Washington v. Smith et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRUCE WASHINGTON CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 24-145
RANDY SMITH, ET AL. SECTION “O” (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court in this civil-rights case is Defendants’ motion
1
to strike
Plaintiff Bruce Washington’s second amended complaint (the “complaint”), in its
entirety or in part, or in the alternative to provide a more definite statement.
Defendants Randy Smith, Jeffrey Boehm, Michael Ripoll Jr., George Cox, Dale
Galloway, Frank Francois Jr., Chance Cloud, Taylor Lewis, Curtis Finn, Douglas
Searle, Justin Parker, Denise Mancuso, Jeanine Buckner, Michael Sevante, and
Jeremy Church are all employed by the St. Tammany Parish Office (STPSO).
2

Plaintiff opposes the motion.
3
For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is
DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
This civil-rights case arises out of two traffic stops and the events that followed.
Plaintiff Bruce Washington alleges that he was pulled over by police for racially
motivated reasons twice in 2023: first on January 13 and again on October 8.
4

1
ECF No. 100.
2
ECF No. 96 ¶ 9.
3
ECF No. 111.
4
ECF No. 96.
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Washington’s complaint provides substantial factual allegations. What follows is a
brief overview of the main events, as alleged by Washington.
During the first traffic stop, Washington alleges that he was subjected to
unconstitutional searches and seizures, and that the officers involved—Officers
Chance Cloud, Taylor Lewis, and Curtis Finn—unconstitutionally extended the stop.
5

Specifically, he alleges that the officers extended the traffic stop past the time
necessary to fulfill its purpose, which was to provide a warning to Washington for
Washington’s un-signaled lane change.
6
Washington alleges that the officers did so
without reasonable suspicion.
7
He additionally alleges that the officers, specifically
Officer Cloud, unconstitutionally frisked him and searched his pockets, wallet, and
vehicle.
8

Washington alleges that the second stop was made by Officer Searle without
reasonable suspicion and for racially motivated reasons.
9
He specifically alleges that
Officer Searle told Washington that the stop was initiated because Washington did
not have insurance and that this was untrue as Washington did have insurance.
10

Washington alleges that Officer Searle did not activate his body-worn camera until
he had returned to his vehicle with Washington’s identification.
11
Washington
further alleges that Officer Searle took photographs of Washington’s identification on

5
Id. ¶¶ 54-216, 305-430.
6
Id. ¶¶ 305-333.
7
Id. ¶ 317.
8
Id. ¶¶ 72-216, 334-430.
9
Id. ¶¶ 245-255, 431-35.
10
Id. ¶¶ 247-48.
11
Id. ¶¶ 250.
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a device that Washington believes to be Searle’s personal cellphone—a violation of
STPSO policy—and that this cellphone had photographs of other individuals’
identifications.
12

Washington further alleges that following both stops he contacted the STPSO
to report the actions of Officers Cloud, Lewis, Finn, and Searle.
13
He alleges that
Captain Dale Galloway and Sergeant Frank Francois of the STPSO Internal Affairs
spoke to him following the January traffic stop as part of their internal investigation,
and that two days after Washington’s interview the STPSO Public Integrity Bureau
found that the actions of Officers Cloud, Lewis, and Finn were within the parameters
of the STPSO’s policies and regulations.
14
Washington alleges that Francois and
Galloway were more difficult to meet with following the October traffic stop, and that
he was ultimately unable to sit for an interview with them because of their insistence
that Washington’s lawyer not be able to accompany Washington.
15
He alleges that
the only violation of STPSO policy that Francois and Galloway’s investigation found
was Searle’s failure to turn on the body-worn camera after initiating the stop.
16

Washington further alleges that he sought record information from the STPSO
in late 2023 and that the Custodian Defendants (Denise Mancuso, Jeanine Bucker,

12
Id. ¶¶ 251-52.
13
Id. ¶¶ 217-226, 256-277.
14
Id. ¶¶ 217-226.
15
Id. ¶¶ 256-267.
16
Id. ¶ 273.
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Michael Sevante, and STPSO Records Custodian John Doe(s))
17
provided untimely
and unsatisfactory responses.
18

Washington’s complaint additionally includes allegations of racist policies on
behalf of the STPSO, including past statements made under previous Sheriff
administrations and statistics underlying Washington’s assertion that Black and
other people of color are subjected to more traffic stops than White people.
19

Washington additionally mentions the death of Tyre Nichols, a Black man whose
death following a traffic stop in Memphis in January 2023 was widely reported on.
20

