MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for an Order to Show Cause why the FBI Should not be Held in Contempt (Dkt. 190) and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Evidence and Supplemental Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for an Order to Show Cause why the FBI Should not be Held in Contempt (Dkt. 211) are hereby DENIED. Signed by Chief District Judge Amos L Mazzant on 3/24/2026. (baf)•Huddleston v. Federal Bureau of Investigation
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for an Order to Show Cause why the FBI Should not be Held in Contempt (Dkt. 190) and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Evidence and Supplemental Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for an Order to Show Cause why the FBI Should not be Held in Contempt (Dkt. 211) are hereby DENIED. Signed by Chief District Judge Amos L Mazzant on 3/24/2026. (baf)District Court Txed24 de mar. de 2026
United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
BRIAN HUDDLESTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION and UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-447
Judge Mazzant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for an Order to Show Cause why the FBI
Should not be Held in Contempt (the “Motion”) (Dkt. #190) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
File Supplemental Evidence and Supplemental Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for an Order
to Show Cause why the FBI Should not be Held in Contempt (the “Supplemental Motion”)
(Dkt. #211). Having considered the Motion, the Supplemental Motion, and the relevant pleadings,
the Court finds that the Motion and the Supplemental Motion should be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This Memorandum Opinion and Order arises in the context of a dispute between Plaintiff
Brian Huddleston and Defendants Federal Bureau of Investigation (the “FBI”) and the United
States Department of Justice (the “DOJ,” and collectively, the “Government”). A full and
thorough review of this Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) case is readily gleaned from the
introductory portion of the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order on the parties’ prior
cross- motions for summary judgment (Dkt. #70) and the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and
Order on the parties’ prior motions for clarification (Dkt. #136).
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The issue before the Court concerns Seth Rich’s (“Rich”) work laptop, a DVD, and a tape
drive (collectively referred to as the “Work Laptop”), along with a CD containing an image of his
personal laptop (the “Personal Laptop”). On November 28, 2023, the Court ordered the
Government to “produce a Vaughn index addressing the information it possesses on the work
laptop and personal laptop,” and further clarified that “[t]he Vaughn index must address the
metadata contained within Seth Rich’s work laptop” (Dkt. #136 at pp. 24–25). Rather than produce
any information outright, the Government elected to move for summary judgment, which the
Court ultimately denied (Dkt. #175).
On August 16, 2024, the Court ordered the Government to conduct “a
document- by- document review of the information it possesses on the compact disk containing
images of Seth Rich’s personal laptop, Seth Rich’s work laptop, the DVD, and the tape drive that
is responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA requests” (Dkt. #176 at p. 6). It further ordered that the
Government either produce Vaughn indexes addressing such information or file a motion for
summary judgment regarding the same by February 7, 2025 (Dkt. #176 at p. 7). That deadline was
later extended to March 10, 2025 (Dkt. #187). The Government subsequently produced multiple
indexes relating to the Personal Laptop and Work Laptop, which Plaintiff reviewed and ultimately
found insufficient (Dkt. #196 at p. 4).
On April 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed the present Motion, asking the Court to sanction the FBI
in light of its alleged failure to comply with the Court’s August 16, 2024 Order, along with other
relief associated with such failure (Dkt. #190 at p. 2). On May 6, 2025, the FBI filed its Response
(Dkt. #196). 6 days later, Plaintiff filed his Reply (Dkt. #198), which was ultimately followed by the
FBI’s Sur-reply (Dkt. #201). Later, on November 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Supplemental Motion
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and asked the Court to consider additional evidence and briefing contained therein (Dkt. #211).
The FBI filed a Response to that Supplemental Motion as well (Dkt. #212), and Plaintiff once again
filed his Reply (Dkt. #213).
LEGAL STANDARD
A district court has the inherent authority to impose sanctions “in order to control the
litigation before it.” NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696, 703 (5th Cir.
1990), aff’d sub nom. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991). This power may be utilized to
sanction conduct which abuses the judicial process. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45. Such conduct has
taken on many forms, including a party’s “willful disobedience of a court order” and its actions
taken in “bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Id. at 45–46 (citation
modified). Inherent power, however, “may be exercised only if essential to preserve the authority
of the court.” Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 86 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir.
1996).
Contempt of court is a unique form of discipline and may take on either a civil or criminal
form. M. D. by Stukenberg v. Abbott, 119 F.4th 373, 378 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom., M. D.
