Washington v. Smith et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRUCE WASHINGTON CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 24-00145
RANDY SMITH, ET AL.

SECTION “O”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court in this civil rights case is a motion
1
to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) by Defendants Justin Parker, Michael Sevante, Jeffrey Boehm, Jeanine
Buckner, Jeremy Church, Chance Cloud, George Cox, Curtis Finn, Frank J Francois
Jr., Dale Galloway, Taylor Lewis, Denise Mancuso, Michael Ripoll Jr., Douglas
Searle, and Randy Smith.
2
Defendants are all employees of the St. Tammany Parish
Sheriff’s Office (“STPSO”). Plaintiff Bruce Washington opposes
3
the motion and
Defendants replied in further support thereof.
4
For the following reasons, the motion
is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIE D IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
This civil rights litigation arises from two traffic stops and the events that
followed. Because Defendants move to dismiss Washington’s second amended
complaint (the operative “complaint”) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court considers

1
ECF No. 104.
2
Randy Smith recently retired as Sheriff. His successor “is automatically substituted as a
party” and “[l]ater proceedings should be in the substituted party’s name[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d).
The Court invites counsel for Defendants to file a motion to substitute interim sheriff Bret Ibert.
Meanwhile, “any misnomer . . . must be disregarded.” See id.
3
ECF No. 118.
4
ECF No. 121.
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the following well-pleaded facts drawn from Washington’s second amended
complaint. See generally Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 190 (5th Cir.
2009).
5

Plaintiff Bruce Washington, a Black resident of St. Tammany Parish, filed the
instant suit after he was pulled over by St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office
(“STPSO”) Police Officers on two occasions.
6
Washington alleges that his interactions
with the STPSO Officers were racially motivated. Washington’s allegations are
described in further detail below.
A. January 13, 2023 Traffic Stop
At approximately 7:16 p.m. on January 13, 2023, Washington—who was
driving on Highway 12, heading to New Orleans to spend Martin Luther King Jr.
weekend with his girlfriend and perform yardwork for her—was pulled over by an
unmarked vehicle driven by STPSO Officers Chance Cloud and Taylor Lewis, both
Defendants in this case.
7
STPSO Officer Curtis Finn, also a Defendant, joined the

5
In the second amended complaint, Washington alleges that “all references to timing of events
or quotations of conversations between [the officers] and Mr. Washington are based on the body-worn
camera footage obtained from the STPSO via a Public Records Request.” ECF No. 96 at 17 n.21.
Accordingly, as permitted, the Court has viewed the video evidence attached to Defendants’ motion to
dismiss because video of Plaintiff’s January 13, 2023 traffic stop is “referenced in the complaint and .
. . central to the plaintiff’s claims.” Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d
890, 900 (5th Cir. 2019). The Court discounts the complaint allegations in favor of the video evidence
only when that evidence “blatantly contradict[s]” the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded factual allegations.
Harmon v. City of Arlington, Texas, 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 380 (2007)); see also Winder v. Gallardo, 118 F.4th 638, 643 (5th Cir. 2024) (observing, in
reviewing district court’s ruling on motion to dismiss, that the plaintiffs “referenced the video in their
complaint and brief, . . . and caselaw supports our consideration of the video”).
6
See generally ECF No. 96. Less than two years prior to the traffic stops forming the basis of
the instant lawsuit, Washington had been stopped by STPSO deputies; a traffic stop which gave rise
to prior litigation. See Washington v. Smith, 639 F. Supp. 3d 625 (E.D. La. 2022).
7
ECF No. 96 ¶¶ 3, 54-57.
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traffic stop shortly after it began.
8
Upon pulling Washington over, Cloud informed
Washington that the stop was because Washington had failed to use his turn signal
to change lanes.
9
Washington “immediately” apologized to the officers; Cloud assured
him that he was “good.”
10
Cloud then asked for Washington’s identification, which
Washington produced, and Cloud began to question him, asking, for example, if he
had “any weapons or anything in the boot?”
11

While Cloud was questioning him, Lewis used a flashlight to look into his
backseat and then requested that Cloud instruct Washington to exit his vehicle;
Cloud said to Washington, “Do me a favor, man. Hop on out for me real quick?”
12

Before Washington exited the vehicle, Lewis retracted his previous statement to
Cloud about Washington exiting his car by informing Cloud that the item in the
backseat was “not what [he] thought it was.”
13
Despite hearing Lewis, Cloud
continued to wait for Washington to exit the vehicle, which Washington did without
external protest.
14

Cloud then again asked Washington if he had any weapons on his person or
“anything crazy [he] should know about”; Washington said no.
15
Cloud told
Washington that he would like to perform a pat down search.
16
Washington raised

8
Id.
9
Id. ¶ 58.
10
Id. ¶¶ 59-60.
11
Id. ¶¶ 61-62
12
Id. ¶¶ 63, 65.
13
Id. ¶ 66.
14
Id. ¶¶ 67, 71.
15
Id. ¶ 72.
16
Id. ¶ 73.
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his hands in a “gesture of submission” but did not verbally respond.
17
Washington
states that he was fearful for his life and believed that he would be patted down
regardless of whether he consented.
18
To conduct the frisk, Cloud ordered
Washington to the rear of his vehicle and directed Washington to put his hands on
top of the trunk; Washington complied.
19
During the frisk, Cloud reached into
Washington’s pocket and removed Washington’s wallet;
20
Cloud reached into an
additional pocket of Washington’s but did not find anything.
21

Cloud then handed Washington’s identification to Lewis to run a license and
records check.
22
To Washington, Cloud stated “your wallet there—do you mind if I
make sure you don’t [have] anything crazy in there?”
23
Washington gave his wallet
to Cloud, but states that he did so only because he felt he had “no choice.”
24
Cloud
then went through Washington’s wallet.
25

Finn joined the group as Cloud was searching Washington’s person and
wallet.
26
Upon joining, Finn began questioning Washington about where he was from
and where he was going.
27
While questioning Washington, Finn used his flashlight
to look into Washington’s car.
28
Washington told Finn that his “weed-eater” was in

17
Id. ¶¶ 74, 78.
18
Id. ¶¶ 75-80.
19
Id. ¶¶ 79-81.
20
Id. ¶ 83.
21
Id. ¶ 85.
22
Id. ¶ 87.
23
Id. ¶ 94.
24
Id. ¶¶ 95, 97.
25
Id. ¶ 97.
26
Id. ¶ 99.
27
Id. ¶¶ 99-110.
28
Id. ¶ 110.
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the backseat of the car and Finn confirmed that he saw what the item was.
29
During
this questioning, Lewis, who was in the STPSO vehicle, remained in possession of
Washington’s identification.
30

Cloud then asked Washington whether there was anything in his car that the
officers “should be concerned about.”
31
Washington responded by stating “No, you
can look” and gestured towards the windows that Finn and Lewis had previously
looked into.
32
Washington also offered to open the door so that the officers could view
the weed-eater in the backseat.
33
Cloud declined Washington’s offer to open the door,
radioed that no further assistance was necessary, and then informed Washington
that he (Cloud) was “not a ticket writer” and wouldn’t write him a ticket for the
allegedly un-signaled lane change.
34
Washington alleges that, if not sooner, this is
the point at which the purpose of the stop had concluded.
35

Finn then re-approached Washington and looked into Washington’s vehicle
without his flashlight.
36
Washington offered to open his trunk for the officers to take
a look, but Washington maintains that he did not inform the officers that they could
search his car.
37
Cloud “did not ask if the Defendants could search [his] car[;]” rather,
he then informed Washington that the officers would “go through [his] car real

29
Id. ¶¶ 113-15.
30
Id. ¶ 117.
31
Id. ¶ 119.
32
Id. ¶ 121.
33
Id. ¶ 122.
34
Id. ¶¶ 123-25.
35
Id. ¶ 125.
36
Id. ¶ 127.
37
Id. ¶¶ 128-132.
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quick.”
38
Finn began questioning him before attempting to open his passenger side
door.
39
Washington asked Finn if he (Washington) should unlock the door; Finn
responded that he would do it himself.
40

At 7:20 p.m.,
41
Lewis returned after completing checks of Washington’s license
and receiving confirmation that no outstanding warrants for Washington existed.
42

Lewis did not immediately return Washington’s license; instead he maintained
possession of it as Finn began searching Washington’s car.
43
While Finn was
searching the car, Cloud continued questioning Washington before asking Lewis to
take over that role.
44
At that point Cloud moved to the now-unlocked passenger door
and joined Finn in searching the vehicle.
45
Throughout the search of the car, at least
one officer was engaged in questioning Washington or engaging in small talk with
him while the others performed the search.
46
Washington states that, in an effort to
avoid appearing disrespectful or uncooperative, he did not refuse the search or refuse
to answer the officers’ questions.
47

The officers thoroughly inspected his vehicle, looking not only near the weed-
eater that had been the subject of early conversation but throughout the cabin, under

38
Id. ¶¶ 135-36 (emphasis in original).
39
Id. ¶¶ 138-42.
40
Id. ¶¶ 143-45.
41
The Second Amended Complaint alleges he returns at 7:19; Lewis’s body camera video
timestamp shows the time as 7:20.
42
Id. ¶ 147.
43
Id. ¶ 148.
44
Id. ¶ 149.
45
Id. ¶ 152.
46
Id. ¶ 153.
47
Id. ¶ 151.
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the hood, and inside the trunk of the vehicle.
48
The officers looked through the
contents of items within the vehicle, including a briefcase, backpack, and bags.
49

During the search, Cloud began “muttering” about what Lewis had seen.
50

Washington alleges that this was essentially an admission that Cloud did not know
what he was looking through Washington’s vehicle for.
51
Cloud then moved to the
rear of the vehicle to search the trunk.
52
Cloud did not ask for Washington’s consent
before opening and inspecting the trunk.
53

Throughout the search of his vehicle, the officers “peppered” Washington with
questions, including questions unrelated to the stop.
54
Washington states that this
questioning prevented him from observing or limiting the search.
55

Around 7:29, approximately 10 minutes after the license and identification
checks came back clear and 13 minutes after Washington argues any chance of
reasonable suspicion was “dispelled,” Washington was finally informed that he could
leave.
56
Only at this point did Lewis return Washington’s identification.
57

B. Report Following the January Traffic Stop
Days after the January traffic stop, Washington contacted STPSO Internal
Affairs which he alleges is comprised of two individuals: Captain Dale Galloway and

48
Id. ¶¶ 155-203.
49
Id. ¶¶ 169, 173, 180.
50
Id. ¶ 181.
51
Id.
52
Id. ¶¶ 182-84.
53
Id. ¶ 184.
54
Id. ¶ 213.
55
Id.
56
Id. ¶¶ 203-07.
57
Id. ¶ 206.
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Sergeant Frank Francois, Jr.
58
Washington spoke to Galloway and Francois for
around 30 minutes on January 26, 2023.
59
Washington sat for a complaint intake
interview on January 30, 2023, which lasted for approximately 30 minutes.
60

Francois and Galloway then spoke to Cloud, Lewis and Finn on January 31, 2023.
61

On February 1, 2023, the STPSO Public Integrity Bureau reported its findings
on the incident.
62
The Investigations & Professional Standards Division, Public
Integrity Bureau and Internal Affairs Division found that the actions of Cloud, Lewis,
and Finn during the January traffic stop were within the parameters of the STPSO’s
policies and regulations, and that Washington’s complaint regarding the traffic stop
lacked merit.
63

Washington alleges that Galloway and Francois report directly to
Investigations Major Michael Ripoll, Jr.
64
He further alleges that the Investigations
Major is responsible for assuring compliance with policies.
65
Washington additionally
alleges that Sheriff Randy Smith delegated policymaking authority to Galloway and
Francois.
66

C. October 8, 2023 Traffic Stop
On October 8, 2023, STPSO Deputy Douglas Searle pulled Washington over.
Searle followed Washington for nearly 20 miles along Highway 21 before pulling him

58
Id. ¶ 218.
59
Id. ¶ 221.
60
Id. ¶ 222.
61
Id.
62
Id. ¶ 223.
63
Id. ¶ 224.
64
Id. ¶ 219.
65
Id.
66
Id. ¶ 220.
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over just shy of the Washington Parish line.
67
At the time of the stop, Searle informed
Washington that the reason for the stop was that Washington did not have insurance,
a statement that was untrue.
68
However, when Searle was later asked about the stop
by STPSO Internal Affairs, he provided that the stop was because Washington’s tag
lights were too dim to read the license plate.
69

Searle questioned Washington for around 10 minutes, during which Searle did
not activate his body camera.
70
As he questioned Washington, Searle peered into
Washington’s vehicle.
71
Upon returning to Searle’s own vehicle with Washington’s
license, Searle finally activated his body camera.
72
Searle then took photographs of
Washington’s driver’s license and other documentation with a cellphone.
73

Washington states that Searle’s body camera footage shows that the camera roll of
Searle’s phone includes pictures of other individuals’ identifications.
74

D. Report Following the October Traffic Stop
Following the October traffic stop, Washington sought to file a complaint with
the STPSO. Consistent with this goal, Washington left two voicemails on November
21, 2023 and November 27, 2023.
75
Washington spoke to Francois on November 30,
2023 and set up an interview for December 5, 2023.
76
But Washington was not able

67
Id. ¶¶ 22, 245.
68
Id. ¶¶ 23, 24, 247.
69
Id. ¶ 23.
70
Id. ¶ 250.
71
Id.
72
Id. The Court is not in receipt of this footage and has therefore not reviewed it.
73
Id. ¶¶ 251-55. Washington alleges that, upon information and belief, the cellphone was
Searle’s personal cellphone because it had social media applications on it. Id. ¶ 252.
74
Id. ¶251-55.
75
Id. ¶ 257.
76
Id. ¶¶ 257-58.
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to sit for the interview on December 5, 2023 because nobody was at the Public
Integrity Board when he arrived.
77
Further, despite Washington’s attempts to
contact Francois, Washington was unable to reach Francois.
78
Washington was later
informed by an STPSO employee that Francois had left early on the day of
Washington’s scheduled interview to be with family.
79
This statement was then
contradicted by Galloway, who called Washington later that afternoon to inform him
that Francois was called on another assignment.
80
A new interview time was
scheduled for the afternoon of December 7, 2023.
81

After providing the December 7 interview date and time, Galloway texted
Washington that he should come to the interview alone.
82
Despite this instruction,
Washington arrived for the interview on December 7 with his attorney.
83
Francois
and Galloway came to the parking lot as Washington parked and “inspected Mr.
Washington’s vehicle.”
84
Francois and Galloway provided no response when asked if
there was something wrong with Washington’s car.
85

Francois informed Washington that Washington’s attorney could not be
present when Washington made his complaint.
86
The officers provided no reason for
this limitation, and Francois would not budge.
87
Washington states that he did not

77
Id. ¶ 258.
78
Id.
79
Id. ¶¶ 259-60.
80
Id.
81
Id. ¶ 260.
82
Id. ¶ 261.
83
Id. ¶ 262.
84
Id. ¶ 263.
85
Id.
86
Id. ¶ 264.
87
Id.
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want to sit for the interview without counsel, so he instead prepared a statement with
counsel while still in the parking lot.
88
The statement was then printed and
Washington signed it.
89
Internal Affairs did not interview Washington, and
Washington was not contacted regarding the complaint after the December 7 parking
lot meeting.
90

Francois and Galloway interviewed Searle for thirteen minutes on December
12, 2023.
91
It was during this interview that Searle provided the new rationale—that
the license plate was not properly illuminated—for stopping Washington.
92
Searle
reported that the reason his body camera was not on for most of the stop was that he
simply “forgot.”
93

Francois and Galloway did not investigate Washington’s concerns of Searle’s
use of a cellphone to photograph Washington’s license during the stop.
94
Additionally,
Francois and Galloway did not investigate what Searle did with that photograph, or
the other photographs of identification that appeared on the cellphone camera roll.
95

