CORDARIAL PRATT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY — MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING

IMPORTANT NOTICE “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION” THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED” PURSUANT TO RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE (RAP) 40(D). THIS OPINION SHALL NOT BE CITED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE. UNDER RAP 41, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF KENTUCKY APPELLATE COURTS RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, THAT ARE FINAL UNDER RAP 40(G), MAY BE CITED BY A PARTY FOR CONSIDERATION BY A COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSES THE POINT OF LAW BEING ARGUED BY A PARTY. IF AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION IS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY A COURT THE OPINION SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION IN THE DOCUMENT IN WHICH THE UNPUBLISHED OPINION IS CITED.

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RENDERED: OCTOBER 22, 2026 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Supreme Court of Kentucky 2025-SC-0432-MR CORDARIAL PRATT APPELLANT V. ON APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE COLE ADAMS MAIER, JUDGE NO. 21-CR-00149 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING Cordarial Pratt entered a conditional guilty plea to first-degree robbery, second-degree robbery, first-degree fleeing or evading police, second-degree assault, first-degree wanton endangerment, convicted felon in possession of a handgun, theft by unlawful taking (automobile greater than $10,000), theft by unlawful taking (firearm), first-degree criminal mischief, and two counts of kidnapping. Pratt was sentenced to thirty-two years’ imprisonment. His plea was conditional on his right to appeal the issue of whether the court appropriately denied his motion pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) KRS1 440.450, Article III, which sought to dismiss his indictment. 1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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2 He now appeals as a matter of right. K Y . CONST . § 110(2)(b). I. Background On May 28, 2021, Pratt was indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury on charges of first-degree robbery and first-degree burglary. On June 17, 2021, Pratt appeared for arraignment. On December 29, 2021, he was indicted by a superseding indictment that added additional charges of one count of first-degree robbery, three counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, three counts of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun, two counts of first-degree fleeing or evading police, and one count each of kidnapping with serious physical injury, kidnapping, receiving stolen property valued at more than $10,000, first-degree assault, first-degree strangulation, theft by unlawful taking value more than $10,000, theft by unlawful taking of a firearm, first- degree criminal mischief, and second-degree fleeing or evading police. These charges arose from a series of crimes Pratt committed on February 1, 2021. Pratt’s arraignment on the superseding indictment was scheduled for January 13, 2022. However, he was not present at the arraignment because he was in federal custody in Mississippi. The trial court rescheduled Pratt’s arraignment for April 21, 2022. The record does not contain a video recording of a hearing on April 21, 2022. However, the record shows that the written docket reflects that an arrest warrant was issued with bail set at $250,000. On February 9, 2023, Pratt was again scheduled for arraignment, and he appeared with counsel. The trial court scheduled a pre-trial conference for May 11, 2023. Pratt was being held in Madison County Detention Center at the time.

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3 On May 11, 2023, Pratt appeared at a pre-trial conference. Defense counsel informed the trial court that the matter was not yet ready to be resolved. The trial court asked defense counsel when an appropriate date would be to reset the pre-trial conference, and defense counsel requested a July date. The trial court then set Pratt’s second pre-trial conference for July 13, 2023. Pratt was present for the second pre-trial conference on July 13, 2023. At this time, defense counsel informed the trial court that Pratt was requesting Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The trial court responded that it would accommodate that request if Pratt would agree to a continuance to resolve the matter. The Commonwealth and defense counsel agreed to a continuance and to move forward with ADR. The trial court then continued the matter until October 12, 2023. On October 12, 2023, defense counsel informed the trial court that Pratt was moved out of the Madison County Detention Center and was being held in federal custody in Bourbon County. Defense counsel requested that the matter be rescheduled for a date sometime in November, and the trial court rescheduled the pre-trial conference for November 9, 2023. On November 9, 2023, defense counsel informed the trial court that Pratt was still being held in federal custody in Bourbon County. The trial court rescheduled the pre-trial conference for December 7, 2023. On December 7, 2023, defense counsel informed the trial court that Pratt was in federal custody for charges in Arkansas. The trial court then issued an arrest warrant with a no-bond hold and scheduled a status hearing on April 4, 2024. On April 4, 2024, defense

