Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-139

1988-139Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL September 27, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88-139
The Honorable William R. Brady
State Representative, Sixth District
1328 Grand
Parsons, Kansas 67357
Re: Accountants, Certified Public--State Board of
Accountancy; Rules and Regulations; Restraining
Exercise of Trade
Synopsis: K.A.R. 74-6-2 requires an additional office of a
certified public accountant (CPA) have a resident
manager who devotes more than half of his working
time to the affairs of that office. This
regulation is outside the scope of the
legislatively delegated powers in that it violates
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1-202 et
seq.; K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 77-425, as amended by
L. 1988, ch. 366, sec. 38; K.A.R. 74-6-1; 74-6-2;
74-6-1; U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amend.
*
Dear Representative Brady:
As Representative of the Sixth District, you request an
opinion regarding Kansas Administrative Regulation (K.A.R.)
74-6-2, that requires an additional office of a certified
public accountant (CPA) have a resident manager who devotes
more than half of his working time to the affairs of that
office. Specifically you inquire whether K.A.R. 74-6-2, as it
is applied by the board of accountancy, constitutes a
restraint of trade or exceeds the authority of the board to
adopt rules and regulations it deems necessary for the proper
administration of its duties.
You indicate that the regulation imposes a hardship on
sole-practitioner CPA's in small rural communities in that a
sole-practitioner cannot under this regulation open a
part-time office in a neighboring community not served by an
accountant. You further indicate that the board of
accountancy has advised you that such a part-time office would
be acceptable if the CPA did not advertise, which would
preclude even a published telephone number. In your judgment
the public would be better served by allowing the accountant
to travel to a neighboring community to serve his clients
rather than requiring the clients to travel to the
accountant's office. You also feel that advertising such an
office with an accurate listing of the time the CPA is in
that office would be appropriate and responsible.
We will assume for purposes of your question that a
sole-practitioner is one who works as a sole proprietor and
employs no CPA's. K.A.R. 74-6-2 states:
"An office as defined by regulation
74-6-1, and located in this state must
have a resident manager in charge who is
the holder of a valid permit to practice
as a certified public accountant issued by
this state. The resident manager of such
an office must devote more than half of
his working time to the affairs of that
office. (Authorized by K.S.A. 1-202;
effective Jan. 1, 1966)."
K.A.R. 74-6-1 defines an office as any office space identified
to the public or connected with an individual, partnership or
professional corporation practicing as certified public
accountants, or for which there is a separate telephone
listing.
Initially we note that Administrative regulations when adopted
have the force and effect of law. K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 77-425,
as amended by L. 1988, ch. 366, sec. 38; Kansas Gas
Electric Co. v. Kanss Comm'n on Civil Rights, 242 Kan.
763 (1988). Generally legislative rules (regulations) are
valid if (a) within the granted power, (b) issued pursuant to
proper procedure, and (c) reasonable as a matter of due
process. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §7:8 Rules, p.
36 (1979); Pork Motel Corp. v. Kansas Dept. of Health &
Environment, 234 Kan. 374, 378-79 (1983). The Board of
Accountancy has adopted the regulation in question pursuant to
a delegation of legislative power. See K.S.A. 1-202. The
regulation in question is thus a legislative rule and subject
to the aforementioned test for validity.
In applying the test we must determine first whether the
board's promulgation of the regulation in question is within
the board's legislatively granted power. Thus the issue is
whether the statutory authority asserted by the agency as the
basis for its regulation is broad enough to authorize the
regulation. Malone Oil Co. v. Department of Health and
Environment, 234 Kan. 1066, 1068 (1984). Pursuant to
K.S.A. 1-202, the board has the general authority to adopt
such rules and regulations as it may deem necessary for the
proper administration of its duties and for effectuation of
the purposes of the act. The act, K.S.A. 1-202 et seq.,
regulates the practice of accountancy under the general police
powers of the state and is generally a licensing act for the
public benefit. The board of accountancy is the
administrative agency charged with effectuating the statutory
mandate of the act by promulgating regulations. There is,
however, no common law power that can be exercised by an
administrative agency, and thus regulations that go beyond
authority conferred, violate the statute or are inconsistent
with the statutory power are void. Pork Motel Corp. v.
Kansas Dept. of Health and Environment, 234 Kan. 374,
378-79 (1983). The general policy of the rule in question
seems on its face to be unrelated to the act. The licensing
act K.S.A. 1-201 et seq. does not address whether a
sole-practitioner can practice his trade from two different
offices nor how much time must be spent on the affairs of each
office. Thus, we have a question of discretion. In
addressing the issue of how much discretion is vested in an
administrative body, the court in Cray v. Kennedy, 230
Kan. 663 (1982) states:
"The issue presented is not without
difficulty. In many areas of regulation,
the legislature has established rather
broad, nonspecific standards for
regulation and has vested the executive
director of the agency with a
corresponding broad discretion to enforce
the statute. In other areas, the
legislature has established specific
legislative standards which bind the
director of the agency and do not permit
any discretion in departing from them.
