Department of State Police v. State Police Association of Massachusetts (AC 25-P-321) (October 13, 2026)

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25-P-321 Appeals Court
DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE vs. STATE POLICE ASSOCIATION OF
MASSACHUSETTS.
No. 25-P-321.
Suffolk. June 11, 2026. - October 13, 2026.
Present: Vuono, Neyman, & Smyth, JJ.
State Police. Police, Authority of police chief, Collective
bargaining. Contract, Collective bargaining contract.
Labor, Grievance procedure. Arbitration, Collective
bargaining. Public Employment, Managerial prerogative.
Practice, Civil, Judgment on the pleadings.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
September 28, 2023.
The case was heard by Robert L. Ullmann, J., on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
Laurel Kennedy for the defendant.
Daniel Brunelli for the plaintiff.
SMYTH, J. General Laws c. 22C, § 18 (§ 18), inserted by
St. 1991, c. 412, § 22, establishes that the colonel of the
State police (colonel) "may, in the event of any public
emergency, or of any unusual demand for the services of members
of the state police . . . or whenever he deems it in the public

2
interest, require such members to work additional hours of duty
and prevent such members from taking time off." The issue in
this appeal is whether the colonel may cede authority under § 18
to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the
Department of State Police (department) and the State Police
Association of Massachusetts (union). A Superior Court judge
concluded that the colonel's authority under § 18 to mandate
that department members work additional hours and prohibit time
off on Independence Day in 2022 was nondelegable because it
involved a core managerial function of the colonel that
implicated public safety. Based on this conclusion, the judge
allowed the department's motion to permanently stay arbitration
of a union grievance alleging that the department violated a
prior agreement to not strictly enforce § 18.
The union now appeals, arguing that the judge erred in
permanently staying arbitration because (1) the union and
department expressly incorporated § 18 into the CBA in 1999, and
(2) the colonel's authority under § 18 is "conditional and fact-
specific, requiring an arbitration record from which to render
an opinion as to its viability." Because we conclude that the
grant of authority under § 18 is essential to the colonel's
public safety mandate, and thus is nondelegable, we affirm.
Background. In 1999, the parties agreed to incorporate
into their existing CBA a side letter of agreement (side

3
letter), which expressly subjected the colonel's authority under
§ 18 to collective bargaining. The side letter provided, in
pertinent part,
"The events associated with Marathon Monday/Patriot's Day1
and 4th of July holidays, in and of themselves, will not be
considered public emergencies, or unusual demands for
services, or a need in the public interest . . . .
"The provisions of this Side Letter of Agreement shall be
subject to the grievance/arbitration provisions of the
Employer/Association collective bargaining agreement, and
shall be coterminous with the duration of this Agreement
. . . ."
Beginning in 2013, the colonel issued an annual memorandum
informing department members that they could be required to work
overtime "for the July 4th Celebration on the Esplanade" in
Boston, and further, that all requests for time off on July 3
through July 5 would be denied, with limited exceptions. The
annual memorandum stated that this order was necessary "to
ensure that the Department is at full operational readiness for
July 4th." On May 10, 2022, the colonel issued one such
memorandum regarding staffing for Independence Day that year.
On July 25, 2022, the union submitted a grievance, pursuant
to article 22 of the parties' CBA, alleging that the department
violated the side letter by requiring members to work additional
hours and prohibiting time off on July 4, 2022. The grievance
1 The Boston Marathon, held annually on the third Monday in
April, coincides with Patriot's Day.

4
was scheduled for arbitration on February 6, 2024. However, on
September 28, 2023, the department filed a complaint and
application in the Superior Court to stay arbitration alleging,
inter alia, that the union's attempt to arbitrate the colonel's
staffing order pertaining to Independence Day interfered with
the colonel's exercise of "nondelegable, statutory authority."
The union opposed, asserting as an affirmative defense that its
grievance was subject to arbitration. The department
subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings in July 2024.
Following a hearing, the judge allowed the department's motion
and permanently stayed arbitration after concluding that § 18
grants the colonel the nondelegable authority "to perform the
narrow and important public safety function of ensuring that
there are enough Department members to handle large crowds at
events and other gatherings, in this instance July 4th events at
the Esplanade."
Discussion. We review a judgment on the pleadings de novo.
See Merriam v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 464 Mass. 721, 726
(2013).
1. Colonel's authority under § 18. The union argues that
the judge erred in ruling that § 18 grants the colonel the
nondelegable authority to order department members to work
additional hours on July 4, 2022, effectively rendering the side
letter a nullity.

