Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-044

1988-044Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
March 29, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 44
The Honorable Susan Roenbaugh
State Representative
One Hundred Fourteenth District
State Capitol, Room 170-W
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Minors--General Provisions--Consent for Medical
Care of Unmarried Pregnant Minor
Synopsis: In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 995 S.Ct.
3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979) (plurality opinion) the
United States Supreme Court held that the United
States Constitution would permit a state to require
a pregnant minor to obtain parental consent to an
abortion if the state provided an alternative
procedure whereby the minor could establish that
she was mature enough to make the decision on her
own or that it would be in her best interests to
have the abortion. Since 1988 House Bill No. 2950
establishes such an alternative procedure, it is
our opinion that its parental consent requirements
would pass constitutional muster. Cited herein:
1988 House Bill No. 2950.
Dear Representative Roenbaugh:
You request our opinion regarding the parental consent
provisions in 1988 House Bill No. 2950. Specifically you ask
whether, in light of our conclusions in Attorney General
Opinion No. 87-66, the parental consent requirements of 1988
House Bill No. 2950 for a minor's abortion would be
unconstitutional. You inform us that House Bill No. 2950 was
reported unfavorably and that the issue may return thus making
our opinion desirable.
In Attorney General Opinion No. 87-66 we were asked whether a
county health department could legally provide family planning
services to minors without parental consent. In reviewing
United States Supreme Court decisions regarding the
constitutional rights of minors, we found that while minors
are indeed protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights [Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth, 488 U.S. 52, 74, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 2843, 49
L.Ed.2d 788 (1976)], the State has somewhat broader authority
to regulate the activities of children than of adults, id.,
and a restriction on minors' rights will be tolerated if it
serves a significant state interest that is not present in the
case of an adult. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74, the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a Missouri statute which required the consent
of a parent to the abortion of an unmarried minor because it
constituted an absolute and arbitrary veto power over the
decision of a minor regardless of the maturity or best
interests of the minor. In balancing the State's interest
against the constitutional rights of minors, the Court found
that the State's interest in safeguarding the family unit and
parental authority did not justify this degree of
constitutional interference. Thus, we concluded in Opinion
No. 87-66 that mandatory parental consent requirements for all
contraceptive services to minors were unconstitutional because
they imposed absolute third party veto powers over a minor's
ability to obtain contraceptives.
In Opinion No. 87-66 we also discussed the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979) (plurality opinion),
hereinafter referred to as Bellotti II. In this case the
court set forth three criteria to consider when determining
the constitutional rights of minors:
"[First,] although children generally are
protected by the same constitutional
guarantees against governmental
deprivations as are adults, the State is
entitled to adjust its legal system to
account for children's vulnerability and
their needs for 'concern, . . . sympathy,
and . . . paternal attention.' [Id., at
635, citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528, 550, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29
L.Ed.2d 647 (1971).1
"Second, the Court has held that the
States validly may limit the freedom of
children to choose for themselves in the
making of important, affirmative choices
with potentially serious consequences.
These rulings have been grounded in the
recognition that, during the formative
years of childhood and adolescence, minors
often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to
them.
"Third, the guiding role of parents in the
upbringing of their children justifies
limitations on the freedoms of minors."
Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 635, 636.
With these principles in mind, and acknowledging its previous
holding that "a State may not impose a blanket provision . . .
requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco
parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor
during the first twelve weeks of her pregnancy" regardless of
her maturity or best interests [Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49
L.Ed.2d 788 (1979)], the Court held that a State which decides
to require a pregnant minor to obtain parental consent to an
abortion must also provide an alternative procedure whereby
authorization for the abortion can be obtained. Bellotti
II, 443 U.S. at 643.
"A pregnant minor is entitled in such a
proceeding to show either: (1) that she
is mature enough and well enough informed
to make her abortion decision, in
consultation with her physician,
independently of her parents' wishes; or
(2) that even if she is not able to make
this decision independently, the desired
abortion would be in her best interests.
The proceeding in which this showing is
made must assure that a resolution of the
issue, and any appeals that may follow,
will be completed with anonymity and
sufficient expedition to provide an
effective opportunity for an abortion to
be obtained. In sum, the procedure must
ensure that the provision requiring
parental consent does not in fact amount
to the 'absolute, and possibly arbitrary,
veto' that was found impermissible in
Danforth." Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at
643, 644.
The court thus reached a compromise between protecting the
constitutional rights of minors and the State's interests in
protecting those minors and preserving family integrity. This
position was reaffirmed by the Court in Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 439, 103 S.Ct. 2481,
2496, 76 L.Ed.2d 687, 709 (1983) and Planned Parenthood
Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490,
491, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733, 745 (1983).
It is evident from these decisions that the Supreme Court has
concluded (not without dissent) that the Constitution would
permit a state to require a pregnant minor to obtain parental
consent to an abortion if the state provided a procedure
whereby the minor could establish that she was mature enough
to make the decision independently of her parent's wishes or
that it would be in her best interests to have the abortion.
See Planned Parenthood Association of Utah v. Matheson,
582 F.Supp. 1001, 1008 (D. Utah); H B v.
Wilkinson, 639 F.Supp. 952, 953 (D. Utah 1986).
1988 House Bill No. 2950 contains the alternative procedure
required by Bellotti II. Section 3(b)(1) provides that if
neither of the parents is available to consent, if consent is
refused, or if the minor elects not to seek such consent, the
minor may petition any district court for a waiver of the
consent requirement. Section 4 sets forth the procedure for
obtaining judicial waiver of the consent requirement. It
ensures anonymity, §4(b), establishes the minor's right to
court-appointed counsel, §4(c), assures an expedited
resolution of the issue, §§4(d) and (f), and provides that the
court shall waive the consent requirement if it finds that the
minor is mature and well informed enough to make the abortion
decision on her own or the performance of the abortion would
be in the minor's best interests, §4(e)(3). We therefore
conclude that the parental consent requirements of this bill
are not unconstitutional.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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