Rainey v. Marathon Petroleum Company LP

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UNI
TED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRODERICK K. RAINEY CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO: 25-2047
MARATHON PETROLEUM COMPANY LP
S
ECTION: KWR
ORDER & REASONS
This matter is before the Court on consent of the parties. R. Doc. 11. Before the Court is
Defendant’s Marathon Petroleum Company LP’s (“Marathon”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint (R. Doc. 8), seeking dismissal of the Plaintiff’s claims under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Motion is
opposed. R. Doc. 17.
I.Introduction
A.Factual Summary
Plaintiff Broderick K. Rainey (“Rainey”) suffers with chronic kidney disease and IgM
nephropathy, an autoimmune disorder that causes kidney damage and related problems. R. Doc. 1
at 4. Rainey treated his nephropathy through a combination of medication, regular doctor’s visits
for blood work, and self-administered peritoneal dialysis once per day either manually or using a
portable machine. Id. at 5.
Rainey was to begin employment with Marathon Petroleum Company LP (“Marathon”)
in 2023 as a professional light product transport driver in Garyville, Louisiana. R. Doc. 1 at 3, ¶¶8.
According to the Complaint, his full-time employment was conditioned upon him passing a pre-
employment physical. Id. at 6, ¶29. On April 12, 2023, Marathon rescinded his job offer claiming
he failed the pre-employment physical. Id. at 7, ¶36.
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On November 8, 2023, within 300 days of the revocation of Rainey’s employment offer
he filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination.
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Id. at 3, ¶12. On July 3, 2025, the EEOC issued a
notice of right to sue to Rainey. Id., ¶13.
Rainey alleges that his condition was well controlled with dialysis and therefore did not
limit his ability to perform all the essential duties of the job offered by Marathon. R. Doc. 1 at 5,
¶22. Rainey also alleges that he was medically cleared to work in his job assignment and that he
did not have any restrictions. Id., ¶23-24. Alternatively, Rainey alleges that he was capable of
performing the job with reasonable accommodations of periodic rest breaks and time off to attend
routine doctor’s appointments or perform dialysis on himself between shifts. Id., ¶28. Rainey
alleges that he objectively and medically passed the pre-employment physical and satisfied all
DOT regulatory requirements to be deemed physically qualified to drive a commercial vehicle. Id.
at 6-7, ¶31-32.
Rainey contends that his job offer was revoked due to bias against his kidney disease and
dialysis treatment protocol. Id. at 7, ¶¶34-36. Rainey claims that Marathon accepted the physicians
assistant’s examination report without objective or medical substantiation. Id. at 34-36, ¶13.
Rainey alleges that after the alleged discrimination he suffered significant out of pocket expenses,
damages, costs and attorney’s fees. Id. at 11, ¶47. He filed the instant suit against Marathon under
the Americans with Disabilities Act on September 30, 2025. See R. Doc. 1.
B. Subject Motion
Marathon filed the subject motion and contends that Plaintiff’s own allegations
conclusively establish that he was not a qualified individual with a disability under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). R. Doc. 8 at 1. According to Marathon, Rainey’s allegations