5
General Laws c. 150E, enacted in 1973, protects the rights
of public employees to collectively bargain "with respect to
wages, hours, standards [of] productivity and performance, and
any other terms and conditions of employment." Somerville v.
Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 470 Mass. 563, 564
(2015). The statute imposes "significant obligations on public
employers with respect to" public employees' collective
bargaining rights, including the employer's obligation to
negotiate those rights in good faith. Board of Higher Educ. v.
Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 483 Mass. 310, 311
(2019). However, as our courts have long recognized, there is a
"tension between the statutory right of public employees to
bargain collectively the terms and conditions of their
employment with public employers and the Legislature's intent to
bestow upon those employers nondelegable managerial
responsibilities." Id. at 310. See Chief Justice for Admin. &
Mgt. of the Trial Court v. Commonwealth Employment Relations
Bd., 79 Mass. App. Ct. 374, 380-381 (2011). Although "there is
a strong public policy favoring collective bargaining between
public employers and employees over the conditions and terms of
employment," (quotation and citation omitted), Board of Higher
Educ., supra at 319, when "a negotiation requirement would
unduly impinge on a public employer's freedom to perform its
public functions, G. L. c. 150E, § 6, does not mandate

6
bargaining over a decision directly affecting the employment
relationship" (citation omitted), Worcester v. Labor Relations
Comm'n, 438 Mass. 177, 180 (2002).
Rather, the Supreme Judicial Court has determined that
there are "certain types of managerial decisions that must, as a
matter of policy, be reserved to the public employer's
discretion," and may not be bargained away. Worcester, 438
Mass. at 180-182. The inquiry of whether a managerial decision
is exempted from mandatory bargaining is "directed towards
defining the boundary between subjects that by statute, by
tradition, or by common sense must be reserved to the sole
discretion of the public employer so as to preserve the intended
role of the governmental agency and its accountability in the
political process." Id. at 181, quoting Lynn v. Labor Relations
Comm'n, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 178 (1997). In making such
determinations, the Supreme Judicial Court has adopted the
nondelegability doctrine, which limits the reach of G. L.
c. 150E, "in those circumstances where public policy requires
that a public employer reserve certain personnel matters to its
sole discretion in order to preserve accountability to the
public in the performance of the essential functions of
government." Dracut v. Dracut Firefighters Union, IAFF Local
2586, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 374, 379 (2020).

7
One such managerial prerogative is that of police chiefs,
or commissioners, to make public safety decisions, which include
making determinations about staff assignments. Such core
determinations are nondelegable and thus not subject to
collective bargaining. See, e.g., Boston v. Boston Police
Superior Officers Fed'n, 466 Mass. 210, 215-216 (2013) (police
commissioner's authority to assign and transfer officers is
nondelegable statutory power); Worcester, 438 Mass. at 182-183
(city has nondelegable authority over "allocation of resources,"
assignment of officers, and law enforcement priorities);
Framingham v. Framingham Police Officers Union, 93 Mass. App.
Ct. 537, 545-546 (2018) (police chief's authority to transfer
and assign officers is "within [his] exclusive purview . . .
pursuant to G. L. c. 41, § 97A, and the doctrine of
nondelegability"); Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers
Fed'n, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 907, 908 (1990) (police commissioner
not required to bargain over temporary assignments made to meet
"demands of public safety"). In fact, this court has recognized
that "[t]he protection of a public employer's management
prerogative is particularly strong where, as here, the
prerogative concerns policy judgments in the allocation and
deployment of law enforcement resources." Saugus v. Saugus Pub.
Safety Dispatchers Union, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 901-902 (2005).
See Dracut, 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 382 n.12.