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4 counsel informed the trial court that Pratt remained in federal custody in Arkansas. The trial court passed the matter until November 13, 2025. On March 20, 2025, Pratt was served with the warrant that was issued on December 7, 2023. Pratt then appeared for a pre-trial conference on April 10, 2025. At this hearing, defense counsel informed the trial court that more time was needed to consult with Pratt. The trial court asked defense counsel how much time was needed, and defense counsel requested a pre-trial conference in June. The trial court scheduled the next pre-trial conference for June 12, 2025. Trial Court: Do you all just want to put it on the July 3rd or July 10th docket? Assuming that. . . . Commonwealth: He’s filed some paperwork on the Interstate Agreement on Detainers to get the charge resolved within six months. So, I have spoken with [defense counsel]. If we could have an early August . . . trial date. Trial Court: I mean. What date were those filed? Commonwealth: I think mid-February. And then it took a little bit beyond that to get him from Arkansas. Trial Court: I don’t know that I can get him early August, but I can maybe get him in the end of August understanding that we are stacked on August 4th and Jackson is scheduled on August 11th until it’s over. Defense Counsel: Understood, your honor. Trial Court: Well then, does he need ADR? If he just wants a trial date.

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5 Commonwealth: Well, I was just trying to get the date in case. I didn’t want the time to run. Defense Counsel: Judge, we would request an ADR date. We are certainly not ruling out the possibility for a solution. Commonwealth: Yeah, I’m not either. I just, out of an abundance of caution, would like to get something done at the latest August, if not June. Trial Court: Alright. Final status is July 10th. Standard motion deadline—that will all pretty much be around the corner, but I suspect you will know everything you need to do or not by the time mediation is over. Defense Counsel: Thank you, judge. The jury trial was set for August 25, 2025, and the final status hearing was scheduled for July 10, 2025. The video record does not show the parties discussing the August 25 trial date; however, the trial court’s order denying Pratt’s KRS 440.540, Article III motion, states that the jury trial was set for this date. On July 10, 2025, Pratt appeared before the trial court for a status conference. Defense counsel informed the trial court that there had not been a resolution to Pratt’s case during mediation. However, defense counsel stated that a resolution has not been ruled out yet by Pratt. The trial court responded: “Well, I presume based on his motion practice and his own expressed interest to resolve this, if that matter that is expected to be called for trial on August 11th is adjourned before then, he has to be the case that is tried. No motion to be continued will be well taken from anyone.”

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6 On August 15, 2025, Pratt filed a motion pursuant to KRS 440.450, Article III that stated the following: COMES NOW, Defendant, by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to KRS 440.450, Article III, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and moves this Court to enter an order dismissing the charges contained in the above-mentioned indictment against the Defendant. In relevant part, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers as codified in KRS 440.450, Article III, states: (1) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint against the prison, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made in the indictment, information, or complaint. . . The defense contends that the letter provided to the Commonwealth Attorney of the 25th Judicial Circuit, David W. Smith, complies with the notice requirements in the terms of containing the “written notice of the place of imprisonment” and Mr. Pratt’s request for a final disposition of the above-named case. Id. That letter is dated and its offer of delivery for temporary custody is dated February 6th, 2025. The defendant is set for trial on August 25, 2025, per the court’s order entered on June 16th, 2025. The defense contends that this trial date clearly falls outside of those one hundred eighty (180) days clearly stated in KRS 440.450, Article Three, Section One. Mr. Pratt was clearly detained by the Commonwealth of Kentucky for purposes of KRS 440.450 when he was not released from federal custody due to the Commonwealth’s detainer. The defense counsel contends that the defendant clearly invoked his rights under KRS 440.050, Article III. The defense further contends that