Francois and Galloway’s investigation found Washington’s complaint to be
without merit, and that the only violation of STPSO policy found was the failure to
turn on the body camera after initiating the stop.
96

88
Id. ¶¶ 265-66.
89
Id. ¶ 266.
90
Id. ¶ 267.
91
Id. ¶ 268.
92
Id. ¶ 269.
93
Id. ¶ 271.
94
Id. ¶ 272.
95
Id.
96
Id. ¶ 273.
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E. Requests for Information
Washington states that he encountered difficulties requesting record
information from the STPSO.
97
He specifically alleges the following: On November
9, 2023, through his counsel, Washington requested traffic stop records with
demographics information for January 2023.
98
Seven days later, on November 16,
2023, he was provided a list of all traffic stops for the period, but the list did not
contain the demographics information.
99
This is despite Washington requesting
information including “race, sex, and age” of stopped individuals.
100
On November
17, 2023, Denise Mancuso, the custodian who provided the report the day prior,
agreed to produce a new report utilizing the demographic filters.
101
After re-running
the search, Mancuso reported to Washington’s attorney that the new report contained
more results than the original but that she could not release the additional reports
before conferring with Information Services.
102
On November 28, 2023 a new report
was issued to Washington but it did not contain the demographic information.
103

Washington then requested traffic stop records for a period in November
2023.
104
He received multiple reports from the Custodian Defendants with
demographic information included.
105
After receiving these reports, Washington

97
See generally id. ¶¶ 280-304.
98
Id. ¶ 280.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. ¶ 281.
102
Id.
103
Id. ¶ 282.
104
Id. ¶ 283.
105
Id. ¶ 284. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint defines the “Custodian Defendants” as
Mancuso, Buckner, Sevante, and STPSO Records Custodian(s) John Doe(s).
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requested the same information for the period of January 1, 2021 to December 31,
2022.
106
He made this request on December 13, 2023.
107
Washington followed up on
this request on December 21, 2023, and received a response from Mancuso the next
day.
108
Mancuso informed Washington’s attorney that a partial production was
available but did not produce an invoice for the production until five days later and
after multiple requests from Washington’s counsel.
109
The Custodian Defendants
informed Washington that the requested demographic information would not be
provided.
110

On January 10, 2024, Washington’s attorney submitted a public records
request for reproduction of the electronically stored information regarding STPSO’s
traffic stops and information regarding the reporting system itself.
111
Washington’s
attorney followed up with Custodian Defendants two weeks later.
112
The initial and
follow-up were not answered until January 30, 2024.
113
Moreover, the response
Washington/his attorney received was unsatisfactory as Custodian Defendants
refused to produce certain information requested.
114

F. Allegations of Racism
Washington alleges that the STPSO has been aware that a disproportionate
number of Black community members have been stopped by STPSO officers since at

106
Id. ¶ 287.
107
Id.
108
Id. ¶¶ 289-90.
109
Id. ¶¶ 290-94.
110
Id. ¶¶ 294-96.
111
Id. ¶¶ 300-01.
112
Id. ¶ 302.
113
Id. ¶¶ 303-04.
114
Id. ¶ 303.
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least 2008.
115
He further alleges that despite STPSO’s refusal to provide certain data
responsive to his public records requests, he was able to obtain a limited set of data,
which underlies the statistics that follow: First, that the rate of traffic stops in St.
Tammany Parish from January 1, 2023 to November 29, 2023 was 5,245 for every
one hundred thousand Black residents and 1,619 for every one hundred thousand
White residents; second, that people of color (i.e., people not categorized as “white” in
the dataset) are stopped at a rate at least 2.1 times higher than white people; third,
that Black people accounted for 36% of people stopped for and 26% of people cited for
traffic violations despite accounting for only 15% of the St. Tammany Parish
populations; fourth, Black people were two times more likely than white people to
receive a citation solely for a violation that could not be observable to an officer on
patrol (e.g., driving without a license); and fifth, Black people received 1.37 violations
per traffic ticket compared with the 1.19 violations per traffic ticket received by white
people, while Hispanic people received 1.86 violations per traffic ticket.
116

G. Claims
Beginning with the January Traffic Stop, Washington brings a litany of state
and federal law claims against the officers directly involved (Cloud, Lewis, and Finn).
Specifically, Washington brings claims for: (1) unlawful extension of detention (First
Cause of Action), (2) unlawful search and seizure (Second Cause of Action), and (3)
unlawful search (Third Cause of Action), all in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 5 of the

115
Id. ¶ 227.
116
Id. ¶¶ 227-33.
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Louisiana Constitution; (4) conspiracy to commit § 1983 violation (Eleventh Cause of
Action); (5) unlawful search and seizure in violation of Article I Section 5 of the
Louisiana Constitution (Twelfth Cause of Action); (6) invasion of privacy in violation
of Article I Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution (Thirteenth Cause of Action); (7)
negligent infliction of emotional distress (Fourteenth Cause of Action); (8) failure to
intervene (Eighteenth Cause of Action); and (9) false imprisonment (Nineteenth
Cause of Action).
Moving to the October Traffic Stop, Washington brings two claims against
Officer Searle: one § 1983 claim for unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section
5 of the Louisiana Constitution against Searle (Fourth Cause of Action); and a state
law claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (Fifteenth Cause of Action).
In relation to the Investigation of the October Traffic Stop, Washington brings
a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against defendants Francois,
Galloway, Boehm (STPSO Deputy Chief), Ripoll, and Cox (STPSO Deputy Chief of
Investigations & Professional Standards) (Sixteenth Cause of Action).
Washington additionally brings multiple claims alleging Monell liability for:
unlawful searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment based on ratification against
Smith, Boehm, Cox, Ripoll, Galloway, and Francois (Fifth Cause of Action); unlawful
searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment based on a de facto policy against
Smith and the “Supervisor Defendants”
117
(Sixth Cause of Action); unlawful searches

117
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint defines the “Supervisor Defendants” as Boehm, Cox,
Ripoll, Galloway, Francois, Parker, and Church.
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in violation of the Fourth Amendment based on failure to train against Smith and
the “Supervisor Defendants” (Seventh Cause of Action); unlawful searches in
violation of the Fourth Amendment based on single decision by a final policymaker
against Smith and the “Supervisor Defendants” (Eighth Cause of Action); racist
policing practices in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against Smith and the
“Supervisor Defendants” (Tenth Cause of Action); and First and Fourteenth
Amendment
118
violations against Smith and the “Custodian Defendants” in their
individual and official capacities (Twenty-First Cause of Action).
Washington additionally brings a Title VI claim against Smith and the
“Supervisor Defendants” (Ninth Cause of Action), a claim for negligent
supervision/training against Smith and the “Supervisor Defendants” (Seventeenth
Cause of Action), a claim for vicarious liability against Smith and the “Supervisor
Defendants” (Twentieth Cause of Action), and a claim for failure to respond to public
records requests under the Louisiana Public Records Act against Smith and the
“Custodian Defendants” (Twenty-Second Cause of Action).
Defendants now move to dismiss each of Washington’s 22 claims for failure to
state a claim.
119
Defendants additionally invoke qualified immunity.
120

118
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint appears to contain a mistake in the subtitling of this
claim, stating that it is brought under the “First and Fourth Amendments” as the allegations in the
text of the complaint discuss the First and Fourteenth, not First and Fourth Amendments. See ECF
No. 96 at 117-121.
119
ECF No. 104.
120
Id.
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II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint that does not
meet Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard should be dismissed for failing to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). “[T]he pleading standard
Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitations
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Ultimately, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although courts “accept all well-pled facts as true,
construing all reasonable inferences in the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal
conclusions are not accepted as true.” Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 743 (5th Cir. 2023)
(cleaned up).
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In resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court is generally “limited to the contents
of the pleadings, including any attachments thereto.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). However, there are two
limited exceptions to this general rule in which the Court may rely on evidence
beyond the complaint without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion
for summary judgment. George v. SI Grp., Inc., 36 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2022)
(citing Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2014)). First,
the Court “may consider ‘any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are
central to the claim and referenced [or incorporated] in the complaint.’” See PHI Grp.,
Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 58 F.4th 838, 841 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Lone Star Fund
V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010)); see also Doe
v. Ferguson, 128 F.4th 727, 733-34 (5th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted); see also
Edmiston v. Borrego, 75 F.4th 551, 557-58 (5th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). Second,
the Court may consider “a matter subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of
Evidence 201.” George, 36 F.4th at 619.
If the Court considers materials outside the pleadings, the motion to dismiss
must be converted into a motion for summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d);
see also Kennedy v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, 369 F.3d 833, 839 (5th Cir. 2004).
If conversion to summary judgment is appropriate, the Court must notify the parties,
then consider all evidence presented. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d); see also Scanlan v.
Texas A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003).
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A. Section 1983 and Qualified Immunity
Section 1983 “allows plaintiffs to seek damages from persons who violate their
constitutional rights while acting under color of state law.” Gray v. White, 18 F.4th
463, 467 (5th Cir. 2021). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must (1)
allege a violation of the Constitution or of federal law, and (2) demonstrate that the
alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Doe on
Behalf of Doe v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998). A state
official whose “conduct deprives another of a right secured by federal constitutional
or statutory law is nonetheless shielded from personal liability for damages under
section 1983 by the doctrine of qualified immunity,” unless “all reasonable officials”
would have realized at the time that “it was proscribed by the federal law on which
the suit is founded.” Dudley v. Angel, 209 F.3d 460, 462 (5th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff argues in opposition to the motion to dismiss that qualified immunity
does not apply to the allegations in the complaint and that the text of § 1983 precludes
the defense of qualified immunity.
121
Later sections of this opinion address whether
qualified immunity protects these officers from Plaintiff’s specific claims. At the
outset, though, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s broader argument. This Court cannot
overrule the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit’s qualified immunity doctrine. The
Fifth Circuit recently considered the argument advanced by plaintiff and stated that
“[w]hatever its merit, the argument is foreclosed because ‘only the Supreme Court
can definitively grapple with § 1983’s enacted text and decide whether it means what

121
ECF No. 118 at 72-77.
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it says—and what, if anything that means for § 1983 jurisprudence.’” Hankins v.
Wheeler, 109 F.4th 839, 845 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Rogers v. Jarrett, 63 F.4th 971,
981 (5th Cir. 2023) (Willett, J., concurring)). This Court too cannot “grapple with §
1983’s enacted text” and decide what it “means for §1983 immunity jurisprudence.”
Id. Accordingly, this Court must reject Plaintiff’s argument that qualified immunity
is not authorized under the text of § 1983.
The doctrine of qualified immunity “provides government officials with
immunity from suit ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Smith v. Lee, 73 F.4th 376, 381 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009)). The Supreme Court has stated that the doctrine “attempt[s] to
balance competing values: not only the importance of a damages remedy to protect
the rights of citizens, but also the need to protect officials who are required to exercise
discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of
official authority.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 800 (1982). Qualified
immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.” Hughes v. Garcia, 100 F.4th 611, 618 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
Once a government official asserts the defense of qualified immunity, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to negate the defense. Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568
F.3d 181, 194 (5th Cir. 2009). Where, as here, a “motion to dismiss raises the defense
of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must plead specific facts that both allow the court
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to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm . . . alleged
and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.” Sanchez v.
Nunemaker, 179 F.4th 315, 318 (5th Cir. 2026) (citing McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682,
688 (5th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)). Thus, to overcome
qualified immunity at the pleadings stage, “the plaintiff must ‘have alleged facts
sufficient to plausibly show that (1) the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional
right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
misconduct.’” Id. (citing Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1163 (5th Cir.
2021)). A district court may consider the two elements in whichever order it chooses.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
“Clearly established law is a ‘demanding standard,’ [which] protects ‘all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Searles v. City of
Houston, 180 F.4th 842, 847 (5th Cir. 2026) (citations omitted). It is settled that
“[c]learly established law is not to be defined at a high level of generality.” Tucker v.
City of Shreveport, 998 F.3d 165, 174 (5th Cir. 2021). Rather, the clearly-established
“inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad
general proposition.’” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (per curiam).
The Supreme Court has instructed that “specificity is especially important in the
Fourth Amendment context, where . . . it is sometimes difficult for an officer to
determine how the relevant legal doctrine[ ] will apply to the factual situation the
officer confronts.” Id. (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam)).
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For a plaintiff to show that a right was “clearly established” at the time of the
alleged conduct, he must show that the right was “so well defined that it is clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” City
of Tahlequah, Okla., v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021) (cleaned up). “A right is not clearly
established if existing precedent does not place the constitutional question ‘beyond
debate.’” Zorn v. Linton, 607 U.S. ---, 146 S. Ct. 926, 930, 224 L. Ed. 2d 400 (2026)
(per curiam) (citation omitted) (observing that “[t]he relevant precedent must define
the right with a high degree of specificity, so that every reasonable official would
interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.”).
122
The
burden is on the plaintiff to “identify[ ] the clearly established law, and the right’s
contours must be ‘sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right.’” Nevarez v. Dorris, 135 F.4th 269, 275 (5th Cir.
2025) (citation omitted) “Of course, ‘general statements of the law are not inherently
incapable of giving fair and clear warning’ to officers, but ‘in the light of pre-existing
law the unlawfulness must be apparent[.]’” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79-80 (2017)
(cleaned up, citations omitted). “In short, officers receive qualified immunity unless
they could have ‘read’ the relevant precedent beforehand and ‘know[ n]’ that it
proscribed their specific conduct.” Zorn, 146 S. Ct. at 930 (citing City and County of
San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 616 (2015)).

122
It is settled in the Fifth Circuit that “[c]learly established law is determined by controlling
authority—or a robust consensus of persuasive authority—that defines the contours of the right in
question with a high degree of particularity.” See Clarkston v. White, 943 F.3d 988, 990 (5th Cir. 2019)
(citation omitted). The Supreme Court has “assume[d] without deciding that ‘controlling Circuit
precedent’ can clearly establish law for qualified-immunity purposes.” Zorn, 146 S. Ct. at 930 n.3
(citing Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021 (per curiam)).
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B. Body Camera Footage and Complaint Attachments
At the outset the Court finds it prudent to address the scope of materials that
may be considered in resolving Defendants’ motion, that is, consideration of the body
camera footage, the complaint itself, and the attachments to the complaint.
The Court has viewed the video evidence attached to Defendants’ motion to
dismiss because Plaintiff has incorporated bodycam video footage of the January 13,
2023 traffic stop, which—though not submitted by Plaintiff—is nevertheless
referenced in the complaint and clearly central to Plaintiff’s claims.
123
The Court
“view[s] all well-pled facts and video recordings incorporated into the pleadings in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Sanchez v. Nunemaker, 179 F.4th 315, 318 (5th
Cir. 2026) (citing Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1162–63 (5th Cir.
2021)); but see Hodge v. Engleman, 90 F.4th 840, 844-45 (5th Cir. 2024) (treating
dismissal as implicit conversion to summary judgment where district court had
reviewed officer bodycam footage neither attached to nor referenced in the complaint
and then granted motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds). The Court
discounts the complaint’s allegations in favor of the video evidence only when that
evidence “blatantly contradict[s]” the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded factual allegations. See
Harmon, 16 F.4th at 1163 (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)); see also
Winder v. Gallardo, 118 F.4th 638, 643 (5th Cir. 2024) (observing, in reviewing

123
Washington himself utilized the bodycam footage from the January traffic stop to craft the
allegations in his second amended complaint and thus fairly incorporated the footage therein. See,
e.g., ECF No. 96 n.21 (alleging that “all references to timing of events or quotations of conversations
between [the officers] and Mr. Washington are based on the body-worn camera footage obtained from
the STPSO via a Public Records Request”).
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district court’s ruling on motion to dismiss, that the plaintiffs “referenced the video
in their complaint and brief, . . . and caselaw supports our consideration of the video”).
Here, the body camera footage largely aligns with—and thus does not “blatantly
contradict”—Washington’s well-pleaded factual allegations, so the Court principally
relies upon Washington’s pleaded allegations in its assessment.
Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ reliance on facts alleged in the attachments to
the complaint—in particular, police reports that Defendants themselves generated
and that characterize the traffic stops in a light more favorable to Defendants than
the versions set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint.
124
In their reply brief, Defendants look
to Smit v. SXSW Holdings, Inc., 903 F.3d 522 (5th Cir. 2018) in arguing that the
Court should disregard Plaintiff’s characterization of the facts when inconsistent
with Plaintiff’s own complaint attachments. But Smit is taken out of context. In
Smit, permit and traffic plans attached to the complaint expressly contradicted an
allegation in the complaint. Smit, 903 F.3d at 528. Accordingly, it was sensible (and
the court found) that the exhibit, and not the allegation, controlled. Here, though,
the defendants ask the Court to rely on statements they made during internal
investigations to rebut Plaintiff’s allegations simply because Plaintiff attached the
internal investigation paperwork to his complaint. The Court does not find this to be
a sensible course of action. The Seventh Circuit case of Northern Indiana Gun &
Outdoor Shows, Inc., v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 1998) is instructive.
There, the Seventh Circuit explained that

124
ECF No. 118 at 24.
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[t]o conclude summarily, however, that letters written by Century
Center [a facility established by the defendant] represent the truth with
regard to the defendants’ intent simply because [plaintiff] attached them
to its complaint for reasons unrelated to their truthfulness is
inappropriate.

