TAKEMATSU v. TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICALS U.S.A., INC.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MELINDA DAY TAKEMATSU,
Plaintiff,
v.
TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICALS U.S.A.,
INC.,
Defendant.
No. 22-cv-6650
OPINION & ORDER
CECCHI, District Judge.
Before the Court is defendant Takeda Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc.’s (“Takeda” or
“Defendant”) motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 64; see ECF No. 65 (“Def.’s MSJ Br.”),
and plaintiff Melinda Day Takematsu’s (“Plaintiff”) cross-motion for partial summary judgment,
ECF No. 67; see ECF No. 68 (“Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-MSJ Br.”). Takeda opposed Plaintiff’s cross-
motion and replied in further support of its motion, ECF No. 71 (“Def.’s Opp’n & Reply Br.”),
and Plaintiff filed a reply in support of her cross-motion, ECF No. 73 (“Pl.’s Reply Br.”). The
Court decides the motions without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For
the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Takeda’s motion for
summary judgment and deny Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
I.BACKGROUND
1
This matter arises out of Plaintiff’s employment at Takeda, a large pharmaceutical
company, and concerns Takeda’s alleged failure to administer Plaintiff’s disability
accommodations and subsequent transfer of Plaintiff to another role.
1
Background facts come from the pleadings, evidence, the parties’ statements of undisputed
material facts pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1, the parties’ counterstatements thereto, and the
parties’ replies to those counterstatements. See ECF Nos. 66 (“Def.’s SMF”), 69 (“Pl.’s SMF”),
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A.Plaintiff’s Disability Accommodations
Plaintiff began working for Takeda in 2018, when Takeda merged with Plaintiff’s previous
employer. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 4. Prior to the merger, Plaintiff was an associate director of sales, id. ¶ 3,
and shortly after the merger, Takeda elevated her to Senior Regional Business Director (“SRBD”)
in charge of managing seven Northeast-based sales representatives in the area of Hereditary
Angioedema, Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 5–6. As an SRBD, Plaintiff was “expected to lead, manage, provide
observational coaching for, and develop the skills of” the sales representatives on her team. Id. ¶
6. She was also responsible for developing and presenting business plans and reviews. ECF No.
65-7 (“Potilechio Dep.”) at 50:16–22, 56:1–12; Def.’s SMF ¶ 15; Pl.’s CSMF ¶ 15; ECF No. 65-
28 at 2.
In March 2018, Plaintiff began experiencing symptoms of her then-undiagnosed Multiple
Sclerosis (“MS”), such as slurred speech, confusion, forgetting words, and dizziness—all of which
were triggered and exacerbated by stressful situations. Def.’s SMF ¶ 11; Pl.’s SMF ¶ 8.
Nonetheless, Plaintiff continued to work as an SRBD. For instance, in her 2019 performance
review, Plaintiff’s superiors noted that Plaintiff was “dedicated to” “elevating her existing skill
set” and “continue[d] to make progress in her leadership journey.” ECF No. 65-39 at 3; see also
ECF No. 65-18; Pl.’s SMF ¶ 10 (“[A] fellow SRBD . . . note[d] [in a text message to Plaintiff]
that . . . [she] was doing an ‘outstanding job.’”). At the same time, despite a “strong” fourth
quarter, Plaintiff’s sales team ranked last for the 2019 performance year, Def.’s SMF ¶ 30; Pl.’s
SMF ¶ 11, and her supervisors commented that Plaintiff needed to “[c]ontinue [her] transition from
70 (“Pl.’s CSMF”), 71-4 (“Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s CSMF”), 72 (“Def.’s CSMF”), 73-1 (“Pl.’s Reply
to Def.’s CSMF”).
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[an] [i]ndividual [c]ontributor” to a “leader” and “lack[ed] confidence in . . . presenting [and]
recruiting,” ECF No. 65-39 at 2–3; see ECF No. 65-18 at 2–3; Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 30–34.
In September 2020, Plaintiff was diagnosed with MS and began a course of treatment. Pl.’s
SMF ¶ 9. Plaintiff informed Manny Gaspar (“Gaspar”), her then-manager and head of sales for
Plaintiff’s division, and several other colleagues of her diagnosis. Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 8, 11. Initially,
Plaintiff continued in her SRBD role full-time during treatment, and her sales team ranked second
(out of five) in terms of total sales for fiscal year 2020. Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 10–11; Def.’s CSMF ¶ 11.
However, on January 24, 2021, Plaintiff began short-term disability leave to “take . . . time to focus
on [her] health and to focus on living [her] new normal.” ECF No. 65-3 (“Takematsu Dep.”) at
94:1–8; see Pl.’s SMF ¶ 12; Def.’s CSMF ¶ 12. During her leave, Plaintiff continued to experience
“dizziness, fatigue, slurring of her words, confusion[,] . . . memory issues,” and balance issues.
Pl.’s SMF ¶ 13.
On April 5, 2021, with the end of her leave approaching, Plaintiff obtained a letter from
her psychologists at New York University. Def.’s SMF ¶ 13; see also Takematsu Dep. at 97:7–
99:6. In the letter (the “NYU Letter”), Plaintiff’s psychologists made several “clinical[]
recommend[ations]” related to her return to work, including: (i) “advanced and extended
preparation time for presentations” and “plan documents” (the “Advance Preparation
Accommodation”), (ii) “previews [of] expected questions” in advance of presentations, as well as
“extended and advanced review” of those questions (the “Question Preview Accommodation”),
(iii) “additional reviews with management” to ensure her understanding of work assignments (the
“Management Review Accommodation”), and (iv) the use of assists (e.g., cue cards, scripts)
during presentations (the “Presentation Assists Accommodation”) (collectively, the “Approved
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Accommodations”).
