Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-006

1988-006Kanag

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ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL January 19, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 6
Mr. Gary Baker
Manager, Groundwater Management District No. 3
409 Campus Drive
Garden City, Kansas 67846
Re: State Boards, Commissions and Authorities -- Kansas
Water Office and Kansas Water Authority -- Duties
of Office -- Conservation Plans, Effect on Existing
Water Rights
Synopsis: Water conservation measures which reduce an
existing water right are compensable takings if
such measures are imposed to preserve water for
future public use. Compensation is not necessary
if conservation is required in order to promote
health, safety and welfare. Cited herein: K.S.A.
1987 Supp. 74-2608; 82a-711(d); U.S. Const.,
Amend. V.
Dear Mr. Baker:
As manager for Groundwater Management District No. 3, you have
requested our opinion concerning the imposition of
conservation plans on land covered by an existing water
right. Specifically, you ask whether conservation measures
that have the effect of reducing an existing water right are a
taking which require compensation.
Pursuant to K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 74-2608, the Kansas Water
Office has developed guidelines for conservation plans.
See, Water Conservation Planning Guidelines, Kansas Water
Office, December 1986. An applicant desiring a permit to
appropriate water may be required to adopt and implement a
conservation plan in accordance with those guidelines. K.S.A.
1987 Supp. 82a-711(d). While conservation plans are not
currently required for existing water rights, you are
concerned that future application to existing water rights may
raise constitutional issues.
Private property may not be taken by a government for public
use without just compensation. U.S. Const., Amend. V. A
distinction must be drawn, however, between a taking of
property for public use, which requires compensation therefor,
and the exercising of a state's police power to protect the
public health, safety, welfare or morals, which does not
require compensation. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669,
31 L.Ed. 205 (1887); Small v. Kemp, 240 Kan. 113, Syl.
1 2 (1986). It is therefore the nature of the state's action
which is critical in takings analysis. When the government
action is a physical invasion of property, a taking may be
readily found. See, e.g., United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946). However, an action which
merely adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good is less likely to constitute a
taking. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). See also, Keystone
Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, U.S. , 94 L.Ed.2d
472, 491, 107 S.Ct. 1187 (1987), note 18. There is no set
formula for deciding whether justice and fairness require that
economic injuries caused by public action must be deemed
compensable. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1005,
81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984). Some factors have been identified and
applied, however, to determine whether the economic impact of
regulation should be borne by the individual experiencing loss
or by the public as a whole. Those factors include the
character of the governmental action, the economic impact of
the governmental action, and the action's interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations. Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robbins 447 U.S. 74, 83, 64 L.Ed.2d 741
(1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
175, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979).
In summary, state action that results in the destruction of
property may or may not be a taking for which compensation is
required. At one end of the spectrum, the state may exercise
its police power to abate what amounts to a nuisance, and an
injured person is not entitled to compensation. On the other
end of the spectrum, if property is physically invaded and
taken for public use, then the public must pay for that use by
reimbursing the injured person. Somewhere between those
extremes are acts of the state which amount to regulation but
are also acquisitions of property for public use.
The issue of conservation plans and their constitutional
implications regarding existing water rights was thoroughly
examined by Professor John C. Peck in Legal Constraints On
The State of Kansas In Imposing Conservation Practices on
Holders of Existing Water Rights (1986), a report prepared
for the United States Department of Interior. Specifically,
at pages VIII - 7-9, various legislative alternatives are
examined as well as the constitutional consequences. Implicit
in the analysis is the distinction between regulation for the
health, safety and welfare of the people and the preservation
of water for future public use.
We concur with the conclusions of Professor Peck insofar as
the necessity for compensation is determined by the underlying
purpose of a conservation scheme. If conservation of water is
seen as necessary to promote health, safety and welfare, then
there is not a compensable taking of an existing water right.
If conservation is implemented merely to allow future public
use, then reducing an existing water right may require
compensation to the holder of that right. We decline to
comment at the present on various schemes which may be
implemented to achieve either purpose.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Mark W. Stafford
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JLM:MWS:bas

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