USA v. Surani et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

SHARJEEL SURANI (1)
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§
§
§
§

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 4:25-cr-
00037-ALM-AGD-1

REPORT AND RECOMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pending before the court is Defendant Sharjeel Asif Surani’s (“Defendant”) Motion to
Suppress Search of Residence and Supporting Brief (“Residence Motion”) (Dkt. #39) and Motion
to Suppress Search of Warehouse and Supporting Brief (“Warehouse Motion”) (Dkt. #40). After
considering the motions (Dkt. #39; Dkt. #40), the Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion
to Suppress Residential Search (“Residence Response”) (Dkt. #44), the Government’s Response
to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Warehouse Search (Dkt. #45) (“Warehouse Response”), and
all other relevant filings, the court recommends that Defendant’s motions (Dkt. #39; Dkt. #40) be
denied.
1

I. BACKGROUND
On November 21, 2024, Special Agent Sean Reilly (“Agent Reilly”) from the Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) submitted an Application for a Warrant by Telephone or
Other Reliable Electronic Means (“Residence Application”) to Magistrate Judge Bill Davis (Dkt.
#39-2, at p. 1). Therein, Agent Reilly sought a search warrant for 2076 Hidalgo Lane, Frisco,
Texas, Defendant’s primary residence (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 3). Agent Reilly began by detailing his
law enforcement background, experience with drug-related offenses, and knowledge in the area of

1
Likewise, the court recommends that Defendant’s Motion for Return of Property Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41(g), (Dkt. #38), should be denied as well.
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money laundering as it concerned drug trafficking (Dkt. #39-2, at pp. 3-5). Agent Reilly explained
his investigation into Defendant in his Application, through which he claimed supported a finding
of probable cause for the search of Defendant’s residence (Dkt. #39-2, at pp. 7-44).
On December 3, 2024, Earl Green (“Detective Green”), a detective with the Farmers
Branch Police Department, submitted an Affidavit for Search Warrant (“Warehouse Affidavit”) to
Criminal Judicial District Court 5, of Dallas County, Texas (Dkt. #40-1, at pp. 2-15). Detective
Green largely relied upon Agent Reilly’s Residence Application to support a search of 2099 Valley
View Lane, Farmers Branch, Dallas County, Texas, a warehouse (Dkt. #40-1, at pp. 4-13). On
December 3, 2024, Judge Carter Thompson signed the search warrant for that address (Dkt. #40-
1, at p. 15).
Throughout the course of his investigation into Defendant, Agent Reilly learned through a
confidential informant (“CS”) that Defendant owned SS Distro, a “wholesale supplier [of nicotine
and tobacco products] for smaller retail stores in the state of Texas” (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 7). Agent
Reilly’s investigation uncovered that SS Distro was engaged in the “repackaging and relabeling of
large amounts of illegal flower marijuana...and the product [was] then resold as CBD/HEMP
products throughout numerous areas within the Dallas-Fort Worth area and also other cities such
as Houston (TX) and San Antonio (TX)” (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 7). Further, Agent Reilly was informed
that the repackaging and relabeling was done at a warehouse located at 2099 Valley View Lane,
Farmers Branch, Dallas County, Texas (Dkt. #39- 2, at p. 7). The warehouse housed several
companies that Defendant owned (Dkt. #39-1, at p. 2).
Undercover officers conducted two controlled purchases through the CS at the warehouse
(Dkt. #39-2, at pp. 10-13). The first buy at the warehouse, on July 16, 2024, was for twelve
products (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 10). Of the twelve purchased products, two contained psilocin, “a
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Schedule I substance under the Controlled Substances Act” (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 11). The rest tested
positive for “a Delta-9 Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration” above .3 percent
2
(Dkt. #39-
2, at p. 11). A second controlled purchase took place at the warehouse on August 27, 2024 (Dkt.
#39-2, at p. 12). During that purchase, twenty products were bought (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 12). Of the
twenty products, one contained psilocin and two others contained a concentration of Delta-9 THC
above the legal limit (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 13).
In 2023, several tobacco/nicotine shops in Arlington, Texas were raided by police (Dkt.
#39-2, at p. 8). As such, retail customers of SS Distro “began asking SS Distro for laboratory
reports to confirm that the product[s] that they were purchasing from SS Distro and subsequently
selling were in fact legal in the state of Texas” (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 8). As such, SS Distro “began
producing laboratory reports that indicated [its] products to be within legal limits” (Dkt. #39-2, at
p. 8). However, the CS informed Agent Reilly that the laboratory results that SS Distro provided
to customers did not match the products that customers were purchasing (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 8). This
was later confirmed on September 14, 2024, by Christopher Hammer (“Hammer”), “a source of
supply for marijuana being distributed by SS Distro” (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 13). Specifically, Hammer
told the CS on a recorded line that he was providing Kamran Lakhani (“Lakhani”) with falsified
reports (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 14). The reports proclaimed that the products contained a legal amount
of Delta-9 THC, when the shipped products actually had illegal limits of Delta-9 THC (Dkt. #39-
2, at p. 14). According to the CS, Lakhani was one of Defendant’s business partners in SS Distro
(Dkt. #39-2, at p. 7) and a broker for SS Distro’s marijuana (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 13).
On March 25, 2024, Karim Thawar (“Thawar”) was arrested with twenty pounds of black-
market marijuana in Oklahoma (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 11). He claimed that he did not know what he