2
ECF No. 65-10; see Pl.’s SMF ¶ 14; Def.’s SMF ¶ 13. Plaintiff submitted
the NYU Letter to Takeda, requesting that it approve her psychologists’ recommendations as
disability accommodations upon her return to work. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 14. After a conversation between
human resources partner Susan Potilechio (“Potilechio”) and Plaintiff, as well as discussions
between Takeda’s human resources staff and Gaspar related to the feasibility of certain
accommodations, Takeda and Plaintiff agreed to the Approved Accommodations. Id. ¶¶ 15–16;
Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 14–16. In addition, Plaintiff states that she requested and Takeda approved one
additional accommodation not listed in the NYU Letter: the opportunity to make presentations to
her manager prior to presenting live in front of a group (the “Mock Presentation
Accommodation”). Pl.’s SMF ¶ 16. As discussed further below, Takeda disputes Plaintiff’s
account and there is conflicting evidence on this point. Compare, e.g., id., with Def.’s CSMF ¶
16.
Plaintiff returned to work on April 18, 2021, with Gaspar aware of her Approved
Accommodations. Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 12, 15; ECF No. 65-5 (“Gaspar Dep.”) at 29:18–36:20. Initially,
Takeda generally complied with the Approved Accommodations. For instance, Gaspar met with
Plaintiff weekly, whereas he met with other SRBDs every other week. Def.’s SMF ¶ 15; Pl.’s
CSMF ¶ 15. He also set aside additional time to review Plaintiff’s quarterly business reviews with
2
The NYU Letter contained three additional suggestions: the “gradual resumption of work duties,”
“built-in opportunities for breaks,” and the ability to sit as needed to avoid extended periods of
standing. ECF No. 65-10. The parties agree that Plaintiff dropped her request to gradually resume
her work duties. See Pl.’s SMF ¶ 16; Def.’s CSMF ¶ 16. Moreover, Plaintiff concedes that the
“built-in opportunities for breaks” and ability to sit recommendations are immaterial to the parties’
motions. Pl.’s Reply Br. at 7 n.3. Finally, Takeda granted Plaintiff’s request for a remote work
accommodation (the “Remote Work Accommodation”) on August 31, 2021, for three months due
to the COVID-19 pandemic. Def.’s SMF ¶ 16. Takeda renewed the Remote Work
Accommodation in “three-month increments” through April 2022. Id. ¶ 17; see also Pl.’s Reply
Br. at 7 n.3.
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Plaintiff and at least once previewed questions for Plaintiff before a presentation. Def.’s SMF ¶
15; Pl.’s CSMF ¶ 15.
However, Plaintiff’s superiors also made two comments related to Plaintiff’s presentation
style that Plaintiff characterizes as critical of her Presentation Assists Accommodation. First, after
Plaintiff’s presentation of her July 2021 business plan, Gaspar told Plaintiff that she “sounded like
[she] was reading” and suggested that she “work[] on ways to present more natural[ly] and [allow
her] personality [to] come” through. Def.’s CSMF ¶ 17; Def.’s SMF ¶ 35; Pl.’s CSMF ¶ 35; see
also Gaspar Dep. at 57:7–61:16. Second, in August 2021, Tony Melo (“Melo”), Gaspar’s manager
and the chief of Plaintiff’s division, asked Plaintiff, “Why do you read [during presentations]? You
have such a good personality.” Takematsu Dep. at 105:18–106:22; see also ECF No. 65-6 (“Melo
Dep.”) at 105:1–25; Def.’s CSMF ¶ 17; Def.’s SMF ¶ 10.
In November 2021, Christopher Wilson (“Wilson”) became Plaintiff’s manager. Def.’s
SMF ¶ 37; Pl.’s SMF ¶ 18. Around the time of this transition, Potilechio—the employee in charge
of managing accommodations across Takeda’s “U.S. Business unit”—left the company. Pl.’s
SMF ¶¶ 19–20. However, no one at Takeda informed Potilechio’s replacement, Irving Forestier
(“Forestier”), of Plaintiff’s accommodations. Id. (also noting that Forestier did not become aware
of Plaintiff’s accommodations until April 11, 2022). As a result, Wilson—Plaintiff’s new
manager—was not informed of Plaintiff’s accommodations. Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 18–20; Def.’s CSMF ¶
20; see also Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 19, 22, 26.
Plaintiff contends that Takeda failed to administer her accommodations once Wilson took
over as her manager, and there is evidence to support Plaintiff’s position. See Pl.’s SMF ¶ 21. For
instance, Wilson noted in April 2022 that he had “scheduled and conducted the same cadence of
[one-on-one] calls with” Plaintiff “as with the rest of [his] team (bi-weekly).” ECF No. 65-24 at
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3 (emphasis added). However, Plaintiff states that, pursuant to the Management Review
Accommodation, she expected to check in with her manager more frequently than other SRBDs.
Pl.’s SMF ¶ 21; see ECF No. 65-10; Def.’s SMF ¶ 15; Pl.’s SMF ¶ 14. That said, Takeda cites
evidence that Plaintiff may not have expected Takeda to fulfill this accommodation at all times.
See, e.g., ECF No. 65-15 at 5 (“Interactive Process Notes” stating that “[i]f I [i.e., Plaintiff] have
a presentation due[,] [i]t would be good for my manager to meet with me once a week before a
presentation. Other than that[,] every other week is fine.” (emphasis added)); see also Takematsu
Dep. at 163:11–164:19.
In addition, Takeda tasked Plaintiff with presenting twice at an internal meeting in
Savannah, Georgia in early 2022 (the “Savannah Meeting”). Pl.’s SMF ¶ 22; Def.’s CSMF ¶ 22;
Def.’s SMF ¶ 23. Although Wilson “sp[oke] to Plaintiff about her presentation in advance,” Pl.’s
CSMF ¶ 23, Plaintiff was given “two to four weeks to prepare,” which did not provide for
additional time beyond what was provided to other SRBDs,
3
ECF No. 65-9 (“Wilson Dep.”) at
77:5–21; see also Takematsu Dep. at 113:2–20. Moreover, Plaintiff’s declaration in this litigation
states that the Question Preview Accommodation was not satisfied ahead of the Savannah Meeting,
ECF No. 68-9 (“Takematsu Decl.”) ¶ 13, though there is some conflicting evidence on this point,
see Wilson Dep. at 79:4–80:12; see also Def.’s Opp’n & Reply Br. at 11–12 (noting this dispute
3
In its briefing, Takeda suggests that the Advance Preparation Accommodation only required it to
give Plaintiff adequate time to prepare, not additional time relative to her SRBD peers. Def.’s
Opp’n & Reply Br. at 11; see Def.’s CSMF ¶ 21 (Takeda stating that the NYU Letter did not
explicitly “recommend [Plaintiff] having more time than her peers.”; citing ECF No. 65-15 at 4).