Northern Indiana Gun & Outdoor Show, 163 F.3d at 455. The Court continued,
instructing that
[r]ather than accepting every word in a unilateral writing by a
defendant and attached by a plaintiff to a complaint as true, it is
necessary to consider why a plaintiff attached the documents, who
authored the documents, and the reliability of the documents.

Id.
The Court heeds the Seventh Circuit’s advice and considers why the plaintiff
attached the documents, the authors of the documents, and the reliability of the
documents. A consideration of these factors does not support the conclusion that the
exhibits upon which Defendants rely to counter Plaintiff’s allegations should control.
In addition to bringing claims related to the actual traffic stops, Plaintiff brought
claims regarding the investigations into the stops. It follows then that the
investigation reports were attached to showcase the investigations, not to provide an
accurate accounting of the traffic stops. Accordingly, the Court will not consider the
narratives provided within the investigative reports for their truth. Instead, the
Court will rely upon the well-pleaded complaint to the extent not blatantly
contradicted by the body camera videos that have been submitted.
C. Group Pleading
Not every instance in which a plaintiff categorizes defendants amounts to
impermissible group pleading. Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., No.
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15-2177, 2016 WL 4479507, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 25, 2016) (Morgan, J.), aff’d in part,
re’vd in part and remanded on other grounds, 869 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2017) (“A
complaint that contains ‘group allegations’ and ‘lumps together’ defendants is not ipso
facto in violation of Rule 8.”). What matters is whether “the complaint, with its ‘group
allegations,’ gives each defendant adequate notice” of the plaintiff’s claims and
grounds upon which they rest. Id. Thus, the Court does not dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
simply because he utilized categorization. Instead, where relevant, the Court
considers whether the defendants were given adequate notice of Plaintiff’s claims and
the grounds upon which they rest.
D. January 13, 2023 Traffic Stop
Washington alleges three Fourth Amendment violations arising out of the
January 13, 2023 Traffic Stop: (1) prolonged detention, (2) unlawful search and
seizure of his person and wallet, and (3) unlawful search of his vehicle. Washington
alleges that he did not provide consent for any of the above actions. He further alleges
that the actions were conducted because Washington is a Black man. The officers
conducting the January Traffic Stop activated their body worn cameras, which videos
this Court has reviewed. The Court considers each of Washington’s claims—and the
arguments advanced by Defendants to dismiss them—in turn.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Absent an exception, a warrantless search or
seizure is “per se unreasonable.” United States v. Ducksworth, 168 F.4th 764, 768
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(5th Cir. 2026) (citation omitted). One established exception to the warrant or
probable cause requirements “is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1974). “Terry stops and pat-downs, or
Terry ‘frisks’ are among [other] exceptions.” Ducksworth, 168 F.4th at 768 (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). “A ‘Terry stop’ is a ‘special category of Fourth
Amendment ‘seizures,’” in which an officer may briefly detain an individual for
further investigation, if the officer has reasonable suspicion the individual is engaged
in criminal activity.” United States v. Wright, 57 F.4th 524, 530 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 9).
Traffic stops are “seizures” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). In the context of a traffic stop, Terry v.
Ohio provides the standards under which § 1983 claims for unlawful seizure, frisk,
search, and extension of detention are evaluated. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 108-12 (1977) (per curiam) (applying Terry analysis to a traffic stop for
expired license plate). “The touchstone of [the court’s] analysis under the Fourth
Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’” Id. at 108-09.
Under Terry, courts employ a two-part test to resolve challenges to the legality
of police investigatory traffic stops. United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 436-37 (5th
Cir. 2008). First, the court examines whether the officer’s action was “justified at its
inception.” United States v. Bams, 858 F.3d 937, 942 (5th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up); see
also United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004). At inception, a
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traffic stop is justified if a law enforcement officer has “an objectively reasonable
suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation” has occurred.
Bams, 858 F.3d at 942. If the stop was justified, the court’s second inquiry is “whether
the officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
that justified the stop . . . .” See id.; see also Cavitt, 550 F.3d at 436 (“Whether an
officer’s actions are ‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified
the stop’ is a fact-specific question often informed by ‘timing and sequence.’”). The
“stop must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop, unless further reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable
facts, emerges.” Bams, 858 F.3d at 942 (cleaned up). “Reasonable suspicion” of
additional criminal activity must arise “before the initial purpose of the stop ha[s]
been fulfilled.” Cavitt, 550 F.3d at 436-37 (quoting United States v. Lopez-Moreno,
420 F.3d 420, 431 (5th Cir. 2005)).
The second part of the Terry test thus makes clear that the Fourth Amendment
imposes a limit on the permissible duration of a traffic stop otherwise justified at its
inception. Assessing the permissible duration of a stop is keyed to the stop’s mission:
“[a] police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was
made violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015) (rejecting a rule that would render
permissible a seizure posing a merely de minimis delay and holding that the officers’
extension of the otherwise completed traffic stop was unlawful absent independent
reasonable suspicion supporting the canine sniff). “Authority for the seizure . . . ends
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when [the] tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—
completed.” Id. at 354; Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (observing that
a traffic stop thus “become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably
required to complete [its] mission”).
Per Rodriguez, a traffic stop’s legitimate mission involves (1) “address[ing] the
traffic violation” and (2) “attend[ing] to related safety concerns.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S.
at 354. During the permissible duration of the stop, an officer is free to undertake
activities both related and unrelated to the traffic stop’s mission. See id. (observing
that “the Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations that d[o]
not lengthen the roadside detention”). Once the time reasonably required to complete
the stop’s mission has expired, however, the Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer
from “prolong[ing] the stop.” Id. at 355.
1. Unlawful Extension of Detention (First Cause of Action)
Washington’s first claim attacks the extended time during which he was
questioned and his person, wallet, and vehicle were searched. Defendants argue that
this claim should be dismissed because Washington has failed to plausibly allege that
the traffic stop constituted an unlawful extension of detention.
125
They additionally
invoke qualified immunity.
126

As a threshold matter, Washington does not argue, nor could he, that the initial
stop of his vehicle was improper. Upon stopping him, the officers said he was stopped
for an un-signaled turn, an action that Washington does not deny. See United States

125
ECF No. 104-1 at 32-37.
126
Id.
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v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that “so long as
police do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do,
their motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry”).
Washington does not claim that the stop was unjustified at its inception.
Rather, Washington alleges that the officers impermissibly extended the stop’s
permissible duration. Washington provides two key timestamps at which he alleges
that the purpose of the stop was achieved. First, he alleges that the purpose of the
stop was achieved “within the first two minutes.” He alleges that this is so because,
by the two-minute mark, Cloud had informed Washington why he was being pulled
over (to warn him regarding the un-signaled turn), and Washington had apologized.
Second, he alleges that the purpose of the stop was achieved once the license and
warrant check returned clear. This was after the two-minute mark but well before
the stop concluded and Washington was permitted to continue his travels to New
Orleans.
Although Washington asserts that the stop’s mission was completed “within
the first two minutes,” the facts alleged in his well-pleaded complaint indicate that
the officers had not finished running the license and warrant check at that point. The
“mission” of a traffic stop is “to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop
and attend to related safety concerns.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 (internal citations
omitted). “Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission
includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop.” Id. at 355 (cleaned up). These
inquiries include “checking the driver’s license[ and] determining whether there are
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outstanding warrants against the driver.” Id. As these tasks were still underway
within the first two minutes, the stop cannot be said to have concluded at that time.
Instead, according to the complaint’s well-pled allegations, the “mission” of the stop
was complete when Lewis returned having run the license and warrant check.
Further, to the extent Washington’s claim relates to allegation that the officers
ordered him out of his vehicle, he fails to allege any constitutional violation. During
a traffic stop lawful at its inception, an officer may order the driver to step out of the
car. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (holding that officers may “order
all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they ha[ve] been
stopped for a traffic violation”); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15
(1997) (extending the rule of Mimms to apply to passengers as well as drivers such
that “an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car
pending completion of the stop”). No additional reasonable suspicion is required. See
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109 (“Deferring for a moment the legality of the ‘frisk’ once the
bulge had been observed, we need presently deal only with the narrow question of
whether the order to get out of the car, issued after the driver was lawfully detained,
was reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment. This inquiry
must therefore focus not on the intrusion resulting from the request to stop the
vehicle or from the later ‘pat down’ but on the incremental intrusion resulting from
the request to get out of the car once the vehicle was lawfully stopped.”). Accordingly,
it did not matter whether the officers’ suspicion arising out of the “green vegetable
matter” atop the weed-eater had subsided when Washington was ordered out of the
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car. So long as the stop’s mission was reasonably underway (i.e., not yet complete),
ordering Washington to step out of the car was constitutionally permissible per
Mimms’ bright line rule. Based on Washington’s own complaint, he was already
outside of the vehicle by the time the warrant and license check returned clear.
Accordingly, based on Washington’s well-pleaded facts, the stop had not yet concluded
when the officers ordered him to step out of the car. The officers did not need
independent “reasonable suspicion” to order him out of the vehicle or continue the
stop until the license and warrant check returned clear.
The traffic stop did not conclude once the license and warrant check came back
clear, though. Washington alleges that Lewis returned to notify Cloud and Finn that
Lewis received confirmation from dispatch that he had completed checks on
Washington and there were no outstanding warrants against Washington at 7:20
p.m.
127
At this point, the “mission” of the initial stop was completed. Washington
alleges that the stop continued for some 10 additional minutes after Lewis returned
having completed the license and warrant check.
128
For this extension to be justified,
the officers must have “develop[ed] reasonable suspicion of additional criminal
activity.” United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 833 (5th Cir. 2013). If the officers
had not developed such suspicion, then they must have received valid consent for
further actions before the purpose of the stop was completed.

127
ECF No. 96 ¶ 147. Plaintiff alleges Lewis returned at 7:19 but the body camera footage
timestamp indicates he returned closer to 7:20.
128
Id. ¶ 204 (alleging “[f]inally, no less than ten minutes after Mr. Washington’s license had
been cleared by dispatch, and thirteen minutes after Defendant Lewis had dispelled any chance of
reasonable suspicion, Defendant Cloud told Mr. Washington that he was ‘good to go’”).
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Washington alleges in his complaint that the officers had not developed
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at 7:19/7:20, and the body camera video
supports the same. Washington alleges that, prior to exiting his vehicle at the
officers’ command, Officer Lewis realized that the item of potential interest in the
backseat (the weed-eater) was not what he thought it was, thus dispelling any
reasonable suspicion that item may have generated. Washington further alleges that
Lewis relayed this to Cloud, who was instructing Washington out of the vehicle at
that moment. And Washington alleges that Finn acknowledges that he sees the
weed-eater as he was peering through the car windows. Nothing else in Washington’s
complaint, nor in the body camera footage, suggests reasonable suspicion.
The question then is whether, absent reasonable suspicion, the officers
received valid consent for further action before the purpose of the stop was completed.
Defendants rely on purported consent from Washington for their post-license and
warrant check actions and invoke qualified immunity.
As described in greater detail below, at this stage, Washington has alleged
facts that plausibly overcome the officers’ invocation of qualified immunity as to his
claim that the officers unlawfully searched his vehicle. See section II.D.2.ii. For the
purposes of assessing the constitutionally tolerable duration of the stop, (a) the traffic
stop was lawful at its inception and (b) the vehicle search was getting underway—
Cloud and Finn were initiating the search of Washington’s vehicle—when Lewis
returned, having completed the license and warrant check.
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To be sure, per Rodriquez, the officers were permitted to undertake activities
unrelated to the traffic stop’s mission during the stop’s permissible duration so long
as it did not prolong the stop. 575 U.S. at 354-55. The Fourth Amendment analysis
calls for consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case to determine whether
the officers’ conduct, “including the length of the detention,” was reasonable under
those circumstances. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2004) (en
banc). Of course, “[c]onsensual encounters ‘do not implicate Fourth Amendment
concerns[.]’” United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 438-39 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Brigham, 382 F.3d at 508).
Here, Washington alleges facts indicating that completion of the vehicle search
unreasonably extended the traffic stop past the license and background checks.
Unless as Defendants contend the extension was attributed to what a reasonable
officer would have understood to be Plaintiff’s valid consent to search his vehicle,
Plaintiff has stated a plausible constitutional violation. Though Defendants argue
that they enjoy qualified immunity because Plaintiff fails to identify precise
controlling authority in which an officer violated a traffic stop detainee’s right to be
free from a traffic stop prolonged by a vehicle search initiated upon the detainee’s
perceived consent purportedly secured during the traffic stop’s mission but which
vehicle search continued and was completed only after completion of the mission, the
Court finds that to accept Defendants’ argument would be to impermissibly impose a
heightened pleading standard on Plaintiff. See Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 267
(5th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted) (“Section 1983 claims implicating qualified
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immunity are subject to the same Rule 8 pleading standard set forth in Twombly and
Iqbal as all other claims; an assertion of qualified immunity in a defendant’s answer
or motion to dismiss does not subject the complaint to a heightened pleading
standard.”).
As analyzed below in Section II.D.2.ii, Plaintiff pleads facts which overcome
Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity with respect to the search of his car and,
it follows that Plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to plausibly show that Defendants’
conduct violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from a prolonged traffic stop
in the circumstances alleged. Plaintiff alleges facts indicating that Defendants
prolonged the stop beyond the stop’s mission, which was to run a license and warrant
check to “investigate” the failure to indicate a lane change traffic violation. Plaintiff
alleges facts indicating that the stop’s mission had expired—at the latest—when
Lewis approached Cloud and Washington having completed the license check at 7:19-
7:20 p.m. Yet Lewis “maintained possession of Mr. Washington’s license while
Defendant Finn began the vehicle search. Even if Mr. Washington had explicitly been
told he was free to leave, he could not have left, because Defendants Cloud, Lewis,
and Finn retained possession of his identification.”
129
Washington alleges that the
stop was prolonged by at least 10 minutes while his car was searched after dispatch
had cleared the license check; only then—around 7:29 p.m.—was Washington advised
that he was “good to go” and his license returned to him.
130

129
ECF No. 96 ¶¶ 147-48.
130
Id. ¶¶ 204-06.
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He thus alleges that the comprehensive vehicle search nearly tripled the length
of the stop whose mission to perform a license check to investigate failure to indicate
a lane change had been completed within the first few minutes of being stopped,
frisked, and questioned. Washington has alleged facts sufficient to plausibly show
that it was then clearly established that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the
officers from “prolong[ing] the stop” beyond “the time needed to handle the matter for
which the stop was made.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, 350. Because “[a]uthority for
the seizure . . . end[ed] when [the] tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or
reasonably should have been—completed[,]” id. at 354; Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 407 (2005)—here, when Lewis completed the computer check—Washington’s
claim regarding the unlawfully prolonged traffic stop survives Defendants’ invocation
of qualified immunity at this stage.
131
Furthermore, it is difficult to square
dismissing Plaintiff’s cause of action for unlawful extension of detention while
simultaneously maintaining the claim anchored to the underlying act which extended
the detention—the vehicle search—which the Court does below in Section II.D.2.ii.
132

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Washington’s
claim for unlawful extension of traffic stop duration.