1
The EEOC field office has a work sharing agreement with the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights (“LCHR”).
R. Doc. 1. LCHR automatically accepted the filing and referred it to EEOC for processing.
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establish that he (1) failed to pass the U.S. Department of Transportation’s mandatory medical
examination, (2) did not obtain a medical variance, and (3) did not challenge the certification
decision through the U.S. Department of Labor’s dispute resolution process. Id. Marathon
contends that an employer must comply with federal safety regulations before considering to
conduct an ADA reasonable accommodation analysis. Id. Further, Marathon contends that the
Complaint fails to allege that Rainey requested a reasonable accommodation or that Marathon
denied one. Id.
Plaintiff opposes the motion and contends that he has plausibly alleged that Marathon
through its employees unreasonably and without any objective medical justification refused to
certify him as medically fit to drive a truck under 49 C.F.R. § 391.41. R. Doc. 17 at 1. Rainey
contends that assuming that his allegations are true, Marathon deferred to its medical employee’s
facially unjustifiable medical determination regarding his fitness for duty and engaged in a “garden
variety” of disability bias against him because he has kidney disease that required peritoneal
dialysis Id. at 2. Notwithstanding his diagnoses, Rainey claims that there was otherwise no
objective medical determination that he was not fit for the job. Id. at 3. Therefore, Rainey contends
that the Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
II. Standard of Review
Under Rule 12(b), the Court may dismiss a complaint if it lacks jurisdiction over the subject
matter or for failure to state a claim upon which any relief may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The same standard is applied for a motion to dismiss
brought under either Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction or under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim for which relief can be granted. Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir.
1992).
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“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court
must accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010); Guidry v.
American Public Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2007).
The Supreme Court, however, has declared that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citation omitted). Moreover, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level,” and “[t]he plaintiff must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Guidry, 512 F.3d at 180 (citations omitted). The United States Supreme
Court has explained:
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
In determining whether a complaint states a claim that is plausible on its face, the Court
“draw[s] on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, as mentioned
above, to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”’ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). In order for a claim to be plausible at the pleading stage, the complaint need not
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strike the reviewing court as probably meritorious, but it must raise “more than a sheer possibility”
that the defendant has violated the law as alleged. See id.
Further a complaint need not include detailed facts to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. When a complaint fails to adequately state a claim,
such deficiency should be “exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by
the parties and the court.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. However, the plaintiff should generally be
given at least one chance to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a) before dismissal with prejudice,
“ unless it is clear that the defects are incurable. Great Plaints Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002).
III. Analysis
A. Qualified Individual
Marathon first contends that Rainey is not a qualified individual with a disability by the
ADA. R. Doc. 8-1 at 5. Marathon contends that Rainey’s pleadings affirmatively demonstrate that
he was categorically disqualified under binding federal regulations governing commercial motor
vehicle drivers. Id. at 5-6. Marathon therefore maintains that his inability to satisfy the DOT
medical certification requirements renders him unqualified as a matter of law. Id. at 6. Marathon
further claims that Plaintiff did not obtain a medical variance and did not challenge the medical
provider’s conclusion through DOT’s dispute resolution process. Id. at 7
Rainey contends that he has plausibly alleged Marathon unreasonably and without any
medical justification refused to certify him as medically fit to drive a truck under 49 C.F.R. §
391.41 et. seq. after offering him the job. R. Doc. 17 at 1 Rainey contends that Marathon wrongly
deferred to its medical employee and his report. Id. at 18. Rainey contends that Marathon knew or
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should have known that relying on a facially faulty medical opinion to deny DOT certification for
a non-mandatorily disqualifying condition was improper and violative of the ADA. Id. at 2.
Under 49 C.F.R. § 391.11, “[a] person shall not drive a commercial motor vehicle unless
he/she is qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle.” The regulation further states that “a motor
carrier shall not require or permit a person to drive a commercial motor vehicle unless that person
is qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle.” Id. Among the requirements for qualification is
the obligation to be deemed “physically qualified” in accordance with the FMCSR’s
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“Physical
Qualifications and Examinations.” 49 C.F.R. § 391.11(b)(4); see also 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.41-391.49.
Per 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(9), an individual is not physically qualified if they suffer from a
condition that is “likely to interfere with his/her ability to drive a commercial motor vehicle
safely.” To drive commercially, an applicant must either pass the physical examination or obtain
a formal medical variance from the FMCSA
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under 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(a)(3)(ii). Indeed, “courts
have consistently held that an employment action based upon an employee’s or prospective
employee’s inability to satisfy DOT medical standards does not violate disability discrimination
laws.”
Williams v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 826 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases)
(quoting Talbot v. Md. Transit Admin., No. WMN-12-1507, 2012 WL 5839945, at *2 (D. Md.
Nov. 15, 2012)).
Commercial drivers' ADA claims were rejected, where a doctor found the plaintiff
medically unqualified, and the plaintiff did not obtain a contrary opinion through the DOT's
administrative process. See Harris v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 339 F.3d 635, 637-39 (8th Cir. 2003)
(where the court affirmed summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiffs’ ADA claim because he
did not present prima facia evidence that he was qualified to perform the job function of a

2
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations
3
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
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commercial truck driver.); see also Bay v. Cassens Transp. Co., 212 F.3d 969, 973–76 (7th Cir.
2000) (explaining that “[u]nder applicable DOT regulations, Cassens was not allowed to permit
Bay to resume driving until he produced a copy of a doctor's certificate indicating he was
physically qualified to drive, and nothing in the ADA purports to change that obligation.”).
49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b) provides that a person is physically qualified to drive a commercial
motor vehicle if that person-
1. Has no loss of a foot, a leg, a hand, or an arm or has been granted a skill performance
evaluation certificate pursuant to §391.49;

2. Has no impairment of :
i. hand or finger interfering with prehension or power grasping;
ii. an arm, foot or leg that interferes with the ability to perform
normal tasks associated with operating a commercial motor
vehicle; ....