In response, Plaintiff states that the Advance Preparation Accommodation required Takeda to
provide her with additional time relative to her peers. Pl.’s Reply Br. at 8 n.4 (“If Plaintiff was
given the same amount of reviews and the same amount of time that Defendant normally provided
to her SRBD peers, then she would not be provided ‘additional’ anything.”); see Pl.’s SMF ¶ 21
(Plaintiff stating that “Wilson also provided Plaintiff with the same amount of lead time within
which to prepare for her presentations as her peers and did not provide her with additional time.”);
ECF No. 65-10; Takematsu Dep. at 103:2–11.
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and citing Def.’s SMF ¶ 21 and Pl.’s SMF ¶ 22). And finally, Plaintiff states in her declaration
that Wilson never fulfilled the Mock Presentation Accommodation, Pl.’s SMF ¶ 21 (citing
Takematsu Decl. ¶ 13), but as noted above and discussed further below, Takeda disputes that it
ever approved this accommodation.
This disconnect led Plaintiff to confront Wilson in early to mid-April 2022 about what she
perceived to be Takeda’s failure to satisfy her accommodations. See, e.g., Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 23–26.
For example, in an email to Wilson on April 4, 2022, Plaintiff attached the NYU Letter and stated,
“You may have already been made aware but I feel it is important you have my accommodations.”
Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff emailed Wilson again ten days later, stating that “in order for [him] to work with
[her] on the accommodations, [he] . . . need[ed] to” be aware of them. Id. ¶ 26. Wilson did not
engage with Plaintiff based on his view that he was “not at liberty to discuss anything medical-
related.” Def.’s CSMF ¶ 24; see also Pl.’s SMF ¶ 26; Def.’s SMF ¶ 26. Instead, Wilson referred
Plaintiff to human resources and forwarded Plaintiff’s initial email to Forestier and other human
resources personnel. Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 27–28. Wilson—then still unaware of Plaintiff’s
accommodations—stated that he thought that Plaintiff was making a new accommodation request,
which he would have been unable to handle under Takeda’s accommodation policies. Def.’s SMF
¶¶ 24–26; Pl.’s SMF ¶ 28 (“Wilson eventually responded to say ‘it’s not that I don’t want to know
about accommodation out of indifference but out of protection of your privacy.’”); ECF No. 65-1
¶ 3.
B.Takeda’s Investigation of Workplace Complaints Against Plaintiff
In March 2022, almost a year after Takeda and Plaintiff agreed to the Approved
Accommodations, several employees accused Plaintiff of inappropriate conduct. Def.’s SMF ¶
42. Specifically, a sales representative on Plaintiff’s team (“Complainant I”) accused Plaintiff of
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sexually harass[ing] [Complainant I], foster[ing] a hostile work environment,
bully[ing] and intimidat[ing] [Complainant I], engag[ing] in unprofessional
behavior such as swearing and yelling, instruct[ing] [Complainant I] to use
inappropriate and aggressive sales tactics to obtain [sales], and ask[ing]
[Complainant I] to call her and keep her on the phone but concealed in his pocket
so that she could eavesdrop on his meetings with healthcare providers without their
knowledge.
Def.’s SMF ¶ 43. Another sales representative on Plaintiff’s team (“Complainant II”) accused
Plaintiff of
engag[ing] in unprofessional behavior, including erratic swearing and yelling,
instruct[ing] Complainant II to use inappropriately aggressive sales tactics, and
[similarly, as with Claimant I] ask[ing] Complainant II to call her and keep her on
the phone but concealed in her pocket so that [Plaintiff] could eavesdrop
on . . . meetings with healthcare providers without their knowledge.
Id. ¶ 44. In addition, an anonymous caller to Takeda’s internal employee hotline alleged that
Plaintiff engaged in compliance violations. Id. ¶ 45.
In response, Forestier and Margaret Ives (“Ives”) from Takeda’s ethics department
launched an investigation into Plaintiff’s conduct. Id. ¶ 46. They interviewed twenty witnesses,
including Plaintiff, Wilson, Melo, Complainant I, Complainant II, and others on Plaintiff’s sales
team. Id.; see generally ECF No. 65-32. Ultimately, Forestier concluded that the allegations of
“sexual harassment,” “hostile work environment,” and “intimidation/bullying” were
“unsubstantiated.” ECF No. 65-32 at 6; see Def.’s SMF ¶ 51.
However, Forestier also concluded that there was “reasonable evidence to [find] that”
Plaintiff violated Takeda’s “general harassment . . . [p]olicy.” ECF No. 65-32 at 6. Specifically,
Forestier found (i) that Plaintiff “regularly display[ed] inappropriate behavior towards her team,”
including “cursing (not at employees) . . . , screaming/yelling ([at] at least two employees),
outbursts and unnecessary pressure to produce start forms (sales)”; (ii) “a consensus among the
majority” of Plaintiff’s team that “her management skills, workplace behavior and leadership
[were] inefficient, unpredictable, [and] inappropriate”; and (iii) that Plaintiff engaged in
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“aggressive and questionable sales” tactics. Id. at 4–7; see Def.’s SMF ¶ 52; see also id. ¶ 56
(“Forestier determined [Plaintiff] . . . lacked ‘professionalism, capacity for leadership[,] and
general business acumen.’”). Moreover, he concluded that Plaintiff instructed sales
representatives “to activate a concealed telephone so she could listen in on the sales
representatives’ conversations with health care provider[s] without [their] consent.” Id. ¶ 54 (first
alteration in original). Forestier also determined that, during the course of the investigation,
Plaintiff retaliated against Complainant I, inappropriately revealed sensitive information about
Complainant II’s family, and lied in her interview with Forestier and Ives. Id. ¶¶ 53–55; see also
id. ¶¶ 48–49. Given these findings, on April 19, 2022, Forestier recommended that Takeda either
fire Plaintiff or transfer her with a “final warning.” Id. ¶ 57; see ECF No. 65-32 at 2–9.