The Kansas cases have consistently held,
whether in the case of administrative acts
or in the case of the adoption of rules
and regulations, that administrative
agencies must act within the ambit of
their specific statutory authority and not
beyond." 230 Kan. at 675.
In our judgment it begs the question to attempt to determine
whether the discretion vested in the board of accountancy
includes the authority to dictate for the public benefit how a
satellite office is to be managed and what amount of time a
CPA must spend on the affairs of that office. The necessity
for timeliness in the work of an accountant makes the issue of
discretion more difficult.
In any event, because the regulation in effect restrains the
exercise of a trade, the more important test for its validity
is whether it offends notions of due process under the 14th
Amendment of the United States Constitution. In State, ex
rel., v. Gillen, 126 Kan. 368 (1928) the Court addressed
a similar restraint of practice in the field of cosmetology.
The question was whether the Kansas board of cosmetologists
had the authority to require a period of six months of
practice in Kansas before a license could be issued without
examination, even though the statute in question made no such
requirement. The Court found that because the board's
interpretation in effect restrained the exercise of a trade, a
strict construction of the statute was necessary; the Court
held the board's interpretation erroneous. See also
Willcott v. Murphy, 204 Kan. 640 (1970); Marcotte
Realty & Auction, Inc. v. Schumacher, 225 Kan. 193
(1979); Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. City of Topeka
Street Department, 212 Kan. 398, cert. denied 414
U.S. 1066, 94 S.Ct. 573, 38 L.Ed.2d 470 (1973).
Unlike Gillen, we have no specific statute that authorizes
the board's regulation (other than the statute providing broad
discretion). However under an analysis of due process, the
regulation, in our judgment, is unreasonable.
Under this analysis the issue is whether there is a reasonable
relationship between the terms of the rule and the statutory
purpose of regulating accountants and thereby protecting the
public by licensing requirements, etc. Implicit in this
question is a recognition that while an administrative
agency's regulatory power by necessity encompasses a wide
latitude of discretion and freedom, even general regulatory
power does not encompass the latitude to infringe on notions
of due process or to have an unjustified intrusion on private
rights. See Brown v. American Hospital Assn., 476 U.S.
610, 106 S.Ct. 2101, 90 L.Ed.2d 584 (1986) (the presumption of
regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory
mandate is not equivalent to the minimum rationality a statute
must sustain in order to withstand analysis under the Due
Process Clause; rather the agency must explain the rationale
and factual basis for its decision).
Considering the factual basis for the board's decision, the
regulation in question requires that any certified public
accountant's office, identified to the public as such, have a
resident manager who devotes more than half of his working
time to the affairs of that office. While clearly not
requiring physical presence, the regulation in effect
precludes a sole practitioner, one who does not employ any
other CPA's, from opening a satellite office. The sole
practitioner obviously could not devote more than half of his
time to the affairs of both offices. While we do not and
cannot question the wisdom of a regulation that attempts to
keep a CPA from overextending himself to the detriment of
the public, an administrative agency cannot under the guise of
a regulation substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature. See In Re Department of Energy Stripper Well
Exemption Litigation, 520 F.Supp. 1232, reversed 690 F.2d
1375, cert. denied Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v.
Hodel, 459 U.S. 1127, 103 S.Ct. 763, 74 L.Ed.2d 978, on
remand 578 F.Supp. 586, certified question answered
Exxon Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 744 F.2d 98,
cert. denied 469 U.S. 1077, 105 S.G. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515
(D.C. Kan. 1981); Peoples Natural Gas Division of Northern
Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 7 Kan.
App.2d 519 (1982). See also State, ex rel., v.
Columbia Pictures Corporation, 197 Kan. 455 (1966).
In conclusion, the board of accountancy having promulgated
K.A.R. 74-6-2, is subject to the same test as to
reasonableness and basic facts justifying the regulation as
would be applied if the legislature had enacted the regulation
as a statute. 73 C.J.S. 592 Public Administrative Law
(1983). The power of a body to make or adopt regulations does
not include the power to adopt regulations inconsistent with a
constitutional provision, nor does it include the power to
make rules affecting or creating substantive rights.
Therefore, in our opinion, K.A.R. 74-6-2 is outside the scope
of the board of accountancy's legislatively granted powers and
thus the board has exceeded its authority to promulgate rules
and regulations it deems necessary for the proper
administration of its duties.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Guen Easley
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JLM:GE:jm

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