131
Plaintiff provides ample detailed allegations indicating how the circumstances alleged
overcome qualified immunity. See generally id. ¶¶ 305-32 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., United
States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 242–43 (5th Cir. 2000), abrogated in part on other grounds by United
States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that an officer impermissibly prolonged a traffic
stop beyond the completion of computer checks, and observing without deciding that the officer's
attempts to obtain consent while still in possession of the driver's identifying documentation and while
the driver was in the back seat of the patrol unit could lead to an inference of coercion).
132
Each of the alleged Fourth Amendment violations are inextricably intertwined. In the
interest of brevity, the Court does not repeat the patently fact-bound (or, more precisely at the pleading
stage, allegation-bound) consent analysis applicable to the vehicle search—a fact-bound analysis
which follows other fact-bound analyses of the frisk and wallet search—here.
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2. Unlawful Search and Seizure
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants (1) patted him down, (2) reached into two
pockets during the pat down, (3) removed his wallet from one of the pockets during
the pat down, (4) searched his wallet after removing it from his person, and (5)
searched his vehicle and items within it. As these are additional seizures beyond the
scope of the initial traffic stop, they must be justified by additional reasonable
suspicion of illegal conduct, see United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 351 (5th Cir.
2010), or be preceded by valid consent. United States v. Montgomery, 777 F.3d 269,
272-73 (5th Cir. 2015).
Here, in invoking qualified immunity, Defendants rely upon Washington’s
purported consent to justify the lawfulness of the frisk, the wallet search, and the
vehicle search. Determining whether consent is valid is a fact-intensive endeavor.
As the Supreme Court has framed the requisite voluntariness feature of consent,
when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to
justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact
voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or
implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the
circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is
a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to
demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a
voluntary consent.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
To be valid, consent must be: (1) voluntary and, if consent follows an initial
unconstitutional search, consent must also be (2) an independent act of free will.
133

133
As analyzed below, the “independent act of free will” feature of consent is only implicated
where the purported consent follows an initial unconstitutional search. Factors relevant to that
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United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350, 357 (5th Cir. 2007), overruled on other
grounds by Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 451 (2011); see also Montgomery, 777 F.3d at
273 (citation omitted). To assess voluntariness, per Bustamonte, courts must
carefully consider the totality of the circumstances. 412 U.S. at 227. As part of that
assessment, the Fifth Circuit evaluates six factors:
1) the voluntariness of the [detainee’s] custodial status; 2) the presence
of coercive police procedures; 3) the extent and level of the [detainee’s]
cooperation with the police; 4) the [detainee’s] awareness of his right to
refuse consent; 5) the [detainee’s] education and intelligence; and 6)
the [detainee’s] belief that no incriminating evidence will be found.

United States v. Hernandez, 279 F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2002). No factor is
determinative.
As the Fifth Circuit has observed, “[t]here are two forms of consent: explicit
and implicit.” Smith v. Lee, 73 F.4th 376, 381 (5th Cir. 2023). Though “[i]mplicit
consent ‘can be inferred from silence or failure to object to a search . . . if that silence
follows a request for consent[,]” such silence-based implicit consent or failure to object
“must ‘follow[ ] a police officer’s explicit or implicit request for consent.’” Id. (citations
omitted). “Consent may also be inferred from actions that reasonably communicate
consent.” United States v. Staggers, 961 F.3d 745, 757 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation
omitted). “It is [nevertheless] well established that a [detainee’s] mere acquiescence
to a show of lawful authority is insufficient to establish voluntary consent.” Lee, 73
F.4th at 381 (quoting United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 1996)). This

particular inquiry include: the “temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the consent,” whether
intervening circumstances exist, and “the purpose and flagrancy” of the preceding misconduct. United
States v. Hernandez, 279 F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2002).

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is so because, critically, “[w]here there is coercion there cannot be consent.” See
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 234 (citation omitted) (observing that the Fourth
Amendment “require[s] that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means[;
f]or, no matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting ‘consent’ would be
no more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth
Amendment is directed”).
i. The “Frisk” and Wallet Search (Second Cause of Action)
To justify the frisk, the officers must have had reasonable suspicion that
Washington was armed and dangerous. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 332 (2009).
Reasonable suspicion is determined by looking to the “totality of the circumstances,”
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989) and must be supported by “specific
and articulable facts suggesting actual physical risk to [the officers] or others.”
United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 407 (5th Cir. 2006). Alternatively, a frisk is
justified if there is valid consent. Montgomery, 777 F.3d at 272-73. In support of
their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff consented to the frisk and
wallet search.
134
Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the
frisk and wallet search are insufficient to bring a cause of action against Finn and
Lewis.
135
As Officer Cloud was the officer that frisked Washington, searched his
pockets, removed the wallet, and searched Washington’s wallet, the Court first
considers Cloud’s conduct. The Court then turns to potential liability for officers Finn
and Lewis.

134
ECF No. 104-1 at 38-47.
135
Id. at 38.
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When Defendants sought to frisk Washington, Washington alleges that
Defendants did not have reasonable suspicion that Washington was armed and
dangerous. As detailed above, Washington alleges that any suspicion the weed-eater
might have generated was dispelled by the time Washington had exited his vehicle.
Washington was out of his vehicle before the subsequent alleged seizures occurred.
Washington makes no other allegations from which the Court could conclude that
Cloud and/or Lewis developed a reasonable suspicion that Washington was armed
and dangerous before the pat-down. The body camera footage is aligned with
Washington’s allegations as to this point. Accordingly, no facts are alleged that would
indicate that Defendants had reasonable suspicion to conduct the pat down search.
See Washington v. Smith, 639 F. Supp. 3d 625, 649 (E.D. La. 2022) (Washington I)
(“Under the clearly established law discussed[,] a reasonable officer would have
known that these circumstances did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that
Washington was armed and dangerous.”); see also Johnson, 555 U.S. at 326-27
(holding “to proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect
the person stopped is armed and dangerous”).
Even absent reasonable suspicion that Washington was armed and dangerous,
the frisk is permissible if Washington provided valid consent. As set forth above, to
be valid, consent must be: (1) voluntary and, if consent follows an initial
unconstitutional search, consent must also be (2) an independent act of free will.
United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350, 357 (5th Cir. 2007), overruled on other
grounds by Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 451 (2011); see also United States v.
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Montgomery, 777 F.3d 269, 273 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Considering the
totality of the circumstances, the Fifth Circuit looks to the six factors articulated
above to determine whether consent is voluntary. Mere silence, passivity, or
acquiescence are insufficient to establish voluntary consent. See United States v.
Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hernandez, 701 F. App’x 400,
401 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Cooper, 43 F.3d 140, 145 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995) (“we
disagree that nonresistance amounts to consent”).
Viewing the facts alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, four factors weigh in favor of finding that his consent was not voluntary: (1)
his custodial status was not voluntary; (2) he alleges that coercive police procedures
were used prior to obtaining any purported consent; (3) he alleges he has limited
education; and (4) he alleges that he believed he was not free to refuse the officers’
requests.
136
The two remaining factors weigh in favor of finding that Washington’s
consent was voluntary: (1) Washington was cooperative throughout the stop,
including raising his hands in the air when Cloud advised him that he would like to
perform a pat down search; and (2) the allegations support that Washington believed
that no incriminating evidence would be found. The complaint, supported by the body
camera footage, indicates that Washington acquiesced to the search.
As Defendants have invoked qualified immunity, the salient question then is
whether Washington has pointed to law that clearly established that Cloud was
violating his constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable frisk. Plaintiff must

136
See, e.g., ECF No. 96 ¶¶ 403, 408.
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identify caselaw indicating that it was not “beyond debate” that raising one’s hands
in a non-verbal sign of assent in response to an officer’s indication that he would like
to perform a pat-down is insufficient for voluntary consent. See White v. Pauly, 580
U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (explaining that the unconstitutionality of the action must be
“beyond debate”). Plaintiff points to United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir.
1996), United States v. Hernandez, 701 F. App’x 400, 401 (5th Cir. 2017), and United
States v. Cooper, 43 F.3d 140, 145 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995) for support. In Jaras, the Fifth
Circuit found that valid consent could not have reasonably been implied from “silence
or failure to object” when the officer seeking to perform the search “did not expressly
or impliedly ask” for the individual’s consent. Jaras, 86 F.3d at 390. Cooper instructs
that “nonresistance may not be equated with consent” for constitutional purposes.
Cooper, 43 F.3d at 145 n.2. Hernandez, an unpublished opinion, merely cited to
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968) for the proposition that
acquiescence cannot discharge the burden of proving consent. Hernandez, 701 F.
App’x at 401.
Similar to Washington I, where the complaint alleged that the officer asked
Washington “whether Washington would mind if [the officer] patted him down,” it
was alleged that Washington made no verbal response, believed he was not free to
decline, and made a “gesture of submission” to the officer. See Washington I, 639 F.
Supp. 3d 625, 649. There, Judge Africk concluded that Washington’s unlawful frisk
claim survived the motion to dismiss, considering the voluntariness factors in light of
the allegations. See id. (concluding that Washington stated a Fourth Amendment
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violation given Washington’s custodial status was not voluntary, he did not believe
he could refuse the request to frisk, and the complaint alleged that Washington did
not consent, and further concluding that the allegations overcame the invocation of
qualified immunity).
137
So too here.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Washington, the alleged facts, including
that his custodial status was not voluntary, coercive police procedures allegedly were
used prior to obtaining any purported consent, he has limited education, and he
believed he was not free to refuse the officer’s requests, suggest that his acquiescence
perceived as consent was not voluntary.
Furthermore, where the validity of a search rests on consent, it is clearly
established that the requisite consent must in fact be obtained and it must be freely
and voluntarily given, that “a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority” is
insufficient to implicate consent. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (citations
omitted). Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to plausibly show that Cloud’s conduct
violated Washington’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable
search and that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
misconduct. Accordingly, as to the exterior search of Washington’s person,
Washington’s allegations supporting his unlawful frisk claim overcome the officers’
invocation of qualified immunity.

137
Notably, Judge Africk later denied the officer’s motion for summary judgment, finding a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe he
had Washington’s consent for the frisk. See Washington v. Smith, No. 22-632, 2022 WL 17844622, at
*3-5 (E.D. La. Dec. 22, 2022), appeal dismissed sub nom. Washington v. Thomas, 2023 WL 4704142
(5th Cir. 2023) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction where appellant-defendant challenged the
genuineness of the factual disputes forming the basis of denial of summary judgment).
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Plaintiff additionally challenges the scope of the frisk, as Washington alleges
that Cloud impermissibly reached into and searched Washington’s pockets. A search
following an investigatory stop is typically limited to a pat-down of an individual’s
outer clothing and does not extend to an individual’s pockets unless the officer
discovers an object during the pat-down that might be a weapon. See Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993). Furthermore, removing items from a suspect’s
pockets exceeds the scope of a permissible search following an investigatory stop if
the officer can readily determine that the object is not a weapon. Id.; see also United
States v. Ponce, 8 F.3d 989, 999 (5th Cir. 1993). If the officer suspects that an object
might be a weapon, he may conduct further examination of that object. United States
v. Campbell, 178 F.3d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1999). These confines are clearly established;
they are “beyond debate.” White, 580 U.S. at 79.
Here, as Washington alleges and the body camera footage shows, Cloud
reached into multiple of Washington’s pockets while conducting the frisk.
Washington further alleges that Cloud reached into both of Washington’s pockets
when Cloud could not have felt anything that might have been a weapon inside either
pocket.
138
Indeed, one of the pockets was empty and the other contained a wallet.
139

Nothing in the body camera footage discounts this allegation. The wallet eventually
seen in the footage is slim and small. Accordingly, Washington has adequately pled
a Fourth Amendment violation based on the search of his pockets and removal of his

138
ECF No. 96 ¶ 351.
139
Id. ¶ 85.
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wallet.
140
Moreover, Washington has alleged facts indicating that Cloud exceeded the
permissible scope of a weapons frisk as described above and as clearly established.
Washington’s allegations thus overcome Defendants’ invocation of qualified
immunity. Accordingly, Washington has plausibly alleged a Constitutional violation
based on the search of his pockets and the invocation of qualified immunity does not
doom this claim at this stage.
Washington additionally challenges the search of the wallet itself. Shortly
after Cloud removed the wallet from Washington’s pocket and finished the weapons
frisk, Cloud asked if Washington “minded” if Cloud checked if anything “crazy” was
in Washington’s wallet. The wallet, visible on the body camera footage, was not large.
In response, Washington handed Cloud the wallet, which Cloud then rummaged
through. Nothing from the complaint nor the video supports a conclusion that Cloud
had reasonable suspicion to search the wallet. At issue is whether Washington’s act
of handing Cloud the wallet in response to Cloud’s inquiry constituted valid consent.
The same principles set forth above applicable to determining voluntariness of
consent apply here. Additionally, the independent act of free will doctrine is
implicated. “[I]f an individual gives consent after being subject to an initial
unconstitutional search, the consent is valid only if it was [both voluntary and an]
independent act of free will, breaking the causal chain between the consent and the
constitutional violation.” United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350, 357 (5th Cir.