2
0.3 percent is the legal limit for THC products (Dkt. #39, at p. 11).
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was going to do with the black-market marijuana in the future and that he had never trafficked
illegal drugs (Dkt. #39-2, at pp. 11-12). Thawar was another business partner in SS Distro with
Defendant, according to the CS (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 7). On July 30, 2024, Thawar was interviewed
by police regarding the case against Defendant (Dkt. #39-2, at pp. 11-12). Thawar admitted to
owning a gas station with Defendant in Oklahoma but never mentioned SS Distro (Dkt. #39-2, at
p. 12). However, text messages between Thawar and the CS indicate that Thawar was engaged in
trafficking marijuana from Oklahoma to Texas (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 12).
On August 3, 2024, Farmers Branch Police Department officers responded to an alarm call
at the warehouse (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 12). Upon arrival, a door that only had pin-code access and
seemingly remained shut and locked normally, was cracked open (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 12). As such,
responding offers could access the room (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 12). When they did so, the officers
observed several boxes in the room that contained a “green leafy substance” (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 12).
The CS informed Agent Reilly that Defendant was engaged in “money laundering and [the
creation of] ghost companies to assist in [] transferring large amounts of [money,] involving checks
from the wholesale vape shops to and from other Limited Liability Companies (LLC) owned by
[Defendant]” (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 9). Thus, a financial analysis was conducted on Defendant and the
various companies he owns (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 15). The analysis uncovered the constant movement
of money, usually large sums, between Defendant’s various bank accounts that were associated
with different companies (Dkt. #39-2, at pp. 16-23).
In September and October 2024, 2076 Hidalgo Lane, Frisco, Texas, was confirmed to be
Defendant’s primary residence (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 14). Moreover, the residence was used as a
“business address of multiple companies managed by [Defendant] to include SURANI Capital
LLC and 4076 Spring Valley LLC, which are businesses identified as suspected money laundering
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vehicles following a preliminary financial investigation into [Defendant] and his associates” (Dkt.
#39-2, at p. 15). Additionally, Defendant and the residence were listed on signature cards for two
separate bank accounts that were suspected of being involved in Defendant’s money laundering
scheme (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 16).
3
Accordingly, Agent Reilly specified in his Residence Application
that a search of the residence would “result in the seizure of documents and evidence to support
the sale of controlled substances and money laundering allegations related to [Defendant] and his
companies” (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 24) (emphasis added).
Agent Reilly’s Residence Application specifically noted that agents sought to seize “[l]arge
amounts of United States and/or foreign currency (exceeding $1,000) or readily transported assets
which are used as cash equivalents to include but not limited to, cashiers’ checks, bearer bonds,
precious metals, precious jewels, safes, etc.” as evidence and instrumentalities of violations of 18
U.S.C. § 1956, and conspiracy to commit that crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Dkt. #39-
2, at p. 42). Agent Reilly explained that in his experience “individuals normally maintain records
of their financial activity at their businesses and in their residences, including receipts for
expenditures by cash and check, bank records, sales invoices, business expense receipts and other
financial documents. [Further,] individuals, who operate businesses, legitimate and otherwise,
frequently maintain business and personal records at their businesses and residences” (Dkt. #44-
1, at p. 4). Judge Davis signed Agent Reilly’s search warrant on November 11, 2024 (Dkt. #39-2,
at p. 45).
Detective Green averred that based on his experience with the possession and sale of
controlled substances, and based upon Agent Reilly’s information, he believed “that evidence of
[the Manufacturing and Delivery of a Controlled Substance and Money Laundering] [wa]s [] to be