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7 the appropriate remedy for failure to provide disposition of these charges is dismissal of this indictment. WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests the court to dismiss the above-named indictment due to the failure to comply with bringing the defendant to trial within the one hundred eighty (180) day term clearly stated in KRS 440.050, Article III. Pratt notably did not attach the letter cited as written notice of imprisonment allegedly dated February 6, 2025, to this motion, and the letter is not in the record before this Court. On August 19, 2025, the trial court denied Pratt’s motion for the following reasons: • Pratt has not strictly complied with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”). “The 180-day time period established by the IAD does not commence until a detainee’s request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the appropriate court and to the prosecuting officer that lodged the detainer against him.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Ky. 2014), abrogated by Roe v. Commonwealth, 493 S.W.3d 814 (Ky. 2015) (citing Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 52, (1993). To date, the court record does not indicate any request for final disposition of the charges. A letter was purportedly delivered to the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office. It is not attached as an exhibit to the motion. IAD Form II is not part of the record, and nothing that purports to fill a similar purpose is filed with this Court. Furthermore, Pratt references his date of mailing as the correct date to calculate days, but that is inconsistent with the statute, as noted in Johnson. • Pratt appeared with counsel on April 10, 2025, and a jury trial date was not set. The record shows the parties were engaged in negotiation. After that date, there is no motion filed requesting the court to assign a jury trial date. • The Court’s Criminal Trial Order established a motion deadline as follows: Consistent with Ky. RCr2 8.20, the Motion Deadline set by the Court in the above-styled case shall be ten (10) days before status hearing.” No motions were filed in compliance with the deadline. The Criminal Trial order further states, “Except for good 2 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

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8 cause shown, certain defenses, objections, and/or requests not raised by the Court’s Motion Deadline shall be considered waived. Ky. RCr 8.18.” The Court considers Pratt’s alleged request for a speedy trial according to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers waived when he did not object to the initial jury trial date, and he did not file a timely motion to dismiss or reschedule according to the Court’s criminal jury trial order. Based on the foregoing and because Pratt did not strictly comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers or this Court’s Criminal Trial Order, the motion is DENIED. This matter remains set for a Jury Trial on August 25, 2025, at 9:00 AM. The deadline to resolve this matter by agreement is on Wednesday, August 20, 2025, at 1:00 P.M. In the trial court’s order denying Pratt’s motion, it included a footnote that stated: The letter was acknowledged by the Commonwealth at the June 2025 Pre-Trial Conference, but there was nothing in the court file making the Court aware of this issue until the oral request for a jury trial date on that docket. Counsel for the Commonwealth and the defendant understand this Court gets four jury trial months a year in Madison County (as described in the Local Rules). Neither June or July are jury trial months for Division II and, at the time, a high-profile criminal matter that had been set for 8-months was scheduled for most of August. In another footnote, it further noted: The Motion to Dismiss was filed after both regularly scheduled motion dockets in Madison County for August 2025 were concluded. In addition to that, if the Motion was timely filed consistent with the Criminal Trial Order, the Court would have been able to reschedule the matter to August 4. On July 24, all matters set for jury trial on August 4, 2025, were resolved with pleas. Counsel for the defendant likely is aware of this because he appeared on that date to represent a client resolving cases. The Court would readily have advanced this case at Pratt’s timely request. On August 20, 2025, Pratt entered a conditional guilty plea to charges of first-degree robbery, second-degree robbery, first-degree fleeing or evading

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9 police, second-degree assault, first-degree wanton endangerment, convicted felon in possession of a handgun, theft by unlawful taking (automobile greater than $10,000), theft by unlawful taking (firearm), first-degree criminal mischief, and two counts of kidnapping. Pratt was sentenced to thirty-two years in accordance with the conditional plea. His plea was conditional on his right to appeal the issue of whether or not the court appropriately denied his Motion Pursuant to KRS 440.450, Article III, which sought to dismiss his indictment. II. Analysis Pratt now appeals as a matter of right. K Y . CONST . § 110(2)(b). He seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his motion pursuant to KRS 440.450, Article III, which sought to dismiss his indictment. Pratt claims that the trial court violated his 180-day right limit under the IAD, KRS 440.450, Article III.3 He further claims that the trial court violated his 120-day right limit under the IAD, KRS 440.450, Article IV. KRS 440.450, Article III states: Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his 3 See Clutter v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 59, 60 (Ky. 2010) (explaining that the IAD is “codified in Kentucky law by KRS 440.450.”).

