Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-023

1988-023Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL February 19, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 23
Charles H. Apt
City Attorney
P.O. Box 308
Iola, Kansas 66749
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles--Drivers' Licenses;
Motor Vehicle Drivers' License Act--Driving While
License Canceled, Suspended or Revoked; Application
of 90 Day Mandatory Jail Term
Synopsis: The 90 day jail term provided in K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
8-262(a)(4) does not become mandatory until a
person having been convicted of driving under the
influence (D.U.I.) and having his drivers' license
suspended or revoked therefore is subsequently
convicted of both a second D.U.I., committed while
his license was still suspended or revoked pursuant
to the first D.U.I. conviction, and a violation of
driving while his license was suspended or revoked,
committed while his privilege to drive was
suspended for the prior D.U.I. conviction. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 8-262; 8-1567.
* *
Dear Mr. Apt:
As attorney for the city of Iola, you request our
interpretation of the language contained in K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
8-262(a)(4). Specifically, you ask under what circumstances
the mandatory 90 day jail term is to be imposed.
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 8-262 provides in pertinent part:
"(a)(1) Any person who drives a motor
vehicle on any highway of this state at a
time when such person's privilege so to do
is canceled, suspended or revoked shall be
guilty of a class B misdemeanor on the
first conviction, a class A misdemeanor on
the second conviction and for third and
subsequent convictions shall be guilty of
a class E felony.
"(4) If a person (A) is convicted of a
violation of this section, committed
while the person's privilege to drive was
suspended or revoked for a violation of
K.S.A. 8-1567 and amendments thereto or
any ordinance of any city or a law of
another state, which ordinance or law
prohibits the acts prohibited by that
statute, and (B) is or has been also
convicted of a violation of K.S.A. 8-1567
and amendments thereto or of a municipal
ordinance or law of another state, which
ordinance or law prohibits the acts
prohibited by that statute, committed
while the person's privilege to drive was
so suspended or revoked, the person
shall not be eligible for suspension of
sentence, probation or parole until the
person has served at least 90 days'
imprisonment, and any fine imposed on
such person shall be in addition to such a
term of imprisonment." (Emphasis added.)
In State v. Roudybush, 235 Kan. 834, 842 (1984) the
Kansas Supreme Court reiterated the long-standing rule of
statutory construction that a criminal statute is to be
strictly construed against the state and in favor of those
subject to it. K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 8-262 is a criminal statute
and thus must be strictly construed against the state. State
v. Evans, 10 Kan. App. 2d 171, 173 (1985). See also
State v. Floyd, 218 Kan. 764 (1976). Further,
legislative intent should be ascertained from a general
consideration of the entire statute [State v. Dumler, 221
Kan. 386, 389 (1977)J, and effect must be given, if
possible, to every part of the statute. State, ex rel.,
Stephan v. Board of Education of U.S.D. 428, 231 Kan. 579
(1982).
Applying these rules to the statute in question, it is our
opinion that at least three convictions must be had before the
90 day jail term becomes mandatory. First the individual must
be, or have been, convicted of a violation of K.S.A. 8-1567
(driving under the influence or D.U.I.), or a substantively
similar law or ordinance, committed while the person's
privilege to drive was suspended or revoked for a prior D.U.I.
conviction. Secondly, the individual must be convicted of
violating K.S.A. 8-262, or a substantively similar law or
ordinance, committed while the person's privilege to drive was
suspended for a D.U.I. violation. The convictions for the
second D.U.I. and violation of K.S.A. 8-262 (driving while
license suspended or revoked for prior D.U.I.) may stem from
the same or separate incidents. This interpretation is
supported by comments made in the 1985 subcommittee report
addressing the addition of subsection (a)(4) to K.S.A. 8-262.
See Feb. 2, 1985 Minutes, House Committee on Federal and
State Affairs, Attachments A, p. 3 and B, p. 1.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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