By Next Friend Stukenberg v. Abbott, 146 S. Ct. 99 (2025). “Whether a contempt order is civil or
criminal turns on the ‘character and purpose’ of the sanction involved.” Id. (quoting Gompers v.
Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911)).
Criminal contempt is a “punitive” imposition, applied “retrospectively for a completed act
of disobedience.” See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994)
(citation modified). Criminal contempt invokes criminal penalties, which “may not be imposed on
someone who has not been afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal
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proceedings.” Id. at 826. The elements of a conviction for criminal contempt, which must be
proven by the movant beyond a reasonable doubt, are: (1) a contemptuous act; and (2) a willful,
contumacious, or reckless state of mind. United States v. McCargo, 783 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1986).
In contrast, civil contempt is intended to compel obedience with a court order. See In re
Bradley, 588 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2009) (“If the purpose of the sanction is to coerce the
contemnor into compliance with a court order, or to compensate another party for the contemnor’s
violation, the order is considered purely civil.”). “A party commits contempt when he violates a
definite and specific order of the court requiring him to perform or refrain from performing a
particular act or acts with knowledge of the court’s order.” SEC v. First Fin. Grp. of Tex., Inc., 659
F.2d 660, 669 (5th Cir. 1981).
In a civil contempt proceeding, the movant bears the burden of establishing the elements
of contempt by clear and convincing evidence. SEC v. Res. Dev. Int’l LLC, 217 F. App’x 296, 298
(5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford Enters., Inc., 826
F.2d 392, 401 (5th Cir. 1987)). Those elements are three-fold: (1) a court order is or was in effect;
(2) the order requires certain conduct; and (3) the opposing party fails to comply with the court
order. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 228 F.3d 574, 581 (5th Cir. 2000); Martin v. Trinity
Indus., Inc., 959 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1992). Finally, “[t]he contemptuous actions need not be willful
so long as the contemnor actually failed to comply with the court’s order.” Am. Airlines, Inc., 228
F.3d at 581; see N.L.R.B. v. Trailways, Inc., 729 F.2d 1013, 1017 (5th Cir. 1984).
ANALYSIS
I. Standing
The FBI first argues that Plaintiff no longer has standing to pursue this legal action and
challenges Plaintiff’s ability “to seek to hold Defendant in contempt for violating any court order”
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on that ground (Dkt. #196 at p. 4). To support its argument, the FBI points to a motion entitled
“Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Parties” (Dkt. #164). That motion informed the Court that “Mr.
Huddleston has transferred his interest in this case to Mr. Miller” and further requested that the
Court “substitute Mr. Miller as the named plaintiff” (Dkt. #164). This attempted substitution was
opposed and ultimately rejected by this Court as insufficient under FED. R. CIV. P. 25(c) (Dkt. #204
at p. 4). Nevertheless, the FBI alleges that Plaintiff’s transfer of interest has destroyed his personal
stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and has thus deprived the Court of jurisdiction regardless of
the name listed on the title of the case (Dkt. #212 at p. 3).
The Court finds the FBI’s argument contrary to both the plain text of Rule 25(c) and Fifth
Circuit precedent. Rule 25(c) provides:
(c) Transfer of Interest. If an interest is transferred, the action may be continued
by or against the original party unless the court, on motion, orders the transferee to
be substituted in the action or joined with the original party. The motion must be
served as provided in Rule 25(a)(3).
FED. R. CIV. P. 25(c).
While a district court “may direct that the person to whom the interest has been transferred
be substituted,” it is under no obligation to do so. In re Covington Grain Co., Inc., 638 F.2d 1357,
1361 (5th Cir. 1981). This is because “Rule 25(c) is not designed to create new relationships among
parties to a suit but is designed to allow the action to continue unabated when an interest in the lawsuit
changes hands.” Id. at 1364 (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff purportedly transferred his interest in this case to one “Mr. Miller”
(Dkt. #164). Thus, “the action may be continued by or against the original party unless the court,
on motion, orders the transferee to be substituted in the action . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 25(c). Even
though the Court has denied Plaintiff’s previous request for substitution without prejudice, the
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original named party may continue the case (Dkt. #204). This ruling is consistent with the purpose
of Rule 25(c). See, e.g., Christiana Tr. v. Riddle ex rel. Riddle, 819 F. App’x 255, 256 (5th Cir. 2020)
(per curiam) (unpublished) (holding that a plaintiff’s assignment of interest while a lawsuit was
pending did not render the case moot, as “a live controversy—albeit between different
parties— persisted”). Accordingly, the Court holds that Plaintiff may continue litigating this FOIA
action regardless of his prior transfer of interest.
II. Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion
In his Supplemental Motion (Dkt. #211), Plaintiff requests that the Court take into
consideration certain pieces of evidence related to former FBI director James B. Comey, Jr.’s
(“Comey”) indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Specifically,
Plaintiff argues that the evidence is relevant for the following reasons:
(a) Comey served as FBI director from September 4, 2014 until May 9,
2017, and was therefore serving as the director when Rich was
murdered (Dkt. #211 at p. 2);
(b) Comey misspelled the names of certain individuals for the
“apparent purpose of concealing his email from keyword searches”
(Dkt. #211 at p. 2);
(c) Comey used a private email account under a fake name to hide his
communications (Dkt. #211 at p. 2);
(d) The relevant indictment accuses Comey of acting in an antagonistic
manner towards “a Senate committee’s oversight investigation into
the FBI’s handling of the 2016 Russia election interference probe
and related matters” (Dkt. #211 at p. 2);
(e) The FBI used the indictment of purported Russian hackers as a basis
for withholding records about Rich (Dkt. #211 at p. 3); and
(f) Members of the FBI were caught placing certain evidence in “burn
bags” before the Trump Administration took office on January 20,
2025 (Dkt. #211 at pp. 3–4).
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Plaintiff argues that these facts provide evidence of bad faith in this case to such a degree
that “the [G]overnment cannot plausibly argue that its keyword searches of its document indexing
system . . . were sufficient [to comply with the Court’s August 16, 2024 Order]” (Dkt. #211 at p. 4).
Plaintiff thus offers the above information as support for his position that the FBI conducted
insufficient or bad faith searches for documents responsive to his original FOIA request. The FBI
counters Plaintiff’s requested relief by labeling the proposed evidence as “a house of
cards . . . constructed from speculation stacked upon speculation based on unrelated investigations,
misspelled words, and recently discovered documents” (Dkt. #212 at p. 2). Additionally, the FBI
describes the issue as one that has been precluded by this Court’s prior findings.
The FBI is correct in its assertion that the Court has previously addressed the adequacy of
the FBI’s search in its prior opinions. As far back as 2022, this Court has held that “the FBI
conducted a legally adequate search using ‘methods which can be reasonably expected to produce
the information requested’ in Huddleston’s FOIA requests” (Dkt. # 70 at p. 26). The Court
repeated this sentiment in 2024, when it denied Plaintiff the ability to conduct further discovery
because “Huddleston has not sufficiently persuaded the Court that there is tangible evidence of
bad faith sufficient to justify discovery” (Dkt. #174 at p. 19).
The Court declines to second-guess its prior rulings on the issue of bad faith given the
supplemental facts presented. Whether the FBI should be held in contempt will instead be decided
solely upon its actions taken in immediate relation to the Court’s prior orders. In that same vein,
the Court cites the D.C. Circuit for a third time in its dealings with this case: “[m]ere speculation
that as yet uncovered documents may exist does not undermine the finding that the agency
conducted a reasonable search for them.” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. S.E.C., 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C.
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Cir. 1991) (citing Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1486–87 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). To the
extent that Plaintiff is concerned about additional relevant evidence being discovered in previously
undisclosed rooms, his concerns will be addressed in a forthcoming order. Considering the
Government’s ongoing investigation, the Court can find no pressing or relevant need to expand the
record to include the information listed above.
III. Civil Contempt
As noted above, civil contempt is warranted when the movant can prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that: (1) a court order is or was in effect; (2) the order requires certain
conduct; and (3) the opposing party fails to comply with the court order. Allied Pilots, 228 F.3d at
581; Martin, 959 F.2d at 47. If the movant has carried its burden to present a prima facie case of
contempt, the respondent may avoid contempt by showing that it has substantially complied with
the order or has otherwise made reasonable efforts to comply. In re Brown, 511 B.R. 843, 849 (S.D.
Tex. 2014) (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 20, 598 F.2d 363, 368 (5th
Cir. 1979)).