C.Plaintiff’s Transfer and Subsequent Disability Leave
Based on the investigative findings, Melo, the chief of Plaintiff’s division—after consulting
with (i) Wilson, (ii) a human resources leader at Takeda, and (iii) his supervisor at the time—
concluded on April 20, 2022, that Plaintiff was not fit to be a manager and that a transfer was
appropriate. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 30; Def.’s CSMF ¶ 30; Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 10, 16, 59; Pl.’s CSMF ¶ 59; Melo
Dep. at 31:14–16. On April 28, 2022, Plaintiff was transferred to a new “project-focused”
marketing role that did “not involve people management or require face-to-face interaction.” ECF
No. 68-15 at 2–3; see Pl.’s SMF ¶ 30. The next day, Plaintiff told Takeda that she would not be
moving forward with the new role. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 31. Instead, Plaintiff—whose last active day of
work was April 30, 2022—began short-term disability leave and then transitioned to long-term
disability leave in October 2022. Id. ¶ 31; Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 27–29. Had Plaintiff assumed the new
role, her salary and long-term incentive plan target would not have changed; however, her “bonus
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eligibility” would have, and she “would have lost her company car because she was no longer
supervising field sales.” Def.’s SMF ¶ 60.
D.Procedural History
After receiving a notice of her right to sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Plaintiff filed her complaint on November 16, 2022. See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶
5–9; ECF No. 9 ¶¶ 5–9. Takeda answered the following month. ECF No. 9. After discovery, the
parties filed their summary judgment motions. ECF Nos. 64, 67.
II.LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). “‘A dispute is genuine if a reasonable trier-of-fact could find in favor of the nonmovant’
and ‘material if it could affect the outcome of the case.’” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138 (3d
Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see SodexoMAGIC, LLC v. Drexel Univ., 24 F.4th 183, 203–04 (3d
Cir. 2022). “In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make
credibility determinations or . . . weigh[] . . . the evidence; instead, the non-moving party’s
evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Marino v.
Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Morgan v. Allison
Crane & Rigging LLC, 114 F.4th 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2024) (“[W]e deny summary judgment if there
is enough evidence for a jury to reasonably find for the nonmoving party.” (citation omitted)).
The standard by which a district court decides a summary judgment motion does not
change when the parties file cross-motions. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc., 835
F.3d 388, 402 (3d Cir. 2016). When ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, a district
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court must consider the motions independently and view the evidence on each motion in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See id.
III.DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings several disability discrimination claims under both the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., (the “ADA”), and New Jersey’s Law Against
Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1, et seq., (the “NJLAD”). See Compl. ¶¶ 45–67. Because
“[d]isability discrimination claims under the ADA and the NJLAD are analyzed under the same
framework,” the Court will evaluate them in tandem. Marsh v. GGB, LLC, 455 F. Supp. 3d 113,
123–24 (D.N.J. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Armstong v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 438
F.3d 240, 246 n.12 (3d Cir. 2006); Def.’s MSJ Br. at 15 n.3; Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-MSJ Br. at 20.
To establish a prima facie claim of disability discrimination, Plaintiff must show that she
(i) is disabled, (ii) is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or
without reasonable accommodations, and (iii) has suffered an adverse employment action because
of her disability. See Fowler v. AT & T, Inc., 19 F.4th 292, 299, 299 n.3, 303 (3d Cir. 2021).
Takeda does not appear to contest either of the first two factors. Instead, the parties’ arguments
focus on whether Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. See
MacDougall v. Rhuling, No. 24-989, 2024 WL 3993213, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2024) (“[A]n
adverse employment action means . . . that the employee suffered ‘some harm’ to a term or
condition of employment,” i.e., “that the employer treated the employee ‘worse’ because of a
protected characteristic.” (citation omitted)).
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Plaintiff argues that she suffered three adverse employment actions.
4
See Compl. ¶¶ 45–
67; see also Def.’s MSJ Br. at 14, 21–22; Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-MSJ Br. at 19, 26, 30. First, she
claims that Takeda failed to reasonably accommodate her disability by failing to actually
implement her accommodations (“Failure to Accommodate Claims”).
5
Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-MSJ
Br. at 19–26. Second, she claims that Takeda transferred her from her SRBD role because of her
disability (“Transfer Claims”). Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-MSJ Br. at 30–40. Third, Plaintiff claims
that Takeda constructively discharged her by failing to implement her accommodations,
transferring her to a new role, and creating other “unpleasant [and] difficult” conditions
(“Constructive Discharge Claims”). Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-MSJ Br. at 26–30. While Plaintiff’s
Transfer and Constructive Discharge Claims are subject to the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), burden-shifting framework, her Failure to Accommodate Claims are not. See
Russo v. Bryn Mawr Tr. Co., No. 22-3235, 2024 WL 3738643, at *4 (3d Cir. Aug. 9, 2024); Lavia
v. Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 224 F.3d 190, 199 n.8 (3d Cir. 2000); Reyer v. Saint Francis Country House,
243 F. Supp. 3d 573, 591, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
4
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges one additional adverse employment action: retaliation. Compl. ¶¶
52, 63. However, Plaintiff did not address retaliation in her briefing. Def.’s Opp’n & Reply Br.
at 1 n.2; see also Def.’s MSJ Br. at 22–40; Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-MSJ Br.; Pl.’s Reply Br.
Therefore, Plaintiff has abandoned her retaliation claims. See Campbell v. Jefferson Univ.