140
The Court notes that this finding has little bearing on the Court’s analysis of the extension
of detention claim as the search of his pockets, removal of his wallet, and the subsequent search of his
wallet occurred before Lewis finished running the license and background check.
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2007). To determine if consent was “the independent act of free will,” courts look to
factors such as the “temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the consent,”
whether intervening circumstances exist, and “the purpose and flagrancy” of the
preceding misconduct. United States v. Hernandez, 279 F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2002).
As the search of the wallet itself followed the pocket search, the heightened
standard for determining voluntariness is implicated. Here, Washington has
plausibly alleged that handing his wallet over was not an “independent act of free
will” that “br[oke] the causal chain between the consent and the constitutional
violation.” Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d at 357. Almost immediately after finishing the
weapons frisk, Cloud asked to “check” Washington’s wallet. The temporal proximity
weighs in favor of finding that the consent was not an independent act of free will.
Further, nothing in the complaint or body camera footage suggests that intervening
circumstances existed, which weighs towards finding that the perceived consent was
not an independent act of free will. Although the pocket search may not have been
“flagrant,” the Court finds that handing over his wallet was not an “independent act
of free will,” as two of the three factors weigh toward finding that the causal
connection between the earlier plausibly alleged violation and the purported consent
was not broken. Accordingly, viewing the allegations in Washington’s favor, any
consent was invalid because it was not an independent act of free will.
Washington’s allegations concerning the search of the wallet withstand
Defendants’ invocation of qualified immunity. Washington’s purported consent “may,
but does not necessarily, dissipate the taint of” the alleged Fourth Amendment
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violation. United States v. Montgomery, 777 F.3d 269, 272-73 (5th Cir. 2015).
Washington alleges facts indicating that his consent was not valid for an additional
reason: it was not voluntary. Id. The same factors as above apply here: he alleges
that his custodial status was not voluntary; coercive police procedures were used prior
to obtaining any purported consent; he has limited education; and he believed he was
not free to refuse the officer’s requests.
Additionally, at the point of the wallet search, he had already been ordered out
of his car, directed to the back of his car, frisked, and asked multiple questions. That
the nature and extent of Washington’s cooperation and his belief that nothing
incriminating would be found counsel for finding voluntary consent does not defeat
this claim at the pleadings stage because Washington has plausibly alleged that any
consent was not voluntary and handing over his wallet was not an “independent act
of free will” that “br[oke] the causal chain between the consent and the constitutional
violation.” See Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d at 357.
Much of the same caselaw Washington invoked regarding his lack of (or
invalid) consent to the allegedly unconstitutional frisk bears on Washington’s claim
that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion and lacked valid consent to search his
wallet. As before, no allegations plausibly indicate that the officers had reasonable
suspicion to search a slim wallet for weapons. What is more, viewing the allegations
in the light most favorable to Washington, he has alleged facts sufficient to plausibly
show that Cloud acted unreasonably and violated his constitutional right to be free
from an unconstitutional search, which right was clearly established. Again, where
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the validity of a search rests on consent, it is clearly established that the requisite
consent must in fact be obtained and it must be freely and voluntarily given—“a mere
submission to a claim of lawful authority” is insufficient to implicate consent. Royer,
460 U.S. at 497 (citations omitted). Simply put, unless the officers obtained
Washington’s valid consent, it was clearly established that the wallet search violated
Washington’s Fourth Amendment rights. Washington alleges facts indicating that he
did not validly consent because any perceived consent was involuntary and any
consent was not an independent act of free will. Accordingly, Washington’s claim that
Cloud violated his clearly established right to be free from an unreasonable search of
his wallet thus withstands invocation of qualified immunity at this stage.
The Court now returns to defendants Finn and Lewis. As explained below,
Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a conspiracy involving Finn and Lewis. See
section II.D.4. Thus, to maintain claims against Finn and Lewis, Plaintiff must
articulate specific facts to illustrate each defendant’s participation. See Jacquez v.
Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff has not done so. Accordingly,
the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim as it relates to defendants
Finn and Lewis.
ii. Search of Vehicle (Third Cause of Action)
As with the previously examined searches, the legality of the vehicular search
turns on consent as Washington has plausibly alleged that the officers did not have
reasonable suspicion at the point that they initiated the vehicle search. Specifically,
Washington alleges that Lewis had already realized that the weed-eater, which had
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piqued his interest earlier, was not what he thought it was; that Lewis relayed that
information to Cloud; and that Finn acknowledged that he saw the weed-eater when
he was looking through the car’s windows. Nothing else in Washington’s complaint,
nor in the body camera footage, purports to confer reasonable suspicion. Defendants
argue that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that the officers searched his vehicle
without consent, and they invoke qualified immunity.
141

As explained above, if a constitutional violation has already been committed,
complexities are added to the consent inquiry. With a preceding violation, the
standard is more demanding than the general inquiry into the voluntariness of
consent absent a pre-existing violation. As the Court has determined that
Washington has plausibly alleged a previous constitutional violation, the relevant
inquiry is whether consent to the vehicle search was voluntary and whether there
was a break in the causal chain. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d at 357. The Court begins
with whether Washington’s consent to the search of his vehicle was voluntary.
Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Washington, the same
four factors weigh in favor of finding voluntary consent and the same two weigh
against. As with the frisk, Washington’s cooperation and his belief that no
incriminating evidence would be found weigh towards finding voluntary consent, and
the involuntary nature of his custodial status, alleged use of coercive police
procedures to obtaining any purported consent, his limited education, and his belief

141
ECF No. 1-4-1 at 47-50.
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he was not free to refuse the officer’s requests all weigh against finding voluntary
consent.
Additionally, as with the frisk, the camera footage captures at best an implied
request to search the car from Cloud. A review of Finn and Cloud’s body camera
footage reveals the following: Cloud, Washington, and Finn are located near
Washington’s vehicle; the officers are asking Washington questions and peering into
the interior of his car; Cloud states “you don’t have anything [unintelligible] in the
car we should be concerned about”; Washington appears to respond to with “no, you
can look” and “you want me to open the door”; Cloud informs Washington he does not
need to open the door and should stay “right here”; there is more chatter; then Cloud
states “we’re going to” go through Washington’s car; Washington makes no immediate
verbal response; Finn then attempts to open one of the car’s doors, at which point
Washington asks if he should unlock the door; Finn tells Washington that he (Finn)
would get it; questioning continues as the officers begin searching Washington’s car;
Lewis returns from the patrol vehicle at 7:20 and joins in questioning Washington;
an officer later opens Washington’s trunk and begins to look through it.
Viewing these allegations in the light most favorable to Washington, Officer
Cloud made an inquiry regarding the contents of the vehicle, to which Washington
responded “you can look” and even volunteered to open the door. But, as the
purported consent followed a prior potential constitutional violation, the consent
inquiry requires more. The complaint and body camera footage suggest that there
was no break in the causal chain between the previous constitutional violation and
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the purported consent. The inquiry regarding the vehicle happens close in time to
the frisk and wallet search, and no intervening circumstances are identified or clearly
shown in the body camera footage. Regardless of the “flagrancy” of the prior
violations, these two factors weigh against finding a causal break. Accordingly, even
assuming arguendo Washington’s consent to search the vehicle could be deemed
voluntary, he alleges facts indicating that his consent was not an independent act of
free will, which would render any consent to search invalid.
Turning to the officers’ invocation of qualified immunity, as outlined above, it
is clearly established that, in the absence of reasonable suspicion, valid consent must
precede a search. As set forth above, absent an intervening act between an illegal
detention and/or constitutional violation, any consent provided is not an independent
act of free will. Defendants’ insistence that Plaintiff identifies no caselaw with
sufficient specificity bearing on the alleged facts here does not doom Plaintiff’s claim.
Plaintiff points to several principles of clearly established law which he contends
defeat the officers’ assertion of qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation. See,
e.g., United States v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509, 524 (5th Cir. 2011) (consent may not
constitute an independent act of free will if it was given when the officer still holds
driver’s identification or shortly after the identification’s return); United States v.
Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 407 (5th Cir. 2006) (when a law enforcement officer remains in
possession of an detainee’s identification and the detainee is not aware he may leave,
any consent to search that follows closely on the heels of an illegal detention is not an
independent act of free will); United States v. Gomez-Moreno, 479 F.3d 350, 355 (5th
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Cir. 2007) (“if an individual gives consent after being subject to an initial
unconstitutional search, the consent is valid only if it was ‘an independent act of free
will, breaking the causal chain between the consent and the constitutional
violation’”), overruled on other grounds by Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 131 S. Ct.
1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011)). Plaintiff has satisfied his burden to allege facts
sufficient to plausibly show that the officers’ conduct violated his Fourth Amendment
right to be free from an unreasonable vehicle search, which itself followed an initial
allegedly unconstitutional search, and that right was clearly established at the time
of the alleged misconduct.
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Washington’s
third cause of action that their search of his vehicle violated the Fourth
Amendment.
142

3. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
As to Counts One, Two and Three, Washington also brings claims against
Cloud, Lewis, and Finn for discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.
143

Defendants argue that Washington’s Fourteenth Amendment claims should be
dismissed because they lack factual support.
144
Washington argues that the
complaint provides evidence of racial bias by the STPSO.
145

142
Because the Court denies the motion to dismiss Washington’s claim regarding the allegedly
unconstitutional vehicle search, the Court need not address Washington’s additional arguments that
the scope of the vehicle search exceeded the scope of any consent.
143
ECF No. 96 ¶ 306 (“Moreover, these stops and frisks were performed on the basis of racial
and/or national origin profiling.”), ¶ 363 (“Moreover, the Defendants Cloud, Lewis, and Finn’s acts
were performed on the basis of racial profiling.”), ¶ 426 (“Moreover, the Defendants Cloud, Lewis, and
Finn’s acts were performed on the basis of racial profiling.”).
144
ECF No. 104-1 at 32-50.
145
ECF No. 118 at 35-36.
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Racial profiling can constitute a deprivation of the constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 813 (1996) (holding that claims asserting selective enforcement of a law on the
basis of race are properly brought under the Equal Protection Clause, and that the
right to equal protection may be violated even if the actions of the police are
acceptable under the Fourth Amendment); see also United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d
343, 352 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides citizens a degree of protection independent of the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
To establish a claim for racial profiling, the plaintiff must allege that he
received treatment different from that received by other similarly situated
individuals and that the unequal treatment stemmed from a discriminatory or
purposeful intent. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985);
Taylor v. Johnson, 257 F.3d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 2001); Stout v. Vincent, 717 F. App’x
468, 471-72 (5th Cir. 2018). “[A] plaintiff’s subjective belief of discrimination,
however genuine, cannot be the basis of judicial relief.” Stout, 717 F. App’x at 472
(cleaned up). The “discriminatory intent of one official may not be imputed to another
for purposes of imposing individual liability under the civil rights laws.” Id. (quoting
Coleman v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 1997)).
Here, Plaintiff relies upon statistical information to allege that he received
different treatment than other similarly situated individuals. Plaintiff provides no
allegations from which this Court can infer racially discriminatory intent by officers
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Cloud, Lewis, and Finn. General evidence of STPSO racial profiling cannot be
attributed to these officers without additional allegations. See id. at 473 (“Moreover,
we cannot attribute the general evidence of racial profiling by the MHSP . . . to [the]
Officer[.]”) (citing Coleman, 113 F.3d at 534). Plaintiff has not made sufficient
allegations of these officers operating with racially discriminatory motives.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s racial profiling Fourteenth Amendment claims within
causes of action one, two, and three must be dismissed.
4. Conspiracy Claim (Eleventh Cause of Action)
A conspiracy claim under § 1983 is a “legal mechanism through which to
impose liability on all of the defendants without regard to who committed the
particular act . . . .” Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1995), abrogated on
other grounds, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 395-97 (2015). There must be
an actual violation of § 1983 for a § 1983 conspiracy claim to be actionable. Id. To
bring a § 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) an agreement to commit
an illegal act; and (2) an actual deprivation of constitutional rights in furtherance of
the conspiracy. Priester v. Lowndes Cty., 354 F.3d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 2004).
Conclusory allegations are insufficient; “[a] plaintiff must allege specific facts to show
an agreement.” Bohannan v. Doe, 527 F. App’x 283, 300 (5th Cir. 2013); see also
Rodriguez v. Neeley, 169 F.3d 220, 222 (5th Cir. 1999).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead a conspiracy claim because
Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege an underlying constitutional violation and has
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failed to allege any facts showing an underlying agreement.
146
Defendants
additionally invoke qualified immunity.
147
Plaintiff argues that two factors tend to
support the existence of a conspiracy: the fact that all three officers were STPSO
deputies, evidencing a pre-existing relationship, and the way in which the officers
interacted with each other when completing the traffic stop.
148
Washington argues
that Cloud’s instructing Washington out of the vehicle after being told to by Lewis;
Lewis’s questioning Washington as Cloud frisked Washington; and the officers’
questioning and distracting Washington during the vehicle search all evidence his
second point. If such allegations were sufficient, then all police officers who worked
together during a traffic stop that resulted in a potential constitutional violation
would be said to have conspired with one another. These allegations are insufficient
to plausibly allege that the officers had come to an agreement to violate Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss
this claim.
E. October 8, 2023 Traffic Stop: Unlawful Seizure (Fourth Cause of
Action)
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a valid
claim against Searle.
149
They additionally invoke qualified immunity.
150
As
explained above, for a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, the officer “must have
an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic

146
ECF No. 104-1 at 85-88.
147
Id.
148
ECF No. 118 at 56-59.
149
ECF No. 104-1 at 50-56.
150
Id.
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violation, [has occurred] or is about to occur.” United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420
F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005). The “reasonableness inquiry” is key here. Reasonable
suspicion, which is evaluated under the “totality of the circumstances,” exists when
the officer “can point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the search and seizure.” Id.
Reasonable suspicion need not rise to the level of probable cause, but it must be based
on more than a mere hunch. Id.
Taking the alleged facts as true, the stop was not justified at its inception.
Washington alleges that the reason Searle provided for stopping him at the time of
the stop was that Washington did not have insurance. Washington states that he did
have insurance and was pulled over by Searle because of his race. Washington has
adequately pled that there was no justification for pulling him over. Accordingly,
Washington has adequately stated a claim against Searle for unlawful seizure. See
Alexander v. City of Round Rock, 854 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding that
plaintiff had stated a claim for unlawful detention when officers stopped him and
removed him from his vehicle without reasonable suspicion that a crime had or was
about to occur).
That Searle reported an entirely new basis for pulling Washington over months
later does not change this analysis. Nor does the potential rationale offered (reliance
on a mistaken database) change the analysis.
151
Getting to the bottom of why Searle

151
United States v. Broca-Martinez, 855 F.3d 675 (5th Cir. 2017), which Defendants rely upon
for the proposition that a computer database’s indication of insurance status may establish reasonable
suspicion, does not change the outcome at this juncture. There, the Court concluded that “[a] state
computer database indication of insurance status may establish reasonable suspicion when the officer
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truly pulled over Washington is not an activity that is appropriate at the motion to
dismiss stage. Defendants’ reliance on Searle’s traffic stop data is improper for this
very reason. At this juncture Washington’s allegations are taken as true, and, when
viewed in that light, suffice.
Searle’s invocation of qualified immunity does not protect him at this stage. It
is clearly established that a traffic stop that lacks reasonable suspicion—as is alleged
here—violates the Fourth Amendment. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20. Accordingly, the
Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim.
F. Monell Claims
A municipality may be subject to liability under § 1983 when that municipality
maintains an unconstitutional policy or custom. Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d
536, 542 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).
To successfully state a Monell claim for municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff
must show that he was deprived of a federally protected right pursuant to (1) an
official policy, (2) promulgated by a policymaker, (3) that was the moving force behind
the violation of a constitutional right. Edwards v. City of Balch Springs, Tex., 70
F.4th 302, 307-08 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838,
847 (5th Cir. 2009)). These elements are necessary “to distinguish individual
violations perpetrated by local government employees from those that can be fairly

is familiar with the database and the system itself is reliable.” Id. at 680. While evidence of such facts
may be produced by Searle in discovery in support of his defenses to Washington’s complaint, such
facts are absent from the complaint and thus it is impossible (and improper) to attempt to determine
whether Searle ran a computer search prior to pulling Washington over; the database searched was
familiar to Searle; and the system itself is reliable. Such beyond-the-pleadings factual inquiries are
inappropriate at the motion to dismiss stage.
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identified as actions of the government itself.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d
567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up).
An official policy may be a written policy statement, ordinance, or regulation.
Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1997) (cleaned up). It may also be a
widespread practice that is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that
represents municipal policy. Sweetin v. City of Texas City, Texas, 48 F.4th 387, 392
(5th Cir. 2022). Or it may be a single act conducted by an official or entity with final
policymaking authority. Id. A practice constitutes a custom if it has occurred so
much that “the course of conduct warrants attribution to the governing body of
knowledge that the objectionable conduct is the expected, accepted practice.”
Peterson, 588 F.3d at 850-51 (5th Cir. 2009). An “extremely narrow” single incident
exception to the policy or custom requirement exists and “gives rise to municipal
liability only if the municipal actor is a final policymaker.” Valle, 613 F.3d at 542
(citing Bolton v. City of Dallas, 541 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2008)).
The “policymaker” prong is satisfied if actual or constructive knowledge of a
policy is attributable to the municipality’s governing body or to an official to whom
the municipality has delegated policy making authority. Webster v. City of Houston,
735 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). Under Louisiana law, the sheriff is the
final policymaker for a parish’s law enforcement. See LA. CONST. art. 5, § 27. As
alleged in the complaint, the sheriff in St. Tammany Parish is defendant Smith.
Sheriff Smith is the policymaker for the STPSO.
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To establish the third element, the plaintiff must show either that “the policy
itself was unconstitutional” or that it “was adopted with deliberate indifference to the
known or obvious fact that a specific constitutional violation would follow.” Edwards,
70 F.4th at 308.
Washington brings six Monell claims as follows: Four claims regarding
unlawful searches, each under a different theory of Monell liability, namely
ratification, de facto policy, failure to train, and single decision by a final policymaker;
one claim for racist policing under a de facto policy theory; and one claim under the
First and Fourth Amendments. The Court’s discussion of the first five Monell claims
follows; the Court addresses the final Monell claim along with associated claim
twenty-two at the conclusion of this order. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed
to adequately allege these Monell claims and that they are impermissibly group
pled.
152

1. Unlawful Searches—Ratification Theory (Fifth Cause of Action)
The Supreme Court permits a ratification theory against a municipality in
limited circumstances:
[W]hen a subordinate’s decision is subject to review by the
municipality’s authorized policymakers, they have retained the
authority to measure the official’s conduct for conformance with their
policies. If the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s
decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the
municipality because their decision is final.