A. Elements One and Two
Plaintiff has easily met his burden to prove the first two elements by clear and convincing
evidence. Specifically, Plaintiff has indicated that the Court’s August 16, 2024 Amended
Memorandum (Dkt. #176) (the “2024 Order”) and the November 28, 2023 Order (Dkt. #136) (the
“2023 Order,” or, together with the 2024 Order, the “Orders”) were both in effect during the
relevant period. Neither party disputes that those rulings required the FBI to take the following
actions:
(a) “[P]roduce a Vaughn index addressing the information it possesses
on the compact disk containing images of Seth Rich’s personal
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laptop that is responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA requests” (Dkt. #136 at
p. 24);
(b) “[P]roduce a Vaughn index addressing the information it possesses
on Seth Rich’s work laptop, the DVD, and the tape drive that is
responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA requests. The Vaughn index must
address the metadata contained within Seth Rich’s work laptop”
(Dkt. #136 at pp. 24–25);
(c) “[C]onduct and complete . . . a document-by-document review of
the information it possesses on the compact disk containing images
of Seth Rich’s personal laptop, Seth Rich’s work laptop, the DVD,
and the tape drive that is responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA requests”
(Dkt. #176 at p. 6); and
(d) “[E]ither (1) produce Vaughn indexes addressing the information it
possesses on the compact disk containing images of Seth Rich’s
personal laptop, Seth Rich’s work laptop, the DVD, and the tape
drive that is responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA requests by February 7,
2025; or (2) file a motion for summary judgment regarding the
information it possesses on the compact disk containing images of
Seth Rich’s personal laptop, Seth Rich’s work laptop, the DVD, and
the tape drive that is responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA requests . . . .”
(Dkt. #176 at p. 7).
The parties instead clash over the third element: whether Plaintiff has successfully
indicated that the FBI violated the Orders.
B. Element Three
The Court is tasked with determining whether Plaintiff has provided clear and convincing
evidence that the FBI has failed to comply with the 2023 or 2024 Order. To make such a showing,
Plaintiff must identify facts related to FBI’s failure to: (a) produce a Vaughn index of the information
it possesses on the Personal and Work Laptop; (b) produce a Vaughn index of the information it
possesses on the Work Laptop that addresses metadata; or (c) conduct a document-by-document
review to construct the Vaughn indexes (Dkt. #136 at pp. 24– 25; Dkt. #176 at p. 6).
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1. The Government’s required production of a Vaughn index of the
information it possesses on the Personal and Work Laptops
Plaintiff has not provided clear and convincing evidence that the FBI failed to comply with
the first requirement imposed by the Court. The FBI argues that “it is undisputed that [it]
produced Vaughn Indexes addressing the [W]ork and Personal Laptops” (Dkt. #196 at p. 8). The
FBI believes that such production, standing alone, conclusively proves that it “complied with
the . . . Order requiring production of Vaughn Indexes” (Dkt. #196 at p. 8). Plaintiff disagrees,
taking issue with the composition of the indexes and arguing that they are “woefully inadequate”
(Dkt. #190 at p. 8).
The Court cannot clearly address this issue without first disposing of the FBI’s initial
contention. Taken to its logical extreme, the FBI’s rhetoric would suggest that any production, even
an otherwise blank slip of paper, would preclude the Court from holding the FBI in contempt as
long as the produced item was entitled “Vaughn index.” Of course, the Court’s use of the phrase
“Vaughn index” itself implies a baseline amount of production—a Vaughn index is defined by
unique legal characteristics which set it apart from other forms of production. Thus, a brief analysis
of the relevant produced document is crucial insofar as it is necessary to determine whether the
Court and Plaintiff alike have, in fact, received a Vaughn index as opposed to an alternative or
otherwise inferior type of data collection. See, e.g., Kay v. F.C.C., 976 F. Supp. 23, 35 (D.D.C. 1997),
aff’d, 172 F.3d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is well established that the critical elements of the Vaughn
Index lie in its function, and not its form. As a result, an agency may depart from the traditional
Vaughn Index depending on the exemption invoked.” (internal citations omitted)).
Although “there is no set formula for a Vaughn index . . . the least that is required, is that
the requestor and the trial judge be able to derive from the index a clear explanation of why each
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document or portion of a document withheld is putatively exempt from disclosure.” McQueen v.
United States, 264 F. Supp. 2d 502, 515 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (citation modified) (quoting Hinton v.
Dep’t of Justice, 844 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1988)), aff’d, 100 F. App’x 964 (5th Cir. 2004).