Physicians, 22 F. Supp. 3d 478, 487 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“[W]hen a plaintiff responds to a defendant’s
summary judgment motion but fails to address the substance of any challenge to particular claims,
that failure ‘constitutes an abandonment of th[o]se causes of action and essentially acts as a waiver
of these issues.’” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
5
The Third Circuit has stated that “a claim stemming from an employer’s failure to accommodate
an employee’s disabilities may be viewed simply as a type of discrimination claim, where the
relevant adverse employment action is the employer’s ‘refus[al] to make reasonable
accommodations for a[n employee’s] disabilities.’” Fowler, 19 F.4th at 306 (alterations in
original) (quoting Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 2010)); see also, e.g.,
Galette v. Avenue 365 Lending Serv. LLC, No. 24-1221, 2025 WL 429973, at *4 (3d Cir. Feb. 7,
2025); Voigt v. Fluor Marine Propulsion, LLC, No. 21-378, 2024 WL 555088, at * 7 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 12, 2024).
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Takeda moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims, ECF No. 64-1, whereas
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment only on her Failure to Accommodate Claims, ECF No. 67-
1 at 2. The Court will address each theory of liability in turn.
A.Neither Party Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Failure to
Accommodate Claims
An employer must make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of [an] individual[,] unless the [employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of the [employer].” Taylor v.
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999) (third and fourth alterations in original)
(citation omitted); see Turner v. Hershey Chocolate U.S., 440 F.3d 604, 611 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006).
An “employer can breach this duty by failing to provide an accommodation that is reasonable or
by failing to engage in a good faith interactive process to identify [reasonable] accommodations.”
Lewis v. Univ. of Pa., 779 F. App’x 920, 923 (3d Cir. 2019). A “reasonable accommodation” is
an accommodation that allows the disabled employee in question to perform the essential functions
of the job in question without modifying the job’s essential character. See Skerski v. Time Warner
Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 283–84 (3d Cir. 2001); Spratley v. KidsPeace Corp., No. 22-2411, 2023
WL 3007933, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2023).
Here, the Court finds a genuine dispute of material fact that prevents a grant of summary
judgment for either party. See Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 386 (3d Cir. 2008) (“On cross-
motions for summary judgment, the court construes facts and draws inferences ‘in favor of the
party against whom the motion under consideration is made.’” (citation omitted)). Specifically, a
trial is needed to determine the extent to which Takeda complied with Plaintiff’s accommodations,
in particular during Wilson’s tenure as Plaintiff’s manager. This dispute consists of at least three
interrelated sub-disputes, which the Court will address in turn.
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First, a reasonable jury could find in either direction on the issue of whether Plaintiff’s
Approved Accommodations also included the Mock Presentation Accommodation, i.e., “the
opportunity to make her presentations to her manager ahead of time prior to presenting in front of
a group.” Pl.’s SMF ¶ 16; see Def.’s CSMF ¶ 16; Def.’s Opp’n & Reply Br. at 10 n.9. For instance,
an April 6, 2021, email from a Takeda human resource employee to Gaspar states, “[Plaintiff] can
return to work on 4/19/21 with the following accommodations,” and does not list the Mock
Presentation Accommodation. ECF No. 65-26 at 2; see also ECF No. 65-15 at 4 (“Interactive
Process Notes” from April 2022 listing “Reasonable Accommodation Request[s],” but not listing
the Mock Presentation Request). In addition, the NYU Letter makes no mention of the Mock
Presentation Accommodation. ECF No. 65-10. And in her deposition, Plaintiff did not explicitly
mention the Mock Presentation Accommodation. See, e.g., Takematsu Dep. at 102:19–103:15.
However, Plaintiff’s declaration states that “[p]rior to my return to work, I requested, and
Defendant approved, an accommodation for my MS-related disabilities which would permit me to
make my presentations to my manager ahead of time, prior to presenting in front of a group.”
Takematsu Decl. ¶ 12. In addition, Potilechio testified that, based on her contemporaneous
handwritten notes of a meeting she had with Plaintiff on April 13, 2021, Plaintiff “ask[ed] to
present [Business Plans] to [Gapsar] first before being in front of a group.” Potilechio Dep. at
45:17–21, 54:13–18; see also ECF 68-5 (Potilechio’s notes from the April 13, 2021, call).
According to Potilechio, Plaintiff requested that accommodation because “she had difficulty with
slurring her words and losing her train of thought.” Potilechio Dep. at 56:23–57:6. Potilechio
further testified that Gaspar assented to that request when human resources asked about the
feasibility of Plaintiff’s requested accommodations. Id. at 55:3–5. As such, this factual dispute
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remains unresolved. And this factual dispute is critical, because it bears directly on the extent to
which Takeda complied with the Approved Accommodations.
6

Second, a reasonable jury could find for either party on the issue of whether Wilson
satisfied the Question Preview Accommodation ahead of the Savannah Meeting. For example,
Plaintiff states in her declaration that the Question Preview Accommodation was not satisfied
ahead of the Savannah Meeting. Takematsu Decl. ¶ 13. However, Wilson testified that he
generally always provided “anticipated questions” ahead of business plan meetings, and one of
Plaintiff’s presentations at the Savannah Meeting involved a business plan. Wilson Dep. at 79:9–
80:12; see also Def.’s Opp’n & Reply Br. at 11–12 (noting this issue of fact).
Third, a reasonable jury could find in favor of either side on the issue of whether Wilson
satisfied the Management Review Accommodation during his tenure as Plaintiff’s manager. For
instance, Plaintiff states that, pursuant to the Management Review Accommodation, she expected
to check in with her manager more frequently than other SRBDs, Pl.’s SMF ¶ 21; see also ECF
No. 65-10 (“It is also recommended that she be provided with additional reviews with management
to ensure understanding of any tasks being requested for her to complete.”), and there is evidence
that Wilson checked in with Plaintiff on the “same cadence . . . as with the rest of [his] team (bi-
weekly).” ECF No. 65-24 at 3. Yet Plaintiff told Takeda human resources staff in the spring of
6
Relevant here, Takeda cites Annenberg v. Clark County School District, 818 F. App’x 674 (9th
Cir. 2020), for the proposition that “[t]he fact that [a defendant] failed to provide a particular
accommodation . . . does not mean that [defendant] did not provide a reasonable accommodation.
