Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-123

1988-123Kanag

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL August 29, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88-123
The Honorable Dan Thiessen
State Senator, Fifteenth District
Route 1
Independence, Kansas 67301-9801
Re: Constitution of the State of Kansas--Finance and
Taxation--Exemption of Property for Economic
Development Purposes; Requirement of "Exclusive Use"
Synopsis: Property which is leased for profit to a business
for use for purposes enumerated in article 11,
section 13 of the Kansas Constitution is not
property used exclusively for those purposes and
thus is not qualified for the tax exemption
authorized by that provision. The legislature may,
however, statutorily authorize such an exemption.
Cited herein: K.S.A. 79-201 (1973); 79-201b
(1979); Kan. Const., Art. 11, §§1, 13.
Dear Senator Thiessen:
As Chairman of the Special Committee on Assessment and
Taxation, you request our interpretation of the term "used
exclusively" as used in article 11, section 13 of the Kansas
Constitution. Specifically, you question whether property
which is leased to a business for use for constitutionally
exempt purposes meets the requirement that the property be
used exclusively for such tax exempt purposes.
Article 11, section 13 provides in part:
"(a) The board of county commissioners of
any county or the governing body of any
city may, by resolution or ordinance, as
the case requires, exempt from all ad
valorem taxation all or any portion of the
appraised valuation of: (1) All
buildings, together with the land upon
which such buildings are located, and all
tangible personal property associated
therewith used exclusively by a business
for the purpose of: (A) Manufacturing
articles of commerce; (B) conducting
research and development; or (C) storing
goods or commodities which are sold or
traded in interstate commerce, which
commences operations after the date on
which this amendment is approved by the
electors of this state;
"(d) The provisions of this section shall
not be construed to affect exemptions of
property from ad valorem taxation granted
by this constitution or by enactment of
the legislature, or to affect the
authority of the legislature to enact
additional exemptions of property from ad
valorem taxation found to have a public
purpose and promote the general welfare."
The issue is whether property is "used exclusively by a
business for the purpose[s)" enumerated in the constitutional
provision if the property is leased by that business from
another entity.
In interpreting the provision in question, we are guided by
the following:
"(1) Constitutional and statutory
provisions exempting property from
taxation are to be strictly construed.
"(2) The burden of establishing exemption
from taxation is on the one claiming it.
"(3) The exemption from taxation depends
solely upon the exclusive use made of the
property and not upon the ownership or the
character, charitable or otherwise, of the
owner.
"(5) The question is not whether the
property is used partly or even largely
for the purposes stated in the exemption
provisions, but whether it is used
exclusively for those purposes.
(Clements v. Ljungdahl, 161 Kan.
274, 278, 167 P.2d 603; State, ex rel.,
v. Security Benefit Ass'n, 149 Kan.
384, 87 P.2d 560.)
"(6) The phrase 'used exclusively' as
contained in Section 1, Article 11, of the
Kansas Constitution, was intended by the
framers in the sense that the use made of
property sought to be exempt from
taxation, must be only, solely, and purely
for the purpose stated in the
Constitution, and without admission to
participation in any other use. (Sigma
Alpha Epsilon Fraternal Ass'n v.
Board of County Comm'rs, supra (207
Kan. 514, 485 P.2d 12971.) Lutheran
Homes, Inc. v. Board of County
Commissioners, 211 Kan. 270, 275-276
(1973).
While the court in the Lutheran Home case was construing
K.S.A. 79-201 and article 11, section 1 of the constitution,
we believe the rules enunciated are similarly applicable to
the exemption authorized by article 11, section 13. Thus we
are constrained to a strict interpretation of the term "used
exclusively."
The 1979 Kansas Supreme court considered factual situation
similar to that which you present. The court was asked to
determine whether property owned by a for profit corporation,
but which was leased to a nonprofit corporation for use for
tax exempt purposes, is property "actually and regularly used
exclusively" by the nonprofit corporation so as to be exempt
from property and ad valorem taxation under K.S.A. 79-201b
First. The court concluded that this was a dual or
simultaneous use of property and thus the property was not
"used exclusively" for tax exempt purposes. In re Board of
Johnson County Commissioners, 225 Kan. 517, 523 (1979).
The court reasoned:
"To say that an investor who owns
property, real or personal, and leases it
for profit is not using his property
ignores the obvious fact that the
owner-lessor is exercising his right to
use the property just as surely as if he
were utilizing it in a physical sense for
his own objectives. . . . The renting by
the lessor and the physical use by the
lessee constitute simultaneous uses of the
property and when an owner leases his
property to another, the lessee cannot be
said to be the only one using the
property."
Similarly, property which is leased to a business which uses
the property for tax exempt purposes under article 11, section
13 is not property "used exclusively" for those purposes,
i.e. it is also used for rental property. It is therefor
our opinion that property owned by one entity leased for
profit to a potentially tax exempt entity, is not property
being used exclusively for the tax exempt purposes enunciated
in article 11, section 13 and is not entitled to a tax
exemption pursuant to that provision.
You further inquire whether, notwithstanding the above
conclusion, the legislature may by statute grant an exemption
for property leased to a business to use for the purposes
listed in article 11, section 13. Subsection (d) of that
constitutional provision appears to specifically condone such
legislative action. Further, the courts have long recognized
the legislature's inherent power to enact tax exemptions
beyond those granted by the constitution and to broaden
exemptions contained in the constitution when not specifically
prohibited by the constitution from doing so. See, e.g.,
In re Tax Protest of Strayer, 239 Kan. 136, 141 (1986);
State ex rel. Tomasis v. Kansas City, Kansas Port
Authority, 230 Kan. 404, 411-412 (1981); Topeka Cemetery
Ass'n v. Schnellbacher, 218 Kan. 39, 42 (1975).
In conclusion, property which is leased for profit to a
business for use for purposes enumerated in article 11,
section 13 of the Kansas Constitution is not property used
exclusively for those purposes and thus is not qualified for
the tax exemption authorized by that provision. The
legislature may, however, statutorily authorize such an
exemption.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.