3
The accounts were with “Hanmi Bank (Dallas, Texas)” and ended “in 8441 (Power Builders LLC) and 201398665
([Defendant] and Nazreen Merchant)” (Dkt. #39-2, at p. 16).
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found in the [warehouse] and device(s) to be searched” (Dkt. #45-1, at pp. 3-4, 13). As such, Judge
Thompson signed the warehouse search warrant (Dkt. #45-1, at p. 15). The search warrant
authorized the search of the warehouse and seizure of
[p]hysical and digital evidence related to narcotics trafficking and money
laundering including: Bank statements, credit/debit card statements, pay-owe
sheets, ledgers, buyer lists, seller lists, ledgers, records of sales, records of
expenditures drugs or chemicals and apparatus used to manufacture drugs, US
currency, cashier checks, real estate documents, precious metals, jewelry, labels,
packaging, both legal and illegal narcotics and precursors, marijuana, THC, buyer
lists, telephone lists, address books, calendars, cellular telephones, laptops/desktop
computers, digital storage devices, surveillance cameras, hard drives, DVR's, police
radios, anti-bugging devices, scanners, video tapes, photographs, and negatives,
firearms, and vehicles purchased with illicit funds and/or utilized in the listed illegal
activities

(Dkt. #40-5, at p. 14).
On December 4, 2024, officers executed the search warrant of the residence and the
warehouse (Dkt. #39, at p. 1; Dkt. #40, at p. 1). On February 27, 2026, Defendant filed his
Residence Motion and Warehouse Motion (Dkt. #39; Dkt. #40). Therein, Defendant requests that
“the court enter an order suppressing from use at trial suppressing all evidence seized from” the
residence and warehouse (Dkt. #39, at p. 4; Dkt. #40, at p. 4). On March 27, 2026, the Government
filed its Residence Response and Warehouse Response (Dkt. #44; Dkt. #45). In both, the
Government asks the that the court “deny the motion[s] to suppress because (1) the agents
executing the warrant relied on the search warrant affidavit in good faith, and (2) the affidavit to
the neutral magistrate established probable cause” (Dkt. #44, at p. 1; Dkt. #45, at p. 1).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against unreasonable searches and seizures”
and secures them in “in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.” U.S.
CONST. AMEND. IV. “With
some limited exceptions, it requires police officers to secure a search warrant supported by
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probable cause prior to effecting a search or seizure.” See United States v. Ortega, 719 F. App'x
319, 323 (5th Cir. 2018). Regardless, a search and subsequent seizure may still violate a party’s
Fourth Amendment protections, despite being executed under the presumed protection of a search
warrant. See id.
“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not require the suppression of evidence obtained as a result
of objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant...” United States v. Cherna, 184 F.3d 403, 407 (5th
Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Rather, the Fifth Circuit “conducts a two-part inquiry to determine
whether a seizure conducted pursuant to a search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.” United
States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830, 835 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). The first inquiry examines
whether the seizure “falls within the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.” Id. (citation
omitted). The good-faith exception examines “‘the objectively ascertainable question [of] whether
a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the
magistrate's authorization.’” Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 n. 23 (1984)). If
the good-faith exception does not apply, the second part of the inquiry is triggered; otherwise the
inquiry ends. Id. In the second portion of the inquiry, the court “determines whether the magistrate
issuing the warrant had a ‘substantial basis for believing there was probable cause for the search.’”
Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 2000)).
In United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court concluded “that evidence obtained by officers
in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance upon a search warrant is admissible, even though the
affidavit on which the warrant was based was insufficient to establish probable cause.” United
States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing 468 U.S. 897, at 922-23). “This
rule does not apply where the warrant is based on an affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’” Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S.
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897, at 923). However, “[w]hen a warrant is supported by more than a ‘bare bones’ affidavit,
officers may rely in good faith on the warrant's validity.” Id. at 321. A “bare bones” affidavit is
one that contains “wholly conclusory statements, which lack the facts and circumstances from