To prove a violation of the ADA, [plaintiff] must show that the accommodation that was actually
provided was unreasonable.” Def.’s Opp’n & Reply Br. at 12 (quoting Annenberg, 818 F. App’x
at 676). But the record here is very different from the record developed before the district court in
Annenberg. For example, the district court in Annenberg did not “reach th[e] question [of the exact
parameters of plaintiff’s accommodation] because [plaintiff] fail[ed] to show that her
accommodation was not honored, regardless of its actual parameters.” Annenberg v. Clark Cnty.
Sch. Dist., No. 17-3090, 2019 WL 13249693, at *5 n.67 (D. Nev. May 2, 2019) (emphasis added),
aff’d, 818 F. App’x 674 (9th Cir. 2020). That is not the case here.
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2022 that bi-weekly check-ins with her manager were fine so long as she was able to meet with
him “once a week” in the lead-up to presentations. ECF No. 65-15 at 5. From this, a reasonable
jury could find that Plaintiff sanctioned at least some of the lapses in Wilson’s implementation of
the Management Review Accommodation.
Together, these disputes leave an unresolved genuine issue of material fact concerning the
extent to which Takeda complied with Plaintiff’s approved accommodations. See, e.g., Beasley v.
O’Reilly Auto Parts, 69 F.4th 744, 755–56 (11th Cir. 2023) (finding a “genuine issue of material
fact” on a failure to accommodate claim where plaintiff “repeatedly requested, and [defendant]
repeatedly failed to provide,” certain accommodations); Fitzgerald v. Freightliner of Ariz. LLC,
No. 17-4601, 2019 WL 5579595, at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 29, 2019) (“Whether Defendant reasonably
accommodated Plaintiff within the meaning of the ADA, despite its failure to always honor the
noon lunchtime or provide a warehouse staff member to pull certain parts for Plaintiff, is mired in
questions of fact.”); O’Toole v. Ulster Cnty., No. 12-1228, 2014 WL 4900776, at *9 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2014) (finding “a genuine dispute as to whether Defendant refused to reasonably
accommodate Plaintiff’s disability” because “a rational factfinder could determine that
the . . . inadequacy of Defendant’s apparent compliance with Plaintiff’s workstation request was
not truly an ‘accommodation’”); U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Rite Aid Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571 (D.
Md. 2010) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s failure to
accommodate claim where there was a dispute as to whether defendant employer ultimately
provided plaintiff with a certain “reasonable accommodation”); Todd v. Brownlee, No. 05-81,
2006 WL 617960, at *5 (D. Haw. Mar. 9, 2006) (finding a genuine dispute of material fact on an
ADA claim where, as here, there was conflicting evidence on plaintiff’s accommodations and the
degree to which defendant complied with those accommodations). As such, the Court cannot grant
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summary judgment to either party on Plaintiff’s Failure to Accommodate Claims.
7
See Hackman
v. Valley Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 241 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[S]ummary judgment is inappropriate when a
conflict on a material fact is present in the record.”); 18W Holdings, Inc. v. Sing for Serv., LLC,
763 F. Supp. 3d 651, 661–63 (D.N.J. 2025).
B.Takeda Is Not Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Transfer Claims
An employer can be liable for disability discrimination if it transfers an employee to a new
position because of his disability. See Wilkie v. Luzerne Cnty., 207 F. Supp. 3d 433, 438 (M.D.
Pa. 2016); A.D.P. v. ExxonMobil Rsch. & Eng’g Co., 54 A.3d 813, 821 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2012). This type of claim is analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
Hatch v. Franklin Cnty., 755 F. App’x 194, 198–200 (3d Cir. 2018); ExxonMobil, 54 A.3d at 821.
7
Takeda also argues that “an employer’s imperfect provision of an accommodation is not a failure
to accommodate so long as the employer acted reasonably and in good faith.” Def.’s Opp’n &
Reply Br. at 14. An employer’s good faith is relevant in cases where an employer allegedly failed
to engage in the interactive process. See, e.g., Whelan v. Teledyne Metalworking Prods., 226 F.
App’x 141, 144 (3d Cir. 2007); Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317 (“All the interactive process requires is
that employers make a good-faith effort to seek accommodations.”). An employer’s good faith is
also relevant where there is a delay in the implementation of approved accommodations. See, e.g.,
Frost v. City of Phila., 839 F. App’x 752, 757 (3d Cir. 2021) (holding that defendant worked in
good faith to “accommodate [plaintiff’s] needs” where “officials . . . measured and fitted [plaintiff]
for [the] coat and boots [he requested] and was in the process of creating special steering devices
for his use on vehicles [that he requested]” when he was terminated); Jay v. Intermet Wagner Inc.,
233 F.3d 1014, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000) (“While unreasonable delay in providing an accommodation
can provide evidence of discrimination, we believe that Wagner acted reasonably and in good
faith.”); Heard v. J & G Spas, LLC, No. 22-3212, 2024 WL 1511901, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8,
2024). However, Plaintiff makes clear that her Failure to Accommodate Claims do not center on
the interactive process and points out that this is not a “‘delay’ case.” Pl.’s Reply Br. at 11; see
Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-MSJ Br. at 23. And on good faith more generally, the Court notes that
Wilson, as Plaintiff’s manager, was unaware of Plaintiff’s accommodations through her last active
month of work, likely because “Forestier[—]despite being responsible for the process of managing
Plaintiff’s accommodation—was [himself] not aware of the Approved . . . Accommodations until
April 11, 2022.” Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 19–20, 26, 28; Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 19, 22–26; see Taylor, 184 F.3d at
318 (“[W]here there is a genuine dispute about whether the employer acted in good faith, summary
judgment will typically be precluded.”).
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Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case. See Hatch,
755 F. App’x at 198. Then, the burden shifts to the defendant to “produce a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. “If the defendant makes such a
showing, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s purported
reason was really pretext for discrimination.” Id.; see also Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765
(3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for
its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ and hence
infer ‘that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.’” (second
alternation in original) (citation omitted)).