Additionally, a Vaughn index is ultimately defined by its service to three important functions:
[I]t forces the government to analyze carefully any material withheld, it enables the
trial court to fulfill its duty of ruling on the applicability of the exemption, and it
enables the adversary system to operate by giving the requester as much information
as possible, on the basis of which he can present his case to the trial court.
Maynard v. C.I.A., 986 F.2d 547, 557 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Keys v. United States Dept. of Justice,
830 F.2d 337, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
Vaughn indexes are often extensive, and their sufficiency is perhaps best analyzed (and often
re- analyzed) in a summary judgment context. See Eakin v. United States Dep’t of Def., No. CV 5:16-
972, 2019 WL 2368683, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 5, 2019) (“[T]he Court is willing to consider Eakin’s
Vaughn index objections even though production remains ongoing . . . . But the proper vehicle to
do so remains a motion for partial summary judgment teeing-up the specific legal question with a
Vaughn index that samples withholdings or redactions.”). In this context, the Court’s Orders did
not impose upon the FBI an obligation to produce perfect Vaughn indexes on its first attempt.
Rather, the FBI will be found to have fulfilled its obligation under the Orders if it has presented
Plaintiff with a disclosure that permits the Court to deem it identifiable as a Vaughn index.
As with any analysis, context matters. When the Court drafted and published its 2023
Order, it took the FBI at its word that “[w]hile the exact amount of data contained on the disc is
not known, the FBI estimates that the images of Seth Rich’s personal laptop comprise
approximately 400,000 pages, plus images and videos” (See Dkt. #138 at p. 24 n.16 (citing Dkt. #73
at p. 9)). The Court repeated this rhetoric in its 2024 Order, where it clearly noted that “[t]he Work
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Laptop and the Personal Laptop collectively contain hundreds of thousands of documents”
(Dkt. #176 at p. 5).
However, the Vaughn index for the Personal Laptop contains no more than 1,297 entries
(Dkt. #190 at p. 8). The Vaughn index for the Work Laptop is also surprisingly sparse, accounting
for a grand total of 2,094 withheld records (Dkt. #190 at p. 4; Dkt. #190-1 at p. 2). Not only that,
but the Vaughn indexes also contain many instances where the FBI appears to have opted to
withhold an entire file, rather than a specific portion of it, without any apparent justification for
doing so. This defies a core aspect of Vaughn indexes, as the Fifth Circuit has expressly recognized
that “A Vaughn index is a common FOIA procedural device that lists the documents responsive to
the request and explains why portions have been withheld.” Cooper Cameron Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of
Labor, Occup. Saf. & Health Admin., 280 F.3d 539, 544 n.12 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). In
defense of its Vaughn indexes, the FBI cites a correspondence between counsel for both parties:
Regarding files that are not included in the Vaughn indexes, I expressed that our
preferred course of action is to address the documents in the motion for summary
judgment briefing so that there can be a fulsome explanation of the issues rather
than doing it piecemeal prior to that time.
(Dkt. #196 at p. 9 (quoting Dkt. #190-11 at p. 2)).
From these facts alone, the Court is tempted to call into question the sufficiency of the
Vaughn indexes to support any future motion for summary judgment on behalf of the FBI. See, e.g.,
Gahagan v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, No. CIV.A. 15-796, 2015 WL 6738549, at *4
(E.D. La. Nov. 4, 2015) (“The inadequacy of the Vaughn Index prevents summary judgment in
Defendant’s favor. To succeed on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant must resubmit
its Vaughn Index with the above issues corrected.”); Negley v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 5:12-
CA-00362-OLG, 2013 WL 12099972, at *2 (W.D. Tex. July 31, 2013) (“Agencies invoking
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exemptions must provide the requestor with a document index, known as a Vaughn Index, which
lists each withheld document and provides an explanation for why it was withheld.” (emphasis added)),
aff’d sub nom., 589 F. App’x 726 (5th Cir. 2014). However, the Court finds that it would be better
positioned to make such a ruling at summary judgment. Accordingly, it refrains from straying from
the purpose behind the present contempt motion. Because the Vaughn indexes produced by the
FBI contain enough information and organization to warrant being identified as such, the Court
finds that the FBI has provided Plaintiff with Vaughn indexes that are adequate to meet its
obligations under the general language contained in the Orders.
The Court’s hesitancy to pursue civil contempt against the FBI under the facts presented
is reflected in Gahagan v. United States Citizenship, No. CV 15-2540, 2016 WL 3997049, at *5 (E.D.