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10 imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint. . . . Bryant v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 169, 172 (Ky. 2006) (quoting KRS 440.450). A detainee inmate “shall have caused to be delivered . . . written notice”, see id., “by giving his request for final disposition to the ‘warden’ or other official having custody of him, who must then forward the IAD request as directed by the detainee’s paperwork.” Johnson, 450 S.W.3d at 700, abrogated on other grounds by Roe v. Commonwealth, 493 S.W.3d 814 (Ky. 2015). It is clear that the IAD “sets forth the time limits within which a defendant who is subject to the statute must be tried.” Bryant, 199 S.W.3d at 172. Accordingly, “Article V of the IAD . . . sets forth that dismissal is the required remedy when a defendant is not brought to trial within the prescribed period[.]” Id. KRS 440.450, Article V states: If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect. Id. at 172–73 (quoting KRS 440.450). The trial court first rejected Pratt’s motion to dismiss his indictment on the grounds that Pratt had not strictly complied with KRS 440.450, Article III. This Court has “emphasized the necessity of strict compliance with the procedures of Article III of the IAD.” Johnson, 450 S.W.3d at 701 (citing

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11 Clutter, 322 S.W.3d at 59). However, there exists “a limited exception to the requirement of strict compliance applied, ‘only when strict compliance is thwarted by a public official despite a prisoner’s having done everything possible to achieve strict compliance.’” Id. In Johnson, this Court held “that the trial court properly concluded that Appellant had not strictly complied with the IAD requirements that his paperwork be sent to the proper prosecuting official” when “it was the Appellant himself, not a public official, who caused the IAD paperwork to be delivered to the wrong prosecuting officer.” Id. Similarly, in Bryant, this Court held that the trial court did not commit error when it declined to dismiss the charges against him based on the argument that he was not brought to trial within 180 days following his request for final disposition of his indictment in accordance with the IAD. 199 S.W.3d at 174–75. In Bryant, “[t]he trial court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s motion to dismiss prior to the trial and specifically found that his disposition request was never delivered to either the Caldwell County Commonwealth’s Attorney or to the Caldwell Circuit Court” and therefore, “the 180-day limit imposed by the IAD never began to run.” Id. at 174. In its denial of Pratt’s motion to dismiss, the trial court explained: To date, the court record does not indicate any request for final disposition of the charges. A letter was purportedly delivered to the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office. It is not attached as an exhibit to the motion. IAD Form II is not part of the record, and nothing that purports to fill a similar purpose is filed with this Court.

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12 As previously noted, Pratt did not attach the letter cited as written notice of imprisonment allegedly dated February 6, 2025, to his motion to dismiss his indictment, and the letter is not in the record before this Court. Accordingly, the only evidence in the record that Pratt delivered written notice was from the June 12, 2025, pre-trial conference when the Commonwealth informed the trial court that “[h]e’s filed some paperwork on the Interstate Agreement on Detainers to get the charge resolved within six months.” On appeal, Pratt argues that [i]t’s important to note that neither the Commonwealth nor the trial court argued that the paperwork was incomplete or incorrect and the trial court did not state at the time that it did not receive the paperwork. The trial court merely asked, “What date [were] those filed?” . . . Therefore, it must be presumed [Pratt] complied with the directions of the IAD; he caused to be delivered written notice of the place of his imprisonment along with his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint. We disagree. First, it is clear that a state must first file a detainer before a prisoner files his request for a final disposition. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 112 (2000) (“After a detainer has been lodged against him, a prisoner may file a ‘request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint.’”) (emphasis added). Notably, Pratt did not provide supporting documents when he filed his motion to dismiss or this appeal that demonstrated when or if he complied with the notice requirement of KRS 440.450, Article III. In his brief, Pratt alleges that “the letter and its offer of delivery for temporary custody was dated February 6, 2025.” However, the

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13 record is silent on when a detainer had been lodged. In his reply brief, Pratt merely argues that the record demonstrates a detainer had been lodged: [Pratt’s] first appearance in this case was on June 17, 2021, and was in federal custody for most of the entire 4 years prior to the hearing on June 12, 2025. The Commonwealth specifically informed the court that it took the Commonwealth some time to get him back to Kentucky once he received the paperwork, this statement shows that the Commonwealth filed a detainer to get [Pratt] back from Arkansas. Additionally, later in the brief when addressing the calculation of the date, Appellee states, “Notably, the date was based on a date Arkansas stated it could deliver Pratt to Kentucky. . . .” (Appellee’s brief p. 11[)]. This is evidence, Arkansas would not just deliver an inmate to another state for fun of it but would have been in response to a detainer for [Pratt]. However, these facts do not give this Court any further insight into when the detainer was lodged, and whether Pratt filed his request for a final disposition—if he ever did file his request—before or after the detainer had been lodged. It is a strict requirement of KRS 440.450, Article III that the Commonwealth must first file a detainer before a prisoner files his request for a final disposition. This Court is in no position to assume that Pratt strictly complied with the notice requirement of KRS 440.450, Article III. Second, there is no evidence that Pratt “caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint.” KRS 440.450 (emphasis added). Even assuming based on the record that the Commonwealth received proper written notice based on its statement that “he’s filed some paperwork” during the June 12, 2025, hearing, there is no evidence