Here, the Court cannot grant summary judgment in Takeda’s favor, because there are
genuine disputes of material fact, i.e., “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see
also Pignataro v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 593 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2010) (“After making all
reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor, there is a genuine issue of material fact if a
reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.”); Specht v. Suarez, 798 F. Supp. 3d 485, 500,
502 (D.N.J. 2025) (denying defendant’s summary judgment motion where there were two “way[s]
[of] see[ing] the evidence,” one that favored plaintiff and one that favored defendant, “[a]nd that
means the Plaintiff’s . . . claim is for a jury to consider—not for the Court to take away, by granting
summary judgment”). Those genuine disputes occur at steps one and three of the McDonnell
Douglas framework, which the Court will address below.
1.McDonnell Douglas Step One: Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case
At step one, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff has met the “low bar” of establishing
a prima facie case of disability discrimination based on her transfer. Rice-Smith v. Misericordia
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Convalescent Home, No. 20-1473, 2022 WL 2231822, at *9 (M.D. Pa. June 21, 2022) (citation
omitted); see also Quick v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 18-93, 2020 WL 532343, at *16 (W.D. Pa. Feb.
3, 2020) (noting that a prima facie ADA claim requires “a causal connection between [plaintiff’s]
disability and [the relevant] adverse employment action”). For instance, as discussed further
below, Wilson and Melo both made statements to those investigating Plaintiff’s misconduct that a
reasonable jury could view as evidence of discriminatory animus towards Plaintiff’s disability.
Pl.’s CSMF ¶ 59; see Briggs v. Temple Univ., 339 F. Supp. 3d 466, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (noting
that “[t]he prima facie case and pretext inquiries [of McDonnell Douglas] often overlap”). In
addition, Takeda notes that Plaintiff “raised her accommodations to Wilson on April 4, 2022,” and
that “Melo decided to transfer her on April 20, 2022.” Def.’s MSJ Br. at 29. A reasonable jury
could find that sixteen-day period to be “unusually suggestive” of discriminatory intent. Coleman
v. Childs.’ Hosp. of Phila., No. 22-1445, 2023 WL 7412923, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2023) (citation
omitted) (noting that the Third Circuit has not established any bright-line rule for unusually
suggestive temporal proximity), aff’d, No. 23-3064, 2024 WL 4490602 (3d Cir. Oct. 15, 2024);
see Smondrowski v. Edgewood Co., Inc., No. 24-1297, 2025 WL 3678885, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
18, 2025) (considering “temporal proximity” at the prima facie stage of an ADA discrimination
claim (citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Parrish v. UPMC Univ. Health Ctr. of Pittsburgh, 373 F.
Supp. 3d 608, 636 (W.D. Pa. 2019) (“[S]ixteen days ‘qualifies as unusually suggestive timing.’”
(quoting Pizzo v. Lindenwold Bd. of Educ., No. 13-3633, 2015 WL 1471943, at *13 (D.N.J. Mar.
31, 2015))).
Moreover, in at least one instance, Takeda investigated Wilson for misconduct but was
arguably more lenient in disciplining Wilson (relative to Plaintiff). Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-MSJ Br.
at 32–35. Specifically, in 2021, Takeda investigated Wilson for allegedly speaking “unpleasantly”
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to a member of his sales team. ECF No. 65-33 at 2–3. And although Takeda substantiated the
allegations and found that Wilson’s “actions violated Takeda’s Global Code of Conduct,” id. at 3,
Takeda promoted Wilson after its investigation, whereas Takeda transferred Plaintiff, see ECF No.
65-4 (“Forestier Dep.”) at 119:6-17; Def.’s SMF ¶ 59; Pl.’s CSMF ¶ 59. A reasonable jury could
find this evidence similarly suggestive that Takeda transferred Plaintiff because of her disability.
See Rheem v. UPMC Pinnacle Hosps., No. 23-75, 2025 WL 3008146, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 27,
2025); see also Ray v. Pinnacle Health Hosps., Inc., 416 F. App’x 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting
that “one or two comparators may be sufficient at the prima facie stage”); Irwin v. Fry Commc’ns,
Inc., No. 21-186, 2021 WL 5756386, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2021) (explaining that comparator
evidence is evaluated differently at steps one and three of McDonnell Douglas because “the
specificity required at the prima facie stage is not as great as that required at the pretext stage”),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 21-186, 2021 WL 5757335 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2021).
Thus, construing the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff has
satisfied her initial burden.
2.McDonnell Douglas Step Three: Pretext
Plaintiff concedes that Takeda would succeed at step two, because the company “has
provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s” transfer, Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-
MSJ Br. at 35, namely Takeda’s investigation and accompanying findings that Plaintiff engaged
in “misconduct” and performed poorly, Def.’s MSJ Br. at 33–24; see Zielinski v. City of Wildwood,
No. 12-7195, 2014 WL 6991388, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 10, 2014) (“Case law supports the notion that
an employee’s violation of company policies constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for termination.”). Nonetheless, at step three, a reasonable jury could find that Takeda’s legitimate,
non-discriminatory justification was pretextual. See Connearney v. Main Line Hosp., Inc., No. 15-
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2730, 2016 WL 6440371, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2016) (“Connearney can still show pretext by
presenting evidence that the investigation was tainted by a party who did in fact act with
discriminatory animus.” (citing McKenna v. City of Phila., 649 F.3d 171, 179 (3d Cir. 2011))).
For example, Plaintiff points to the following statement Melo gave to Ives during the investigation
of Plaintiff (after Ives asked about issues related to Plaintiff’s performance): “Last summer she
had a review. There was a one on one with her in Hartford. She was reading a script the whole
way. See her last performance review. She was out on disability 3 months last fiscal year so,
consider that too.” Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-MSJ Br. at 38 (quoting ECF No. 65-21 at 49). Plaintiff
also identifies the following statement Wilson gave to Ives as a part of the investigation: “I said to
her that her presentation lacked depth. [Plaintiff] doesn’t like improvised conversations, she likes
everything scripted, calls and meetings.” Id. (quoting ECF No. 65-21 at 48).