152
ECF No. 104-1 at 17-25, 56-74.
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City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1998). The Fifth Circuit has
cabined Monell claims based on ratification “to prevent the ratification theory from
becoming a theory of respondeat superior.” Milam v. City of San Antonio, 113 F.
App’x 622, 626-27 (5th Cir. 2004).
Monell claims based on ratification do not escape the causation requirements.
The Fifth Circuit has emphasized that “any violation must be causally traceable to
[policymakers], not just to their subordinates.” Milam, 113 F. App’x at 627. It then
follows that demonstrating a causal relationship between an incident of police
misconduct and a subsequent investigation by the municipality is highly difficult.
See id. at 628. But, where there are “extreme factual situations,” it may be proper to
infer a preexisting policy or custom from a subsequent lack of discipline, reprimand,
or findings of error. Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 171 (5th Cir. 1985);
see also World Wide Street Preachers Fellowship v. Town of Columbia, 591 F.3d 747,
755 (2009). “Extreme scenarios” include “obvious violations of clearly established
law,” World Wide Street Preachers Fellowship, 591 F.3d at 755, and “collective
conduct of many individuals and multiple bad acts.” Fuentes v. Nueces Cnty., 689 F.
App’x 775, 779 (5th Cir. 2017). The “extreme factual scenario” is a high bar and “has
not enjoyed wide application in [the Fifth] Circuit.” Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d
791, 797 (5th Cir. 1998).
Against this backdrop, Plaintiff has not presented such “extreme” allegations
that the lack of admission of error following an internal investigation into the incident
allows for the inference of a preexisting policy. In Grandstaff, one of the few Fifth
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Circuit cases to find ratification, officers “poured” gunfire onto a truck, killing an
innocent occupant. Grandstaff, 767 F.2d at 168. The Fifth Circuit noted that the
evidence showed that six officers “participated in [a] wild barrage” and that “the
exercise of the least care and the use of any rational and organized plan would have
avoided” the resulting death. Id. at 171. The lack of reprimands, discharges, and
admissions of error following the “incompetent and catastrophic performance” by the
officers allowed for an inference of ratification. Id.
Here, Plaintiff claims that Francois and Galloway of the Internal Affairs
Division “ratified” Cloud, Lewis, and Finn’s conduct, turning to the Internal
Investigation finding that the officers performed the stop within the parameters of
the STPSO policies and regulations as support. The events of the January Traffic
Stop are not so extreme, so “incompetent,” so “catastrophic” that an underlying policy
can be inferred from the absence of discipline or admission of error after the fact.
Compare id. (finding ratification in a case in which police poured gunfire at a car,
killing an innocent occupant) with Snyder, 142 F.3d at 798 (refusing to find
ratification in a case in which a fleeing suspect was shot in the back).
Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth
cause of action for failure to state a claim.
2. Unlawful Searches—De Facto Policy Theory (Sixth Cause of
Action)
Contrary to Defendants’ opening proposition on this claim, “de facto” policies
can lead to Monell liability in the Fifth Circuit. While an official policy can be found
in a written policy statement, ordinance, or regulation, Esteves, 106 F.3d at 677 (5th
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Cir. 1997), it can also be evidenced by a common and well-settled widespread practice.
Sweetin, 48 F.4th at 392. The latter is a “de facto” policy. Defendants have confused
precedent on policy with that of policymaking authority. Indeed, as Defendants own
chosen quote states, “[t]here is no ‘de facto’ policymaking authority.”
153
Defendants’
leap from no de facto policymaking authority to no de facto policies is unsupported.
To bring a Monell claim based on a de facto policy, Plaintiff must “demonstrate
that there existed [a] persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees,
which although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so
common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal
policy.” Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017) (cleaned
up). Plaintiff “must also establish actual or constructive knowledge of such custom
by the municipality or the official who had policymaking authority.” Id.
Washington alleges that the STPSO has a de facto policy of failing to obtain
valid consent prior to searches, and that this policy is the “moving force” behind the
violation of Washington’s Fourth Amendment rights. The policies, practices, and/or
customs that Washington alleges are: (1) failing to properly screen, train, and
supervise STPSO officers despite STPSO’s awareness of the high risk that its officers
may be engaging in unconstitutional frisks; (2) failing to adequately monitor and
discipline STPSO officers, by ratifying unconstitutional conduct based on
impermissible grounds; and (3) encouraging, sanctioning, and failing to rectify the
STPSO custom and practice of suspicion-less frisks.
154
He alleges that these practices

153
ECF No. 104-1 at 69 (quoting Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 2009)).
154
ECF No. 96 ¶ 458.
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are “pervasive” and that when incidents are “sufficiently common” the Court can infer
a policy.
But Washington does not advance allegations that support the finding that
consent-less frisks are so pervasive that the STPSO has a policy of allowing such
conduct. Looking at the whole of Washington’s complaint, only two incidents of
allegedly consent-less frisks are provided: the January 2023 traffic stop frisk and the
March 13, 2021 traffic stop frisk underlying Washington’s earlier lawsuit
(Washington I).
155
Two allegations separated by nearly two years cannot establish a
pattern sufficient to infer a de facto policy.
Washington also invokes a ruling in Washington I for support. He argues that
the policymakers must have known of the Washington I decision, and that the failure
to act following the decision supports a finding that the STPSO has a de facto policy
of not obtaining valid consent before searches. This argument is strained.
In Washington I, Judge Africk denied summary judgment to an STPSO officer
defendant, finding that a “genuine issue of material fact” existed as to whether it was
objectively reasonable to conclude that Washington had consented to the frisk.
Washington v. Smith, No. 22-632, 2022 WL 17844622, at *3-5 (E.D. La. Dec. 22, 2022),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Washington v. Thomas, 2023 WL 4704142 (5th Cir. 2023)
(dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction where appellant-defendant challenged the

155
Washington’s instant complaint additionally contains a section on the “disparate impact of
STPSO traffic enforcement on black people and people of color” but this section does not provide any
additional alleged consent-less frisks. It instead provides data on the rate of traffic stops compared
across racial groups. This provides no aid to the Monell claims regarding allegedly consent-less
searches.
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genuineness of the factual disputes forming the basis of denial of summary
judgment). The court made this determination after drawing all reasonable
inferences in Washington’s favor, as required. Id. The court did not actually
determine whether it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that he had
Washington’s consent to do an officer safety pat-down. Id.
It is hard to see how a failure to make training or policy adjustments after an
unreported district court opinion that simply found that issues precluding summary
judgment in favor of an STPSO officer remained, without more, supports an inference
that the STPSO has a de facto policy of allowing consent-less frisks. One opinion
regarding the actions of one officer does not support that there is a pervasive practice
within the STPSO.
Washington has not shown that consent-less searches are “so common and well
settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Hicks-
Fields, 860 F.3d at 808. The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for
failure to state a claim.
3. Unlawful Searches—Failure to Train Theory (Seventh Cause of
Action)
To state a claim that a municipality is liable for failing to train an employee,
the plaintiff must allege that (1) the municipality’s training practices were
inadequate, (2) the municipality was deliberately indifferent in adopting this
deficient practice, and (3) the inadequate training practice directly caused the
violations in question. Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., Tex., 948 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir.
2020). “[D]eliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that
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a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Bd. of
County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). Typically,
a plaintiff must show a pattern of similar violations before the lack of training
constitutes deliberate indifference. Livezey v. City of Malakoff, 657 F. App’x 274, 278
(5th Cir. 2016). A limited, “extremely narrow” exception exists whereby a plaintiff
can establish deliberate indifference without a pattern of similar violations when the
plaintiff shows “that the highly predictable consequence of a failure to train would
result in the specific injury suffered.” Valle, 613 F.3d at 549. An injury is “highly
predictable” where the municipality “fail[s] to train its employees concerning a clear
constitutional duty implicated in recurrent situations that a particular employee is
certain to face.” Hutcheson, 994 F.3d at 482-83.
Washington alleges that Smith, Cox, Ripoll, and Church were deliberately
indifferent to the “obvious” need for training on suspicion-less and nonconsensual
searches. Again, Washington invokes Judge Africk’s Washington I decision as
evidence that there was an “obvious” need for training in this area. He further alleges
that the similarity between the frisk underlying his previous lawsuit, and the present
one demonstrates that STPSO’s inadequate training was the “moving force” behind
the violation of his constitutional rights.
To adequately plead the first element, “a plaintiff must allege with specificity
how a particular training program is defective.” Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex.,
614 F.3d 161, 170 (5th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Plaintiff has failed to do so here.
Plaintiff asserts that STPSO’s training on the determination of reasonable suspicion
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and consent was “inadequate” but provides no specificity as to how that is so.
Washington notes that, per a STPSO 2023 Budget Book, the POST (Peace Officer
Standards and Training Council) training was moved in-house. But he fails to provide
any further specificity as to how in-house training is “inadequate.” Plaintiff alleges
that had STPSO issued “any” directive following Judge Africk’s decision in
Washington’s previously brought lawsuit, the events that led to this suit “might” not
have occurred. This is simply insufficient. Washington does not describe any
purported deficiencies in STPSO’s training program considering Cloud, Lewis, and
Finn’s assigned duty. See Snyder, 142 F.3d at 798. Necessarily, without alleging a
sufficiently specified defect in a training program, Washington cannot show causation
as required by the third element.
Moreover, even had Washington satisfied the first element, he has not met his
burden in adequately pleading the second. Washington relies upon the March 2021
stop underlying Washington I and the January 2023 stop underlying this suit to show
a pattern. This is insufficient. A pattern requires “sufficiently numerous prior
incidents.” McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir. 1989); see also
Skyy v. City of Arlington, 712 F. App’x 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Isolated violations
are not the persistent, often repeated, constant violations that constitute custom and
policy as required for [Monell] liability.”). Two isolated incidents nearly two years
apart cannot be said to be “numerous” so as to constitute a pattern. See Peterson, 588
F.3d at 850-51 (holding twenty-seven complaints of excessive force over four years
was insufficient to show a custom where the plaintiff did not allege the facts
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underlying the complaints); see also Henderson v. Killeen Indep. Sch. Dist., No. A-13-
CA-471-LY, 2013 WL 6628630, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2013) (“Two isolated
incidents clearly do not constitute a pattern of unconstitutional conduct sufficient to
hold the school district liable under § 1983.”).
Plaintiff has failed to state a Monell claim under the failure to train theory.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action.
4. Single Decision by Policymaker (Eighth Cause of Action)
“Under appropriate circumstances” a “single decision by municipal
policymakers” can constitute grounds to impose Monell liability. Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986); see also Howell v. Town of Ball, 827 F.3d 515,
527 (5th Cir. 2016) (“A single unconstitutional action . . . may be sufficient in rare
circumstances to impose municipal liability under Monell . . . . ”). The single-incident
exception is an extremely narrow one which the Fifth Circuit has been reluctant to
expand.
A review of Fifth Circuit precedent by a sister court found that “[t]he Fifth
Circuit has consistently rejected nearly every attempt to use the single incident
exception to demonstrate a constitutionally inadequate training program.” Carmona
v. City of Brownsville, No. 23-84, 2023 WL 10366692, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2023)
(citing Henderson v. Harris Cnty., Texas, 51 F.4th 125, 131 (5th Cir. 2022); Hutcheson
v. Dallas Cnty., Texas, 994 F.3d 477, 483 (5th Cir. 2021); Anokwuru v. City of Houston,
990 F.3d 956, 966 (5th Cir. 2021), abrogated on other grounds by Guerra v. Castillo,
82 F.4th 278, 278 (5th Cir. 2023); Doe v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 351,
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367 (5th Cir. 2020); Darden v. City of Fort Worth, Texas, 808 Fed. App'x 246, 250 (5th
Cir. 2020); Blanchard-Daigle v. Geers, 802 Fed. App'x 113, 117 (5th Cir. 2020);
Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 553 (5th Cir. 2018); Leal v. Wiles, 734 Fed. App'x 905,
908 n 11 (5th Cir. 2018); Pena v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 624 (5th Cir.
2018); Saenz v. City of El Paso, 637 Fed. App'x 828, 832 (5th Cir. 2016); Anderson v.
Marshall Cnty., Miss., 637 F. App'x 127, 135 (5th Cir. 2016); Hobart v. Estrada, 582
Fed. App'x 348, 358 (5th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Dallas Cnty., Tex., 759 F.3d 468, 485
(5th Cir. 2014), abrogated in part by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015);
Clyce v. Hunt Cnty., Tex., 515 F. App'x 319, 324 (5th Cir. 2013); Valle v. City of
Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 549 (5th Cir. 2010); Sanders-Burns v. City Of Plano, 594 F.3d
366, 382 (5th Cir. 2010); Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 850 (5th
Cir. 2009); Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293, 299 (5th Cir. 2009), rev'd on other
grounds, 563 U.S. 51 (2011); Plemons v. Amos, 306 F. App'x 160, 164 (5th Cir. 2009);
Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 329 (5th Cir. 2008); Waltman v. Payne, 535 F.3d
342, 350 (5th Cir. 2008); Est. of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406
F.3d 375, 386 (5th Cir. 2005); Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 295 (5th
Cir. 2005); Burge v. St. Tammany Par., 336 F.3d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 2003); Pineda v.
City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 334 (5th Cir. 2002); Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council-
-President Gov't, 279 F.3d 273, 288 (5th Cir. 2002); Hover v. Brenner, 229 F.3d 1147,
n 21 (5th Cir. 2000); Conner v. Travis Cnty., 209 F.3d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 2000); Gabriel
v. City of Plano, 202 F.3d 741, 745 (5th Cir. 2000)). The one time the Fifth Circuit
did not reject such a theory for failure to train was Brown v. Bryan Cnty., 219 F.3d
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450, 458 (5th Cir. 2000). There, the sheriff hired his young, inexperienced great-
nephew as a reserve deputy, despite his great-nephew’s extensive criminal history
which included an active arrest warrant. Brown, 219 F.3d at 454. The Fifth Circuit
provided the following “pertinent facts” regarding the reserve deputy:
[He] was only twenty-one years old. He was also inexperienced . . . . He
had no experience as a law enforcement officer before beginning work as
a reserve deputy for the County . . . .

Within the two-year period before his hire, [he] had been arrested for
assault and battery, resisting arrest, public drunkenness, driving while
intoxicated, possession of false identification, driving with a suspended
license, and nine moving traffic violations. At the time he was hired,
[he] was in violation of the terms of his probation; for that reason, he
had an outstanding warrant for his arrest.