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The union argues, however, that § 18's grant of authority
is not beyond the reach of G. L. c. 150E's protection for
collective bargaining because (1) the colonel relinquished his
power to consider "Marathon Monday/Patriot's Day" and
Independence Day as public emergencies, events that cause an
unusual demand for services, or events that create a need in the
public interest, as those terms are used in § 18, by
incorporating the side letter into the CBA, and (2) § 18 is not
sufficiently "specific, clear, forceful, and unambiguous" to
allow for application of the nondelegability doctrine, and thus
should yield to the terms of the CBA. We are not persuaded.
The present case implicates the colonel's authority to
fulfill the department's public safety mandate pursuant to the
State police statute, G. L. c. 22C. As relevant here, the
colonel is, by statute, the "executive and administrative head
of the department and shall have charge of the administration
and organization thereof." G. L. c. 22C, § 3.2 In addition, the
2 Pursuant to G. L. c. 22C, § 3, the colonel is authorized
"to organize such divisions, bureaus, sections and units as the
colonel deems necessary for the effective management of the
department and, when the colonel deems necessary for such
purpose, may abolish or consolidate such divisions, bureaus,
sections or units. The colonel shall, except as otherwise
provided, direct all inspections and investigations. The
colonel shall make all necessary rules and regulations for the
government of the department, for reports to be made by
employees of the department and for the performance of the
duties of said employees."

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colonel is authorized to assign to each of the four divisions of
the State police "such uniformed members and other employees
. . . as he may deem necessary to carry out its duties." G. L.
c. 22C, §§ 4-8. In the context of a police chief assigning
certain officers to conduct background investigations, we
concluded that the chief's assignment decision implicated public
safety, rested in the "exclusive managerial prerogative of the
chief," and was not delegable to collective bargaining or
subject to arbitration. New Bedford v. New Bedford Police
Union, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 502, 507 (2020). Thus, the issue of
nondelegability turns on whether § 18 similarly grants the
colonel authority to make managerial decisions that are core to
the colonel's public safety mandate.
Our decision in Andover v. Andover Police Patrolmen's
Union, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 167, 170 (1998), is instructive to our
analysis. In that case, we vacated portions of an arbitration
award after concluding that a police chief's statutory authority
to order mandatory overtime on Independence Day was a core
managerial function and thus nondelegable under G. L. c. 41,
§ 97A.3 Andover, supra. Here, § 18 similarly provides the
3 General Laws c. 41, § 97A, confers on a chief of police
"immediate control . . . of the police officers, whom he shall
assign to their respective duties and who shall obey his
orders."

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colonel with a specific managerial directive -- to mandate that
union members report to duty "in the event of any public
emergency, or of any unusual demand for the services of members
. . . or whenever he deems it in the public interest" -- which
is core to the colonel's statutory authority and implicates
public safety. The nondelegability doctrine requires that the
colonel be able to make such decisions when public safety so
requires without interference from collective bargaining. See
Department of State Police v. Massachusetts Org. of State Eng'rs
& Scientists, 456 Mass. 450, 455, 457, 462 (2010) (colonel's
exclusive and nondelegable authority under G. L. c. 22C, § 9, to
appoint, transfer, and remove civilian experts and other
department assistants would be undermined by arbitration);
Worcester, 438 Mass. at 182 (allocation of resources among
competing enforcement priorities is reserved to sole discretion
of public employer and is not proper subject of bargaining).
We disagree with the union's argument that for § 18 to be
nondelegable, it would have to specify "in no uncertain terms
that the Colonel can force Association members to work on the
Fourth of July." The doctrine of nondelegability does not
require such statutory specificity but instead applies to
statutory grants, including those that are broadly worded,
concerning authority core to the employer's mandate. See
Framingham, 93 Mass. App. Ct. at 542 ("Even in the absence of

11
express legislative language, police chiefs are inherently
vested with general managerial authority over employees 'where
matters of public safety are concerned'" [citation omitted]).
In choosing not to enumerate in § 18 every permissible decision
the colonel could make in the "public interest" or in response
to an "unusual demand for services," the Legislature has left
those decisions to the province of the colonel.
Indeed, the statutory grant authorizing the colonel to
assign overtime hours and to prevent employees from taking time
off due to public safety needs or an unusual demand for services
must be reserved to the sole prerogative of the colonel in order
to preserve the colonel's ability to perform his core duties and
maintain accountability in the political process. See Lynn, 43
Mass. App. Ct. at 178. The union's argument that an arbitrator
should be allowed to determine whether the colonel met the
burden of showing that the May 10, 2022, memorandum regarding
staffing for Independence Day was supported by an unusual demand
for services is thus foreclosed by the Legislature's broad and
explicit grant of authority to the colonel as set forth in the
State police statute, G. L. c. 22C, §§ 2, 3, 18.
Moreover, the colonel cannot relinquish authority granted
under § 18 to collective bargaining. Boston Police Superior
Officers Fed'n, 466 Mass. at 216 ("a nondelegable authority may
not be delegated to an arbitrator, even with the parties'