49 C.F.R. § 391.41(d)(3) further provides that:

(i) The medical evaluation summary for a driver applicant disqualified under §
391.41(b)(2) shall include:

(A) An explanation as to how and why the impairment interferes with the ability of
the applicant to perform normal tasks associated with operating a commercial motor
vehicle;

(B) An assessment and medical opinion of whether the condition will likely remain
medically stable over the lifetime of the driver applicant; and

(C) A statement by the examiner that the applicant is capable of demonstrating
precision prehension (e.g., grasping and manipulating knobs and switches using the
fingers/thumb) and power grasp prehension (e.g., grasping, holding, and
maneuvering the steering wheel using a hand) with each hand separately. Prior to
applying for an SPE certificate, an applicant with upper limb impairment must be
fitted and proficient with a proper prosthesis or orthotic device, if the applicant is
not capable of demonstrating precision prehension and power grasp prehension
with each hand separately without a prosthesis or orthotic device. This requirement
does not apply to an individual who was granted a waiver, absent an orthotic device,
prior to January 6, 1986, the effective date of the requirement.

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Marathon contends that because the Plaintiff failed his DOT examination, he is not
qualified to work as a driver for Marathon. R. Doc. 8-1 at 6. In assessing whether Rainey was
qualified or not as a driver, a central question is whether Marathon’s medical provider complied
with 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(d)(3)(ii) which required a summary of how Rainey’s impairment
interfered with his ability to operate a commercial motor vehicle, the stability of his medical
condition and Rainey’s ability to demonstrate precision prehension, power grasp prehension.
However, the record is devoid of any evidence that the medical provider complied with the
regulations and nor is this information contained in the pleadings. FMCSA regulations also do not
expressly prohibit people who suffer with an autoimmune disease, nephropathy or kidney disease
from working as a driver.
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Therefore, whether the evaluating doctor’s assessment was reached in an individualized
manner cannot be gleaned from the pleadings. As noted by the Court in Rodrigues v. ConAgra
Grocery Products Co., 436 F.3d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 2006), an assessment not reached in an
individualized manner is not an assessment that can be credited, at least regarding whether Rainey
was actually substantially limited by his autoimmune and kidney disease.
Marathon relies on Williams, for the proposition that because Rainey failed a medical
examination and did not request or receive a medical variance, he cannot assert an ADA claim.
826 F.3d at 806. However, Williams is distinguishable from the subject case. First, Williams

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According to the regulations, only people with diabetes mellitus treated with insulin, myocardial infarction, angina
pectoris, coronary insufficiency, thrombosis or any other cardiovascular disease accompanied with syncope, dyspnea,
collapse or congestive heart failure are not qualified to drive. 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(1)-(9). Additionally, people with
rheumatic, arthritic, orthopedic, muscular, neuromuscular or vascular disease that interferes with his ability to control
or operate a commercial vehicle or epilepsy or another condition likely to cause loss of consciousness are not qualified
to drive. Id. Any person with an established history of a mental, nervous, organic, or functional disease or psychiatric
disorder that is likely to interfere with his ability to operate a commercial vehicle is not qualified to drive. Additionally,
any person without a hearing aid that could not hear a forced whisper or who is on an amphetamine, or other habit-
forming drug or any non-Schedule 1 drug is not a qualified individual. Id.
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suffered from a cardiovascular disease accompanied by syncope,
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which is expressly defined as a
disqualification under FMCSA. See id. at 808; 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(4). In this case, the medical
condition Rainey has been diagnosed with is not expressly identified in the regulations as
preclusive as it was in Williams. Also as stated previously, the pleadings do not provide insight on
what data the physician relied upon in concluding Rainey was not a qualified driver. Further,
Williams expressly stated that “no statute requires that an ADA plaintiff exhaust the § 391.47
process before filing a lawsuit.” 826 F.3d at 806; see also Caldera v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa.,
716 F.3d 861, 867 n.11 (5th Cir. 2013); Premiere Network Servs., Inc. v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 440
F.3d 683, 686 n.5 (5th Cir. 2006). Likewise, Rainey claims that he reached out to DOT for
guidance, and that DOT explained that a medical exemption or variance was not necessary because
“FMCSR do not have mandatory prohibitions for medical certification of commercial motor
vehicle (CMV) drivers who receive dialysis treatments.” R. Doc. 1 at 7.