Id. at 454-55. Despite these alarming facts, the great-nephew turned reserve deputy
was then “unleashed . . . on the public with no training.” Carmona, 2023 WL
10366692, at *6. Unsurprisingly, the untrained reserve deputy then used excessive
force in arresting a subject. Brown, 219 F.3d at 458. The Fifth Circuit found that it
was “highly predictable” that not training the reserve deputy would likely result in a
constitutional violation. Id. at 458-62.
Plaintiff does not make allegations of such egregious deficiencies. Importantly,
Washington does not allege that the officers received “no training whatsoever” like
the reserve deputy in Brown. The single incident exception is “generally
reserved . . . for cases in which the policymaker provides ‘no training whatsoever’
with respect to the relevant constitutional duty, as opposed to training that is
inadequate only as to the particular conduct that gave rise to the plaintiff’s injury.”
Littell v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 625 n.5 (5th Cir. 2018); see also
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Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., Tex., 994 F.3d 477, 482-83 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[P]laintiffs
cannot avail themselves of [the single-incident] exception because they do not allege
that there was “no training whatsoever.”) (citing Pena v. City of Rio Grande City., 879
F.3d 613, 625 (5th Cir. 2018)). To find that Washington’s allegations suffice here
would be an extension of this limited exception. As the Fifth Circuit is averse to
expansion in this area, the Court will not do so here.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action.
5. Racist Policing Practices (Tenth Cause of Action)
Washington brings a claim against Sheriff Smith and the Supervisor
Defendants for racist policing practices under the de facto policy theory of Monell
liability. He alleges that Smith, Cox, Ripoll, Galloway, Francois, and Church have
implemented and enforced a practice of suspicion-less stops and frisks on Black
people. Washington alleges that pretextual traffic stops and weapons frisks on the
basis of race is a pervasive policy in the STPSO. Defendants argue that Washington
has not plausibly alleged a pattern or practice.
The only specific instances of allegedly unlawful traffic stops that Washington
provides are his three interactions with police over a more than two-year period: the
March 2021 stop, the January 2023 stop, and the October 2023 stop. While this is
plainly insufficient to establish a pattern, Washington additionally relies upon
statistics to bolster his allegations regarding the existence of a pattern. Washington
looks to data on the frequency of STPSO traffic stops by race. Specifically,
Washington alleges that from January 1, 2023 to November 29, 2023, there were
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5,245 stops for every hundred thousand Black residents and only 1,619 stops for every
hundred thousand White residents in St. Tammany Parish.
156
This statistical data
is sufficient to plausibly allege that a pattern or practice exists and that Smith had
at least constructive notice. See Sowell v. City of Rowlett, Tex., No. 17-307, 2018 WL
4026353, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2018) (finding that plaintiff had sufficiently pled a
municipal liability claim when he pointed to racial profiling reports to show a custom
or practice); see also Wright v. City of San Diego, No. 24-2089, 2025 WL 1222507, at
*7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025), motion to certify appeal denied, 2025 WL 1746305 (S.D.
Cal. June 24, 2025) (“These statistical data and the City of San Diego's knowledge of
racial disparities in police stops provide sufficient facts to allege the City's deliberate
indifference.”).
Washington must also plausibly allege that the de facto policy of racist policing
was the “moving force” behind his alleged constitutional violations to maintain his
Monell claim. He has done so here. Washington’s complaint sufficiently alleges that
the racial bias in the STPSO’s policing directly led to him, a Black man, being stopped
and searched for pretextual reasons.
i. “Supervisor Defendants”
Defendants separately argue that the Monell claims against Supervisor and
Custodian Defendants should be dismissed as redundant. Defendants argue that this
is so because Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Smith and the other officers in their

156
ECF No. 96 ¶ 229. Washington acknowledges that there are gaps in the data. But this is
due to the STPSO’s record-keeping practices. Regardless, the reliability of data is not an appropriate
inquiry at the motion to dismiss stage.
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official capacity are all truly claims against the government entity they serve (the St.
Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office). Accordingly, per Defendants, Plaintiff has
achieved suing the STPSO by suing Sheriff Smith in his official capacity and the
additional official capacity suits are thus duplicative.
Claims against municipal officials in their official capacity are tantamount to
a suit against the municipal entity. See Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d
366, 373 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that claims against the city rendered identical official-
capacity claims redundant); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66
(1985). The Court has discretion to dismiss official-capacity claims as redundant
when they are identical to claims raised against a municipal entity. See Castro
Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2001); Flores v. Cameron County, 92
F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 1996). In this claim Washington makes no distinction between
the actions of Smith and the “Supervisor Defendants.” Sheriff Smith is the
policymaker for the STPSO. It is appropriate to dismiss the claim against the
“Supervisor Defendants.” The cause of action remains only as it is asserted against
Sheriff Smith in his official capacity.
ii. Individual Capacity
Defendants argue that the Monell claims should be dismissed against the
named defendants as brought in their individual capacities. In response, Plaintiff
states that the complaint does not allege Monell claims against Defendant Smith and
the Supervisor Defendants in their individual capacities.

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***
Washington has plausibly alleged a Monell liability claim for racist policing
practices. This claim remains only against Smith in his Official Capacity as STPSO
Sheriff.
G. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Ninth Cause of Action)
Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program receiving Federal financial
assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. To enforce a claim under Title VI, plaintiffs must
assert (1) intentional discrimination based on race or national origin and (2) that the
discrimination occurred under a program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (emphasis added). The
failure to allege either element dooms the claim. If a plaintiff does not allege the
existence of a discriminatory policy, he “must plausibly allege that an appropriate
person . . . i.e., someone who could take corrective measures[] had actual knowledge
of intentional discrimination yet responded with deliberate indifference.” Bhombal
v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 809 F. App’x 233, 237 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up)
(emphasis added).
In support of his Title VI claim, Washington references two statements made
directly to Washington by Francois.
157
Washington additionally references statistics
indicating that Black drivers are pulled over and cited more often than white drivers

157
ECF No. 96 ¶¶ 490-91.
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in St. Tammany Parish,
158
a 2010 “rant” by the former STPSO Sheriff, and racist
emails from 2014.
159
Washington alleges that the STPSO receives federal funds. He
further alleges that the STPSO has engaged in racial discrimination in its law
enforcement activity. He alleges that he has suffered injuries and damages because
of the alleged racially discriminatory policing.
First, Defendants argue that many of the allegations are irrelevant to
Plaintiffs’ Title VI claim as the underlying incidents occurred before defendant Smith
became the St. Tammany Sheriff.
160
Defendants point this Court to a decision in
Washington I for support. In Washington I, Judge Africk found that the plaintiff had
“not adequately alleged that Smith knew about the incidents referenced in the
complaint.” 639 F. Supp. 3d 625, 658 (E.D. La. 2022). Here too, Plaintiff fails to
adequately allege that Smith knew about the incidents referenced in his complaint.
As in Washington I, Plaintiff’s statement that “[u]pon information and belief,
Defendants . . . have been made aware of concerns that STPSO employees are
engaging in racial profiling but have refused to take corrective action” is
insufficient.
161

Plaintiff has not alleged the existence of a discriminatory policy. For his claim
to stand he therefore must have plausibly alleged that “someone who could take
corrective measures[] had actual knowledge of intentional discrimination yet
responded with deliberate indifference.” Bhombal, 809 F. App’x at 237 (cleaned up)

158
Id. ¶¶ 15-16, 229-32.
159
Id. ¶ 12.
160
ECF No. 104-1 at 75-76.
161
ECF No. 96 ¶ 493.
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(emphasis added). He has not done so here. Accordingly, the Court dismisses his
Title VI claim.
H. State Law Claims
1. Unlawful Search and Seizure (Twelfth Cause of Action)
Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution provides that “[e]very person
shall be secure in his person, property, . . . against unreasonable searches, seizures,
or invasions of privacy.” LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5. The principles embodied in the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution are analogous to the principles in
Article I, Section 5. See Washington v. Smith, 639 F. Supp. 3d 625, 646 (E.D. La.
2022) (Africk, J.) (quoting May v. Strain, 55 F. Supp. 3d 885, 901 (E.D. La. 2014)
(Brown, J.)); see also Imani v. City of Baton Rouge, 614 F. Supp. 3d 306, 376 (M.D.
La. 2022). “Louisiana applies qualified immunity principles to state constitutional
law claims based on the same factors that compelled the United States Supreme
Court to recognize a qualified good faith immunity for state officials under § 1983.”
Washington, 639 F. Supp. 3d at 646 (cleaned up).
Washington’s twelfth cause of action is based on the alleged extension of the
traffic stop beyond the period required to complete its legal purposes, and the alleged
searches and seizures during that stop. Washington’s parallel claims as brought
under the federal constitution have survived Defendants’ challenge at this stage of
the proceedings. For the reasons given in this Court’s denial of Defendants motion
to dismiss these parallel federal claims, the Court declines to dismiss this state
constitutional claim. See Smallwood ex. rel. T.M. v. New Orleans City, No. 15-1887,
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2015 WL 5944374, at *7 (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2015) (Barbier, J.) (“Inasmuch as Plaintiff’s
claims under state constitutional law parallel entirely the section 1983 allegations,
Plaintiff fails to state a claim against [defendant] sufficient to overcome qualified
immunity.”); see also Washington, 639 F. Supp. 3d at 646 (dismissing claims for same
reasons); May, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 901 (same). The Court denies Defendants’ motion
to dismiss Washington’s twelfth cause of action.
2. Invasion of Privacy (Thirteenth Cause of Action)
The “test of whether and when an intrusion on privacy rights occurs as a
matter of the Louisiana Constitution is identical to the Fourth Amendment
standard.” State v. Moultrie, 224 So. 3d 349, 352 (La. 2017).
Washington’s thirteenth cause of action is based on the search of his person,
wallet, and vehicle. Washington’s second and third causes of action allege federal
constitutional violations based on the very same allegations. Accordingly, this claim
survives to the same extent that the analogous federal law claims remain.
3. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Fourteenth-
Sixteenth Causes of Action)
Louisiana law does not generally recognize an independent cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Moresi v. Dep’t of Wildlife, 567 So. 2d 1081
(La. 1990). The cause of action is only available under limited circumstances. “For
example, negligent infliction of emotional distress has been awarded when a plaintiff
watches their property get damaged [ ] or when a plaintiff experiences ‘fright or
nervous shock’ to the degree that they are ‘in great fear for [their] personal safety.”
See Harris-Gilchrease v. Cap. One Auto Fin., No. 24-357, 2024 WL 5046006, at *6
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(E.D. La. Dec. 9, 2024) (citations omitted). A plaintiff asserting negligent infliction
of emotional distress must prove the elements of negligence, namely:
(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his or her conduct to a specific
standard of care; (2) the defendant failed to conform his or her conduct
to the appropriate standard; (3) the defendant’s substandard conduct
was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries; (4) the defendant’s
substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; and (5)
actual damages.

Simmons v. State, 255 So. 3d 701, 704-05 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2018), writ denied, 259 So.
3d 345 (La. 2018) (quoting Crockett v. Cardona, 713 So. 2d 802, 804 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1998).
When a plaintiff brings a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim absent
physical damage/injury, the plaintiff must prove “the especial likelihood of genuine
and serious mental distress, arising from the special circumstances, which serves as
a guarantee that the claim is not spurious.” Spencer v. Valero Ref. Meraux, L.L.C.,
356 So. 3d 936, 950 (La. 2023) (cleaned up). For such a claim to be proper, “[t]he
plaintiff’s mental disturbance must be ‘serious.’” Id. Emotional distress is considered
“serious” if “a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope
adequately with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the case.”
Held v. Aubert, 845 So. 2d 625, 633-34 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2003).
Washington’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claims related to the
January and October Traffic Stops and the Investigation of the October Traffic Stop
all fail for the same reason: Washington has not alleged any facts that indicate that
his emotional distress is “serious.” Washington has pled that he suffers from
depression, high blood pressure, insomnia, headaches, nausea, and anxiety. In the
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context of non-confrontational traffic stops, this is insufficient. See Danks v. Grayson,
626 F. Supp. 3d 922, 945 (E.D. La. 2022) (finding traffic-stop passenger-arrestee’s
allegations of serious emotional trauma and humiliation from being aggressively
pulled from the car, handcuffed, and left lying on the ground with her pants down
and body exposed insufficient). Negligent infliction of emotional distress is not a
broadly available claim, and this is not such an exceptional case such that the theory
is available here.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses causes of action fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen.
4. Negligent Supervision/Training (Seventeenth Cause of Action)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a negligent
supervision/training claim against Boehm (Sheriff Smith’s “second in command”),
Galloway (Captain of the STPSO Public Integrity Bureau and Internal Affairs
Division), Francois (investigator for the STPSO Internal Affairs Division), and Parker
(STPSO Internal Affairs Supervisor).
162
Outside of raising qualified immunity in the
section subtitle, Defendants make no arguments regarding the other listed
defendants (Sheriff Smith, Cox (Deputy Chief appointed to STPSO’s Investigations
& Professional Standards Division), Ripoll (STPSO Investigations Major), and
Church (STPSO Training Division Captain)). Plaintiff argues that Defendants have
implicitly conceded that the claim stands as to Smith, Cox, Ripoll, and Church, and
that the claim also stands against the other defendants because Washington has
alleged that each “Supervisor Defendant” held a relevant supervisory and

162
ECF No. 104-1 at 98.
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investigatory role at the STPSO and that STPSO’s supervision and training was
“flagrantly lacking.”
163

The Court first addresses qualified immunity. While true that Louisiana
applies qualified immunity to state constitutional law claims, Louisiana does not
apply qualified immunity to state tort law claims. See Roberts v. City of Shreveport,
397 F.3d 287, 296 (5th Cir. 2005). Negligence sounds in tort, not constitutional law.
Federal qualified immunity does not provide a shield. However, “public entities in
Louisiana are shielded for negligent conduct in the ‘exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform their policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts
are within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties.’” Perry v. City of
Bossier, No. 17-583, 2018 WL 5074674, at *13 (W.D. La. Oct. 17, 2018) (quoting La.
Stat. Ann. § 9:2798.1(B) (2009)). This statutory immunity does not cover actions that
are “criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or
flagrant misconduct.” La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2798.1(C). The Sheriff’s “training and
supervision decisions are policymaking acts under the immunity statute.” Perry,
2018 WL 5074674, at *13 (citing Roberts, 397 F.3d at 296).
Defendants make no arguments regarding the statutory immunity afforded
under Louisiana law. Indeed, as stated above, the only mention of immunity relating
to this cause of action is in the subsection header. The Court finds this insufficient
to argue that Defendants are entitled to statutory immunity under Louisiana law.

163
ECF No. 118 at 66.
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The Court turns to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s allegations are
insufficient as to defendants Boehm, Galloway, Francois, and Parker as Plaintiff
alleges no facts specific to those defendants. “The elements of liability in a Louisiana
negligence case are: (1) duty; (2) breach of duty; (3) cause-in-fact; (4) scope of liability
or scope of protection; and (5) damages.” Gomez v. Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 780 (5th
Cir. 2021) (citing Kelley v. Dyson, 10 So. 3d 283, 287 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2009)).
Defendants make no arguments regarding these elements for defendants Smith, Cox,
Ripoll, or Church.
164
The Court construes Defendants’ argument as to the other
defendants as challenging duty and breach. The dearth of allegations against Boehm,
Galloway, Francois, and Parker relating to supervision requires the dismissal of this
claim against them. Generally alleging that they hold supervisory roles in the STPSO
but making no specific mention of them with regards to this claim is insufficient to
plausibly allege duty and breach.
The Court must therefore dismiss claim seventeen as brought against
defendants Galloway, Francois, and Parker. As Defendants make no specific
arguments on the insufficiency of the pleading as to Smith, Cox, Ripoll, and Church,
the claim remains as brought against that defendant group.