12
consent"). Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 41 Mass.
App. Ct. 269, 270 n.3 (1996) ("The fact that the city agreed to
arbitrate the grievance is of no legal consequence if the issue
is beyond the authority of the arbitrator"). Cf. Boston
Firefighters Union, Local 718, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters,
AFL-CIO v. Boston, 491 Mass. 556, 566 (2023) (city "not free to
bargain away certain elements of [its] nondelegable authority
and responsibility to act for the public health, safety, and
welfare, because the public interest . . . impose[s] a necessary
limitation upon the collective bargaining process" [quotations
and citation omitted]).4 Accordingly, the colonel may not be
bound by the side letter because it would compromise the
statutory grant of authority to allow the colonel to assign
officers to meet the demands of public safety.
We further note that "where there is a conflict between a
statute and the parties' collective bargaining agreement, the
collective bargaining agreement shall prevail if the statute is
one that is enumerated [in G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d)]" (quotation
4 We note that the public interest in allowing the colonel
to pursue the State police mandate by enforcing § 18 overrides
any equitable considerations arising from the colonel
unilaterally revoking the side letter agreement. See Municipal
Light Co. of Ashburnham v. Commonwealth, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 162,
167 (1993) ("Generally, the principles of estoppel are not
applicable against the government in connection with its
exercise of public duties, particularly when the government is
acting in the public interest and safety, as its duly
constituted officials see that interest").

13
and citation omitted). Somerville, 451 Mass. at 496. Contrary
to the union's argument, there is a conflict between the side
letter to the CBA and § 18 because the former compromises the
colonel's "freedom to perform [his] public functions" (citation
omitted). Worcester, 438 Mass. at 180. Where, as here, a
statute, not enumerated in G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d), authorizes a
public employer to perform specific functions, the public
employer's explicit statutory authority to perform its functions
cannot be undermined by the terms of a CBA or subject to
arbitration. See Andover, 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 170 ("nothing in
§ 7 [d] purports to displace the general authority vested in a
police chief by § 97A to order his officers to a mandatory
overtime deployment when, in his judgment, the public safety so
requires").
2. Permanent stay of arbitration. The union argues that
the judge's permanent stay of arbitration was premature because
the claim sought to be arbitrated states a controversy covered
by the CBA. For the reasons articulated above, we disagree. As
relevant here, a judge may stay an arbitration proceeding after
finding "that the claim sought to be arbitrated does not state a
controversy covered by the provision for arbitration and
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the
arbitration provision are not themselves made subject to
arbitration." G. L. c. 150C, § 2 (b). See Department of State

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Police, 456 Mass. at 455. Although the side letter incorporates
an agreement to arbitrate, "[a]n agreement to arbitrate a
dispute which lawfully cannot be the subject of arbitration [is]
equivalent to the absence of a controversy covered by the
provision for arbitration." Massachusetts Coalition of Police,
Local 165, AFL-CIO v. Northborough, 416 Mass. 252, 256 (1993),
quoting Dennis-Yarmouth Regional Sch. Comm. v. Dennis Teachers
Ass'n, 372 Mass. 116, 119 (1977). See Framingham, 93 Mass. App.
Ct. at 544, citing Massachusetts Coalition of Police, Local 165,
AFL-CIO, supra at 255 ("even if the CBA provided otherwise, it
could not abrogate the police chief's authority to transfer,
assign, and deploy officers according to the police chief's
discretion").
We thus conclude that because the colonel's authority to
order department members to work additional hours on
Independence Day could not legally be the subject of
arbitration, the judge did not err in staying arbitration of the
union's grievance.
Conclusion. The judgment allowing the department's motion
and permanently staying arbitration is affirmed.
So ordered.