La. July 26, 2016). There, a district court found that a government agency had failed to provide a
Vaughn index sufficient to “justify . . . non-disclosure of the requested information.” Id. The
district court “therefore ordered [the agency] to produce a revised Vaughn index more fully
explaining why the challenged records fall within one of the privileges.” Id. However, the
government agency again failed to submit a sufficient Vaughn index, leaving multiple index entries
completely unchanged and implicitly relying upon the attorney work product privilege doctrine to
justify its inaction. Id. As a result, the plaintiff filed a contempt motion, which the Court found
“unwarranted in this case” because, among other things, “the agency has discharged its FOIA
obligations with respect to most of the issues in this case.” Id. at 6. Here, the FBI has provided
Plaintiff with Vaughn indexes. While the provided discovery is far from flawless, it is not so
egregious as to warrant civil contempt—had the Court preferred the Vaughn indexes to conform to
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particular standards beyond those presently observed, it would have provided the parties with such
an order.
However, the FBI cannot have its cake and eat it, too. The FBI was ordered to make a choice
in the Court’s 2024 Order: “[i]t is further ordered the government shall either (1) produce Vaughn
indexes . . . or (2) file a motion for summary judgment” (Dkt. #176 at p. 5). The FBI’s production
of vague and comparatively sparse Vaughn indexes, together with its stated intent to file further
motions for summary judgment, collectively work to undermine the Court’s insistence on the
election of a specific course of action. In light of the decencies of the Vaughn indexes detailed above
and the FBI’s disregard of its prior obligation to choose a particular course of action, the Court
finds Plaintiff entitled to additional information on this matter. Like the district court in Am. C. L.
Union Found. of N. H. v. United States Customs & Border Prot., 586 F. Supp. 3d 68 (D.N.H. 2022),
the Court finds that “it should be of minimal burden [to the FBI] to file a supplemental affidavit
detailing [the FBI’s] process and reasoning” regarding (a) the absence of any detailed explanations
as to how disclosure would harm the interests protected by the claimed statutory exemptions; and
(b) its failure to include all withheld documents in its Vaughn indexes. See id. at 77. Thus, the Court
declines to deploy the “potent weapon” of the contempt power and will instead order the FBI to
produce such an affidavit as further outlined below. See Piggly Wiggly Clarksville, Inc. v. Mrs. Baird’s
Bakeries, 177 F.3d 380, 383 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Martin, 959 F.2d at 47).
2. The Government’s required production of a Vaughn index of the
information it possesses on the Work Laptop that addresses metadata
The Court’s 2023 Order required that the Vaughn index related to Rich’s Work Laptop
“address the metadata contained within [it]” (Dkt. #136 at p. 25). Even a cursory review of both
Vaughn indexes reveals that they each include metadata “in the form of the name of each file, folder
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and sub-folder, date and time modified, file type, size of file, and number of pages” (Dkt. #196-1 at
p. 7). It is in this context that Plaintiff takes issue with the absence of the FBI’s production of what
he terms “rudimentary metadata,” including the “total gigabytes and total number of files” on the
Work Laptop (Dkt. #198 at p. 4). The Court is thus tasked with determining whether the FBI’s
failure to provide specific metadata to Plaintiff constitutes a violation of the 2023 Order.
In answering this question, the Court is immediately faced with a glaring absence of any
explanation put forward by the FBI addressing the lack of purported “rudimentary metadata” in
the disclosures. This presents a significant issue, as the Court’s 2023 Order discussed metadata in
the context of a reply brief filed by Plaintiff in January 2023 (Dkt. #136 at p. 19 (citing Dkt. #92 at
p. 15)). In fact, the Court made specific reference to that reply brief, which includes Plaintiff’s
request for “metadata indicating that [certain files] existed but [were] downloaded to a thumb
drive,” along with “metadata to determine whether the records were truly hacked (versus being
downloaded to a thumb drive)” (Dkt. #92 at p. 15). To the extent that the FBI has failed to provide
Plaintiff with the metadata necessary to make such determinations, including providing Plaintiff
with, at a minimum, the total gigabytes and number of files on the Work Laptop, the Court finds
that the FBI has failed to comply with the spirit of the 2023 Order.