164
The Court notes that Defendants, in reply, assert that the Court should dismiss this cause
of action if it dismisses Plaintiff’s Monell claim for failure to train/supervise. The Court does not
consider arguments first raised in reply. Moreover, “a claim for negligent training under state law is
completely different from the failure-to-train theory of Monell liability . . . .” A.F. by and through J.F.
v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, No. 23-7426, 2025 WL 1220805, at *15 (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 2025)
(Fallon, J.).
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5. Failure to Intervene (Eighteenth Cause of Action)
Defendants argue that Washington has failed to allege a claim for failure to
intervene against defendant Cloud.
165
Defendants provide no specific argument that
this claim is insufficient as it relates to defendants Lewis and Finn.
166
Defendants
section header states “[t]he eighteenth cause of action must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim, and alternatively, because [d]efendants are entitled to qualified
immunity.”
167
Federal qualified immunity has no bearing on this state law claim as
it sounds in tort. Tuttle v. Sepolio, 68 F.4th 969, 976 (5th Cir. 2023); see also Roberts,
397 F.3d at 296.
Plaintiff alleges that he brings the failure to intervene claim based on the “duty
to intervene” that Louisiana recognizes, which he alleges includes the duty for officers
to intervene to protect citizens from the conduct of other officers.
168

The complaint makes no specific allegations that Cloud failed to intervene.
Plaintiff argues that because he alleges that all the officers, not just Cloud, engaged
in unlawful conduct, and that because Cloud was present the entire time, he had a
duty to intervene. This is insufficient. Plaintiff’s failure to make specific allegations
as to how Cloud breached his duty to intervene renders his claim against Cloud

165
ECF No. 104-1 at 98.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
ECF No. 96 ¶ 575-80. (citing Westmoreland v. City of Natchitoches, 771 So. 2d 715, 717 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 2000); Keys v. Broussard, 692 So. 2d 596, 598 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1997); La Stat. Ann. § 40:2401;
La. Stat. Ann. § 40:24024; Rogers v. Dep’t of Public Safety & Corrections, 2022 WL 669397 (La. App. 1
Cir. 2022), reh’g denied (Apr. 12, 2022); and Taylor v. City of Baton Rouge, 233 So. 2d 325 (La. App. 1
Cir. 1970), writ refused, 236 So. 2d 32 (La. 1970)).
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deficient. Accordingly, cause of action eighteen as it is brought against defendant
Cloud is dismissed. The claim remains pending against defendants Finn and Lewis.
6. False Imprisonment (Nineteenth Cause of Action)
Under Louisiana law, “[t]he tort of false imprisonment consists of the following
two essential elements: (1) detention of the person; and (2) the unlawfulness of the
detention.” Miller v. Desoto Reg’l Health Sys., 128 So. 3d 649, 658 (La. App. 3 Cir.
2013) (cleaned up). Unlawful detention is restraint without color of legal authority.
Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So. 2d 969, 971 (La. 1977). In Louisiana, the federal
reasonable suspicion standard is applied to traffic stops. State v. Hunt, 25 So. 3d 746,
753 (La. 2009) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); State v. Kalie,
699 So. 2d 879, 881 (La. 1997)); see also La. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 215.1 (“A law
enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects
is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense . . .” and “During
detention of an alleged violator of any provision of the motor vehicle laws of this state,
an officer may not detain a motorist for a period of time longer than reasonably
necessary to complete the investigation of the violation and issuance of a citation for
the violation, absent reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity . . . .”).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for false imprisonment during the
January Traffic Stop should be dismissed for three reasons: (1) because the
allegations are based on “group pleading”; (2) because Plaintiff has failed to allege
specific conduct on behalf of each individual defendant; and (3) because Defendants
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are entitled to qualified immunity.
169
Plaintiff argues that the complaint provides
extensive allegations regarding the actions of the defendants throughout the
complaint; that he has plausibly alleged that he was (1) detained for the duration of
the stop and (2) the officers did not have reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to
detain him for the prolonged period; and that qualified immunity does not apply to
this state law claim.
170

Defendants’ “group pleading” argument is unpersuasive. Washington’s
nineteenth cause of action clearly states that it is brought against defendants Cloud,
Lewis, and Finn.
171
These are the three officers who were present during the January
Traffic Stop. That Washington then calls them “Officer Defendants” does not render
Defendants any less capable of understanding Washington’s claim. Moreover, the
complaint itself provides extensive allegations as to the action of each individual
officer during the traffic stop. That Plaintiff did not repeat the full set of allegations
within each cause of action is of no import.
Plaintiff has adequately alleged that defendants Cloud, Lewis, and Finn, the
“Officer Defendants” in this claim, detained him during the January Traffic Stop. He
has further adequately alleged that those same defendants did not have reasonable
suspicion to continue the traffic stop after the license and warrant check returned
and that he did not consent to the extension of detention past that time. The Court
cannot say that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege an unlawful detention. Cf.

169
ECF No. 104-1 at 98-99, 27-28.
170
ECF No. 118 at 68-69.
171
See ECF No. 96 at 115.
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Perry, 2018 WL 5074674, at *14-16 (denying summary judgment on plaintiff’s state
false imprisonment claim despite finding that the officer was protected by federal
qualified immunity from § 1983 false arrest claim).
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim.
7. Vicarious Liability (Twentieth Cause of Action)
Plaintiff’s complaint does not clarify for which alleged torts he seeks to hold
Smith and the “Supervisor Defendants” vicariously liable. The Court will assume
that he aims to hold Smith and “Supervisor Defendants” vicariously liable for failure
to intervene as alleged in count eighteen and false imprisonment as alleged in count
nineteen, the two intentional torts alleged. Vicarious liability is not available for
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. See, e.g., Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N.
Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 380-81 (5th Cir. 2005). And this Court has dismissed
Plaintiff’s three negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. See section II.H.3.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim is insufficient because he has engaged
in group pleading.
172
Defendants also argue that plaintiff has failed to state a claim
against Boehm, Cox, Galloway, Francois, Parker, and Church because plaintiff does
not make any specific allegations as to these defendants.
173
They further argue that
claims against these defendants are redundant and duplicative because Plaintiff is
already asserting a vicarious liability claim against Smith.
174
Plaintiff, in response,
argues that the complaint satisfies the elements of vicarious liability for all

172
ECF No. 118 at 69-70.
173
Id. at 101.
174
Id.
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Supervisor Defendants as he alleges that Boehm, Cox, Galloway, Francois, Parker,
and Church hold supervisory roles and that they were acting within the scope of their
employment when subordinate officers violated the law.
175

Plaintiff has stated a claim against Smith but not the other “Supervisor
Defendants.” Plaintiff has alleged that Smith “heads” the STPSO and that all STPSO
officers act under his “direction, control, and supervision.” Defendants do not appear
to contest these allegations. Plaintiff makes no similar allegations as to the
“Supervisor Defendants.” His listing of their roles at the STPSO in preceding
paragraphs of the complaint is insufficient. Outside of Smith, no specific defendant
is named within the twentieth cause of action. Plaintiff’s allegation that “Supervisor
Defendants are liable under the laws of vicarious liability” is conclusory and therefore
implausible.
The Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the “Supervisor
Defendants”; cause of action twenty remains as alleged against Smith.
I. Public Records Claims
1. Monell Liability under the First and Fourth Amendments
(Twenty-First Cause of Action)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has improperly engaged in group pleading.
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They further argue that Plaintiff’s allegations against the “Custodian Defendants”
are insufficient as to Buckner, Sevante, and Boehm and additionally redundant and
duplicative as Plaintiff is already asserting this claim against Smith.
177
Plaintiff

175
ECF No. 118 at 69-70.
176
ECF No. 104-1 at 29-30.
177
Id. at 102-04.
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argues that he has not engaged in improper group pleading, he need not specifically
single out a policymaker, and his description of the relevant roles of each defendant
in the STPSO is sufficient.
178

The Court notes that in reply Defendants attempt to argue that Plaintiff has
failed to make allegations sufficient to sustain a Monell claim. The Court will not
entertain arguments first brought in a reply. See, e.g., Jones v. Cain, 600 F.3d 527,
541 (5th Cir. 2010); Little Tchefuncte River Association v. Artesian Utility Co., Inc.,
155 F. Supp. 3d 637, 657 (E.D. La. 2015) (“Arguments cannot be raised for the first
time in a reply brief.”) (quoting Benefit Recovery, Inc. v. Donelon, 521 F.3d 326, 329
(5th Cir. 2008)).
As previously explained, an official capacity Monell suit is tantamount to a suit
against the municipal entity. See Sanders-Burns, 594 F.3d at 373; see also Graham,
473 U.S. at 165-66. The Court has discretion to dismiss official-capacity claims as
redundant when they are identical to claims raised against a municipal entity. See
Castro Romero, 256 F.3d at 355; Flores, 92 F.3d at 261. The overlapping claims are
redundant; accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion and dismisses the official
capacity claims against Boehm, Mancuso, Buckner, Sevante, and STPSO Custodian
John Doe(s). The Court does not dismiss the official capacity claim as brought against
Smith.
As to Plaintiff’s claim against these defendants in their individual capacities,
Monell analysis does not apply. When a plaintiff sues “governmental officials in their

178
ECF No. 118 at 70-72.
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individual capacities . . . [he] must allege specific conduct giving rise to a
constitutional violation.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing
Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999)). To do so
“plaintiff must allege specific facts giving rise to a constitutional violation.” Id. (citing
Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1996)). Defendants’ argument regarding
the lack of specific conduct pled rests upon the lack of utilization of specific
defendants’ names within the paragraphs encompassing this cause of action.
Plaintiff has alleged specific facts giving rise to a constitutional violation, but he has
not connected them to specific individuals. That each defendant has a role within the
STPSO is of no moment. However, as explained in greater detail in section II.I.2,
within the complaint, Plaintiff alleges personal involvement on behalf of Mancuso,
Buckner, and, to a lesser-extent, Sevante. Plaintiff has failed to allege personal
involvement to connect the other “Custodian Defendants” to the constitutional
violation. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff did intend to bring this claim
against Smith and the “Custodian Defendants” in their individual capacities, it is
dismissed as to all defendants except for Mancuso, Buckner, and Sevante.
2. Public Records Request (Twenty-Second Cause of Action)
Washington brings his twenty-second cause of action under the Public Records
Act of Louisiana. The law provides that “any person of the age of majority may
inspect, copy, or reproduce any public record” except as otherwise provided by law.
La. R.S. 44:31(B)(1). It further provides that
Any person who has been denied the right to inspect, copy, reproduce,
or obtain a copy or reproduction of a record under the provisions of this
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Chapter, either by a determination of the custodian or by the passage of
five days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays,
from the date of his in-person, written, or electronic request without
receiving a determination in writing by the custodian or an estimate of
the time reasonably necessary for collection, segregation, redaction,
examination, or review of a records request, may institute proceedings
for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, injunctive or declaratory
relief . . .

La. R.S. 44:35(A).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient as brought
against Mancuso, Buckner, Sevante, and Boehm as they are based on group pleading
and Plaintiff has not provided any allegations of personal involvement or specific
conduct on behalf of these defendants.
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They further argue that the claim should
be dismissed as duplicative or redundant as Plaintiff is already asserting this claim
against Smith.
180

Defendants’ argument regarding Mancuso and Buckner do not persuade. The
danger of group pleading, that Defendants lack adequate notice of Plaintiff’s claims
such that they can respond, is not at issue here. Plaintiff has not lumped every
defendant in this action together. He has simply crafted a category of relevant
defendants, whose relevance is alleged through their roles listed and the background
allegations. Plaintiff has made a logical categorization based upon the substance of
his allegations; it is sensible that he would bring a failure to respond to public records
request claim against those at the STPSO who have the authorization to respond to
public records requests. Mancuso and Buckner are both mentioned multiple times in

179
ECF No. 104-1 at 30-32, 104-06.
180
Id.
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the complaint and attachments thereto. Their relevance to this claim is clear. While
more tenuous, Sevante’s relevance can also be gleaned from the complaint. As
Defendants note, Sevante is specifically mentioned in Plaintiff’s discussion of the
alleged “wild goose chase” the STPSO initiated in response to Washington’s records
requests. Defendants’ argument regarding Boehm, however, is well-taken as there
are no specific allegations in the complaint, nor material in the attachments that
specifically ties him to these allegations. Defendants notably do not attack the
substance of Plaintiff’s twenty-second cause of action.
The Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s twenty-second
cause of action except as to defendant Boehm.
J. Remedies
Defendants additionally bring challenges to Plaintiff’s request for punitive
damages, pre-judgment interest, and injunctive relief.
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1. Punitive Damages
Section 1983 does not allow for recovery of punitive damages against a
municipal entity, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), but
punitive damages are available from individual defendants. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.
30 (1983). Under § 1983, punitive damages may be awarded only if the official
conduct “is motivated by evil motive or intent” or demonstrates “reckless or callous
indifference” to a person’s constitutional rights. Id. Plaintiff has alleged that the

181
ECF No. 104-1 at 109-114.
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individual officers acted with callous indifference. And Plaintiff has individual
capacity § 1983 claims remaining: cause of action four and part of cause of action two.
Louisiana has a general public policy against punitive damages. Ross v.
Conoco, Inc., 828 So. 2d 546, 555 (La. 2002). Under Louisiana law, punitive damages
are not recoverable absent an express statutory authorization. International
Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (La. 1988). Plaintiff has not
identified a statutory provision entitling him to punitive damages for his state
constitution claim.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages is
granted as to Plaintiff’s claim under the Louisiana Constitution and denied as to
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims to the extent they are brought against Defendants in their
individual capacities.
2. Pre-judgment interest
Defendants provide no authority to support deciding on pre-judgment interest
at the 12(b)(6) stage. That the decision whether to grant pre-judgment interest in
§ 1983 cases is discretionary is of no moment. The Court need not determine how it
will exercise that discretion at this junction. Accordingly, the Court denies
Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s prayer for pre-judgment interest.
3. Additional Requests for Relief
“[I]njunctions requiring affirmative steps to safeguard constitutional rights
fall squarely within the equitable powers of the federal courts.” Daves v. Dallas Cnty.,
Texas, 22 F.4th 522, 565 (5th Cir. 2022) (Haynes, J., dissenting) (citing M. D. by
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Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 F.3d 237, 276–79, 282–83 (5th Cir. 2018) (concluding that
a federal court could require a state foster care system to implement training,
investigative, reporting, and computer systems policies); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d
1115, 1155–56 (5th Cir. 1982) (concluding that a federal court could require a state
prison system to record all disciplinary hearings, preserve those recordings, and
make them available to inmates), modified on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.
1982); Ciudadanos Unidos de San Juan v. Hidalgo Cnty. Grand Jury Comm'rs, 622
F.2d 807, 828–30 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding that a federal court could require local
jury commissioners to formulate policies to ensure that indigent individuals, among
other groups, were adequately represented in grand jury pool); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15–20 (1971) (requiring a state public school
district to implement a busing policy to rectify an equal protection violation and
noting that a federal court's power to enter such injunctive relief “does not differ
fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair
the denial of a constitutional right”); Jones v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just., 880 F.3d 756,
759–60 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (concluding that a federal court could require a
prison to provide an inmate with less sugary meals); Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323,
339–40 (5th Cir. 2004) (concluding that a federal court could require a prison to adopt
a policy providing fans, ice water, and daily showers to inmates under certain
conditions); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 751 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that a
federal court could require a prison to adopt a policy allowing inmates to exercise
outdoors)). The Court sees no reason to strike relief requests at this juncture.
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Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s prayer for injunctive relief is
denied.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS OR DERE D that Defendants’ motion
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to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PAR T.
The motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth,
eleventh, fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth claims. It is GRANTED IN PART as
described above as to Plaintiff’s racial profiling Fourteenth Amendment claims within
causes of action one, two, and three; as well as described above with respect to the
tenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, twentieth, twenty-first, and twenty-second claims; as
well as described above with respect to punitive damages. The motion is otherwise
DENIED.
IT IS F URTH ER ORDER ED that Plaintiff’s motion
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for ruling is
DENIED AS MOOT.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 6th day of August, 2026.
BRANDON S. LONG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

182
ECF No. 104.
183
ECF No. 146.
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