The allegations described within this paragraph are largely the specific paragraphs
that Defendants seek to be stricken if the Court does not strike the complaint in its
entirety.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint should be stricken in its entirety
as an impermissible “shotgun” pleading.
21
Alternatively, they argue that certain
paragraphs in the complaint should be stricken as immaterial, impertinent,
scandalous, and prejudicial.
22
As an additional alternative, Defendants argue that
Plaintiff should be ordered to provide a more definitive statement.
23
Plaintiff opposes
Defendants’ motion, arguing that the complaint satisfies Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b); the specific statements challenged are not impertinent,

17
Id. ¶¶ 48-51.
18
Id. ¶¶ 280-304.
19
Id. ¶¶ 10-16, 227-233.
20
Id. ¶¶ 3, 118, 547.
21
ECF No. 100.
22
Id.
23
Id.
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irrelevant, and scandalous, and moreover Defendants have not shown that those
statements will be prejudicial; and that Plaintiff’s pleading is not so vague that
Defendants cannot reasonably respond.
24

II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Strike the Complaint as a Whole
Although captioned as a motion to strike, Defendants first request is more
accurately described as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. “[A]lthough
there are instances in which Rule 12(f) has been used to strike a pleading in its
entirety,” motions to strike are typically inappropriate vehicles for requesting the
dismissal of a whole complaint. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1380 (3d ed. Nov. 2025 Update). Indeed, dismissal under Rule 12(f) “is
usually reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous,
vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”
Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint is a “shotgun” pleading
inconsistent with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.
25

Defendants argument rests upon Plaintiff’s use of group allegations and defendant
categories, and Plaintiff’s incorporation of preceding paragraphs into subsequent
claims.
26
Defendants additionally argue that Washington’s complaint is
impermissibly long and should therefore be dismissed in its entirety.
27

24
ECF No. 111.
25
ECF No. 100-1 at 3-5.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 5-7.
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Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint that does not
meet Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard should be dismissed for failing to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint is not a
“shotgun” pleading simply because it categorizes defendants, see Body by Cook, Inc.
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 2016 WL 4479507, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 25, 2016)
(Morgan, J.), aff’d in part, re’vd in part and remanded on other grounds, 869 F.3d 381
(5th Cir. 2017) (“A complaint that contains ‘group allegations’ and ‘lumps together’
defendants is not ipso facto in violation of Rule 8.”), or “incorporates by reference
previous allegations.” Lee v. Lawrence, 2024 WL 1890298, at *1 (M.D. La. Apr. 29,
2024) (Johnson, J.) (cleaned up). What matters is whether the complaint lays out the
conduct underlying each allegation and gives each defendant adequate notice of the
plaintiff’s claims and the grounds upon which they rest. See Body by Cook, Inc., 2016
WL 4479507, at *3; Lee, 2024 WL 1890298, at *1.
Plaintiff’s complaint lays out the conduct underlying each claim. And
Plaintiff’s grouping of the defendants does not amount to impermissible group or
shotgun pleading. The allegations in Plaintiff’s second amended complaint are
sufficient to give Defendants adequate notice of his claims. Neither Washington’s use
of groups nor his incorporation of preceding paragraphs by reference cause confusion.
His factual allegations are not “buried beneath innumerable pages of rambling
irrelevancies.” Martin v. Tesoro Corp., 2012 WL 1866841 (W.D. La. May 21, 2012)
(internal quotation omitted). This is not such a case where the complaint is
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incomprehensible such that dismissal is warranted based on either Rule 12(f) or Rule
12(b)(6).
Further, Defendants cite to no authority that establishes that complaints must
be of a certain length. Defendants instead look to inapt cases wherein the Courts
found complaints to be confused, rambling, and incomprehensible. See McZeal v. J.P.
Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 2014 WL 3166715, at *6 (E.D. La. Jul. 7, 2014) (describing
the complaint as “impenetrably dense, jargon-laden, and largely incomprehensible”);
Muniz v. Medtronic, Inc., 2014 WL 1236314 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2014) (dismissing a
complaint wherein the plaintiff did not describe the factual allegations specifically
related to the case until page fifty-nine of seventy-seven). As stated above,
Defendants here have been adequately notified of Washington’s claims and the
factual allegations underlying them. While long, his complaint is not confused or
rambling, it does not waste the majority of pages on allegations unrelated to
Washington and the present matter, and it is not difficult to parse.
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint in
its entirety.
B. Motion to Strike “Immaterial, Impertinent, or Scandalous”
Material