A reasonable jury could find that these statements evince “discriminatory animus” of
Plaintiff’s disability. Connearney, 2016 WL 6440371, at *5; see also Sinha v. Bradley Univ., 995
F.3d 568, 574–75 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Sinha must show that Radson actually harbored discriminatory
animus and that his ‘input was a proximate cause’ of the adverse employment action.” (citation
omitted)). In addition, a reasonable jury could find that the investigators relied on these statements
in making their relevant factual findings, because Melo and Wilson were high-ranking employees
who had significant experience working with Plaintiff. See McKenna, 649 F.3d at 179. And
finally, a reasonable jury could further infer pretext from the fact that Melo—who, as noted above,
directed investigators to “consider that” Plaintiff was “out on disability 3 months last fiscal year,”
Pl.’s Opp’n & Cross-MSJ Br. at 38—bore ultimate responsibility for the decision to “transfer[] her
to” a non-managerial role. Def.’s SMF ¶ 59; see also Forestier Dep. at 133:1–12. Therefore,
construing the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could find that Takeda’s
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investigation was tainted and thus pretextual. Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 166 (3d Cir.
1999) (“Where the plaintiff . . . offer[s] evidence that would allow reasonable minds to conclude
that the evidence of pretext is more credible than the employer’s justifications, the employer’s
motion for summary judgment must fail.”); see, e.g., Knox v. PPG Indus., Inc., No. 15-1434, 2018
WL 1334828, at *4–6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2018); Mason v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 134 F. Supp. 3d
868, 875–77 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
** *
As such, Takeda is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Transfer Claims. See
Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen there is a disagreement about the
facts or the proper inferences to be drawn from them, a trial is required to resolve the conflicting
versions of the parties.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); In re SoClean, Inc., Mktg., Sales
Pracs., & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 22-152, 2025 WL 974258, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2025) (“If
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could draw different inferences from the basic facts on
which the parties agree, summary judgment may not be granted, and the claim must proceed to
trial.”).
C.Takeda Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Constructive
Discharge Claims
An employer can be liable for disability discrimination if it constructively discharges an
employee, i.e., if an employer maintains “conditions so unpleasant or difficult that a reasonable
person would have felt compelled to resign.” Colwell, 602 F.3d at 502 (citation omitted). The
Supreme Court has explained that a constructive discharge claim in the closely related Title VII
context has two basic elements: a plaintiff must (i) prove that “he was discriminated against by his
employer to the point where a reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to
resign” and (ii) show that “he actually resigned.” Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 555 (2016).
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Unsurprisingly, district courts in the Third Circuit as well as other courts of appeals have used
Brennan’s constructive discharge standard in the ADA context. See Gray v. York Newspapers,
Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1079 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he doctrine of constructive discharge is the same
in all employee discrimination claims.”); see, e.g., Powrzanas v. Jones Util. & Contracting Co.,
834 F. App’x 500, 505 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Brennan’s constructive discharge elements in the
context of an ADA claim); Vélez-Ramirez v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Sec’y of Just., 827 F.3d 154, 158
(1st Cir. 2016) (affirming a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant employer on an
ADA constructive discharge claim where plaintiff “conced[ed] that she did not resign”); Pridgen
v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC, No. 25-7589, 2026 WL 735250, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 16, 2026); Ingram
v. Abington Sch. Dist. Auth., No. 24-174, 2025 WL 1839491, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 3, 2025);
Larochelle v. Wilmac Corp., 210 F. Supp. 3d 658, 705 n.36 (E.D. Pa. 2016), clarified on denial of
reconsideration, No. 12-5567, 2016 WL 6135577 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2016), aff’d, 769 F. App’x 57
(3d Cir. 2019). And Brennan’s constructive discharge standard is consistent with New Jersey
courts’ approach to constructive discharge under the NJLAD. See C.E.W. v. Borough of River
Edge, No. 1932-22, 2025 WL 2214205, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 5, 2025) (“[A]
constructive discharge claim under the [NJ]LAD accrues when the employee gives notice
of . . . resignation or retirement.” (first alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of constructive discharge. In
particular, Takeda correctly argues that Plaintiff’s Constructive Discharge Claims fail because she
“never resigned from her position.” Def.’s Opp’n & Reply Br. at 16. It is undisputed that after
her last active day of work on April 30, 2022, Plaintiff began short-term disability leave and
transitioned to long-term disability leave in October 2022. See Def.’s SMF ¶¶ 27, 29; Pl.’s SMF
¶¶ 18, 31 (stating that Plaintiff went “on leave” after her transfer and has not returned to the
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“workforce” since). But without evidence that she “actually resigned,” Plaintiff’s Constructive
Discharge Claims fail as a matter of law. Brennan, 578 U.S. at 555; see Ingram, 2025 WL
1839491, at *4 (granting summary judgment for defendant on a disability discrimination
constructive discharge claim where “[t]he undisputed facts of record establish[ed] that Plaintiff
[was granted a leave of absence and] did not quit his job”); Ballard v. AT&T Mobility, Inc., No.
15-8808, 2017 WL 3671313, at *11 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2017); see also Knispel v. Haaland, No. 21-
3015, 2025 WL 306426, at *25 (D.S.D. Jan. 27, 2025); Maron v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 605 F. Supp.
3d 547, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); Alsbrook v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 19-673, 2021 WL 4482143, at *21
(S.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2021); Kheibari v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 14-11496, 2017 WL 4251758, at *4
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2017). Therefore, Takeda is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
Constructive Discharge Claims. See Mall Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gen. Motors LLC, 99 F.4th 622, 630
(3d Cir. 2024) (“[A] moving party may . . . demonstrate that the nonmoving party has not made ‘a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case . . . on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” (citation omitted)).
IV.CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS on this 29th day of July 2026;
ORDERED that Takeda’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 64) is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 67) is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Constructive Discharge Claims and claims under the ADA and
NJLAD based on retaliation are DISMISSED; and it is finally
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ORDERED that this Opinion and Order will be filed under temporary seal. It shall be
unsealed unless an appropriate motion to seal (pursuant to Local Civil Rule 5.3(c)) is filed within
fourteen (14) days of this Opinion and Order.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Claire C. Cecchi
CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.
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