Lastly, Williams was decided on summary judgment grounds. 826 F.3d at 813. The Court
notes that the Plaintiff attached additional documents in opposition to the motion. However, given
the pleadings before the Court, the complaint states a claim as written that he was a qualified
person under the FMCSA. The Court will not convert the matter to a summary judgment which
would allow for the review of additional information. The Fifth Circuit has explicitly recognized
that a court may consider documents attached not only to the pleadings, but to the Motion to
Dismiss under rule 12(b)(6). For this exception to apply, the documents must be referred to in the
complaint and be integral and central to the plaintiff's claim. See Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2000). Here, the documents were not referred to in the

5
Fainting
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complaint and are otherwise not needed for assessing whether the complaint states a cause of
action. For these reasons, the Court finds that the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
B. Failure to Accommodate Claim
Marathon next contends that Rainey’s reasonable accommodation claim independently fails
and must be dismissed for lack of any plausible allegation that accommodation was requested. R.
Doc. 8-1 at 10. Marathon contends that it is not required to guess at an applicant’s needs or initiate
the interactive process in the absence of a result. Id. at 10-11.
Rainey contends that Marathon’s request to dismiss Rainey’s failure to accommodate and
regarded as disabled claims are premature under Rule 12. R. Doc. 17 at 22. Rainey contends that
to the extent that Marathon denied Rainey’s medical certification, then it was Marathon who was
in a position to make any reasonable accommodation absent an undue burden. Id.
The ADA prohibits covered entities from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual
on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination includes “not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability ... unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.” Id. §
12112(b)(5)(A). “A Plaintiff must prove the following statutory elements to prevail in a failure-
to-accommodate claim: (1) the plaintiff is a ‘qualified individual with a disability;’ (2) the
disability and its consequential limitations were ‘known’ by the covered employer; and (3) the
employer failed to make ‘reasonable accommodations’ for such known limitations.” Feist v. La.,
Dep't of Just., Office of the Att'y Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013). However, a plaintiff
must plead that the defendant had “actual knowledge that an accommodation is necessary.” J. W.
v. Paley, 81 F.4th 440, 450 (5th Cir. 2023).
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In the Complaint, Rainey alleges Marathon, through the decision-making of its medical
and human resources employees, revoked Rainey’s job offer because Marathon refused to offer
Rainey a reasonable accommodation that would have permitted him to perform all the essential
job duties of a light products transport driver. R. Doc. 1 at 9, ¶44. Rainey also alleges to the extent
that anything related to his kidney disease or dialysis interfered with his job duties, multiple
reasonable accommodations existed that would have allowed Rainey to perform his job without
any undue burden on Marathon. Id. at 10. Such accommodations included but were not limited to
permitting Rainey occasional time off from work or rest breaks so he could attend routine doctor’s
appointments and perform dialysis on himself between shifts. Id. Lastly, Rainey alleges that
Marathon’s failure to accommodate Rainey, or to even engage in the interactive process with him
on these points, was wholly unreasonable and without objective or medical reason whatsoever. Id.
at 11.
Although Rainey did not formally request an accommodation as suggested by the
Marathon, the Complaint does allege that Marathon, through its medical and human resources
employees, revoked his job offer and refused to offer Rainey reasonable accommodation that
would have allowed him work. See. R. Doc. 1 at 9, ¶44. These allegations address the second
requirement for a pleading to state a failure to accommodate claim. See Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d
584, 596 n.9 (5th Cir. 2015); see also G.W. v. Whitehouse Independent School District, 2026 WL
788865 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2026) (where a motion to dismiss was denied because the plaintiff
adequately alleged the second element by alleging that she or her grandchild made his disability
and its resulting limitations known to defendants).
The parties also do not dispute that Rainey had an autoimmune disease that caused kidney
disease and required peritoneal dialysis. On the other hand, Rainey claims he was healthy and able
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to perform his duties of the light products transport driver with or without accommodation. See R.
Doc. 1 at 8. He does not allege that dialyzing might interfere with his duties but instead states that
if it did that there were reasonable accommodations available that would have allowed him to
