1) misconduct by the State police office
of alcohol testing tainted her plea, rendering her admission
unknowing and involuntary;3 and (2) her plea hearing was
1 The audio recording of the arraignment is unavailable.
Because we conclude below that the plea colloquy was defective
and the defendant's waiver of counsel was invalid at the time
she pleaded, the absence of a recording or transcript of the
arraignment is not material to our determination. See
Commonwealth v. Barros, 494 Mass. 100, 108 (2024) (defendant's
waiver of counsel must be valid at any stage of case).
2 The Commonwealth dismissed the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle charge; the defendant was found responsible on the
civil infraction, and it was placed on file.
3 Because we conclude a new trial is warranted based on the
defendant's invalid waiver of counsel, we need not and do not
reach this argument.

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defective because she did not validly waive her right to
counsel. After hearing argument on the motion, the motion judge
denied the defendant's motion in an order dated October 3, 2024.
Discussion. The Commonwealth concedes that, as the
defendant argues, a new trial is warranted because the plea
judge's colloquy regarding waiver of counsel was inadequate. We
agree.
"As a general matter, we review a judge's denial of a
defendant's motion for a new trial to determine whether there
has been a significant error of law or other abuse of
discretion." Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 487 Mass. 370, 374
(2021).
"[W]henever a defendant elects to waive the right to
counsel -- whether at arraignment or at a plea hearing -- a
trial court judge bears the 'serious and weighty responsibility'
of ascertaining whether that waiver is made knowingly and
intelligently" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Barros, 494
Mass. 100, 101 (2024). "Under art. 12 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights, a criminal defendant's waiver of the
right to counsel must be made knowingly and intelligently, with
adequate[] aware[ness] of [(1)] the seriousness of the charges,
[(2)] the magnitude of [the] undertaking, [(3)] the availability
of advisory counsel, and [(4)] the disadvantages of self-

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representation" (quotation and citation omitted). Id. at 100-
101.
On review, we assess the defendant's subjective
understanding of their choice to waive their right to counsel
and the consequences thereof. See Barros, 494 Mass. at 105.
"[A] trial court judge may not forgo ascertaining that a
defendant's waiver of counsel is made knowingly and
intelligently at any stage of a case -- even if a defendant
expresses an intent to enter a plea as opposed to going to
trial." Id. at 108. Where a record demonstrates that "a waiver
of counsel was not knowing and intelligent, vacatur of the plea
will be required for structural error." Id. at 113.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the
plea judge's inquiry of the defendant during the plea colloquy
was insufficient to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived her right to counsel. See Barros, 494 Mass.
at 106 ("We confirm that art. 12 always requires this inquiry to
ensure that a defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing and
intelligent, at any stage of a case"). The plea judge asked the
defendant only two questions related to the defendant's waiver
of counsel:
Q.: "Okay. You represented yourself in this matter,
you're satisfied you were able to do that, or do you need
time to talk to somebody?"
A.: "I'm satisfied."

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Q.: "You're satisfied you were able to represent
yourself?"
A.: "Yes."
The plea judge never informed the defendant that she had
the right to advisory counsel, and he failed to discuss the
seriousness of the charges against her or the magnitude of the
undertaking of self-representation and its dangers and
disadvantages. See Barros, 494 Mass. at 101 ("the inquiry
required will depend on the individual defendant and the
circumstances of the case, but the judge should ascertain that
each element of the standard for a knowing and intelligent
waiver is met"). Because the plea judge failed to make a proper
inquiry to ascertain that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived her right to counsel, we conclude that her
waiver of counsel was invalid.
The order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial is
reversed. The conviction is vacated, and the defendant is to be
permitted to withdraw her plea. The case is remanded to the

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District Court for further proceedings, including a new trial
should the Commonwealth choose to pursue one.
So ordered.
By the Court (Hershfang,
Tan & Allen, JJ.4),
Clerk
Entered: October 13, 2026.
4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.