Nevertheless, for a finding of civil contempt, a party must be shown “to have failed ‘in
meaningful respects to achieve substantial and diligent compliance’ with a clear and unambiguous
court decree.” Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 673 F. Supp. 828, 839 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (internal citation omitted)
(quoting Aspira of N. Y., Inc. v. Board of Ed. of City of N. Y., 423 F. Supp. 647, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1976));
see also Baddock v. Villard, 606 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1979). As previously noted, the Fifth Circuit
has plainly held that “a court may not hold in contempt a party that substantially complies with an
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order.” Carter v. Local 556, Transp. Workers Union of Am., 156 F.4th 459, 502 (5th Cir. 2025)
(quoting Whitfield v. Pennington, 832 F.2d 909, 914 (5th Cir. 1987)). Given the vague definition of
“metadata” and the FBI’s provision of some metadata for both the Work and Personal Laptops,
the Court finds that Plaintiff has not carried his burden to prove that civil contempt is warranted in
this instance. However, while the FBI will not be held in contempt under the facts presented, it will
be ordered to produce additional metadata in the manner outlined below.
3. The Government’s duty to conduct a document-by-document review
The Court previously recognized that “[e]ven if a document-by-document review may
require arduous efforts by the Government, it remains a requirement of categorical withholding”
(Dkt. #176 at p. 5). It further held that it “recognizes that such a review of hundreds of thousands
of documents will take a large amount of time,” and provided the FBI with ample time to conduct
a thorough search (Dkt. #176 at p. 6).
Over a year later, the FBI filed two affidavits on the issue of its document- by- document
review of the Work Laptop and Personal Laptop. The first affidavit, signed by Acting Section Chief
Shannon R. Hammer, specifically alleges that the Work Laptop Vaughn index was based upon a
prior “document-by-document review,” and that the review and resulting index did not include
“unreviewable files that could not be practically processed” (Dkt. #196-1 at ¶ 8). The second
affidavit is signed by Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Spence and alleges that the Personal Laptop
Vaughn index was similarly compiled according to a “document-by document review” which
omitted “unreviewable files that cannot be practically processed” and documents such as “user
manuals associated with software installed on the Personal Laptop” (Dkt. #196-2 at ¶ 6).
As previously indicated by this Court, “[i]n analyzing affidavits and declarations submitted
by an agency, the agency’s affidavits are entitled to a ‘presumption of legitimacy.’” Huddleston v.
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F.B.I., No. 4:20-CV-00447, 2022 WL 4593084, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2022) (quoting Negley v.
F.B.I., 589 F. App’x 726, 730 (5th Cir. 2014)), clarified on denial of reconsideration, No. 4:20-CV-
00447, 2023 WL 8235243 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2023). Absent a showing of contradictory evidence
or bad faith, Plaintiff will not be able to rebut this presumption. See id. To that end, Plaintiff has
directed the Court to multiple snippets of “Google AI” responses and a declaration by one Yaacov
Appelbaum.
1
With these two pieces of evidence, Plaintiff attempts to highlight the ease at which
the FBI could have included “unreviewable files” in its alleged “document-by-document” review.
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the FBI should have utilized third party programs and attempted
to restore or analyze an unknown number of documents to review them for relevant information,
rather than conducting what the FBI has termed “a review of all files that could be practically
processed” (Dkt. #201 at p. 3).
The Court finds that the FBI conducted an adequate document-by-document review under
the circumstances presented by Plaintiff’s contempt motion. On the fourth page of its 2024 Order,
the Court cited Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. United State Department of
Justice, 746 F.3d 1082, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2014), to note that the Government “must conduct a
document- by- document review in order to assign documents to the proper category.” Id. (quoting Bevis
v. Dep’t of State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). At a minimum, the affidavits reflect that
the FBI conducted a document- by-document review sufficient to determine whether each
document was accessible. The consequences of the FBI’s failure to fully inspect certain files,
however, are better decided through a motion for summary judgment than one for contempt. For
1
“The undersigned entered the same search phrase for .exe files, ReFS files, and NTFS files and received similar
responses from Google AI . . . .” (Dkt. #198 at p. 3).
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instance, at summary judgment, the Government will be required to defend any further attempt it
makes at including the unreviewed files in a categorical exclusion under FOIA Exemption 7(A). See
Gavin v. U.S. S.E.C., No. CIV.04-4522 (PAMJSM), 2006 WL 2975310, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 16,
2006) (holding that an agency had “complied with the Court’s directive to conduct a
document- by- document review” where the “document-by-document review revealed that each
document fell within one of the five functional categories, and that no document contained
information that could be segregated” (emphasis added)).