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14 that Pratt caused to be delivered proper notice to the trial court. The trial court expressly stated that, in addition to the written notice being omitted from the motion, the notice was also nowhere in the record. Accordingly, the record in front of this Court contains no such evidence. In light of the fact that “the statutory text clearly places the responsibility for the accuracy of the notice upon the prisoner[,]” we are unable to presume that Pratt complied with the dual notice requirement of KRS 440.450, Article III. Pratt could have provided supporting documents when he filed his motion to dismiss that demonstrated he did comply with the notice requirement of KRS 440.450, Article III if such letter ever existed. See Bryant, 199 S.W.3d at 171 (“Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the charges pending against him because he had not been brought to trial within 180 days of his request for final disposition as required by the IAD. Included with Appellant’s motion were his IAD Forms I and II, which he had executed almost a year earlier, in July 2002. . . . Appellant introduced additional evidence at the hearing, including a letter from IRCC’s Warden to County Attorney Miller describing the transfer process under the IAD and an affidavit from Holt describing the way misdirected mail was typically handled within the office of the Caldwell County Judge Executive.”). IAD Form II is not a part of the record, and as noted by the Commonwealth, “Pratt produced no return receipt showing that the paperwork had been mailed to, and received by, the trial court as required in KRS 440.450, Art. III (2) and (4).” For these reasons, Pratt is further unable to show that he provided the appropriate paperwork to the prison officials in Arkansas such that we will utilize the

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15 “limited exception to the requirement of strict compliance.” Johnson, 450 S.W.3d at 701. Pratt has failed to demonstrate that strict compliance was “thwarted by a public official despite a prisoner’s having done everything possible to achieve strict compliance.” Id. Accordingly, we decline to presume the trial court received proper written notice strictly required under KRS 440.450, Article III. Because there is no evidence that Pratt’s disposition request was ever delivered to the trial court, the 180-day limit imposed by KRS 440.450, Article III never began to run. Bryant, 199 S.W.3d at 174. Furthermore, the trial court further rejected Pratt’s motion to dismiss because “Pratt reference[d] his date of mailing as the correct date to calculate days, but that is inconsistent with the statute.” In Johnson, this Court held that “the 180-day time period established by the IAD does not commence until a detainee’s request for a final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the appropriate court and to the prosecuting officer that lodged the detainer against him.” 450 S.W.3d at 700 (citing Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 51 (1993)) (emphasis added). However, Pratt merely argued that “the letter and its offer of delivery for temporary custody was dated February 6, 2025.” (Emphasis added). This Court was not provided with evidence of when notice had actually been delivered to the Commonwealth and the trial court—if notice was actually ever delivered at all. The trial court also denied Pratt’s motion to dismiss on the basis that it “consider[ed] Pratt’s alleged request for a speedy trial according to the

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16 Interstate Agreement on Detainers waived when he did not object to the initial jury trial date, and he did not file a timely motion to dismiss or reschedule according to the Court’s criminal jury trial order.” In Hill, the Supreme Court of the United States held that “[d]efense counsel’s agreement to a trial date outside the IAD period bars the defendant from seeking dismissal on the ground that trial did not occur within that period.” 528 U.S. at 110. In Hill, defense counsel affirmatively agreed to a trial date outside the IAD period on the record. Id. at 112–13. The facts in this case differ slightly because defense counsel did not affirmatively agree to the August 25, 2025, trial date on the record. The trial court set this trial date sometime during or after the June 12, 2025, hearing, but this date was not openly discussed. However, it is notable that at the June 12, 2025, hearing, the trial court informed the parties that if mediation continued, an early August trial date may not be possible. As the previously quoted bench discussion indicated, the trial court appeared to offer a trial date before late August by asking whether Pratt needed ADR or whether “he just [wanted] a trial date.” In response, defense counsel specifically requested an ADR date, thereby implicitly moving forward with a later trial date. When the trial court informed the parties that an early August date may not be possible, defense counsel raised no concern and lodged no objection to the case proceeding to ADR despite the possibility that a trial date would be scheduled outside of the IAD period. Next, at the July 10, 2025, hearing, defense counsel did not raise an objection to the August 25, 2025, trial date. On July 10, defense counsel informed the trial court that there had not been a