Rule 12(f) governs motions to strike; it permits the Court to “strike from a
pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). A Rule 12(f) motion to strike is a “drastic
remedy to be resorted to only when required for the purposes of justice.” Augustus v.
Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Escambia Cty., Fla., 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962); see
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also Synergy Mgmt., LLC v. Lego Juris A/S, 2008 WL 4758634, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct.
24, 2008) (“Motions to strike made under Rule 12(f) are viewed with disfavor by the
federal courts, and are infrequently granted.”). A motion to strike should be granted
only when “the allegations are prejudicial to the defendant or immaterial to the
lawsuit.” Johnson v. Harvey, 1998 WL 596745, at *7 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 1998) (internal
quotation omitted). Immateriality is established by showing that the challenged
allegations “can have no possible bearing upon the subject matter of the litigation.”
Bayou Fleet P’ship v. St. Charles Parish, 2011 WL 2680686, at *5 (E.D. La. July 8,
2011) (internal quotation omitted). The decision to grant or deny a motion to strike
is reserved to the Court’s discretion. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (utilizing the permissive
“may”).
With one exception, Defendants have not carried their burden. The specific
paragraphs Defendants challenge in the complaint discuss inter alia interactions
with the police as a person of color; statistics related to Washington’s claims that
Black people are more frequently stopped by the police; and the history of alleged
abuses perpetrated by the STPSO. It is hard to see how such paragraphs “can have
no possible bearing upon” Washington’s case. Bayou Fleet P’ship, 2011 WL 2680686,
at *5. Indeed, it would be difficult for Washington to bring claims for racially
motivated policing without the mention of race or alleging that the police treat
individuals differently based on their race. Moreover, with respect to all but one
subset of the challenged allegations, Defendants do not carry their burden of showing
prejudice. Cf. Sadler v. Benson Motors Corp., 1997 WL 266735, at *1-2 (E.D. La. May
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15, 1997) (striking “Ku Klux Klan” as immaterial and highly prejudicial when the
reference “add[ed] nothing to the material allegations of the complaint” and plaintiff
could “show that defendant’s alleged actions were racially discriminatory without”
using the term but denying the request to strike “lynch noose” because it was
“factually descriptive of the rope that was allegedly placed at plaintiff’s workstation
and of the perceived racial animus behind such an action”). That Defendants are cast
in a negative light is insufficient. See id. at *2 (“Although defendants are
understandably concerned by plaintiff’s accusations of grave misconduct, they may
not rely upon Rule 12(f) to dismiss those accusations.”) (quoting Succession of
Wardlaw, 1994 WL 479183, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 30, 1994)).
The one exception is Plaintiff’s reference to Tyre Nichols in paragraphs 3, 118,
and 547, and associated footnotes. The Court finds that the complaint alleges no
plausible connection between the death of Tyre Nichols in Memphis and Plaintiff’s
allegations against STPSO. Plaintiff has not alleged that he was aware of
Tyre Nichols’s death at the time of his traffic stops, or that he was moved to take or
not take some action during the traffic stops because of fear related to Tyre
Nichols’s death. References to Tyre Nichols have no possible bearing upon the
subject matter of the litigation and only serve to prejudice Defendants by stoking
passions about an unrelated event.
The Court therefore exercises its ample discretion to deny Defendants’ motion
to strike the contested paragraphs in the complaint, except the Court grants
Defendants’ motion under Rule 12(f) as to any mention of Tyre Nichols. Such
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references in paragraphs 3, 18, and 547, and related footnotes, will be stricken from
the complaint.
C. Rule 12(e) Motion for a More Definite Statement
A party unable to frame a response to an opponent’s pleading may seek an
order requiring his opponent who filed the indefinite pleading to lodge a more definite
statement. That is, “[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading
to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that a
party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). “Given the
liberal pleading standard set forth in Rule 8(a), Rule 12(e) motions are disfavored.”
Murugi v. Tex. Guaranteed, 646 F. Supp. 2d 804, 811 (E.D. La. 2009) (citing Mitchell
v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1959)). “A court should only
grant a more definite statement when the complaint is ‘so excessively vague and
ambiguous to be unintelligible and as to prejudice the defendant seriously in
attempting to answer it.’” Engles v. Great Lakes Ins. SE, 675 F. Supp. 3d 702, 705
(E.D La. 2023) (quoting Phillips v. ABB Combustion Eng’g, 2013 WL 3155224, at *2
(E.D. La. June 19, 2013)).
Defendants argue that the complaint contains “numerous allegations” without
factual support.
28
Defendants’ sparse argument fails to show that Plaintiff’s
complaint is “so vague or ambiguous” that they cannot reasonably respond. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(e). The Court accordingly denies Defendants’ disfavored motion.

28
ECF No. 100-1 at 15-16.
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III. CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion
29
is DENIED IN PART as to
Defendants’ request that the complaint be stricken in its entirety; that Plaintiff be
ordered to provide a more definitive statement; and that certain paragraphs in the
complaint be stricken as immaterial, impertinent, scandalous, and prejudicial, with
one exception.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN
PART as to the references to Tyre Nichols in paragraphs 3, 118, and 547, and related
footnotes, which shall be stricken from the complaint.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 25th day of March, 2026.
BRANDON S. LONG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

29
ECF No. 100.
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