Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-157

1988-157Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL November 7, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88-157
The Honorable Nancy Brown
State Representative, Twenty-Seventh District
15429 Overbrook Lane
Stanley, Kansas 66224-9744
Re: Cities and Municipalities -- Public Recreation and
Playgrounds -- Powers of Recreation Commission;
Acquisition of Real Property by Purchase or Lease
Synopsis: Recreation commissions are creatures of statute,
and have only those powers expressly conferred or
necessarily implied. The authority to purchase
real property generally implies the authority to
lease such property. The legislature intended to
preclude acquisition of real property by a
recreation commission, unless such acquisition
occurs by devise, gift or donation. This
limitation of authority narrows the scope of a
recreation commission's power to contract. Thus, a
recreation commission is not authorized to lease
real property from a unified school district.
However, a commission is authorized to enter into a
contract to become a licensee in order to operate a
recreation system. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
12-1924, 12-1928; 1987 House Bill No. 2005; 1987
House Bill No. 2424.
Dear Representative Brown:
As Representative for the Twenty-Seventh District, you have
requested our opinion regarding the power of recreation
commissions. Specifically, you ask whether a commission
operated under the provisions of K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 12-1922
et seq. is authorized to lease real property from a school
district.
Being a creature of the legislature, it is axiomatic that a
recreation commission has only those powers expressly
conferred or necessarily implied by statute. If there is a
doubt as to the existence of a power, such doubt should be
resolved against its existence. State, ex rel. v. Rural High
School District No. 7, 171 Kan. 437, 444 (1951). The
expressed powers are enumerated in K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 12-1928,
which states in relevant part:
"Every recreation commission appointed
pursuant to this act shall have the power
to:
. . .
(g) enter contracts;
• • •
(j) acquire title to personal property
by purchase, bequest, gift or other
donation and acquire title to real
property by devise, gift or other
donation. Whenever property owned by a
recreation commission is sold, the
proceeds shall be used for recreation
purposes. . . ." K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
12-1928 (emphasis added).
While the statute expressly authorizes a commission to acquire
real property by devise, gift or donation, there is silence
regarding acquisition by purchase or lease. The power to
lease real property is generally implied with the power to
purchase. 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 28.10
(1981). Our courts have held that a lease is regarded in the
law of property as equivalent to a purchase of real property
for the term of the lease. Hermes v. Stackley, 10 Kan.
App. 2d 342, Syl. f 2 (1985). Therefore, to determine
whether a recreation commission is authorized to lease real
property, we look to the authorization for acquisition by
purchase.
Subsection (j) of the statute expressly authorizes the
purchase of personal property. Such is not the case regarding
real property. The plain language of the statute indicates
that a commission has power to acquire real property only by
devise, gift or donation. The maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the inclusion of one thing implies the
exclusion of another, is a rule of statutory construction used
to determine legislative intent. Application of the rule
suggests that by granting authority to acquire real property
by devise, gift, or donation, the legislature intended to
abrogate the general rule that the commission not have the
power to acquire real property. This express exclusion from
the general rule implies that the power to acquire real
property by purchase does not exist. See LeSueur v.
LeSueur, 197 Kan. 495, 500 (1966). However, this rule
should not be mechanically used to override a manifest
legislative intent to the contrary. In re Olander, 213
Kan. 282, Syl I 1 (1973).
The statutory history indicates that the legislature did not
intend a recreation commission to purchase real property.
Previously, commissions were governed by K.S.A. 12-1901, et
seq. The 1987 legislature repealed those sections, and
restructured the statutory scheme. The amendments were
initially introduced as 1987 House Bill No. 2005, a product of
Proposal No. 16. The Special Committee on Federal and State
Affairs filed a report dated October 17, 1986, and included
testimony by conferees which indicated that title to real
property should be held by recreation commissions. Report on
Kansas Legislative Interim Studies to the 1987 Legislature,
at page 214. This concern became part of H.B. 2005, which
stated in part,
"Every recreation commission appointed
pursuant to this act shall have the power
to:
. . .
(j) acquire and hold title to
property. . . ." 1987 House Bill No.
2005, § 7.
Section 7(j) of the proposed bill was intended to change the
then existing law which required that title to real property
be held by the city or school board operating the system.
See Minutes of the House Committee on Local Government,
February 3, 1987, attachments 2, 3. At the request of the
conferee for the League of Kansas Municipalities, H.B. 2005
was amended to allow a commission to purchase personal
property, but real property could be acquired only by gift or
donation. Minutes, February 5, 1987, at page 2.
1987 House Bill No. 2005 was eventually withdrawn and replaced
by 1987 House Bill No. 2424. The conceptual amendment to H.B.
2005 regarding acquisitions of real and personal property was
included in the new bill. See Minutes, March 2, 1987,
attachment 1. Those provisions of H.B. 2424 were enacted by
the 1987 legislature, and were codified at K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
12-1928, quoted above. In summary, subsection (j) does not
authorize a recreation commission to purchase or lease real
property.
Additionally, we note that K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 12-1928(g) is a
grant of authority to become a party to a contract. By
definition, a lease involves a contractual relationship.
Black's Law Dictionary 800 (5th ed. 1979). However,
common sense dictates that this express authority to contract
is limited in scope to subject matters within the recreation
commission's express or implied power.
"Ordinarily, the local corporation is
permitted to enter into all contracts
which are proper and reasonably necessary
to enable it to perform the functions
expressly conferred and those which are
necessarily implied. . . ."
10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,
§ 29.05 (1981).
To read subjection (g) so broadly that it encompasses
authority to lease real property strains the notions of
express and implied power regarding acquisition of real
property. Such a reading would conflict with subsection (j).
See Board of Public Utilities, etc. v. City of Kansas
City, 496 F. Supp. 389, 395 (D. Kan. 1980) (statute
required board to use only city attorney for legal services,
authority to contract not authority to hire independent
counsel).
Our opinion to this point is confined to whether a recreation
commission may enter into a lease. A lease is an interest in
real property and an estate in the land for a period of time.
A lease is distinguishable from a license, which is an
authority to do an act on real property without passing an
estate in the property. A license permits the licensee to
enter and occupy the land for a specific purpose without
becoming a trespasser. The fact that the privilege is paid
for by the licensee pursuant to a written agreement does not
transform the license into a lease. The manifest intent of
the parties will generally determine whether the agreement is
a lease or a license. See Gage v. City of Topeka, 205
Kan. 143, 146 (1970).
The statutes governing recreation commissions anticipate that
the commissions become licensees, not tenants of property in
which the right of possession belongs to the city or school
district. The city or school district is directed to
cooperate in providing property for recreational purposes, and
the operation of the recreation system is to be delegated to
the recreation commission. K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 12-1924. The
recreation commission is authorized to conduct activities on
property under its control and management, or on other public
property with proper consent. K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 12-1928(b).
As previously discussed, a commission is expressly authorized
to enter into contracts, which would impliedly include a
license contract.
In conclusion, it is our opinion that recreation commissions
are creatures of statute, and have only those powers expressly
conferred or necessarily implied. The authority to purchase
real property generally implies the authority to lease such
property. The legislature intended to preclude acquisition of
real property by a recreation commission, unless such
acquisition occurs by devise, gift or donation. This
limitation of authority narrows the scope of a recreation
commission's power to contract. Thus, a recreation commission
is not authorized to lease real property from a unified school
district. However, a commission is authorized to enter into a
contract to become a licensee in order to operate a recreation
system.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Mark W. Staffotd
RTS:JLM:MWS:bas Assistant Attorney General

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