perform his job. Id. at 6. The complaint further fails to allege how Rainey’s autoimmune kidney
disease or dialysis requirement substantially limited one or more major life activity and therefore
constituted a disability under applicable law. Based on these allegations, there was nothing for
Marathon to reasonably accommodate, so Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. The Marathon’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to the failure to accommodate
claim. Rainey, however, will be allowed to Amend his complaint no later than 20 days from the
signing of this order. See Torres v. Cornerstone Fitness Tx, LLC, No. 5:22-cv-01190, 2023 WL
11844983, at *3 (W.D. Tex May 9, 2023) (dismissing Plaintiff’s ADA claims but allowed her to
amend her complaint).
C. ‘Regarded As’ Claim
Marathon also seeks dismissal of Rainey’s claim that he was “regarded as” disabled. R.
Doc. 8-1 at 11. According to Marathon, this claim should be dismissed because the ADA’s
“regarded as” prong applies only to individuals who are not actually disabled but who are
perceived by their employer as having a physical or mental impairment. Id. Marathon claims that
Rainey “affirmatively alleges that he was disabled – citing a life-threatening renal condition that
required daily dialysis.” Id. As such, Marathon maintains that Rainey cannot allege to be disabled
and simultaneously assert a “regarded as” claim because the “regarded as” theory is only reserved
for those who are not disabled. Id. at 12.
Rainey contends that he has plausibly alleged that Marathon and its employers were
biased because they regarded Rainey as more disabled than he really was because of his kidney
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disease and related treatment. R. Doc. 17 at 22; R. Doc. 1 at 15. Rainey therefore contends that his
well-pled allegations are at least plausibly viable at this stage of the case. Id. at 23.
Plaintiffs, who are not defined as disabled under the 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), nonetheless can
be regarded as disabled for having an impairment, and Plaintiff’s may file suit under the ADA. See
Hale v. King, 642 F. 3d 492 (5th Cir. 2011). “To meet this standard, a plaintiff must show either
that ‘(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes
that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities.’” Id.
Rainey alleged Marathon, through the decision-making of its medical and human resources
employees, revoked Rainey’s job offer because they held bias against him because of his kidney
disability and associated dialysis treatment protocol. R. Doc. 1 at 8. Rainey alleged that at all
times he was qualified for the light products transport driver position Marathon offered to him. Id.
He also alleges that he was “at all times healthy and physically fit enough to perform all the
essential job duties of the for the light products transport driver....” Id.
He also alleges nothing about his kidney disease or his dialysis precludes him from
performing the duties for the light products transport driver position. Id. at 9. Further, he alleged
further that nothing about his kidney disease or his dialysis caused him to be a direct threat to
himself or his coworkers. Id. He likewise alleges that Marathon’s decision to withdraw its offer of
employment was unreasonable and without any objectively reasonable or reliable medical
evidentiary support. Id. Additionally, Rainey alleges that he satisfied all DOT regulatory
requirements to be deemed physically to drive a commercial motor vehicle codified at 49 C.F.R.
§ 391.41. Id. at 6-7
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Rainey therefore claims that Marathon’s actions show both direct and circumstantial
evidence of disability-based animus. R. Doc. 1 at 15, ¶57. In the absence of any objective, medical
or other credible reason to revoke Rainey’s offer and combined with physician assistant’s written
admission that he failed Rainey because of his kidney disease and dialysis treatment, Rainey
maintains the only plausible explanation is that Marathon and its employees revoked Rainey’s
offer because they did not want to hire or work with Rainey based on his kidney related disabilities
and impairments. Id. Taken Rainey’s allegations as true, Rainey states a claim for “regarded as”
ADA discrimination. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to the “regarded as”
discrimination claim.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 8) is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART.
IT IS GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the extent Marathon seeks dismissal of
the Failure to Accommodate claim. Rainey, however, will be allowed to amend his complaint no
later than 20 days from the signing of this Order.
IT IS DENIED to the extent Marathon seeks to dismiss Rainey’s claims on grounds that
(1) he is not a qualified individual or (2) fails to state to a “Regarded As” claim.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 17th day of June 2026.

KAREN WELLS ROBY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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