which a magistrate can independently determine probable cause.” Id. (citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Here, “reasonably well trained officer[s] would have known that the search[es]...” of the
residence and warehouse, pursuant to the applicable search warrants, were legal. See Allen, 625
F.3d 830, 835. As such, the seizure of property at the residence and warehouse “falls within the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, Defendant’s
motions should be denied.
Defendant argues that “the court enter an order suppressing from use at trial [] all evidence
seized from” his residence and the warehouse (Dkt. #39, at p. 3; Dkt. #40, at p. 4). In his Residence
Motion, Defendant asserts that “the search warrant affidavit contains some boilerplate language
about what drug traffickers normally and commonly do as far as storing drugs and paraphernalia
and keeping records. However, the affidavit states no particular or specific facts establishing
probable cause that such items were likely to be found in the residence searched by agents” (Dkt.
#39, at p. 3). In the Warehouse Motion, Defendant claims that “the search warrant affidavit fails
to establish the reliability and credibility of the CI” and “[a]fter removing the information provided
by the CI, the search warrant is completely devoid of probable cause to search the warehouse”
(Dkt. #40, at p. 3).
In the Residence Response, the Government asserts that “[D]efendant does not challenge
the officers’ good-faith reliance” on the search warrant and “the agents were entitled to rely on it
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because it was obtained in good faith” (Dkt. #44, at p. 3). In the Warehouse Response, the
Government sets forth the same argument (Dkt. #45, at p. 2).
The Government correctly directs the court to the Fifth Circuit’s two-part inquiry test to
determine whether evidence may be suppressed when it was obtained pursuant to a search warrant
(Dkt. #44, at p. 2; Dkt. #45, at p. 2). As detailed above, the Fifth Circuit first determines “whether
a seizure conducted pursuant to a search warrant” falls within “the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule.” Allen, 625 F.3d at 835. The good-faith exception applies when the affidavit
used to obtain the search warrant was more than bare bones, i.e. not “wholly conclusory statements,
which lack the facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can independently determine
probable cause.” Satterwhite, 980 F.2d at 321.
Here, the Residence and Warehouse Warrants were supported by extensively detailed
affidavits (Dkt. #44-1; Dkt. #45-1). Therein, Agent Reilly and Detective Green each explained
their training and experience in the field of narcotics investigations (Dkt. #44, at pp. 3-7; Dkt. #45,
at pp. 3-4). Further, both law enforcement officers included a robust summary of the investigation
into SS Distro, Defendant’s company (Dkt. #44, at pp. 7-24; Dkt. #45, at pp. 4-13). That summary
included information about the ownership structure of SS Distro, the location of activities related
to SS Distro, surveillance of the warehouse and residence, controlled buys at the warehouse,
Defendant and his various companies’ financial transactions, interviews/recorded calls with
known affiliates of Defendant, and observations made within the warehouse (Dkt. #44, at pp. 7-
24; Dkt. #45, at pp. 4-13). These affidavits were not “wholly conclusory statements” that lacked
“facts and circumstances from which” Judge Davis and Judge Thompson could “independently
determine probable cause.” See id. As such, they were more than bare bones and the good-faith
exception applies. See id. at 320-21. Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s two-part inquiry ends here and the
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searches and seizures conducted pursuant to the Residence and Warehouse Warrants did not
violate Defendant’s Fourth Amendment protections. Allen, 625 F.3d at 835.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends that Defendant Sharjeel Asif Surani’s
Motion to Suppress Search of Residence and Supporting Brief (Dkt. #39) and Motion to Suppress
Search of Warehouse and Supporting Brief (Dkt. #40) should be DENIED. Likewise, the court
recommends that Defendant’s Motion for Return of Property Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(g) (Dkt. #38) should be DENIED as well.
Within fourteen (14) days after service of the magistrate judge’s report, any party must
serve and file specific written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate
judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific
finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed
determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing
before the magistrate judge is not specific.
Failure to file specific, written objections will bar the party from appealing the unobjected-
to factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with notice that
such consequences will result from a failure to object. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n,
79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).

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