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17 resolution to Pratt’s case during mediation, but a resolution had not been ruled out yet by Pratt. This indicated that more time was needed to resolve the case, and Pratt failed to raise the issue of a speedy trial under KRS 440.450 with the trial court. We agree with the trial court that Pratt waived his speedy trial request under KRS 440.450, Article III, and was thereby barred from seeking dismissal on the ground that trial did not occur within the 180-day right limit. Id. at 110. Based on the evidence this Court has in the record, we must affirm the trial court’s denial of Pratt’s motion to dismiss on the basis that he failed to strictly comply with the notice requirements of KRS 440.450, Article III. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss on the basis that he waived his speedy trial request under KRS 440.450, Article III. Pratt now also contends that the trial court violated his 120-day right limit under KRS 440.450, Article IV, which provides: In respect of any proceeding made possible by this Article, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty (120) days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. Not only did Pratt fail to invoke the protections of the IAD statute through filing the required paperwork, he also failed to raise the Section IV argument to the trial court. Pratt filed a motion pursuant to KRS 440.450, Article III with the trial court, but he never argued that his 120-day right limit under Article IV was violated.

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18 Pratt’s guilty plea was a conditional plea, and the trial court specifically asked Pratt whether he understood that the issue preserved for appeal was the single issue: So, you understand that you are preserving that single issue? Of whether or not the court appropriately denied dismissing [Pratt’s] motion to dismiss this indictment based on the violation of the Interstate Agreement of Detainers as codified in Kentucky Statutes. So, this is not an appeal of any other issue. The only appellate issue you are preserving is my ruling in that matter. (Emphasis added). Pratt noted that he understood. When the trial court was giving its plea colloquy, it further asked Pratt: Did you also discuss your constitutional rights? Do you understand that by changing your plea from not guilty to guilty you give up the rights that are listed in this motion to enter a guilty plea with the exception of the right to appeal the issue regarding the Interstate Agreement on Detainers? That is all a mouthful of me saying that you understand, right now, before you plead guilty you have . . . the right to appeal. By pleading guilty, you give up all of those rights. Do you understand that? The right that you are preserving is the right to appeal a single issue. Clear as mud, right? You have retained, as laid out by [defense counsel] a right to appeal an issue, but all other rights are being waived. Pratt again noted that he understood. This argument falls outside the scope of matters appealable under the conditional plea because Pratt did not raise the issue that his 120-day right limit under Article IV was violated in his motion to dismiss, nor did he ever bring the issue to the trial court’s attention before entry of his conditional plea. Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Ky. 2009) (“[W]e will consider issues on appeal from a conditional guilty plea if those issues: (1) involve a claim that the indictment did not charge an offense or the sentence imposed by the trial court was manifestly infirm, or (2) the issues upon which

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19 appellate review are sought were expressly set forth in the conditional plea documents or in a colloquy with the trial court, or (3) if the issues upon which appellate review is sought were brought to the trial court’s attention before the entry of the conditional guilty plea even if the issues are not specifically reiterated in the guilty plea documents or plea colloquy.”). Again, no letter nor IAD forms were ever made part of the court record. However, even if Pratt had retained the right to appeal the Section IV issue pursuant to the conditional plea agreement, we hold that he waived this issue. Because Pratt failed to raise this issue with the trial court and is raising it for the first time on appeal, he is barred from seeking dismissal on the ground that trial did not occur within the 120-day right limit. Hill, 528 U.S. at 110. III. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court. All sitting. All concur. COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Roy Alyette Durham Assistant Public Advocate COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Russell M. Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky Matthew R. Krygiel Assistant Attorney General

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