The rationale behind this decision is reflected in Plaintiff’s discussion of metadata, which
takes a detour from addressing the matter of contempt by boldly stating that “the FBI has two
choices: (1) produce the metadata in its native format pursuant to 5 U.S. Code § 552(a)(3)(B); or
(2) figure out a way to review the metadata, after which it can determine whether to assert
exemptions in a Vaughn index pursuant to the Court’s order” (Dkt. #198 at p. 5). The Court need
not entertain such hypotheticals related to the document-by-document review described by the
Hammer and Spence affidavits in a contempt context—it is enough, at this juncture, to merely
repeat the rhetoric expressed by this Court and others around the country, that “even under a
generic category approach, ‘the [agency] must itself review each document to determine the category
in which it properly belongs.’” United Am. Fin., Inc. v. Potter, 531 F. Supp. 2d 29, 40 (D.D.C. 2008)
(quoting Bevis, 801 F.2d at 1389); see also Gavin v. U.S. S.E.C., No. CIV. 04-4522 PAM/JSM, 2006
WL 208783, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2006) (“The SEC must conduct a document-by-document
review to discern whether documents or portions of the documents fall outside the functional
categories.”). In the limited context of a motion for contempt regarding the Court’s 2024 Order,
the Court finds that the FBI has complied with its obligation to conduct a document-by-document
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review of the Personal and Work Laptops to determine which withheld documents belong in certain
categories.
C. Defendant’s Additional Offering
In its Response to Plaintiff’s claim regarding “gaps” in the Vaughn Indexes, the FBI stated
that “Defendant is willing to offer an amended Vaughn Index filling in these gaps to provide
information about the files and indicate that they could not be opened” (Dkt. #196 at p. 11). In the
interest of transparency, the Court elects to enforce the FBI’s offer in favor of Plaintiff.
IV. Plaintiff’s Proposed Civil Contempt Remedies
Plaintiff requests a variety of relief at the conclusion of his Motion, ranging from ordering
the FBI “to pay all fees and costs related to . . . Plaintiff’s prosecution of this motion pursuant to
the Court’s inherent authority to sanction,” to appointing “a special master to review and oversee
production of all the items covered by the August 16, 2024 Order” (Dkt. #190 at pp. 16–17). As the
Court declines to hold the FBI in civil contempt, it must also decline to issue any portion of
Plaintiff’s proposed relief.
V. Criminal Contempt
Finally, Plaintiff also asks the Court to consider exercising its criminal contempt power
against Michael G. Seidel, a former employee of the Department of Justice who has previously
signed many declarations related to this case. After considering the Motion and the arguments of
counsel, the Court finds that there are insufficient grounds to order Michael G. Seidel to show
cause why he should not be held in criminal contempt.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for an Order to Show Cause why the
FBI Should not be Held in Contempt (Dkt. #190) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File
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Supplemental Evidence and Supplemental Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for an Order to
Show Cause why the FBI Should not be Held in Contempt (Dkt. #211) are hereby DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the FBI shall, within 60 days of this Memorandum Opinion
and Order, file a supplemental affidavit detailing the FBI’s process and reasoning regarding: (a) the
absence of detailed explanations in the Vaughn indexes as to how disclosure would harm the
interests protected by the claimed statutory exemptions; and (b) its failure to include all withheld
documents in its Vaughn indexes.
It is further ORDERED that the FBI shall, within 60 days of this Memorandum Opinion
and Order, file a supplemental affidavit which addresses the following: (a) why multiple records in
the Vaughn indexes contain conclusory descriptions such as “This file contains 1 item”; and (b) to
what extent the FBI believes the produced Vaughn indexes offer sufficiently narrow categorical
descriptions.
It is further ORDERED that the FBI shall, within 60 days of this Memorandum Opinion
and Order, produce a supplemental Vaughn index addressing metadata on the Work Laptop which
identifies: (a) the total number of files on the Work Laptop; (b) the total amount of storage taken
up by files on the Work Laptop; and (c) whether and/or how many files were downloaded from the
Work Laptop to one or more external storage device(s).
It is further ORDERED that, within 60 days of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the
FBI must follow through on its offer to produce “an amended Vaughn Index filling in the[] gaps to
provide information about [any omitted] files and indicate that they could not be opened”
(Dkt. #196 at p. 11). This production shall address what measures, if any, the FBI took to “open,”
view, or otherwise restore any allegedly corrupted or unreadable files.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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